I would like to point out that I’m annoyed every time the word „annexation“ is used in terms of what happened in Crimea, and now, in the four former parts of Ukraine which are now Russian land. The vast majority of western (and eastern) observers of what is going on, including, sadly, those who are not drowned by the propaganda and make otherwise pretty good analysis, keep using that word. Why? Because the west said so? And then it is just mindlessly regurgitated by everyone (including, sadly by those who should know better) and becomes „reality“ over the years? Apparently so. Sadly, what Goebbels apparently uttered seems to work every time, paraphrasing; "repeat a lie often enough and people start to believe and parrot it". Let me tell you, just because everyone calls it an Annexation, doesn't make it so. Nor does that coerce me to use it.
Let me explain. I’m appalled of that word being used in this context because I’m pretty sure that it is in reality, in both cases, not an annexation, legally, morally and justifiably, as Reinhard Merkel, a german professor of criminal law and philosophy of law, pointed out many years ago (2014) and you can see translated below. If anything, it comes much closer to a legal definition of a secession. And that is why I refuse to call any of it an "Annexation" and use the much more fitting, but still not perfect word/definition for it instead, namely, a "Secession". I'm pretty sure that Putin acted, yet again, strictly by law in both cases, and took not only the points Merkel mentions below about international law into consideration. Take a special note that Merkel is very knowledgeable about international law. I bet Putin knows the ins and outs at least as good as Merkel does and strictly plays by/through those rules. I think you will also be able to understand Putin's statements, actions and thinking over the years much more clearly. The words in [brackets] are from me, by the way. Well worth the read! (improved machine translation):
Let me explain. I’m appalled of that word being used in this context because I’m pretty sure that it is in reality, in both cases, not an annexation, legally, morally and justifiably, as Reinhard Merkel, a german professor of criminal law and philosophy of law, pointed out many years ago (2014) and you can see translated below. If anything, it comes much closer to a legal definition of a secession. And that is why I refuse to call any of it an "Annexation" and use the much more fitting, but still not perfect word/definition for it instead, namely, a "Secession". I'm pretty sure that Putin acted, yet again, strictly by law in both cases, and took not only the points Merkel mentions below about international law into consideration. Take a special note that Merkel is very knowledgeable about international law. I bet Putin knows the ins and outs at least as good as Merkel does and strictly plays by/through those rules. I think you will also be able to understand Putin's statements, actions and thinking over the years much more clearly. The words in [brackets] are from me, by the way. Well worth the read! (improved machine translation):
Reinhard Merkel, Professor of Criminal Law: Crimea was not annexed, attempts by eastern Ukrainians to secede are legitimate. The West speaks with forked tongues
Voice of Russia
Tue, 21 Oct 2014
There are attempts at secession everywhere, but these are politically evaluated differently. While the Scots were allowed to decide on their independence in a referendum, the Catalans are denied this. What about Crimea? And how would a secession of eastern Ukraine be assessed under international law? That's what Armin Siebert asked Reinhard Merkel, Professor of Criminal Law and Legal Philosophy at the University of Hamburg.
Professor Merkel, has Russia annexed Crimea?
"It was not a clear form of annexation. However, it has also not been a clear, or in other words, a distinct form of another modality of a seclusion or a secession from a mother state, namely, no clear, distinct form of secession. However, to answer the question very pointedly and clearly, it was not an annexation."
Was the referendum in Crimea and its secession from Ukraine against international law?
"No, such referendums cannot violate international law. International law is primarily concerned with the relations between states and then also with how states exercise their power internally, at least beyond a certain limit of abuse of power, i.e. when states begin to organize genocide or massive forms of oppression, torture, etc. All of this is now also a matter for international law. International law is not called into play by separatist or secessionist ambitions/attempts. Therefore, these efforts in Crimea to secede may have been a violation of Ukrainian constitutional law, but not a violation of international law."
Let's move on to the more topical and present problem at the moment, namely eastern Ukraine. Is it legitimate that the Ukrainian military is effectively attacking and bombing its own people?
"This is a difficult question to begin with. Since such a secession, as practiced by the separatist forces there, is not legal under the Ukrainian constitution, the Ukrainian administration and government has the right to react with a certain amount of police force and to prevent it. However, a certain limit is set to this type of coercion being exercised internally. And that limit is also part of the international law discussions about secession.In 1998, Canada's Supreme Court ruled in a landmark ruling that states confronted with domestic separatist and secessionist tendencies/ambitions/attempts cannot immediately respond with military force. Canada has always faced secessionist tendencies, from the people of Quebec. That's why it went through the judiciary there and up to the Supreme Court. If you know this background and also pay a little attention to the human rights agreements, conventions, international treaties, then you can see that the military reaction of the government in Kyiv was illegitimate."
How would a secession of the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Lugansk in eastern Ukraine need to proceed in order for it to be legal?
