Stoic Ethics, Rationality and the Feeling Function

In this first audio recording series the ethics of the Stoics are discussed, laying out the natures of virtue, vice and indifference. What is passion and how is it connected to impulse? How does reason and intellect help one live in accordance with nature? Is knowledge and virtue the same, the highest goods because they're good in and of themselves? The book "Stoicism" that is read from elaborates on these questions quite well.
Part 1 http://youtu.be/edb1fbJzBJs
Part 2 http://youtu.be/hYa1I6OpgPE
Part 3http://youtu.be/LKqgM6QPG8U
The second series is The Encheiridion of Epictetus, a series of aphorisms by the roman stoic. His emphasis on choice/free will really helps one to understand that no matter the circumstances your choice on how you respond can never be taken away. I found these recordings empowering at a stressful time.
Part 1 http://youtu.be/eCmhhQcPXhE
Part 2 http://youtu.be/xNqiiHyDJ-U
Part 3 http://youtu.be/siMJv-Uqor0
Part 4thhttp://youtu.be/yqjgevtuJwM

For those interested in Stoicism, William Irvine's "A Guide to the Good Life: The Ancient Art of Stoic Joy " provides a practical treatment of philosophy as it can apply to modern life. The author is a professor of philosophy who was disturbed by the fact that modern philosophy does not provide any guidance to people about a "philosophy of life" - or how to live a good life. This is not how philosophy was practiced in ancient times.

[quote author=A Guide to the Good Life]
If you had gone to Epictetus and said, “I want to live a good life. What should I do?” he would have had an answer for you: “Live in accordance with nature.” He would then have told you, in great detail, how to do this. If, by way of contrast, you went to a twentieth-century analytic philosopher and asked the same question, he probably would have responded not by answering the question you asked but by analyzing the question itself: “The answer to your question depends on what you mean by ‘a good life,’ which in turn depends on what you mean by ‘good’ and ‘a life.’” He might then walk you through all the things you could conceivably mean in asking how to live a good life and explain why each of these meanings is logically muddled. His conclusion: It makes no sense to ask how to live a good life. When this philosopher had finished speaking, you might be impressed with his flair for philosophical analysis, but you might also conclude, with good reason, that he himself lacked a coherent philosophy of life.
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So his goal in writing the book was not to nitpick at words and get lost in ancient debates about reason vs passion but

[quote author=A Guide to the Good Life]
I wrote this book with the following question in mind: If the ancient Stoics had taken it upon themselves to write a guidebook for twenty-first-century individuals— a book that would tell us how to have a good life— what might that book have looked like? The pages that follow are my answer to this question.
[/quote]

My favorite treatment of Epictetus comes from A.A Long's "Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life". I have read the handbook (Encheiridion) and some of his discourses which is useful. As Long writes

[quote author=Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life]
The popularity of self-help books and therapy sessions has its ancient prototype in the Manual (Encheiridion).
...............
Packaged in this way, Epictetus has his appeal, but if this were all we would scarcely call him a major precursor of our modern philosophical tradition. We would relate him rather (and I do not mean disparagingly so) to the rule books of Christian monasticism or to the Wisdom literature of Buddhism and Confucianism. Those contexts and their meditative practices are appropriate up to a point; Epictetus recommended his students to concentrate on such thoughts as those excerpted above, and some of his work has a mantra-like quality. The excerpts of the Manual, however, are only that-passages Arrian organized, selected, and compressed from the full record in order to present Epictetus' teaching in a more accessible and memorable form. They give a limited and somewhat grim impression of his thinking and speaking in his actual Discourses. There, rather than advancing maxims and potted doctrines, he chiefly tries to show why the prescriptions of the Manual are grounded in truths he thinks he can prove concerning the nature of the world at large, human nature, and a rational mind's dialogue with itself. In addition, he addresses this instruction quite specifically to his student audience, relating it to questions and problems they face as would-be Stoics and as persons engaged in social life, with aspiration to various careers including the teaching of philosophy. To engage their attention, he intersperses quiet reflections with histrionic wit, hyperbole, and Swiftian pungency. The Discourses represent a unique blend of philosophy, pedagogy, satire, exhortation, and uninhibited dialogue. In this book, therefore, my focus will be on the Epictetus of the Discourses rather than the potted excerpts of the Manual.
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Long's work, while more serious in tone and focused in a scholarly sense than Irvine's book, also puts Epictetus in historical context. As is evident from the title of the book, Long treats Epictetus as the latter day Roman successor of the legacy of Socrates. This is based on a number of factors. Epictetus, like Socrates was a teacher not an author. His teachings - or rather fragments of it - were collected and published by his student Arrian. According to Long, Epictetus "appropriates Socrates more deeply than any other philosopher after Plato" citing him often in his lectures and following his style of discourse. Epictetus' philosophy is thus Stoic and Socratic in nature along with some affiliation to Diogenes the Cynic. For those interested to delve a little deeper in Stoic philosophy in a way that is relevant to Gurdjieff's 4th Way, this book would be good reading imo.

