http://harpers.org/sb-six-questions-for-wayne-white-2308402183.html
Six Questions on the Bush Administration and the Middle East Crisis for Wayne White
Posted on Sunday, July 23, 2006.
Wayne White, now an Adjunct Scholar with Washington's Middle East Institute, was Deputy Director of the State Department's Office of Middle East and South Asia Analysis until March 2005. On Saturday, he replied to a series of questions about the situation in Lebanon and the Bush Administration's response.
By Ken Silverstein.
Sources
1. Condoleezza Rice is leaving for the Middle East. Is her trip likely to lead to any favorable diplomatic outcome?
I don't think so. At least not anytime soon. Despite her meetings in New York at the UN, back in Washington, and her upcoming trip to the region, I believe her activities have been tailored to give the impression of action while not designed to make any real progress toward the urgent ceasefire that should be everyone's highest priority. To cite just one disappointment, the apparent failure to engage senior Syrian officials directly is a serious omission since Syria may be the only Arab government in a position to pressure Hezbollah in any meaningful way.
2. Why has the Bush Administration reacted so passively to the current situation? Is it likely that the administration gave Israel a "green light" for what we have been seeing on the ground?
Judging from what I saw during my time in government, one should not jump to the conclusion that Israel either asked for or was given a proverbial "green light" in advance to initiate this robust campaign in Lebanon. More likely, the Israelis took action on their own, counting on Washington's support after the fact, which is precisely what they have gotten. Indeed, the administration has been somewhat passive because it appears to want the Israelis to have all the time they believe they need to complete what is probably viewed as a mission of interest to both governments: an effort to destroy Hezbollah, once and for all.
3. What does Israel hope to gain from its ongoing military operations in Lebanon, and is it likely to meet with success?
Israel's civilian and military leadership appears to believe that it can destroy Hezbollah, not only by attacking Hezbollah itself, but also by showing the government and people of Lebanon what the price will be for allowing Hezbollah to operate on Lebanese territory. To the extent that Israel meets with success, that success will be of questionable long-term value. From a large and enraged Shiite population, surely there will be thousands of recruits ready to replace Hezbollah's losses in personnel. Indeed, just as the emergence of Hezbollah came in reaction to Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, other groups-most likely Palestinians from vast communities in and around Tyre and Sidon, or Sunni radicals from as far away as the Tripoli area of northern Lebanon-could also mobilize against the Israelis. In fact, not learning from the American experience in Iraq-that trying to crush a guerrilla movement with conventional military force and thereby inflicting significant (in this case, even deliberate) collateral casualties might only generate thousands of other potential fighters bearing various grievances-the IDF could find itself mired in the same sort of seemingly open-ended confrontation.
4. Did Israel respond to the snatching of its soldiers on the spur of the moment, or was that incident an excuse for a military operation that Israel has been intending to carry out for some time?
This is an interesting question because I believe the emotional aspect of crisis decision-making often is overlooked. Having been engaged in prolonged and exhausting efforts to address the kidnapping of another Israeli soldier in Gaza and the complications associated with that crisis, Israel's leadership might well have reacted more rashly than otherwise to events in the north. Nonetheless, Israel almost certainly made use of contingency plans already on the shelf for a major campaign against Hezbollah and, perhaps, a parallel strategy of making the point that Lebanon as a whole shared the blame for the failure to disarm Hezbollah. Israel probably also deliberately cast its Lebanese campaign as part of the Global War on Terrorism in order to better ensure U.S. support for this more wide-ranging and damaging course of action.
5. How do you see this playing out? Can Israel "break the back" of Hezbollah? Will Hezbollah be more or less popular in Lebanon and the Middle East? In short, will either side emerge with a political or military victory?
To respond to the last question first, I believe Israel might emerge with an illusion of victory over Hezbollah-a victory that will likely prove somewhat fleeting. With the relatively low popular standing of the United States, let alone Israel, throughout the region, Hezbollah will almost certainly be looked upon with greater sympathy. In fact, if this confrontation were to last the two or three more weeks Israeli officials have been discussing, Shiites from other parts of the Arab world (or even Iran) could begin arriving to join the fight, and if, as I expect, Hezbollah's resilient organization will replenish its personnel losses and attempt to rearm as fully as possible, Israel could threaten-or even lash out at-Syria in an effort to block such assistance, a response that might simply widen the conflict still further.
6. Will there be any negative consequences resulting from the administration's relatively passive diplomacy?
Very much so. As I have noted, the Israelis have embarked on a campaign that will most likely make matters worse over the long term. This crisis will further erode the United States' credibility in the Middle East-and beyond. Despite clearly siding with Israel, Washington used to be regarded as a party quite often useful for intercession with the Israelis, but in this case the Bush Administration has seemingly given Israel a blank check to do whatever it wants for as long as it wants. With respect to another extremely serious consequence of not working to bring this carnage to an early end, Lebanon already has absorbed billions of dollars of damage. By the end of the crisis, the cost of rebuilding Lebanon will be incredibly high and the rebuilding effort quite prolonged, leaving most Lebanese, aside perhaps from the hard-core Christian right, considerably more hostile to Israel-and the United States-than ever before. In this respect, I find scenes of devastated Lebanese urban areas not only appalling, but frightening.