"The correct mode of procedure would be that, and this is how something like this begins, that the secessionist efforts are articulated first of all in a civil society procedure of the organization. Then a referendum can be organized. Now, however, secession from the mother state in Ukraine is unconstitutional. So there would certainly be initial efforts to stop the referendum. But according to the criteria of legal principles, at least as far as the use of force/violence is concerned, the state's hands are tied for the time being. That state [Ukraine in that case] can then try to develop counter-propaganda, so to speak, to ignite a discussion through the media.All of this has to be done in a civilized manner by both sides. If the secessionist efforts continue, the threshold will be reached at some point, and I say this again with a view to the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court, where civilized states are beginning to organize a mediation process. Best with the help of foreign mediators, i.e. other states, best mediated through the United Nations, so that, to put it bluntly, you get together and say, we are negotiating now. [aka. the Minsk agreements among other efforts that came after this article was published. As we all know the Minsk agreements have been repeteidly violated by one side alone, aka. the Ukrainians/USA/Europe/West]If nothing comes out of these negotiations, then before violence is used, the states have to tolerate the organization of referendums. Look how it went in Scotland. This threatened London massively in many ways. Nonetheless, no one said we would use police force to counteract this. A referendum has been allowed to be organized under the auspices of international observers. That's actually the right way. Why I hesitate a bit here and there in my answers [is because]: international law does not provide a clear line. It is not primarily concerned with secession.It only takes care that certain thresholds of violence are not exceeded in cases of conflict of a domestic nature. Unfortunately, these were exceeded in the Ukraine from the start. If a group stubbornly says that we no longer want to stay with the mother state and if this group, for its part, is an important prerequisite, so to speak, capable of running a state, if the area that they control and could then administer after a later seperation satisfies basic state criteria, so to speak, then the mother state has to accept that at some point."
What is, to put it bluntly, when two countries are fighting over a territory, such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria or Abkhazia? In the end, does the will of the residents of the area always count, or can a country say: "No, you must not move to another state or become independend, you belong to us!"
"Well, that falls a bit in that gray area where international law doesn't provide clear directives. Of course, the government of such a state can set all peaceful levers in motion to prevent this, of course they also have the right to say, we do not accept that, you must not secede, you belong to us. And then the need for mediation, for negotiations, for the peaceful search for a way out begins. If that doesn't ultimately lead to the separatist movements ending, a state will have to accept that at some point.The main problem is, of course, when another state is involved that has an interest in this territory coming to it, that this third state should not interfere. This is an absolute requirement of international law. If, however, the separatist efforts clearly show that, firstly, we are splitting off and, secondly, we are joining this other state, then the mother state cannot do anything against the first act, against the splitting off, in the long run, at least it can not resort to military violence.The situations become complicated when the mother state and its government resort to violence too quickly [Ukraine] and then the external third state [Russia] feels called upon to come to the aid of the population in the separatist area, and then the situation becomes unclear. On the one hand, this is a kind of interference on the part of the third country, which is basically forbidden, on the other hand, disproportionate force was used beforehand. In situations like this the legitimation relationships become cloudy and unclear."
Why is Kosovo's secession right/legal, but that of the Catalans is not? Are there double standards when it comes to international law?
"In a certain sense, unfortunately, one cannot deny that double standards are being applied. At the time, I did not believe that the secession of Kosovo was legal, but the Western powers recognised the secession of Kosovo within two days, just as quickly as Russia recognised the secession of Crimea [afterwards]. The story [the secession of Kosovo and subsequent regonistion of western powers] then went via the United Nations National Assembly to the International Court of Justice, which was asked for a so called advisory opinion on the secession of Kosovo.The International Court of Justice, in a dubious and very controversial decision, said: "In any case, this does not violate international law." In my opinion, that [desicion/statment] was wrong, but it was a striking/distinctive point in the development of international law, namely, this report by the International Court of Justice. That's why you can't go around today and say that the secession in eastern Ukraine, for example, is, from the getgo, against every conceivable legal norm. This is no longer the case from the point of view of international law. And as for the Catalans, the situation may be a bit more difficult.The Catalans have essentially nothing to complain about, to put it bluntly, about any kind of oppression. They also have broud autonomy rights. Such a population should first try to reconcile/adjust itself within its largely autonomous status, [and try to] remain with the mother state. That probably wouldn't have been possible in Kosovo because the Albanians there showed no willingness to make concessions. However, and this is important for me to point out, it is not correct what we have read in our media and what some experts in international law say, that the Albanians had a right to secede with Kosovo because they were bloodily oppressed by the Serbs.By the time Kosovo seceded, that was almost ten years in the past. They had long been autonomous, they were under the auspices of the United Nations. Incidentally, the military was also in the country, namely the troops of the United Nations. At the time, this military probably prevented Serbia from trying to prevent the secession of Kosovo with similar violent measures, as Kiev did in eastern Ukraine. All of this shows that the parallel between eastern Ukraine and Kosovo is very clear and that there is a speaking with two tongues taking place; with a forked tongue.In the discussion of the world of states, when it is said that what happened in Kosovo was perfectly okay, [and it is said that] what happened in Ukraine is so very much not okay [at the same time] that one can take military action against it and [in another case, say] the situation with the Catalans is, so to speak, unacceptable from the start: All these things are not coherent [and do not satisfy a unified criterion of legal principles. However, international law is now also called upon, that is, the international law experts themselves are called upon to finally clarify this dark and murky area of their own jurisdiction more precisely."
Professor Merkel, thank you very much for the interview.
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