Part of Polish gov members including president probably dead in plane crash

Thanks for the reminder, P.o.B and very well said. I also recall the last Session mentioning the accident aspect as well.

It does appear that someone(through the media) took this bull by the horns and are using it for their own nefarious reasons, which I'm sure will become a little more clear with time. A la 911.
 
http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/europe/news/article_1555176.php/Mobile-phones-examined-in-Polish-plane-crash-probe

Warsaw - Polish investigators were examining mobile phones of the victims of last month's plane crash in Russia that killed the country's president, the prosecutor general said Wednesday.

Investigators were not ruling out that the mobile phones had interfered with the operations of the plane when it crashed April 10 in Smolensk, said Prosecutor General Andrzej Seremet.

A 'significant number of the cell phones were active during the last leg of the flight,' Seremet told reporters.
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Yeah, they were VIPs with a VIM [very important mission]. Under such circumstances it may be easy to think that no rules apply to you...

Vulcan, do you think it's possible for cell phones to cause a crash? :huh:
 
Possibility of Being said:
Vulcan, do you think it's possible for cell phones to cause a crash? :huh:
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Modern commercial jets equipped with glass cockpits and fly-by wire technology and a bunch of computers, I would say yes. But this aircraft is very old in technological terms and I seriously doubt that cellphones or someone turning on their computer on board would have any effect on the navigational or flight controls of this TU-154 type of aircraft. I could be wrong though. :)
 
hi all

here is a translation of a quite interesting article that says that navigation systems of a plane were fooled - attacked through so called meaconing

src:__http://translate.google.com/translate?js=y&prev=_t&hl=pl&ie=UTF-8&layout=1&eotf=1&u=http%3A%2F%2Fniezalezna.pl%2Farticle%2Fshow%2Fid%2F34367&sl=pl&tl=en

Here is an original article in Polish

src:__http://niezalezna.pl/article/show/id/34367
 
drygol said:
hi all

here is a translation of a quite interesting article that says that navigation systems of a plane were fooled - attacked through so called meaconing
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Hi drygol,
IMO, that's just another bit of speculation. I especially like this sentence:
"because the aircraft was flying on autopilot, the crew believed they were much higher and somewhere else." :huh:

I read the latest MAK report (scroll down, but know it's in Russian) and will try to translate its key points grabbing some pieces from here and there and hoping it makes any sense. (Geez, I know nothing about aviation, and neither my English nor Russian is good enough...)

1. Crew's training and experience
- the Polish Air Force crew did not have proper training for its pilots or clear instructions on how the TU-154's four-member crew must interact.
- the crew did not undergo regular training on simulators, learning to interact and to deal with emergencies. The crew was formed a few days before the flight
- the Tu-154 captain's flight experience was 530 hours (total - 3480), the co-pilot's 160 hours (total - 1900), the navigator's 30 hours[!!!] (total - 1070), the flight engineer's 235 hours (total - 290)

2. Preparation for the flight
The crew did not have up-to-date navigational data for the destination airfield in Smolensk (no current airport chart, including NOTAMs)
They did not have the actual weather data or forecast for the Smolensk "North" airfield

3. The aircraft
Equipped with an early warning system TAWS type and the flight management system UNS-1D (FMS). Systems TAWS and FMS were switched on and operational/functional.

3. Airport
Positively tested on March 25 for all airport facilities and systems, including parameters and the accuracy of PAR, the far and near NDB with markers, lighting, and radio stations.
Not equipped with navigational aids enabling to perform automatic or directed? approach (автоматический или директорный заход).
Minimum visibility: horizontal - 1000m, vertical - 100m

4. During the flight, the crew was repeatedly informed about fog and poor visibility in Smolensk; in particular:
- approximately 16 minutes before the crash, the Yak-40's crew (that landed in Smolensk 1,5 hours earlier) informed TU-154 about horizontal visibility of 400 meters and vertical visibility of 50 meters
- 4 minutes before the crash the crew of YAK-40 informed the crew of the TU-154 that visibility on the ground was 200m

5. At the request of the crew they carried out their "trial" approach to decision height (100 meters). ATC informed the crew after the third turn that from 100 meters they must be prepared to perform a go-around.