Six Questions on the Bush Administration and the Middle East Crisis for Wayne White
Posted on Sunday, July 23, 2006.
Wayne White, now an Adjunct Scholar with Washington's Middle East Institute, was Deputy Director of the State Department's Office of Middle East and South Asia Analysis until March 2005. On Saturday, he replied to a series of questions about the situation in Lebanon and the Bush Administration's response.
By Ken Silverstein.
Sources
1. Condoleezza Rice is leaving for the Middle East. Is her trip likely to lead to any favorable diplomatic outcome?
I don't think so. At least not anytime soon. Despite her meetings in New York at the UN, back in Washington, and her upcoming trip to the region, I believe her activities have been tailored to give the impression of action while not designed to make any real progress toward the urgent ceasefire that should be everyone's highest priority. To cite just one disappointment, the apparent failure to engage senior Syrian officials directly is a serious omission since Syria may be the only Arab government in a position to pressure Hezbollah in any meaningful way.
2. Why has the Bush Administration reacted so passively to the current situation? Is it likely that the administration gave Israel a "green light" for what we have been seeing on the ground?
Judging from what I saw during my time in government, one should not jump to the conclusion that Israel either asked for or was given a proverbial "green light" in advance to initiate this robust campaign in Lebanon. More likely, the Israelis took action on their own, counting on Washington's support after the fact, which is precisely what they have gotten. Indeed, the administration has been somewhat passive because it appears to want the Israelis to have all the time they believe they need to complete what is probably viewed as a mission of interest to both governments: an effort to destroy Hezbollah, once and for all.
3. What does Israel hope to gain from its ongoing military operations in Lebanon, and is it likely to meet with success?
Israel's civilian and military leadership appears to believe that it can destroy Hezbollah, not only by attacking Hezbollah itself, but also by showing the government and people of Lebanon what the price will be for allowing Hezbollah to operate on Lebanese territory. To the extent that Israel meets with success, that success will be of questionable long-term value. From a large and enraged Shiite population, surely there will be thousands of recruits ready to replace Hezbollah's losses in personnel. Indeed, just as the emergence of Hezbollah came in reaction to Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, other groups-most likely Palestinians from vast communities in and around Tyre and Sidon, or Sunni radicals from as far away as the Tripoli area of northern Lebanon-could also mobilize against the Israelis. In fact, not learning from the American experience in Iraq-that trying to crush a guerrilla movement with conventional military force and thereby inflicting significant (in this case, even deliberate) collateral casualties might only generate thousands of other potential fighters bearing various grievances-the IDF could find itself mired in the same sort of seemingly open-ended confrontation.
4. Did Israel respond to the snatching of its soldiers on the spur of the moment, or was that incident an excuse for a military operation that Israel has been intending to carry out for some time?
This is an interesting question because I believe the emotional aspect of crisis decision-making often is overlooked. Having been engaged in prolonged and exhausting efforts to address the kidnapping of another Israeli soldier in Gaza and the complications associated with that crisis, Israel's leadership might well have reacted more rashly than otherwise to events in the north. Nonetheless, Israel almost certainly made use of contingency plans already on the shelf for a major campaign against Hezbollah and, perhaps, a parallel strategy of making the point that Lebanon as a whole shared the blame for the failure to disarm Hezbollah. Israel probably also deliberately cast its Lebanese campaign as part of the Global War on Terrorism in order to better ensure U.S. support for this more wide-ranging and damaging course of action.
5. How do you see this playing out? Can Israel "break the back" of Hezbollah? Will Hezbollah be more or less popular in Lebanon and the Middle East? In short, will either side emerge with a political or military victory?
To respond to the last question first, I believe Israel might emerge with an illusion of victory over Hezbollah-a victory that will likely prove somewhat fleeting. With the relatively low popular standing of the United States, let alone Israel, throughout the region, Hezbollah will almost certainly be looked upon with greater sympathy. In fact, if this confrontation were to last the two or three more weeks Israeli officials have been discussing, Shiites from other parts of the Arab world (or even Iran) could begin arriving to join the fight, and if, as I expect, Hezbollah's resilient organization will replenish its personnel losses and attempt to rearm as fully as possible, Israel could threaten-or even lash out at-Syria in an effort to block such assistance, a response that might simply widen the conflict still further.
6. Will there be any negative consequences resulting from the administration's relatively passive diplomacy?
Very much so. As I have noted, the Israelis have embarked on a campaign that will most likely make matters worse over the long term. This crisis will further erode the United States' credibility in the Middle East-and beyond. Despite clearly siding with Israel, Washington used to be regarded as a party quite often useful for intercession with the Israelis, but in this case the Bush Administration has seemingly given Israel a blank check to do whatever it wants for as long as it wants. With respect to another extremely serious consequence of not working to bring this carnage to an early end, Lebanon already has absorbed billions of dollars of damage. By the end of the crisis, the cost of rebuilding Lebanon will be incredibly high and the rebuilding effort quite prolonged, leaving most Lebanese, aside perhaps from the hard-core Christian right, considerably more hostile to Israel-and the United States-than ever before. In this respect, I find scenes of devastated Lebanese urban areas not only appalling, but frightening.
