Antiphilosophical Dictionary - Peter Naur

Psalehesost

The Living Force
Peter Naur (1928-2016) was a Danish computer science pioneer. Most famous for his work on the ALGOL 60 programming language, and the Backus-Naur Form (BNF) notation used to describe the syntax of formal languages, Naur took an amateur interest in psychology in his later years.

Rejecting the schools of Freudianism, Behaviorism, and Cognitivism as all being based on bad definitions and otherwise flawed foundations, he drew heavily upon William James and his classic work on psychology. He demanded of psychological definitions that they would make sense in relation to experience.

Naur's Antiphilosophical Dictionary tersely dissects bad definitions commonly used by philosophers - and psychologists, whose thinking is largely underpinned by the work of philosophers. Both Behaviorism and Cognitivism, as well as commonly accepted thinking about Artificial Intelligence, build upon the Aristotelian legacy which Naur is most firmly opposed to.

Preface

Judging from what is called philosophy, nonsense must be among the sturdiest plants there are. The seed was sown by Aristotle 350 years B.C., and since then the philosophical nonsense has thrived. A seedling of the plant, Aristotle's talk of motion, died around 1650, but the main stem flowers unscathed today.

In this sturdiness of nonsense there is nothing inexplicable, psychologically. As noted by William James a hundred years ago (see the dictionary article reality, p. 67), we all tend to believe what we are told or read, as long as it does not flatly contradict something in which we are currently engaged. In a debate which does not deal with matters of our special concern we all tend to agree with the latest honourable speaker. This habitual trust in speech and print again is in line with our trust in the way we perceive our ordinary surroundings, our closest fellow beings and the things, the light, and the sounds we encounter. Long periods may elapse between our experience of being astonished or frightened at something we are exposed to. Most of the time we may perceive our impressions in our habitual way, without running into surprises.

Thus it is quite understandable that when we encounter statements concerning issues at the limit of our normal field of interest, that is questions we have had hardly any occasion to give any thought, then we will tend strongly to accept them in the manner children have to accept anything they meet, uncritically. In this field we find, among other things, philosophy.


Another relevant circumstance is the general urge to know better. This urge differs from one person to another, like any other characteristic, but it is evidently lively in many people. Such people will be attracted to Aristotle's philosophical program of the highest knowledge. Philosophy, in other words, is presumption incarnate.

To this is added in recent years the commercialization of science in the form of what is called research projects. Such projects are financed on the basis of, not results, but plans. Those who grant the money and those who receive it have a common interest in defending the projects, whether or not they build upon nonsense, and the more costly the project the greater the defence interest. Disclosure of nonsense in this context thus becomes a subversive activity, in which only those can allow themselves to engage who have given up their chance of getting access to research money. Thus in research contexts nonsense thrives practically unabated.

Scientists are mostly uninterested in what philosophers say. Thus the scientists for hundreds of years, unconcerned with the philosophers' presumption, have been formulating ever more adequate and coherent descriptions of the ways of the world. Most of those who have even glanced at what philosophers say have been puzzled to notice how the philosophers have talked for several thousand years, without being able to display a single specimen of what they say they seek: a truth.

A few scientists have joined the philosophers' club of presumption. However, if one looks close into what they say one finds that they just confirm the basic impossibility of philosophy.

The following notes are the results of irritation over the philosophical inanity accumulated over many years. The first incentive to them came from my study of what is said in philosophical texts about science, induced by my work in astronomy around 1955. Thus I came across Bertrand Russell's essay On the Notion of Cause (for more about this, see cause, p. 10). His starting point is a detailed, critical analysis of what is said about causes in Baldwin's Dictionary of Psychology and Philosophy. In his analysis Russell shows that what is said in the handbook is unclear and self-contradictory. Russell then contrasts this philosophical confusion with the way the things are talked about in scientific astronomy, the field of my insight at first hand.

In later years my work in computing has given me the occasion to evaluate what is said in philosophical and psychological writings about people's mental activity and their perception of their surroundings and of linguistic expressions. Here I have time and again found new examples of philosophical confusion of the kind Russell indicated. However, I have never found other analyses like Russell's, and Russell himself appears in his later writings to have forgotten his antiphilosophical contribution.

[...]

Naur's metaphysical stance is a simple agnostic one. He simply doesn't show interest in the type of idealism Plato is known for, and such subjects are thus outside the scope of his work. But he does firmly object to Aristotle, because Aristotle's work left a foundation hampering the further quest for empirical knowledge.

Translating his stance into Gurdjieff's terms, Aristotle becomes the historical father of wiseacring.

After so long a time immersed in metaphysical subjects, it was refreshing to have a first quick read of this book. It helps clean up the basic definitions and sloppy language in common use.

I'll almost certainly give it a more thorough read. While I have yet to study William James' classic work on psychology, this book adds to the motivation, showing why James' definitions are still better than ones in common use.

Naturally, Naur firmly dissects the philosophizing of Descartes.

This book can be downloaded (PDF), among other works, from Naur's website.
 
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