Subject: Censored parts of Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreementin the Iran
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3. During the discussions, the Iranian leadership stated that
the country’s nuclear programme had
always been exclusively for peaceful purposes and that there
had never been a nuclear weapons
development programme. The Iranian authorities agreed to
accelerate implementation of the work
plan.
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A. Implementation of the Work Plan on Outstanding Issues
A.1. Source of Contamination
4. On 15 September 2007, the Agency provided Iran with
questions relating to the source of the
uranium particle contamination found on some equipment at a
technical university, the nature of the
equipment, the envisioned use of the equipment and the names
and roles of individuals and entities
involved, including the Physics Research Centre (PHRC) (GOV/
2007/58, para. 24)....
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11...The Agency concluded that the explanation and supporting
documentation
provided by Iran regarding the possible source of
contamination by uranium particles at the university
were not inconsistent with the data currently available to
the Agency. The Agency considers this
question no longer outstanding at this stage. ...
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A.1.2. Procurement activities by the former Head of PHRC
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18. The Agency took note of the information and supporting
documents provided by Iran as well as
the statements made by the former Head of PHRC to the Agency
and concluded that the replies were
not inconsistent with the stated use of the equipment. ...
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A.2. Uranium Metal Document
19. On 8 November 2007, the Agency received a copy from Iran
of the 15-page document
describing the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium
metal and the machining of enriched
uranium metal into hemispheres, which are components of
nuclear weapons. Iran reiterated that this
document had been received along with the P-1 centrifuge
documentation in 1987 and that it had not
been requested by Iran. The Agency is still waiting for a
response from Pakistan on the circumstances
of the delivery of this document in order to understand the
full scope and content of the offer made by
the network in 1987 (GOV/2006/15, paras 20–22).
A.3. Polonium-210
20. Polonium-210 is of interest to the Agency because it can
be used not only for civilian
applications (such as radioisotope batteries), but also — in
conjunction with beryllium — for military
purposes, such as neutron initiators in some designs of
nuclear weapons. ...
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24. Based on an examination of all information provided by
Iran, the Agency concluded that the
explanations concerning the content and magnitude of the
polonium-210 experiments were consistent
with the Agency’s findings and with other information
available to it. The Agency considers this
question no longer outstanding at this stage....
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A.4. Gchine Mine
25. On 22 and 23 January 2008, a meeting took place in Tehran
between the Agency and Iranian
officials during which Iran provided answers to the questions
raised by the Agency in its letter dated
15 September 2007 (GOV/2007/58, para. 27) with a view to
achieving a better understanding of the
complex arrangements governing the past and current
administration of the Gchine uranium mine and
mill (GOV/2005/67, paras 26–31).
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34....The Agency concluded that the information and
explanations
provided by Iran were supported by the documentation, the
content of which is consistent with the
information already available to the Agency. The Agency
considers this question no longer
outstanding at this stage....
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B. Current Enrichment Related Activities
45....All activities took place under Agency containment and
surveillance.
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C. Reprocessing Activities
47. The Agency has continued monitoring the use and
construction of hot cells at the Tehran
Research Reactor (TRR), the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon
Radioisotope Production Facility (the
MIX Facility) and the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40)
through inspections and design
information verification. There have been no indications of
ongoing reprocessing related activities at
those facilities. In addition, Iran has stated that there
have been no reprocessing related R&D activities
in Iran, which the Agency can confirm only with respect to
these facilities.
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D. Heavy Water Reactor Related Projects
48....The Agency has continued to monitor the
construction of the Heavy Water Production Plant using
satellite imagery....
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E. Other Implementation Issues
E.1. Uranium Conversion
49. During the current conversion campaign at UCF, which
began on 31 March 2007,
approximately 120 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF6 had
been produced as of 2 February 2008.
This brings the total amount of UF6 produced at UCF since
March 2004 to 309 tonnes, all of which
remains under Agency containment and surveillance. ...
E.2. Design Information
50....Iran has provided updated design information for PFEP.
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F. Summary
52. The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-
diversion of declared nuclear material
in Iran. Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared
nuclear material and has provided the
required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection
with declared nuclear material and
activities. Iran has also responded to questions and provided
clarifications and amplifications on the
issues raised in the context of the work plan, with the
exception of the alleged studies. Iran has
provided access to individuals in response to the Agency’s
requests....
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53. The Agency has been able to conclude that answers
provided by Iran, in accordance with the
work plan, are consistent with its findings — in the case of
the polonium-210 experiments and the
Gchine mine — or are not inconsistent with its findings — in
the case of the contamination at the
technical university and the procurement activities of the
former Head of PHRC. Therefore, the
Agency considers those questions no longer outstanding at
this stage....