6. Final approach and a descent on the glide slope
The glide path was performed on automatic pilot with the longitudinal and side channels active, as well as with the automatic throttle [OR: performed with AP controlling both pitch and bank]. Turning off the autopilot in a longitudinal channel and automatic throttle occurred while trying to do a go-around (second circle) 5 and 4 seconds respectively before the collision with an obstacle (tree), which led to the beginning of the destruction of aircraft structure (1100m from the RWY, the aircraft height was below the level of the runway threshold of 15 meters). Turning off the autopilot in the side channel occurred at the time of the third collision with obstacles (260 meters from the point of the first contact), which led to the beginning of the destruction of the structure

The first warning by the TAW system of type PULL UP was 18 seconds before the collision with an obstacle. Prior to this, double message of type TERRAIN AHEAD was issued.

Time from the beginning of the aircraft structure destruction to its collision with the ground in an inverted position, was about 5-6 seconds.
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Vulcan, what do you think about their flying on autopilot with no ILS?

Anyway, it was not meaconing that made the decision to fly into fog with no required data and visibility of 200x50, and make a "trial approach"! :headbash: Unless that meaconing rewired the crew's brains...

Well, let's have some gossip at the end ;)
According to a third-hand reports, the crew was totally cool and relaxed until they hit the first tree, and a Russian who allegedly had heard the audio of the CVR said that some of the last words out of the crew's mouth, after seeing trees in front of them, were "Settings?... Altitude?"
 
2. Preparation for the flight
The crew did not have up-to-date navigational data for the destination airfield in Smolensk (no current airport chart, including NOTAMs)
They did not have the actual weather data or forecast for the Smolensk "North" airfield
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Assuming that the report is accurate, I find it hard to believe that the crew would depart for an airfield without a current airport chart and NOTAMs nor the weather for the airport!

The first warning by the TAW system of type PULL UP was 18 seconds before the collision with an obstacle. Prior to this, double message of type TERRAIN AHEAD was issued.
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The TAWS activating and giving a "pull up" warning 18 seconds before impact is correct. It is designed to give a warning between 20 to 30 secs and so 18 seconds is close enough for horseshoes. Prior to the "pull up" warning, it would generate "terrain ahead" warnings. So basically in the cockpit, the crew would have heard continuously, "Too Low Terrain," followed shortly after by "Terrain, Terrain, Pull Up". The correct action with such a warning is to disconnect the autopilot and auto-throttles while simultaneously pitching the aircraft up and "slamming" the auto-throttle to full open (ie max power). Why the pilot chose to ignore this warning, I don't know.

6. Final approach and a descent on the glide slope
The glide path was performed on automatic pilot with the longitudinal and side channels active, as well as with the automatic throttle [OR: performed with AP controlling both pitch and bank]. Turning off the autopilot in a longitudinal channel and automatic throttle occurred while trying to do a go-around (second circle) 5 and 4 seconds respectively before the collision with an obstacle (tree), which led to the beginning of the destruction of aircraft structure (1100m from the RWY, the aircraft height was below the level of the runway threshold of 15 meters). Turning off the autopilot in the side channel occurred at the time of the third collision with obstacles (260 meters from the point of the first contact), which led to the beginning of the destruction of the structure
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Basically what this means is that the approach was flown with the autopilot and auto-throttle engaged and both were disengaged on impacting the trees or obstacles. This is consistent with normal flight procedures. The pitch and roll of the aircraft is controlled by dial knobs in the cockpit. So dialling a value in the roll "window" would cause the autopilot to roll to that value. Likewise for the aircraft's pitch which can be done by selecting a specific pitch value or by selecting an altitude value. So assuming an altitude value is selected in the altitude "window" the autopilot would pitch up or down to try and achieve that value. The auto-throttles meantime would adjust correspondingly.