Holy Caesar, this forum is a new Britannica! I was browsing Amazon's audio books as I have some 'free' credits to use before I close my account and came across "A Guide to the Good Life". I got a bit confused by contradictory reviews, most of them making sense for someone who hasn't read the book yet. Then, I found another review that really made me think whether it would really be the best use of my credit. So I'd like to ask you, Obyvatel, what's your take on these statements:

_http://philosophy-of-cbt.com/2013/05/17/review-of-irvines-a-guide-to-the-good-life-the-ancient-art-of-stoic-joy-2009/

So Irvine describes this as his own version of “Stoicism”, and different from any preceding version. Crucially, it involves replacing the supreme Stoic goal of “living in accord with virtue” (aka “living in agreement with nature”) with the goal of attaining “tranquillity” or freedom from emotional suffering. He says that he’s doing this because he believes it is “unusual, after all, for modern individuals to have an interest in becoming more virtuous, in the ancient sense of the word” (2009, p. 42). That’s odd because the Stoic concept of virtue is essentially a form of practical wisdom and I would have said that people today place as much value on practical wisdom, or “the art of living”, as they did in the ancient world. In fact, I think it would make just as much, if not more, sense to the majority of people as the alternative goal of “tranquillity”.

Irvine says that “although the Stoics thought they could prove that theirs was the correct philosophy of life, I don’t think such a proof is possible” (p. 28). This position perhaps has less in common with the ancient Stoics than with Academic Skeptics like Cicero, who appropriated some of the concepts and techniques of Stoicism, while rejecting its philosophical arguments. What Irvine therefore describes is Stoicism as a therapy of the passions, but without any of its philosophical foundations– a kind of Stoicism-lite. In particular, Irvine rejects the Stoic ethical argument that virtue is the goal of life and the highest good. However, this is arguably not a trivial aspect of Stoicism but its core doctrine, which distinguished Stoics from philosophers of opposing schools.

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And

Irvine clearly states that his book replaces the traditional goal of life in Stoicism, “living in accord with virtue”, with the goal of attaining emotional tranquillity. [...]

In modern psychotherapy, it’s widely-recognised now that the desire primarily to avoid unpleasant or painful feelings tends to backfire.

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Now, I seem to understand why some reviewers have mentioned Zen-like approach in the book.

He lost me a bit with his final paragraph though, so I'd really appreciate your thoughts on that.

On pursuit of tranquility vs virtue, Irvine says that Greek Stoics put more emphasis on virtue while Roman Stoics added tranquility to the list. Irvine picked tranquility as the emphasis point and gives his reasons.

What is tranquility

[quote author= A Guide to the Good Life]

We will instead turn our attention to the pursuit of tranquility and what the Stoics called virtue. We will discover that Stoic virtue has very little in common with what people today mean by the word. We will also discover that the tranquility the Stoics sought is not the kind of tranquility that might be brought on by the ingestion of a tranquilizer; it is not, in other words, a zombie-like state. It is instead a state marked by the absence of negative emotions such as anger, grief, anxiety, and fear, and the presence of positive emotions— in particular, joy. We will study the various psychological techniques developed by the Stoics for attaining and maintaining tranquility, and we will employ these techniques in daily living.
[/quote]

Why tranquility

[quote author=A Guide to the Good Life]
For the Roman Stoics, the goals of attaining tranquility and attaining virtue were connected, and for this reason, when they discuss virtue, they are likely to discuss tranquility as well. In particular, they are likely to point out that one benefit of attaining virtue is that we will thereupon experience tranquility. Thus, early in his Discourses, Epictetus advises us to pursue virtue but immediately reminds us that virtue “holds out the promise … to create happiness and calm and serenity” and that “progress toward virtue is progress toward each of these states of mind.” Indeed, he goes so far as to identify serenity as the result at which virtue aims. Because the Roman Stoics spent so much time discussing tranquility (as a by-product of virtuous living), they create the impression that they were disinterested in virtue. Consider, for example, Epictetus’s Handbook, also known as his Manual or Encheiridion. Arrian (one of Epictetus’s students) compiled this work with the goal of providing second-century Roman audiences with an easily accessible introduction to Stoicism. Although the Handbook is filled with advice on what, according to Epictetus, we must do if we wish to gain and maintain tranquility, Arrian saw no need to mention virtue.

