I'm currently reading Czeslaw Milosz's book,
The Captive Mind, which deals with the intellectual life of the inhabitants of the "People's Democracies," that is, the appendages of the Soviet/pathocratic Center. In chapter three, Milosz gives a description of a phenomenon of life under pathocractic rule that is also described by Lobaczewski. As Lobaczewski puts it,
As adduced above, the anomaly distinguished as essential psychopathy inspires
the overall phenomenon in a well-developed pathocracy and betrays biological
analogies to the well known phenomenon called Daltonism, color-blindness or
near-blindness as regard to red and green. For the purpose of an intellectual exer-
cise, let us thus imagine that Daltonists have managed to take over power in some
country and have forbidden the citizens from distinguishing these colors, thus
eliminating the distinction between green (unripe) and ripe tomatoes. Special
vegetable patch inspectors armed with pistols and pickets would patrol the areas to
make sure the citizens were not selecting only ripe tomatoes to pick, which would
indicate that they were distinguishing between red and green. Such inspectors
could not, of course, be totally color-blind themselves (otherwise they could not
exercise this extremely important function). They could not suffer more than near-
blindness as regards these colors. However, they would have to belong to the clan
of people made nervous by any discussion about colors.
With such authorities around, the citizens might even be willing to eat a green
tomato and affirm quite convincingly that it was ripe. But once the severe inspec-
tors left for some other garden far away, there would be the shower of comments it
does not behoove me to reproduce in a scientific work. The citizens would than
pick nicely vine-ripened tomatoes, make a salad with cream, and add a few drops
of rum for flavor.
May I suggest that all normal people whom fate has forced to live under patho-
cratic rule make the serving of a salad according to the above recipe into a sym-
bolic custom. Any guest recognizing the symbol by its color and aroma will refrain
from making any comments. Such a custom might hasten the reinstallation of a
normal man’s system.
The pathological authorities are convinced that the appropriate pedagogical,
indoctrinational, propaganda, and terrorist means can teach a person with a normal
instinctive substratum, range of feelings, and basic intelligence to think and feel
according to their own different fashion. This conviction is only slightly less unre-
alistic, psychologically speaking, than the belief that people able to see colors
normally can be broken of this habit.
Actually, normal people cannot get rid of the characteristics with which the
Homo sapiens species was endowed by its phylogenetic past. Such people will
thus never stop feeling and perceiving psychological and socio-moral phenomena
in much the same way their ancestors had been doing for hundreds of generations.
Any attempt to make a society subjugated to the above phenomenon “learn” this
different experiential manner imposed by pathological egotism is, in principle,
fated for failure regardless of how many generations it might last. It does, how-
ever, call forth a series of improper psychological results which may give the
pathocrats the appearance of success. However, it also provokes society to elabo-
rate pinpointed, well-thought-out self-defense measures based on its cognitive and
creative efforts.
Pathocratic leadership believes that it can achieve a state wherein those “other”
people’s minds become dependent by means of the effects of their personality,
perfidious pedagogical means, the means of mass-disinformation, and psychologi-
cal terror; such faith has a basic meaning for them. In their conceptual world,
pathocrats consider it virtually self-evident that the “others” should accept their
obvious, realistic, and simple way of apprehending reality. For some mysterious
reason, though, the “others” wriggle out, slither away, and tell each other jokes
about pathocrats. Someone must be responsible for this: pre-revolutionary old-
sters, or some radio stations abroad. It thus becomes necessary to improve the
methodology of action, find better “soul engineers” with a certain literary talent,
and isolate society from improper literature and any foreign influence. Those
experiences and intuitions whispering that this is a Sisyphean labor must be re-
pressed from the field of consciousness of the pathocrat.
The conflict is thus dramatic for both sides. The first feels insulted in its hu-
manity, rendered obtuse, and forced to think in a manner contrary to healthy com-
mon sense. The other stifles the premonition that if this goal cannot be reached,
sooner or later things will revert to normal man’s rule, including their vengeful
lack of understanding of the pathocrats’ personalities. So if it does not work, it is
best not to think about the future, just prolong the status quo by means of the
above-mentioned efforts. Toward the end of this book, it will behoove us to con-
sider the possibilities for untying this Gordian knot.