So for this approach, the autopilot and auto-throttle were engaged and the pilot only had to keep the aircraft pointing to the NDB using the roll "window" while the pitch would have been set to 100 meters. When the aircraft reached 100 meters, the autopilot together with the auto-throttle would level off the aircraft.

From the report above, it states that the go around was executed 5 to 4 seconds before the aircraft hit the tree. So perhaps the pilot decided that he wouldn't be able to see the runway and had started the go-around procedure. It is normal to do the go-around procedure with the autopilot and the auto-throttle engaged. The autopilot and auto-throttle were only disengaged after impacting the trees or obstacles by which time it would have been too late since structural damage to the aircraft had already occurred.

I don't think meaconing could have been a factor based on the fact that the earlier reports showed that the aircraft was directly in line with the runway (and hence the NDB).
 
IMO, that's just another bit of speculation. I especially like this sentence:
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might be , i just wanted to keep you guys updated :)

Anyway , if i think about technical details , it is possible to spoof gps readings - I don't know about authorization systems used there thou (If there are any)
But knowing that US Predators didn't use any encryption link to satelites I seriously doubt that Polish plane did.
 
Thanks Vulcan. I'm really impressed with your cool and reasonable explanations :)
So for this approach, the autopilot and auto-throttle were engaged and the pilot only had to keep the aircraft pointing to the NDB using the roll "window" while the pitch would have been set to 100 meters. When the aircraft reached 100 meters, the autopilot together with the auto-throttle would level off the aircraft.
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But it didn't, which indicates again wrong altimeter or other instruments settings, right? Or, it actually leaves a small window open for the possibility of an attack from outside... Theoretically, can we exclude that option?

I don't think meaconing could have been a factor based on the fact that the earlier reports showed that the aircraft was directly in line with the runway (and hence the NDB).
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Actually, according to MAK again, it wasn't; the translation below taken this time from avherald.com:

18 seconds prior to impact with the first obstacle the TAWS alerted "PULL UP! PULL UP!" after it had already warned "Terrain ahead!" prior to this. 5 seconds prior to impact with first obstacles the decision was made to go around and the autopilot was disconnected. The airplane first impacted a barrier 40 meters left of the extended centerline of the runway and 1100 meters before the threshold of the runway at an altitude, that was 15 meters BELOW the runway elevation. The third impact with an obstacle, a birch tree of 30-40cm trunk diameter contacted by the left hand wing, 840 meters before the runway threshold and about 80 meters left of the extended runway centerline, led to the first break up of the aircraft in flight, the aircraft rolled inverted and impacted ground 5 seconds later, that final impact occured at 10:41:06L (07:41:06Z). Impact forces were estimated in excess of 100G and were not surviveable.
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Probably, that Non-crew members were in cockpit of crashed Polish presidential plane
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According to MAK's report, there were at least three non-crew members in the cockpit; one of them has been identified, while the others are not identified yet. MAK's report doesn't specify when those people entered the cockpit.

According to the media and based on interviews with some persons close to the investigation, the identified intruder was as Andrzej Blasik - Lieutenant General, commander of the Polish Air Force, i.e. senior officer for the pilots (he didn't have qualifications to fly Tupolev, btw.), and all intruders' voices were recorded between 20 and 16 minutes before the crash, so the plane was probably still in the Belarusian airspace then. They added also that the cockpit door had been left open.

Thinking about an attack option... To make it possible, they would have had to:
1. Implant the idea of going to Katyn in Kaczynski's head and make him emotional about it;
2. Fool all the govs and military guys and security services to have them all on one plane
3. Play on them emotional games to get them all, the crew included, trapped in the get-there-itis thinking
4. Create fog in Smolensk
5. use meaconing technique

Or, seeing the first three points already in play, to find it as an opportunity, think and act quickly implementing the last two points. Well, not impossible, but what could be worth such an effort? I can't find any reasonable answer, while the psychological explanation coupled with poor crew's skills and weather/airport conditions seem to suffice to explain causes leading to the crash. Ockham's razor then...
 
