I've been reading a really interesting book entitled "Power: A Radical View" by Steven Lukes. I'm not putting this in the books section of the forum because I find that this book articulates clearly many of the things we talk about here on the forum both in terms of psychology AND "conspiracy theory" not to forget sociological conditions that encompass both of those things. Obviously, it has some strong connections to Political Ponerology not to mention studies of Authoritarian personality types and the workings of the Adaptive Unconscious. I'd like to share some excerpts and ideas from the book and encourage those of you who are interested to pick up a copy and take a look yourselves.
Lukes, in his intro writes (bold text is my enhancement):
He quotes "The Power Elite" by C. Wright Mills (1956):
He then goes on to discuss the fact that this book by Mills raised the issue among social scientists and the race was sort of on to find a way to really study power empirically and how they set about doing it. Obviously, the authoritarian follower type of social scientists were soon engaged in working to explain things away and how they go about doing this is an interesting study itself. Just reading it sharpens the brain for cutting through BS arguments that some people come up with. Lukes then writes a bit about his own contribution to the discourse, PRV, published in the middle of this war of ideas, some 30 years ago:
The One-Dimensional View of Power
The next thing Lukes does is show how the authoritarian types mislead the discourse in their one-dimensional view of power that is based only on observable behavior, overt decision making. That is:
The Two-Dimensional View of Power
Along come some other social scientists, Bachrach and Baratz, who argue that the one-dimensional view is misleading and makes everything appear to be above-board and politically open to pluralism (democracy, everybody having some input, and the majority rules). Lukes reports that they say:
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Lukes breaks down and discusses this perspective, pointing out that it includes the first kind of power, and adds another dimension: coercion, influence, authority, force and manipulation.
The Three-Dimensional View of Power
Lukes, in his intro writes (bold text is my enhancement):
Thirty years ago I published a small book entitled "Power: A Radical View" (hereafter PRV). It was a contribution to an ongoing debate, mainly among American political scientists and sociologists, about an interesting question: how to think about power theoretically and how to study it empirically. But underlying that debate another question was at issue: how to characterize American politics - as dominated by a ruling elite or as exhibiting pluralist democracy - and it was clear that answering the second question required an answer to the first. My view was, and is, that we need to think about power broadly rather than narrowly - in three dimensions rather than one or two - and that we need to attend to those aspects of power that are least accessible to observation: that, indeed, power is at its most effective when least observable.
He quotes "The Power Elite" by C. Wright Mills (1956):
The powers of ordinary men are circumscribed by the everyday worlds in which they live, yet even in these rounds of job, family and neighborhood they often seem driven by forces they can neither understand nor govern. (p. 3)
But all men, Mills continued, 'are not in this sense ordinary':
As the means of information and of power are centralized, some men come to occupy positions in American society from which they can look down upon, so to speak, and by their decisions mightily affect, the everyday worlds of ordinary men and women... they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences. Whether they do or do not make such decisions is less important than the fact that they do occupy such pivotal positions: their failure to act, their failure to make decisions, is itself an act that is often of greater consequence than the decisions they do make. For they are in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern society. They run the big corporations. They run the machinery of state and claim its prerogatives. The7y direct the military establishment. They occupy the strategic command posts of the social structure, in which are now centered the effective means of the power and the wealth and the celebrity which they enjoy. (pp. 3-4)
He then goes on to discuss the fact that this book by Mills raised the issue among social scientists and the race was sort of on to find a way to really study power empirically and how they set about doing it. Obviously, the authoritarian follower type of social scientists were soon engaged in working to explain things away and how they go about doing this is an interesting study itself. Just reading it sharpens the brain for cutting through BS arguments that some people come up with. Lukes then writes a bit about his own contribution to the discourse, PRV, published in the middle of this war of ideas, some 30 years ago:
PRV was a very small book, yet it generated a surprisingly large amount of comment, much of it critical, from a great many quarters, both academic and political. It continues to do so, and that is one reason that has persuaded me to yield to its publisher's repeated requests to republish it together with a reconsideration of its arguments and, more widely, of the rather large topic it takes on. ....
There are two subsequent chapters. The first of these (Chapter 2) broadens the discussion... {it} begins by asking whether, in the face of unending disagreements about how to define it and study it, we need the concept of power at all and, if we do, what we need it for - what role it plays in our lives. I argue that these disagreements matter because how much power you see in the social world and where you locate it depends on how you conceive of it, and these disagreements are in part moral and political, and inescapably so. ... it concerns power over another or others and, more specifically still, power as domination. PRV focuses on this and asks: how do the powerful secure the compliance of those they dominate - and, more specifically, how do they secure their willing compliance? ...