Now compare what Lobaczewski had to say with this, from Milosz:
Officially, contradictions do not exist in the minds of the citizens in the people's democracies. Nobody dares to reveal them publicly. And yet the question of how to deal with them is posed in real life. More than others, the members of the intellectual elite are aware of this problem. They solve it by becoming actors.
It is hard to define the type of relationship that prevails between people in the East otherwise than as acting. . . . Before it leaves the lips, every word must be evaluated as to its consequences. A smile that appears at the wrong moment, a glance that is not all it should be can occasion dangerous suspicions and accusations. Even one's gestures, tone of voice, or preference for certain kinds of neckties are interpreted as signs of one's political tendencies.
A visitor from the Imperium is shocked on coming to the West. In his contacts with others, beginning with porters or taxi drivers, he encounters no resistance. The people he meets are completely relaxed. They lack that internal concentration which betrays itself in a lowered head or in restlessly moving eyes. . . .
. . . A constant and universal masquerade creates an aura that is hard to bear, yet it grants the performers certain not inconsiderable satisfactions. To say something is white when one thinks it is black, to smile inwardly when one is outwardly solemn, to hate when one manifests love, to know when one pretends not to know, and thus to play one's adversary for a fool (even as he is playing you for one)--these actions lead one to prize one's own cunning above all else. . . .
Acting on a comparable scale has not occurred often in the history of the human race. [Note: I don't think this is a sound conclusion. It seems likely to me that this categorized MOST of human history, and that our history is written from the perspective of those who "act" the way they must under pathocratic rule.] Yet in trying to describe these new mores, we happen across a striking analogy in the Islamic civilization of the Middle East. Not only was the game played in defense of one's thoughts and feelings well-known there, but indeed it was transformed into a permanent institution and graced with the name of Ketman.
. . . The people of the Mussulman East believe that "He who is in possession of truth must not expose his person, his relatives or his reputation to the blindness, the folly, the perversity of those whom it has pleased God to place and maintain in error." On must, therefore, keep silent about one's true convictions if possible.
Milosz then quotes the story of Sadra, who eventually came to proclaim his "heresy" for all to hear:
He too was afraid of the mullahs. To incite their distrust was inevitable, but to provide a solid basis, furnish proof for their accusations, that would have been to expose himself to endless persecutions, and to compromise at the same time the future of the philosophical restoration he meditated. Therefore he conformed to the demands of his times and resorted to the great and splendid expedient of Ketman. When he arrived in a city he was careful to present himself humbly to all the moudjteheds or doctors of the region. he sat in a corner of their salons, their talars, remained silent usually, spoke modestly, approved each word that escaped their venerable lips. He was questioned about his knowledge; he expressed only ideas borrowed from the strictest Shiite theology and in no way indicated that he concerned himself with philosophy. After several days, seeing him so meek, the moudjteheds themselves engaged him to give public lessons. He set to work immediately, took as his text the doctrine of ablution or some similar point, and split haris over the prescriptions and inner doubts of the subtlest theoreticians. This behavior delighted the mullahs. They lauded him to the skies; they forgot to keep an eye on him. They themselves wanted to see him lead their imaginations through less placid questions. He did not refuse. From the doctrine of ablution he passed to that of prayer; from the doctrine of prayer, to that of revelation; from revelation, to divine unity and there, with marvels of ingenuity, reticence, confidences to the most advanced pupils, self-contradiction, ambiguous propositions, fallacious syllogisms out of which only the initiated could see their way, the whole heavily seasoned with unimpeachable professions of faith, he succeeded in spreading Avicennism throughout the entire lettered class; and when at last he believed he could reveal himself completely, he drew aside the veils, repudiated Islam, and showed himself the logician, the metaphysician he really was.
Milosz points out that in contemporary times, Sadra would not have been so successful! The pathocratic regime is ruthless in stamping out such "deviations."
"Deviations," the tracing of which creates so many troubles for the rulers, are not an illusion. They are cases of accidental unmaskings of Ketman; and those who are most helpful in detecting deviations are those who themselves practice a similar form of Ketman.