Possibility of Being said:
Thanks Vulcan. I'm really impressed with your cool and reasonable explanations :)
So for this approach, the autopilot and auto-throttle were engaged and the pilot only had to keep the aircraft pointing to the NDB using the roll "window" while the pitch would have been set to 100 meters. When the aircraft reached 100 meters, the autopilot together with the auto-throttle would level off the aircraft.
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But it didn't, which indicates again wrong altimeter or other instruments settings, right? Or, it actually leaves a small window open for the possibility of an attack from outside... Theoretically, can we exclude that option?
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At the start of the approach before the aircraft descends, the altitude window (pitch) is wound down to the minimum descent altitude for the approach (in this case 100 meters). As soon as the aircraft has begun it's descent, the altitude window is now set to the go-around altitude, normally higher than the minimum descent altitude.

When the aircraft reaches the minimum descent altitude, the pilot has two options. Either he can see the runway, in which case he disconnects the autopilot and manually lands the aircraft or he doesn't see the runway, in which case he pushes a button which will cause the aircraft to pitch up, auto-throttle to give full power and the aircraft would continue it's climb to the higher altitude set in the window. The aircraft would loss some altitude as it transitions from descent to climb but this is allowed for in the minimum descent altitude value, usually not more than 50ft (16 meters). If the altitude window was not set to the go-around altitude and left at the minimum descent altitude, the autopilot would cause the aircraft to level out as I mentioned above.

18 seconds prior to impact with the first obstacle the TAWS alerted "PULL UP! PULL UP!" after it had already warned "Terrain ahead!" prior to this. 5 seconds prior to impact with first obstacles the decision was made to go around and the autopilot was disconnected. The airplane first impacted a barrier 40 meters left of the extended centerline of the runway and 1100 meters before the threshold of the runway at an altitude, that was 15 meters BELOW the runway elevation. The third impact with an obstacle, a birch tree of 30-40cm trunk diameter contacted by the left hand wing, 840 meters before the runway threshold and about 80 meters left of the extended runway centerline, led to the first break up of the aircraft in flight, the aircraft rolled inverted and impacted ground 5 seconds later, that final impact occured at 10:41:06L (07:41:06Z). Impact forces were estimated in excess of 100G and were not surviveable.
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So here, it suggest that the pilot did not ignore the "terrain warning" although his re-action to it was too slow not to mention that the aircraft itself was low. I still think that the altimeter reading or setting errors are involved as discussed previously.

Probably, that Non-crew members were in cockpit of crashed Polish presidential plane
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According to the media and based on interviews with some persons close to the investigation, the identified intruder was as Andrzej Blasik - Lieutenant General, commander of the Polish Air Force, i.e. senior officer for the pilots (he didn't have qualifications to fly Tupolev, btw.), and all intruders' voices were recorded between 20 and 16 minutes before the crash, so the plane was probably still in the Belarusian airspace then. They added also that the cockpit door had been left open.
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Well somebody certainly pressured the pilot to carry out this approach in less than suitable conditions when the right thing to do would have been to go to another airfield and avoid this tragedy.
 
As some of you possibly know, almost two months after the crash, both Russia and Poland released transcripts of the cockpit voice recorder.

Fortunately, they has been translated into English :) Here go some links:

"original copy" ;) in Russian and Polish

First part in English, not sure if worth posting here.

And the last 1'15'' / = 6km (I believe)