One last comment is in order on the connection for the Roman Stoics between the goal of attaining virtue and the goal of attaining tranquility. Besides asserting that the pursuit of virtue will bring us tranquility, I think the Roman Stoics would argue that the attainment of tranquility will help us pursue virtue. Someone who is not tranquil— someone, that is, who is distracted by negative emotions such as anger or grief— might find it difficult to do what his reason tells him to do: His emotions will triumph over his intellect. This person might therefore become confused about what things are really good, consequently might fail to pursue them, and might, as a result, fail to attain virtue. Thus, for the Roman Stoics, the pursuit of virtue and the pursuit of tranquility are components of a virtuous circle— indeed, a doubly virtuous circle: The pursuit of virtue results in a degree of tranquility, which in turn makes it easier for us to pursue virtue.
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Regarding this quote from the review
[quote author=review]
Irvine says that “although the Stoics thought they could prove that theirs was the correct philosophy of life, I don’t think such a proof is possible” (p. 28). This position perhaps has less in common with the ancient Stoics than with Academic Skeptics like Cicero, who appropriated some of the concepts and techniques of Stoicism, while rejecting its philosophical arguments. What Irvine therefore describes is Stoicism as a therapy of the passions, but without any of its philosophical foundations– a kind of Stoicism-lite. In particular, Irvine rejects the Stoic ethical argument that virtue is the goal of life and the highest good. However, this is arguably not a trivial aspect of Stoicism but its core doctrine, which distinguished Stoics from philosophers of opposing schools.
[/quote]

This is not a book for a scholarly discussion on Stoic philosophy. Irvine makes it clear that he is focusing on practical aspects. He does not reject Stoicism's philosophical basis. He very much follows Epictetus's approach of knowing and mastering oneself first before moving on to social relationships and then onto advanced philosophy and logic. Delving into advanced logic and handling paradoxes through arguments - as has become the norm of philosophy today and as was becoming popular at the time of the Romans - was considered by Epictetus as a field of study reserved for those who had already made substantial progress in mastering oneself and one's relationships. Irvine deals with what Epictetus considered as foundational in this book. The comparison with Cicero is completely unwarranted imo.

[quote author=review]
In modern psychotherapy, it’s widely-recognised now that the desire primarily to avoid unpleasant or painful feelings tends to backfire.
[/quote]

Avoiding unpleasant and painful feelings is quite the opposite of the Stoic approach. There is a whole chapter in the book devoted to negative visualization as well as undergoing voluntary discomfort in an effort to intimately acquaint oneself with unpleasant feelings. I wonder if the person who wrote the above even bothered to read the book. As far as the question of psychotherapy goes, many consider Stoic philosophy as the precursor of modern cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT).


[quote author=Possibility of Being]
Now, I seem to understand why some reviewers have mentioned Zen-like approach in the book.
[/quote]

There are similarities and differences between Zen and Stoicism. The main difference that Irvine points out in the book is that while Zen practice would require a significant amount of time in the day devoted to meditation with a focus towards emptying the mind, practicing Stoicism is a whole day affair intimately connected with normal daily activities, which goes well with the 4th Way.


I think Irvine's book provides a reasonable introduction to Stoic psychology in an easy to digest format. If someone is well versed in Marcus Aurelius or Epictetus or Seneca, then the book would not have a lot of new stuff to offer.

In a more general sense, the main weakness I see in what has reached us as Stoic psychology is the over-emphasis on the conscious mind over the unconscious mind. Posidonius did challenge this to some extent among the Stoic philosophers emphasizing that examination of virtues depend upon the correct examination of emotions which represent the irrational aspect of human nature. Posidonius suggested different modes of education for what he called the rational and irrational aspects of human nature with the irrational aspects to be trained through music and exercise. Irvine's book does not deal with Posidonius directly except for what got adopted by later Roman Stoics like techniques of negative visualization.

Thank you, Obyvatel. Sounds good and I'm going to get the book. :)

Thanks Obyvatal for the summary on A Guide to the Good Life and I would like to ask do you think virtue and tranquility were connected to what G would call a man with a working conscience that is always followed? Virtue tranquility and a good conscience seem to go hand in hand which would bring about joy and other positive emotions.

ajseph 21 said:

Thanks Obyvatal for the summary on A Guide to the Good Life and I would like to ask do you think virtue and tranquility were connected to what G would call a man with a working conscience that is always followed? Virtue tranquility and a good conscience seem to go hand in hand which would bring about joy and other positive emotions.

Click to expand...

I would think so. Stoics put a lot of stock in social relations unlike other philosophies where a practitioner would pursue tranquility and virtue but would be largely isolated from regular life. The Stoic pursuit of tranquility and virtue happened in "the heat of the battle" of social and political turnmoil where they tried to make things better for society at large. This to me indicates that they were generally people with a working and developing conscience .