Notice the similarity to what Lobaczewski mentions about the Daltonists needing those who are only partially colorblind to act as middlemen. In a pathocratic system, the psychopaths rely on characteropathic and morally/intellectually/emotionally weak individuals to inform on other normal people. And the psychopaths are always surprised that people do not rid themselves of their silly notions. As Milosz says, each group is fooling the other! The psychopaths expect the normies to act in a certain way (i.e., without normal human emotion), which they do, to a certain extent. However, it is only an act, and any "deviation" is punished severely.
Milosz gives several examples of subtypes of Ketman, which can be seen as different types of pretense adopted by individuals, often to the point of "identifying" with such beliefs (possibly a form of what Lobaczewski calls conversive thinking): 1) National Ketman, 2) Ketman of Revolutionary Purity, 3) Aesthetic Ketman, 4) Professional Ketman, 5) Sceptical Ketman, 6) Metaphysical Ketman, 7) Ethical Ketman. I got the impression this last one might have applied to the psychopaths, of which Milosz was not aware. That is, they "act" ethical, though they are the biggest mass murderers.
Some more good quotations:
[Regarding aesthetic Ketman] we trespass upon the treacherous territory of the demon, Psychology. To admit that a man's eye has need of exultant colors, harmonious forms, or light sunny architecture is to affirm that the taste of the Center is bad.
[Regarding professional Ketman], If I am a scientist I attend congresses at which I deliver reports strictly adhering to the Party line. But in the laboratory I pursue my research according to scientific methods, and in that alone lies the aim of my life.
After work one goes to political meetings of special lectures, thus lengthening a day that is without a moment of relaxation or spontaneity. The people one talks with may seem relaxed and careless, sympathetic and indignant, but if they appear so , it is only to arouse corresponding attitudes and to extract confidences which they can report to their superiors.
[T]hey [the Party] make concessions to physiological human weaknesses, but they refuse to admit that man has other foibles as well.
Forty or fifty years of education in these new ethical maxims must create a new and irretrievable species of mankind. The "new man" is not merely a postulate. He is beginning to become a reality.
Notice how close Milosz comes to the truth of the matter. The "new man" was not created, it simply emerged from behind its mask of sanity--a psychopathic revelation. In other words, the "new man" has always been here.
How does this apply to alchemy? The alchemists, it now seems to me, had to keep their work secret for a number of reasons. First of all, if working under pathocratic conditions (which would encompass most regions, in most time periods, of our history), to reveal the nature of one's research would prove fatal. Personality development (the creation of a singular "I") involves, as a necessity, the knowledge of human nature, in all its variations. This is a two-front attack on pathocrats: on the one hand such work requires a knowledge of pathological types, on the other, its result is a person with knowledge who has the ability to influence others and pass on that knowledge. So a pathocracy must protect itself by eliminating research that could diagnose it successfully, which would lead to its destruction, and it must also prevent anyone from developing to the point where they can overcome pathocratic control.
Second, if working under friendly conditions (like the "logocracy" of Cathar-era Languedoc), such scientists must pass on their knowledge in a form that will evade pathocrats' notice in more hostile future times. Thus the symbolic nature of alchemy. Such concepts can be explained scientifically to a certain extent (as can be seen in the work of Gurdjieff and Dabrowski), but such an explicit revelation of the possibilities and methods of human development will surely bring pathocratic retribution (i.e., poneric "cointelpro").
I'd hazard to guess that this also applies, on a more subtle level, to information that threatens the larger control system. Such information (e.g., the truths behind "free" energy, hyperdimensions, etc.) will bring "cosmic cointelpro," even in a "normal" system of government/society.
To close, here is the end of Milosz's chapter on Ketman:
Today man believes there is nothing in him, so he accepts anything, even if he knows it to be ad, in order to find himself at one with others, in order not to e alone. As long as he believes this, there is little on e can reproach in his behavior. Perhaps it is better for him to breed a full-grown Ketman, to submit to pressure and thus feel that he is, than to take a chance on the wisdom of past ages which maintains that man is a creature of God.
But suppose one should try to live without Ketman, to challenge fate, to say: "If I lose, I shall not pity myself." Suppose on can live without outside pressure, suppose one can create one's own inner tension--then it is not true that there is nothing in man. To take this risk would be an act of faith.