10:39:49,9 - 10:39:52,3 ATC: Approaching outer marker, on course, on glideslope.
10:39:50,2 - 10:39:58,0 Sound. F=845Hz. Outer Marker.
10:39:52,2 - 10:39:53,7 U: Outer.
10:39:54,1 - 10:39:55,0 Capt: (...)
10:39:57,1 - 10:39:59,3 U: 400 meters. [altitude, in meters]
10:40:02,6 - 10:40:15,6 U: (...)
10:40:06,7 - 10:40:06,8 TAWS: TERRAIN AHEAD:
10:40:13,5 - 10:40:14,6 ATC: 4 on course, on glideslope [4: 4 kilometers from the runway]
10:40:16,7 - 10:40:17,6 Capt: On course, on glideslope
10:40:18,6 - 10:40:20.1 U: (...)
10:40:19,6 - 10:40:21,1 Nav: 300.
10:40:22,8 - 10:40:25,6 U: (250 meters)
10:40:24,6 - 10:40:26,7 (Nav): (250).
10:40:26,6 - 10:40:27,8 ATC: 3 on course, on glideslope
10:40:29,6 - 10:40:30,3 U: (...)
10:40:31,2 - 10:40:32,4 ATC: Turn on the lights.
10:40:32,4 - 10:40:33,5 TAWS: TERRAIN AHEAD.
10:40:32,9 - 10:40:33,6 Nav: 200.
10:40:34,0 - 10:40:34,8 Capt: Turned on.
10:40:37,1 - 10:40:38,1 Nav: 150.
10:40:38,7 - 10:40:39,9 ATC: 2 on course, on glideslope
10:40:39,4 - 10:40:42,0 TAWS: TERRAIN AHEAD, TERRAIN AHEAD.
10:40:41,3 - 10:40:42,6 U: 100 meters.
10:40:42,6 - 10:40:42,7 Nav: 100.
10:40:42,6 - 10:40:44,1 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:44,5 - 10:40:46,1 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:46,6 - 10:40:49,2 TAWS: TERRAIN AHEAD, TERRAIN AHEAD.
10:40:48,7 - 10:40:49,4 Nav: 100.
10:40:49,2 - 10:40:49,6 (FO): Normal.
10:40:49,6 - 10:40:50,1 Nav: 90.
10:40:49,8 - 10:40:51,3 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:50,0 - 10:40:51,3 Nav: 80.
10:40:50,5 - 10:40:51,2 FO: Go around.
10:40:51,5 - 10:40:58,0 Sound. F= 400Hz. Decision Height.
10:40:51,7 - 10:40:53,4 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:51,8 - 10:40:52,4 Nav: 60.
10:40:52,3 - 10:40:53,1 Nav: 50.
10:40:52,5 - 10:40:53,4 ATC: Horizon 101.
10:40:53,0 - 10:40:53,6 Nav: 40.
10:40:53,7 - 10:40:55,5 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:54,5 - 10:40:55,2 Nav: 30
10:40:54,7 - 10:40:56,4 ATC: Height control, horizon.
10:40:55,2 - 10:40:56,0 Nav: 20.
10:40:56,0 - 10:40:58,2 Sound. F=400 Hz. Autopilot disconnect.
10:40:56,0 - 10:40:58,1 Sound. F=800 Hz. Inner Marker.
10:40:56,6 - 10:40:57,7 Sound. F=400 Hz. Autothrottle disconnect.
10:40:56,6 - 10:40:58,2 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:58,6 - 10:41:00,2 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:40:59,3 - 10:41:04,6 Sound of the collision with obstacles.
10:41:00,3 - 10:41:01,4 FO: (censored)
10:41:00,5 - 10:41:01,8 TAWS: PULL UP; PULL UP.
10:41:02,0 - 10:41:03,4 ATC: Go around!
10:41:02,7 - 10:41:04,6 U: Scream (censored)
10:41:05,4 End of the transcript.

U - unidentified voice
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Vulcan, would you like to comment this transcript? :)
 
Hi POB,

Thanks for posting the transcript.

Firstly, it seems that the aircraft was being monitored and doing a PAR or a GCA approach and not an NDB approach as was originally assumed. PAR/GCA is considered a precision approach since both glideslope and heading information is provided to the pilot.

What that basically means is that the ATC or more correctly the approach controller had him on radar and provided the pilot with terrain and lateral guidance to the runway. This would be expected in a military airfield since the visibility is so poor. Hence the words (ATC: 2 on course, on glideslope.) The 2 here, I presume it means distance in kilometres. That means that the ATC is essentially telling the pilot that he is on course and on glideslope at the 2 kilometre point from the runway.

From the transcript I can establish the fact that the speed is 150kts/280kmph and the rate of descent was about 3.9 meters per second/750 ft per minute. All pretty normal. Since the aircraft is on a GCA/PAR approach, all the talk about wrong altimeter settings, pressure versus radio altimeter is not an issue since terrain clearance is provided by the radar controller.