Chapter 3 defends and elaborates PRV's answer to the question, but only after indicating some of its mistakes and inadequacies. It was a mistake to define power by 'saying that A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests'. Power is a capacity not the exercise of that capacity (it may never be, and never need to be, exercised); and you can be powerful by satisfying and advancing others' interests: PRV's topic, power as domination, is only one species of power. Moreover, it was inadequate in confining the discussion to binary relations between actors assumed to have unitary interests, failing to consider the ways in which everyone's interests are multiple, conflicting and of different kinds. The defence consists in making the case for the existence of power as the imposition of internal constraints. Those subject to it are led to acquire beliefs and form desires that result in their consenting or adapting to being dominated, in coercive and non-coercive settings. ... Both John Stuart Mill's account of the subjection of Victorian women and the work of Pierre Bourdieu on the acquisition and maintenance of 'habitus' appeal to the workings of power, leading those subject to it to see their condition as 'natural' and even to value it, and to fail to recognize the sources of their desires and beliefs. These and other mechanisms constitute power's third dimension when it works against people's interests by misleading them, thereby distorting their judgment....
The One-Dimensional View of Power
The next thing Lukes does is show how the authoritarian types mislead the discourse in their one-dimensional view of power that is based only on observable behavior, overt decision making. That is:
A has power over B to the extent that he dan get B to do something that B would not otherwise do. ("The Concept of Power" Dahl, 1957)
The focus on observable behaviour in identifying power involves the pluralists in studying decision-making as their central task. Thus for Dahl power can be analysed only after 'careful examination of a series of concrete decisions.' ...
... argues that identifying 'who prevails in decision-making' seems 'the best way to determine which individuals and groups have "more" power in social life, because direct conflict between actors presents a situation most closely approximating an experimental test of their capacities to affect outcomes'. ... it is assumed that the 'decisions' involve 'direct', i.e. actual and observable, conflict. Thus Dahl maintains that one can only strictly test the hypothesis of a ruling class if there are '... cases involving key political decisions in which the preferences of the hypothetical ruling elite run counter to those of any other likely group that might be suggested', and '... in such cases, the preferences of the elite regularly prevail'. The pluralists {those who basically deny that there is a ruling elite} speak of the decisions being about issues ... the assumption again being that such issues are controversial and involve actual conflict. ...
...the pluralists see their focus on behaviour in the making of decisions over key or important issues as involving actual, observable conflict. ... he even writes that a 'rough test of a person's overt or covert influence is the frequency with which he successfully initiates an important policy over the opposition of others, or vetoes policies initiated by others, or initiates a policy where no opposition appears.' ...
Conflict, according to that view, is assumed to be crucial in providing an experimental test of power attributions: without it the exercise of power will, it seems to be thought, fail to show up. What is the conflict between? The answer is: between preferences, that are assumed to be consciously made, exhibited in actions, and thus to be discovered by observing people's behaviour. ... a conflict of interests is equivalent to a conflict of preferences. They are opposed to any suggestion that interests might be unarticulated or unobservable, and above all, to the idea that people might actually be mistaken about, or unaware of, their own interests.
...the presumption that the 'real' interests of a class can be assigned to them by an analyst allows the analyst to charge 'false class consciousness' when the class in question disagrees with the analyst. (Polsby 1963)
Thus I conclude that this first, one-dimensional, view of power involves a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as express policy preferences, revealed by political participation.
The Two-Dimensional View of Power
Along come some other social scientists, Bachrach and Baratz, who argue that the one-dimensional view is misleading and makes everything appear to be above-board and politically open to pluralism (democracy, everybody having some input, and the majority rules). Lukes reports that they say:
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..power has two faces. The first face is that already considered, according to which 'power is totally embodied and fully reflected in "concrete decisions" or in activity bearing directly upon their making'. (1970) As they write:
Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B. Power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A's set of preferences.
Their 'cental point' is this: 'to the extent that a person or group - consciously or unconsciously - creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has power', and they cite Schatteschneider's famous and often-quoted words:
All forms of political organizations have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others, because organizations is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out. (1960)
... mobilization of bias is...
a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures (rules of the game) that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others. Those who benefit are placed in a preferred position to defend and promote their vested interests. More often than not, the 'status quo defenders' are a minority or elite group within the population in question. Elitism, however, is neither foreordained nor omnipresent: as opponents of the war in Viet Nam can readily attest, the mobilization of bias can and frequently does benefit a clear majority.
Lukes breaks down and discusses this perspective, pointing out that it includes the first kind of power, and adds another dimension: coercion, influence, authority, force and manipulation.
Coercion, as we have seen, exists where A secures B's compliance by the threat of deprivation... Influence exists where A, 'without resorting to either a tacit or an overt threat of severe deprivation, causes B to change his course of action. In a situation involving authority, 'B complies because he recognises that A's command is reasonable in terms of his own values' either because its content is legitimate and reasonable or because it has been arrived at through a legitimate and reasonable procedure. In the case of force, A achieves his objectives in the face of B's noncompliance by stripping him of the choice between compliance and noncompliance. And manipulation is, thus, an 'aspect' or sub-concept of force (and distinct from coercion, influence and authority), since here 'compliance is forthcoming in the absence of recognition on the complier's part either of the source or the exact nature of the demand upon him'.
The central thrust of Bachrach and Baratz's critique of the pluralists' one-dimensional view of power is, up to a point, anti-behavioural: that is, they claim that it 'unduly emphasises the importance of initiating, decideing, and vetoiing' and, as a result, takes 'no account of the fact that power may be, and often is, exercised by confining the scope of decision-making to relatively "safe" issues. ... they do insist ... that nondecisons which confine the scope of decision-making are themselves (observable) decisions. ...