One of the key criticisms of Stoics is that they suppress emotions. I have struggled quite a bit trying to understand this aspect because as you pointed out, if tranquility and virtue are connected with a working conscience, and conscience is largely a function of feeling, how can one develop conscience with the Stoic approach where the supreme goal is rationality? I am not satisfied with the literature I read on Stoic philosophy regarding this matter where emotions are treated as irrational.

Recently I came across some Jungian literature where Carl Jung's personality types are discussed. Jung's work on types is popularized in the Myers and Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) tests. I am not very familiar with MBTI and am not interested in personality typecasting but rather in understanding the feeling function better in order to reconcile the question of feeling and consolidate the Stoic ideas. What I am learning is that Jung identified 4 functions of personality - thinking, feeling, intuition and sensing. Jung treated thinking and feeling as rational functions, while intuition and sensing are irrational functions. Jung also made clear distinctions between emotions and the feeling function. This topic is interesting to me and would perhaps need a detailed discussion, but in a nutshell, a well-developed and differentiated feeling function is an important component of the Jungian process of development (individuation) and it is quite compatible imo with the Stoic and 4th Way concept of development. The question of feeling is treated in some depth in Jungian psychology and from their descriptions, the manifestation of a well developed and differentiated feeling function is different from the popular notions of emotional health.

obyvatel said:

The question of feeling is treated in some depth in Jungian psychology and from their descriptions, the manifestation of a well developed and differentiated feeling function is different from the popular notions of emotional health.

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How would you describe the proper manifestation in contrast with the popular notions?

luke wilson said:

obyvatel said:

The question of feeling is treated in some depth in Jungian psychology and from their descriptions, the manifestation of a well developed and differentiated feeling function is different from the popular notions of emotional health.

Click to expand...

How would you describe the proper manifestation in contrast with the popular notions?

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I need some time to put things together. When I do, I will post it here. I do not have new revealations so to say - if someone follows the forum with enough awareness and/or has a well developed feeling function, then he/she will already know pretty much all of it. I do not fall in this category and for me, some things that I had read earlier and observed in life was sort of brought together in a coherent form through the reading of this literature.

Here is what I have found so far in trying to understand the pursuit of virtue in Stoic philosophy and its potential connection to the feeling function as defined by Jung.

Going back to the Greek Chrysippus, Stoic virtue was considered to be rational excellence . Chrysippus' definition of specific virtues use the Greek term episteme which scholars say is difficult to translate to english. The generally used english equivalent is loosely "knowledge" which helps a person to act appropriately - as is proper to a rational agent - in every situation. The primary virtues were practical wisdom, temperance, courage and justice . All these virtues were considered to belong to the rational category by Chrysippus and apparently his predecessors. It appears that later commentators and writers regarded intellect as the only rational function - and consequently, the scope was extended to include non-intellectual and thus non-rational moral qualities. For people interested in a discussion of this issue from a scholarly perspective, the book "Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics" is one source ( I found it quite dry). Today, wikipedia defines virtue as "moral excellence".

A detailed scholarly study on Stoicism and the role of emotions is presented in Richard Sorabji's "Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation". Sorabji writes

[quote author=Emotion and Peace of Mind]
In Chrysippus' view, all emotion consists of two judgements. There is the judgement that there is good or bad (benefit or harm) at hand, and the judgement that it is appropriate to react in ways which he specifies precisely.
[/quote]
Both the "like-dislike" component and the action that follows to move towards goodness (discussed in "The Quest to Feel Good" a book in the recommended list) are recognized as components of emotion today. In Stoicism, the physical correlates of emotion (muscular tension, changes in the nervous system etc) were considered to be "first movements" which could precede or follow emotions - but emotions themselves were considered as consisting of judgements. The first movements are often involuntary. The appearance of an external situation or an internal state which triggers the emotion are not under our control. However, the judgements are potentially voluntary. In the Stoic view, one usually assents automatically to whatever appears - thus emotions seem to be beyond our control. But Stoic philosophy teaches that one can withhold the assent while one questions the appearance with a set of rules. After examination, one has the choice to give assent (or judgement) to the appearance or not. This ostensibly appears as an intellectual approach. However, Stoic philosophy was practical - and in therapeutic terms, it was the precursor of the popular cognitive behavioral therapy of our times.

Now coming to Carl Jung, Jung identified 4 functions in the human psyche - thinking, feeling, sensing and intuiting.