So even if the altimeter was wrong, the aircraft blip appears on a glideslope (a line) visible on the radar screen of the controller. So the controller knows whether the aircraft is high or low by simply looking at the radar screen. Since the controller is reporting that the aircraft is "on course, on glideslope" it would tell the pilot that everything is normal and hence the hesitation or uncertainty with responding to the TAWS warnings by the pilot.

Just prior to that transmission from the ATC, there is a call by the NAV (navigator) saying 150 and the difference in time is 1 second. 150 here again seems to refer to height in meters. Here I am not sure what the NAV is reading (radio or pressure altimeter). Because to be on slope, the aircraft needed to be at 94/95 meters and not 150 which makes me wonder why the ATC is saying "on glideslope” when essentially the aircraft is slightly high! The correct call by ATC should have been “2 on course, slightly high”. It really doesn't make sense to me since even if the aircraft altimeter reading was incorrect and the aircraft was actually low, why is the ATC saying “on glideslope”?

Since the “Terrain Ahead” warning sounded about 2 seconds after the ATC said, “2 on course, on glideslope” it does confirm the fact that the aircraft was low and so why is the ATC saying “on glideslope”? Doesn't make sense to me yet unless it was "planned" that way.

The next thing is the “Pull Up” warning. The “Pull Up” warning starts at 10:40:44.1 and the time the aircraft hits the obstacle is 10:41:04.6. That is a lapse of almost 21 seconds! If you remember, once the “Pull Up” warning activates or starts, the pilot has between 20 to 30 seconds to impact! So for some reason, the pilot ignored this warning. The correct thing to do on receipt of this “Pull Up” warning is to immediately disconnect the autopilot and auto-throttle and pitch up to about 20 degrees and apply maximum power on the engines.

I can sort of understand the hesitation since at 10:40:39.9 (4 seconds earlier) the ATC is telling him that he is on glideslope. Essentially the pilot is lulled into a false sense of security that the ATC was watching him on radar and if he was close to the ground, they would have told him so.

The other reason would be that, as I understand it, this aircraft was one of only two or a few, fitted with the TAWS system. So it is entirely possible that no training was done by the pilot to understand this system, what it's capability was, what to do in the event of a “Pull Up” warning, and how much time there was to respond to such a warning. It's possible that the pilot only had read the manual but didn't really understand how critical it is to respond immediately to a “Pull Up” warning.

The FO (First Officer) correctly calls for a “go around” at 10:40:51.2 but I am not sure whether that is due to the “Pull Up” warning or because the aircraft is approach the minimum descent altitude. It's a bit strange that the FO didn't say anything about the “Pull Up” warning from the time it started/sounded. Again it tells me that perhaps the crew were not trained and did not understand the significance of the "Pull Up" warning.

The ATC is basically silent from the time they said, “2 on course, on glideslope” till the next call which is at 10:40:53.4 (ATC: Horizon 101). That's a total of 13.5 seconds. The next call should have been, “Approaching decision height, look up, take over visually”. This would have been slightly before the aircraft reached the minimum descent altitude and yet, there is no such call! Strange.

If you look at the calls from the ATC, it was pretty normal even up to the 2km point. The timing between the calls is around 13 seconds which gives me a groundspeed of 280kmph. With the weather so bad, what is missing is that all important last call by the ATC during a PAR approach. Just before reaching the decision altitude (usually 200ft/62meters on a PAR) approach, ATC would say something like, "look up and report runway in sight" or something similar, at which point the pilot reports visual or not visual.

If the pilots reports "visual", the radar controller would say something like, "Contact tower control on 123.45 Mhz" or something similar. Tower control would then give the aircraft the landing clearance and not the radar controller. If the pilots reports "not visual", the radar controller continues to provide vertical and lateral guidance to the aircraft and no switching of radio frequencies is necessary until the aircraft reaches a certain altitude. So for example the pilot says, "not visual" and the radar controller would then say something like, "go around, maintain runway heading and climb to 1200 meters".