A satisfactory analysis, then, of two-dimensional power involves examing both decision-making and nondecision-making. ... nondecision-making is 'a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena; or, failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementing stage of the policy process. ...
Bachrach and Baratz are, in effect, redefining the boundaries of what is to count as a political issue. For the pluralists those boundaries are set by the political system being observed, or rather by the elites within it: as Dahl writes, 'a political issue can hardly be said to exist unless and until it commands the attention of a significant segment of the political stratum'. (1961) The observer then picks out certain of these issues as obviously important or 'key' and analyses decision-making with respect to them. For Bachrach and Baratz, by contrast, it is crucially important to identify potential issues which nondecision-making prevents from being actual. ...
Despite this crucial difference with the pluralists, Bachrach and Baratz's analysis has one significant feature in common with theirs: namely, the stress on actual, observable conflict, overt or covert. Just as the pluralists hold that power in decision-making only shows up where there is conflict, Bachrach and Baratz assume the same to be true in cases of nondecision-making. They they write that if 'there is no conflict, overt or covert, the presumption must be that there is consensus on the prevailing allocation of values, in which case nondecision-making is impossible'. ... If 'there appears to be universal acquiescence in the status quo', then it will not be possible 'to determine empirically whether the consensus is genuine or instead has been enforced through nondecision-making' - and they rather quaintly add that 'analysis of this problem is beyond the reach of a political analyst and perhaps can only be fruitfully analysed by a philosopher'.
... So I conclude that the two-dimensional view of power involves a qualified critique of the behavioural focus of the first view... and it allows for consideration of the ways in which decisions are prevented from being taken on potential issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests seen as embodied in express policy preferences and sub-political grievances.
The Three-Dimensional View of Power
There is no doubt that the two-dimensional view of power represents a major advance over the one-dimensional view: it incorporates into the analysis of power relations the question of the control over the agenda of politics and of the ways in which potential issues are kept out of the political process. Nonetheless, it is, in my view, inadequate on three counts.
In the first place... it is still too committed to behaviourism - that is, to the study of overt, 'actual behavior', of which 'concrete decisions' in situations of conflict are seen as paradigmatic. ... it gives a misleading picture of the ways in which individuals and, above all, groups and institutions succeed in excluding potential issues from the political process. Decisions are choices consciously and intentionally made by individuals between alternatives, whereas the bias of the system can be mobilized, recreated and reinforced in ways that are neither consciously chosen nor the intended result of particular individuals' choices. ... the domination of defenders of the status quo may be so secure and pervasive that they are unaware of any potential challengers to their position and thus of any alternatives to the existing political process, whose bias they work to maintain.
...There are two separable cases here. First, there is the phenomenon of collective action, where the policy or action of a collectivity (whether a group, class, institution, political part or corporation) is manifest, but not attributable to particular individuals' decisions or behaviour. Second, there is the phenomenon of 'systemic' or organization effects, where the mobilization bias results... from the form of organization. ... As Marx succinctly put it, 'Men make their own history but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.'
The second count on which the two-dimensional view of power is inadequate is in its association of power with actual, observable conflict. ... On Bachrach and Baratz's own analysis, two of the types of power may not involve ... conflict: namely, manipulation and authority - which they conceive as 'agreement based upon reason' though elsewhere they speak of it as involving a 'possible conflict of values'.
... it is highly unsatisfactory to suppose that power is only exercised in situations of such conflict. To put the matter sharply, A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have - that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires? One does not have to go to the lengths of talking about "Brave New World", or the world of B. F. Skinner, to see this: thought control takes many less total and more mundane forms through the control of information, through the mass media and through the processes of socialization. ...
Consider the picture of the rule of the 'patricians' in the early nineteenth century: 'The elite seems to have possessed that most indispensable of all characteristics in a dominant group - the sense, shared not only by themselves but by the populace, that their claim to govern was legitimate'. ... leaders ... 'do not merely respond to the preferences of constituents; leaders also shape preferences'. ...'Almost the entire adult population has been subjected to some degree of indoctrination through the schools.
{...to suppose that because power, as the pluralists conceptualize it} only shows up in cases of actual conflict, it follows that actual conflict is necessary to power. But this is to ignore the crucial point that the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place.
The third count on which the two-dimensional view of power is inadequate is closely linked to the second: namely, its insistence that nondecision-making power only exists where there are grievances which are denied entry into the political process in the form of issues. If the observer can uncover no grievances, then he must assume there is a 'genuine' consensus on the prevailing allocation of values. To put this another way, it is here assumed that if people feel no grievances, then they have no interests that are harmed by the use of power. This is also highly unsatisfactory. In the first place, what, in any case, is a grievance - an articulated demand, based on political knowledge, an undirected complaint arising out of everyday experience, a vague feeling of unease or sense of deprivation? Second, is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial? To assume that the absence of grievance equals genuine consensus is simply to rule out the possibility of false or manipulated consensus by definitional fiat.