[quote author=Carl Jung]
Sensation establishes what is actually present, thinking enables us to recognize its meaning, feeling tells us its value, and intuition points to possibilities as to whence it came and whither it is going in a given situation. In this way we can orient ourselves with respect to the immediate world as completely as when we locate a place geographically by latitude and longitude. The four functions are somewhat like the four points of the compass; they are just as arbitrary and just as indispensable.
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Of these 4 functions, Jung considered thinking and feeling to be rational functions which pass judgements while sensing and intuiting are perceptive functions which simply report what is and do not pass any judgement. Jung has defended his categorization of feeling as a rational function.

[quote author=Jung]
What I call the thinking and feeling types comprise two groups of persons who again have something in common which I cannot designate except by the word rationality . No one will dispute that thinking is essentially rational, but when we come to feeling, weighty objections may be raised which I would not like to brush aside. On the contrary, I freely admit that this problem of feeling has been one that has caused me much brain-racking.
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… feeling is a kind of judgment, differing from intellectual judgment in that its aim is not to establish conceptual relations but to set up a subjective criterion of acceptance or rejection. Valuation by feeling extends to every content of consciousness, of whatever kind it may be. When the intensity of feeling increases, it turns into an affect, i.e., a feeling state accompanied by marked physical innervations. Feeling, like thinking, is a rational function, since values in general are assigned according to the laws of reason, just as concepts in general are formed according to these laws.
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The chief difficulty is that the word ‘feeling’ can be used in all sorts of different ways. This is especially true in German, but is noticeable to some extent in English and French as well. First of all, then, we must make a careful distinction between feeling and sensation, which is a sensory function. And in the second place we must recognize that a feeling of regret is something quite different from a ‘feeling’ that the weather will change or that the price of our aluminum shares will go up. I have therefore proposed using feeling as a proper term in the first example, and dropping it – so far as its psychological usage is concerned – in the second. Here we should speak of sensation when sense impressions are involved, and of intuition if we are dealing with a kind of perception which cannot be traced back directly to conscious sensory experience. Hence I define sensation as perception via conscious sensory functions, and intuition as perception via the unconscious.

Obviously we could argue until Doomsday about the fitness of these definitions, but ultimately it is only a question of terminology. It is as if we were debating whether to call a certain animal a leopard or a panther, when all we need to know is what name we are giving to what. Psychology is virgin territory, and its terminology has still to be fixed.....

It is evident, then, that I take feeling as a function per se and distinguish it from sensation and intuition. Whoever confuses these last two functions with feeling in the strict sense is obviously not in a position to acknowledge the rationality of feeling. But once they are distinguished from feeling, it becomes quite clear that feeling values and feeling judgments – indeed, feelings in general – are not only rational but can also be as logical, consistent and discriminating as thinking. This may seem strange to the thinking type, but it is easily explained when we realize that in a person with a differentiated thinking function the feeling function is always less developed, more primitive, and therefore contaminated with other functions, these being precisely the functions which are not rational, not logical, and not discriminating or evaluating, namely, sensation and intuition. These two are by their very nature opposed to the rational functions.

When we think, it is in order to judge or to reach a conclusion, and when we feel it is in order to attach a proper value to something. Sensation and intuition, on the other hand, are perceptive functions – they make us aware of what is happening, but do not interpret or evaluate it. They do not proceed selectively, according to principles, but are simply receptive to what happens. But ‘what happens’ is essentially irrational. There is no inferential method by which it could ever be proved that there must be so and so many planets, or so and so many species of warm-blooded animals. Irrationality is a vice where thinking and feeling are called for, rationality is a vice where sensation and intuition should be trusted.

Now there are many people whose habitual reactions are irrational because they are based either on sensation or on intuition. They cannot be based on both at once, because sensation is just as antagonistic to intuition as thinking is to feeling. When I try to assure myself with my eyes and ears of what is actually happening, I cannot at the same time give way to dreams and fantasies about what lies around the corner. As this is just what the intuitive type must do in order to give the necessary free play to his unconscious or to the object, it is easy to see that the sensation type is at the opposite pole to the intuitive.
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So Jung essentially puts thinking and feeling in the same category as rational and logical discriminatory functions. Feeling is often confused with sensing and intuition especially if the feeling function is relatively undeveloped to begin with.

[quote author=Lectures on Jung's Typology]
First, we usually confuse feeling with sensing. Pain and pleasure are primarily sensations (feeling comfortable, feeling itchy, feeling exhausted). However, pain has a feeling dimension in addition to the pure sensation, inasmuch as it is bound with suffering or displeasure (Unlust, in the language of the German psychologists). Pleasure, too, has a feeling dimension (joy, for instance), so that we can feel disappointed or unhappy from a painful punishment or glad through a delicious dinner. Often we use the expression “I feel” when we mean more accurately “I sense.” For instance, feeling cold, feeling well, feeling the satiny surface of a cloth are all primarily sensations, either sensing the internal milieu, proprioceptively, or sensing an external object. Academic psychology has tried conceptually to separate feeling and sensing in terms of internal and external. We feel subjective states and sense external objects. But Jung’s use of sensation and feeling is more sophisticated: we can feel events as objective values outside in ethical actions and art objects, and so, too, we can sense inside our own subjective processes.