In this scenario, I would have expected the radar controller to call the pilot around the 8 to 10 second point (after the last call at 10:40:39.9 ) but there is no such call. So that is not normal.

It sure looks like this aircraft was “guided control resulting in a crash”. In other words, it sure looks to me like it was done deliberately. The ATC is telling the crew that the aircraft is “on course, on glideslope” while the aircraft instruments are yelling “Terrain Ahead, Pull Up”. Just imagine the conflict going on in the crew's mind of trying to make sense of the conflicting information. Some things don't seem to add up to me, yet.
 
V59 said:
It's a bit strange that the FO didn't say anything about the “Pull Up” warning from the time it started/sounded. Again it tells me that perhaps the crew were not trained and did not understand the significance of the "Pull Up" warning.

The ATC is basically silent from the time they said, “2 on course, on glideslope” till the next call which is at 10:40:53.4 (ATC: Horizon 101). That's a total of 13.5 seconds. The next call should have been, “Approaching decision height, look up, take over visually”. This would have been slightly before the aircraft reached the minimum descent altitude and yet, there is no such call! Strange.
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Do you think it's possible that portions of the recording were removed?
 
anart said:
Do you think it's possible that portions of the recording were removed?
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Hi Anart,

Yeah I did consider that some parts were missing or censored but it doesn't make sense to censor this crucial bit. The call that the ATC actually made at 10:40:52,5 - 10:40:53,4 was ATC: Horizon 101 (Horizon 101 - I assume is the callsign of the aircraft) is like saying "Hello"? Kind of strange to say "Hello" at that point.

The normal procedure on a PAR approach is that there is no reply from the pilot until the visual call is requested by ATC at which point and only at that point the pilot responds. So instead of saying, "Horizon 101", it should have been more like, "Horizon 101, report visual with runway" and this call should have been made at around the 10:40:47.9 time mark by my estimation, about 4 seconds before the ATC made that "Horizon 101" call.

Also note that the ATC cannot hear what is going on in the cockpit and should have just continued with normal ATC calls unless the pilot reports non normal situation or going around due whatever reason at any time during the approach.
 
Hi Vulcan,

Vulcan59 said:
Yeah I did consider that some parts were missing or censored but it doesn't make sense to censor this crucial bit. The call that the ATC actually made at 10:40:52,5 - 10:40:53,4 was ATC: Horizon 101 (Horizon 101 - I assume is the callsign of the aircraft) is like saying "Hello"? Kind of strange to say "Hello" at that point.
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101 is the aircraft's tail number, and its callsign is 'Polish Air Force 1-0-1' or just 'Polish 1-0-1".

But as for the "horizon" call there are basically two versions of its meaning in Polish media/Internet. One version (prevailing in MSM) is that "Horizon 101" is a command (given to 1-0-1?) to stop descending and level off the a/c, with its variation that it is a warning of danger to hit the ground.

The second option is that it's calling for reporting back the a/c altitude. This one would fit with some early reports (true or not) that an interview right after the crash the controller said that he had asked several times the crew to read back the altitude but they didn't.

Oh, and as for the ATC, there was only one controller at the airfield as far as I know. He was just a soldier with some (no details revealed) training as a controller.

After studying the transcript, pictures, charts, and even the EGPWS manual, I kind of guess what could have happened. That's my amateurish hypothesis, not sure if it makes sense, feedback much welcome :)

Everything was done deliberately. They tried to "dive" below clouds (they were told the cloud base was at 50 meters) so to get into an eye contact with the ground, determined to land no matter what. The crew knew what the captain were performing after reaching the MDA way before the near NDB; they did it before. That's why there was silence in the cockpit with the NAV reading RA altitude only. They might have managed it if not the ravine on the way, probably filled with fog... OR if the NAV had read the barometric altimeter. They were short of some 5 meters of altitude. Risky maneuver indeed. :(

I don't understand how it was possible to perform such a maneuver on autopilot, but they did it so clearly it must have been possible...
 
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