We also use sensing and feeling confusedly when we speak of someone as “sensitive” where we are really referring to a refinement of feeling, a touchiness, a quality of heightened sensibility. “Sensitives” in parapsychology refer to those with an amazing intuitive function. So, curiously, we find this mixture of terms where feeling, sensing, and intuiting are indistinct. These differences cannot be made clear as the mind would like, because language follows not logical but psychological truth. Evidently the separation of functions is not sharply defined.
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Second, feeling is often confused with intuiting. Feeling certain, feeling right, feeling something is rotten or fishy are all expressions of intuition. We tend to say “I feel,” rather than “I see” or “I find” or “It seems to me,” which would be more appropriate language for stating intuitions. The statement “He has a good ‘feel’ for paintings” or “He can ‘feel’ into the background of people” more likely describes intuition than feeling.

Third, feeling is often undifferentiated from emotion, affect, and passion (feeling furious, excited, in love, grief).
.Emotions are highly significant states. They provide depth. They give and bring meaning; they disorder and create at the same time, and they present the experience of body consciousness. In a nutshell: emotion embraces both affect and feeling and more as well; feeling is a partial activity associated with consciousness, mainly; affect is largely a physiological expression.

Fourth, feeling as a function differs from feelings. One can have feelings without being able to do much with them, without being able to function feelingly. (Similarly, one can have intuitions or thoughts without functioning mainly through intuition or mainly by thinking; i.e., one can have thoughts without being able to think them further to conclusions.) The feeling function may evaluate thoughts, sense objects and psychic contents of any kind. It is not restricted to feelings.The feeling function feels (appreciates and relates to) not only feelings. We may feel our thoughts, discover their value and importance. We may feel that even the most intense sensations or grandest intuitions have little value or cannot be related to. So too, we may think feeling and about feelings – as we are doing right now in this lecture.

Feelings themselves – irritation, enjoyment, boredom – may be handled adequately or inadequately, valued positively or negatively by the feeling function. So, the person who seems to have so much feeling and be so full of feelings may not be a “feeling type” at all, whereas a feeling type, because he disposes of feelings quite equanimously, may seem utterly devoid of feelings, distant and disinterested. Having feelings and using feeling is the difference between the contents and the process that organizes and expresses the contents. However, once this distinction is made we must not put too much weight on it. Practically, the continual subjective process of experiencing feelings is the passive background of the feeling function.
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Thus feeling is a rational discriminating and evaluating psychological process in Jungian psychology. A well developed feeling function requires a multilevel hierarchical set of values in a "feeling memory" which helps the function operate appropriately in different situations. A well developed and differentiated feeling function thus seems to be very compatible with the Stoic notion of virtue as rational excellence.

I've ordered it this morning. Thanks for the review Obyvatel, It looks very interesting.

obyvatel said:

Thus feeling is a rational discriminating and evaluating psychological process in Jungian psychology. A well developed feeling function requires a multilevel hierarchical set of values in a "feeling memory" which helps the function operate appropriately in different situations. A well developed and differentiated feeling function thus seems to be very compatible with the Stoic notion of virtue as rational excellence.

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Very interesting connection, obyvatel. It feels right and makes sense to me that feelings are rational. :P I guess the sensing and intuiting functions also play an important part in being rationally excellent if they inform us properly. Understanding and balancing all 4 functions would be key. In thinking about the different combinations...

If we have:
Thinking: rational, valuing, conscious
Feeling: rational, valuing, unconscious
Sensing, irrational, perceptive, conscious
Intuiting: irrational, perceptive, unconscious

We might get someone who predominately (overall or in the moment):
Thinks and intuits
Feels and senses
Thinks and senses
Feels and intuits

I suppose it would probably be difficult to only think and feel, or to only sense and intuit and still be alive.

Thanks, Oby! That was a very clear explanation of something Gurdjieff often remarked on: the confusion between sensing and feeling. Also ties into Dabrowski's overexcitabilities: emotional (feeling), intellectual (thinking), sensual (sensing), imaginational (intuiting).

Andromeda said:

Very interesting connection, obyvatel. It feels right and makes sense to me that feelings are rational. :P I guess the sensing and intuiting functions also play an important part in being rationally excellent if they inform us properly. Understanding and balancing all 4 functions would be key. In thinking about the different combinations...

If we have:
Thinking: rational, valuing, conscious
Feeling: rational, valuing, unconscious
Sensing, irrational, perceptive, conscious
Intuiting: irrational, perceptive, unconscious

Click to expand...

I was thinking of it in a similar way:

Thinking: information processing according to logical norms
Feeling: information processing according to moral/evaluative norms
Sensing: information transfer from body to mind
Intuiting: information transfer from unconscious ("subliminal self", mental field, information field, etc.) to mind

But as the quote in Obyvatel's post says: "the separation of functions is not sharply defined". If Whitehead's philosophy is true, this would be because 'perception' (i.e., the receptive function of information transfer) is fundamentally non-sensory in nature, i.e. mind-to-mind. When we "sense", we receive information from the 'mental pole' of the organ or cells doing the sensing. We basically 'intuit' our sensations. (The fact that our conscious connection, or attention, is strongly linked to our sensory organs is probably an evolutionary contingency.) Similarly, we intuit values, logical norms, numbers, propositions, etc., which are not grounded in the physical world. And we have latent abilities of intuition, e.g., telepathy, clairvoyance.

Also, just as sensing may be a specialized form of intuiting, thinking and feeling seem to have a common source, too. After all, logical norms are also values: truth is better than lies, non-contradiction is better than contradiction.

We might get someone who predominately (overall or in the moment):
Thinks and intuits
Feels and senses
Thinks and senses
Feels and intuits

Click to expand...

Perhaps these examples might match up, in order:
-theorist (need to be a good thinker and be able to intuit new connections/syntheses, but without good feeling, can't necessarily come up with the right theory; without good sensing, can't utilize all relevant data)
-sensualist (evaluates sensory impressions of the world and body, but without much critical thought or intuition of wider values)
-experimentalist (need to be a good thinker and have a good handle on data received via the senses),
-artist/empath (needs to properly evaluate non-sensory information, e.g., aesthetic norms, feelings of others).

I suppose it would probably be difficult to only think and feel, or to only sense and intuit and still be alive.

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Yep! If we only thought or felt, we wouldn't have an information with which to think or feel. And if we only sensed and intuited, we couldn't process and output a response.

Which reminds me: one thing missing in Jung's functions, but which Dabrowski includes, is psychomotor overexcitability. If sensing and intuiting are receptive (bottom-up) functions, and if thinking and feeling are evaluative functions, psychomotor (i.e., activity) would be the top-down function. If we only sensed, intuited, felt, and thought, we might be alive, but we wouldn't actually do anything.

Approaching Infinity said:

Which reminds me: one thing missing in Jung's functions, but which Dabrowski includes, is psychomotor overexcitability. If sensing and intuiting are receptive (bottom-up) functions, and if thinking and feeling are evaluative functions, psychomotor (i.e., activity) would be the top-down function. If we only sensed, intuited, felt, and thought, we might be alive, but we wouldn't actually do anything.

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For the Jung/Meyers/Briggs models, the psychomotor overexcitability "doer" personality would best match the Sensing (more concrete physical environment than abstract mind) and Perceiving (more flexible and wishy-washy than decisive and stubborn).

_http://www.ipersonic.com/personality-types.html

Digressing a little bit from the main topic, just like having a lot of thoughts does not mean one is using the thinking function and having a lot of feelings does not mean one is using the feeling function, there is also pretense or "covering up" reactions. Marie Von Franz writes

[quote author=Lectures on Jung's Typology]
Life has no mercy with the inferiority of the inferior function. That is why people produce such “covering up” reactions. Because it is not their real reaction, they simply borrow from the collective. A feeling type, when pressed for thinking reactions, loves to serve up a lot of commonplace remarks or thoughts that are not his real thoughts, but he has to think quickly and the real thought is not yet up to the level at which it can be expressed. So they just make a few commonplace remarks or, what is very usual for feeling types, they use material they have learned by heart.

The same is true for thinking types who get into the habit of producing a kind of amiable, conventional feeling. They send flowers, bring chocolate, or make some very conventional expression of feeling. For example, I have drawn up a form letter of condolence with certain phrases that have struck me as being very nice and touching. If I tried to express my real feelings, I would stick at such a letter for three days! So in all these situations I make a cocktail of the conventional phrases I have collected through my life. The same applies to intuitives with their inferior sensation; they simply have the habitual, technical ways of dealing with it, borrowing help from the collective.

One must not be deceived by these adaptive reactions if one tries to connect with another person. You can always observe these “covering up” reactions by the fact that they are impersonal and banal and very collective. They have no convincing personal quality about them.
[/quote]

This reminded me of what Gurdjieff had mentioned about "rolls" in the personality ( link ) and the formatory apparatus ( link ) which produce ready made thoughts, feelings and reactions.

Marie Von Franz gives some examples of the typical one-sidedness of urban dwelling modern man. He may have one function that works better than the others (his superior function) and when the urge comes in from the unconscious to redress the one-sidedness by developing the inferior function, the initial impetus is quickly hijacked by the superior function.

[quote author=Lectures on Jung's Typology]
When someone tries to meet his inferior function and experiences emotional shock or pain in confronting its real reactions, then the superior function at once says: “Ah, that is something, now we must organize that.” The superior function, like an eagle seizing a mouse, tries to get hold of the inferior function and bring it over into its own realm. I know a natural scientist, a very successful, introverted thinking type, who in his fifties became very bored with his professional work and began roaming about looking for other possibilities. His wife and family could have told him a lot about his inferior feeling, a field for experimentation right under his nose. He had several dreams of collecting rare mountain flowers, which clearly showed what the unconscious was now aiming at. He had the typical inferior feeling of the thinking type, namely, rare and very special feeling. The flowers in the mountains have a much more intense color than those of the plains, and this is also typical for the inferior feeling of a thinking type. He thought he had a good idea for a hobby, so he made friends with a botanist and went off for days, all through his holidays, collecting mountain flowers. Any attempts made by other people at telling him that he could do something about his feeling function only met with the reply that he had given up his main function and was doing something with his other side. He was studying mountain flowers! Thus he got stuck in the concretistic interpretation instead of taking the dream symbolically, and he made a sort of science of it. He wanted knowledge of those flowers, so the main function was at it again, and the inferior function once more was frustrated.

To take an irrational type: there is the intuitive who gets into a situation where he should use his inferior sensation. He becomes attracted by the idea of stonecutting or working with clay. This sort of thing very often helps inferior sensation come up in intuitives, for by such means they may get in touch with outer purpose or reason, with some kind of concrete material, with matter. He will, perhaps, mold something in clay – say, a very helpless looking, childish statue of an animal. Then he experiences something improving in himself, but immediately – like an eagle – intuition pounces on it and says: “This is it, that’s what should be introduced into all the schools,” and away he goes into his intuition again, into all the possibilities of clay molding, what could be done with it in the education of humanity, what it would include, and how it is the key to the experience of the godhead. The intuitive always brings in the whole world. But the one thing that is not considered is the molding of another figure! The main function is raving again. Having had this quickening and vivifying touch with the earth, off it goes, up into the air again.
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I think these observations are in accord with Gurdjieff's observations about Man1, Man2, Man3.

It is not only the superior function that interferes with the inferior function(s). It can sometimes also work the other way. Jung believed that the unconscious produces compensatory reactions to excessively one-sided conscious ego attitudes to keep a regulating balance in the psyche. When the one-sidedness is not consciously addressed, the inferior function(s) can come up and give the superior function an "unadapted neurotic twist.".

Thus raw unacknowledged feelings coming up unbidden can contaminate the thinking of a thinking type. Sometimes this dynamic can be seen in the unwavering loyalty some otherwise high functioning intelligent thinking types show towards an ideal - like being adherents to a particular religion. Their intellect could be razor sharp in most other areas of life but when it comes to their religious beliefs, they would be unable to hold any intelligent discussions with legitimate criticisms directed towards the tenets of their faith.

Another example would be the typical extraverted sensation oriented person - a common example in today's western culture. Such a person could be hard-nosed practical and believe in nothing except what his senses tell him and thus conduct his whole life. However, sometimes, he can suddenly fall prey to some dubious metaphysical or mystical phenomena or join such a movement or develop a sudden interest the occult and approach the subject with a completely uncritical attitude and ignore hard facts on the ground, facts that his sensing function would pick up easily in any other area of life. Von Franz writes that this is likely influenced by the inferior intuition, which being neglected by the conscious attitude, takes on a primitive archaic character.

The neurotic twist provided by inferior sensation on the superior intuition could take the form of B-grade fantasy or science fiction novels. The intuitive function can imagine going over to other worlds but still be bogged down by primitive sensual delights in such magical lands or create weird, sometimes disgusting fantasies.

The role of inferior function(s) on superior feeling can result in what Von Franz describes as "racing with a few ideas through a tremendous amount of material". As mentioned earlier, someone with superior feeling and inferior thinking tends to rely on a few ideas borrowed from others and learnt by heart (literally). Such people may tend to apply these ideas with fanatical zeal and certainty on a wide array of situations. I think that cases where a charismatic (non-psychopathic) leader with mass appeal comes to power but proves to be completely inept in running an administration setting up impractical and cookie cutter policies would fall under this dynamic.