KEY JUDGMENT
President Kabila is likely to seek a negotiated settlement with M23 rebels that will increase the probability of his political survival. However, if such negotiations take longer than two weeks or if they fail completely and M23 expands the territory under its control, the risk of political instability will be severe. In such a scenario, Kabila is likely to be ousted if there are mass demonstrations in cities at the same time as an outbreak of mutinies at military barracks as a result of intensifying public and military frustration with his leadership.
DETAILED ANALYSIS
Over the next week, M23 will look to consolidate its control over mineral-rich areas in North Kivu before moving towards Bukavu. An on-going Army counter-offensive is likely to slow M23's momentum, although likely further reinforcements of Rwandan troops would give M23 a strategic advantage.
Following our update on 21 November, the M23 rebel group has consolidated its control over key locations in Goma, the capital of North Kivu Province, and has subsequently mobilised to capture Sake, 25 km west of Goma. On 22 November the Congolese Army (FARDC) launched a counter-offensive near Sake from Minova. Both sides currently claim to hold Sake, although our local sources confirm that M23 has now gained the upper hand and moved south to another area (Macha/Shasha). According to social media, Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) have been spotted supporting the M23 at Sake, confirming that Rwanda is still supporting the group despite calls for a ceasefire in a joint communique. While the M23's advance has been slowed at Sake, likely further reinforcements by RDF troops would give it a strategic advantage over the FARDC.
While M23 has claimed it aims to capture Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu province, we assess that the group is more likely to first move west from Sake towards Masisi, where it has usually enjoyed considerable support and would be able to cooperate with local Mai-Mai militias. A key indicator for an M23 deployment towards Bukavu would be further attempted counter-offensives by the FARDC from the south, which would force the M23 south to meet them. Additionally, an outbreak of violence by the M23-allied MCC rebel group in Uvira (south of Bukavu) would be another indicator that M23 intends to deploy south and join up with the MCC in a coordinated assault on Bukavu. Any mobilisation towards Bukavu is very likely to be met with strong resistance by both the FARDC and other armed groups, especially the ethnic Hutu FDLR and other Mai-Mai militias that are opposed to M23, particularly around Kalehe and Kabare territories (as well as Shabunda territory, which does not lie on the Goma-Bukavu route).
Despite M23 claims to the contrary, it is very unlikely that they would attempt to march towards the capital Kinshasa given the logistical challenges and distances involved. Instead, if an assault on Bukavu is unsuccessful, M23 is likely to take the time to consolidate its control over the Rutshuru-Goma-Masisi triangle, a traditional stronghold of the CNDP (from which the M23 was largely formed). A successful FARDC counter-offensive would only be likely with support from rival armed groups or the United Nations MONUSCO mission (currently unlikely as its mandate has not yet been strengthened) or alternatively if Rwanda suspends military support to M23 (also unlikely). We assess that as long as M23 receives RDF support it will retain a strategic advantage over the FARDC and its allied proxy groups.
In the currently unlikely event of a defeat of M23 by the FARDC, the rebels would be likely to retreat north towards its stronghold in Rutshuru, and possibly the Virunga Mountains. Attempts to dislodge them from this position would raise the risk of collateral damage to mining operations by RandGold and AngloGold Ashanti, as well as energy operations by SOCO, Total, and SacOil. Whilst we do not expect the M23 to deploy far enough south to directly affect mining assets such as Banro's Twangiza mine, disruption to operations in the area will become more likely as competing armed groups seek to increase rent from mines to boost their position. Mining operations in Katanga are very unlikely to face risk of disruption due to the relative stability of the province.
In the most likely case of a negotiated settlement, President Kabila is likely to be forced to offer increased autonomy to the provinces to appease his critics, raising risks to mining and energy contracts.
We assess that M23's intentions are to seek direct negotiations with Kinshasa rather than to oust President Kabila. M23's alleged backers in Rwanda are also unlikely to seek regime change in DRC, which would exacerbate current regional instability. The threat of targeted and economic sanctions against Rwanda following the release of the UN Experts Report, which alleged Rwandan support for M23, is also likely to disrupt Rwandan financial and other support to M23 over the coming weeks. This will increase pressure on the group to seek a negotiated settlement with the Kinshasa government within weeks. In this case, the threat to President Kabila would be mitigated, although an agreement would be highly unpopular with the military and Kinshasa-allied Mai-Mai militias. Moreover, if Kabila is forced into offering increased autonomy, i.e. over levying taxes and controlling security forces, to North Kivu, this would trigger similar demands in other provinces. Increased autonomy for provinces would increase the risk of contract reviews and demands for double taxation to foreign investors, particularly those in the mining and energy sectors.
If the FARDC does not retake Goma within two weeks or if M23 continues to expand its territory, the risk to President Kabila's government will become severe. Mass demonstrations in major cities and mutinies at military barracks would be key indicators for the ousting of President Kabila.
We are monitoring a number of indicators that would have to occur simultaneously for the risk of political instability to rise to severe over the next few weeks, including the ones below,
Civil Unrest in major cities: Since the capture of Goma by M23 on 20 November, violent protests have erupted in cities throughout DRC, including Kinshasa, Kisangani, Bunia and Bukavu. UN and ruling party interests have been targeted during demonstrations and security forces have used live ammunition to disperse protesters. So far, opposition parties have failed to coordinate the protests, or even provide a united condemnation of President Kabila. We also assess that distrust of M23 and its alleged backer, Rwanda, is likely to mitigate the risk of an outbreak of nationwide unrest. However, continued failure by President Kabila to end M23's advance would exacerbate on-going protests and allow the opposition to join and coordinate the protest movement.
If we see this, the probability of widespread unrest would heighten the risk of Kabila's removal from power through protests. Violent protests and riots in Kinshasa would pose the greatest risk to Kabila's government. It is unlikely that key regional allies like Angola would agree to deploy sufficient troops to Kinshasa to protect Kabila, as they have done in the past, due to lingering territorial disputes between the two countries. However, we assess that a popular uprising is very unlikely to be successful without dissent in the security forces.
Unrest within the military: The loss of Goma to M23, President Kabila's perceived weakness and his unpopular decision to begin negotiations with M23 have increased the risk of a military coup. Our sources report that the military is strongly divided and that various factions see President Kabila's removal as necessary for the restoration of stability in the East. The removal of Army Chief Amisi and planned further reshuffles in the military high command will incite anger among senior officers (although some sources report that Asisi's removal has appeased other factions). A source in Goma reported that the on-going FARDC and Mai-Mai counter-offensive around Sake and Minova had not received approval from Kabila and was instead led by Amisi and other officers frustrated with his leadership.
While Kabila will be able to benefit from factionalism within the military by playing off rival commanders against each other, a negotiated settlement with M23 or failure to retake Goma within a few weeks will critically raise the probability of a military coup against Kabila. An outbreak of mutinies at key barracks, most likely starting in the East and spreading westwards from there to Kinshasa, would be the most likely pathway towards Kabila's removal by the military. We also assess that a military coup would be most likely in case of widespread and heavily attended demonstrations, particularly in Kinshasa.
Demands for regional autonomy: Kabila's inability to provide strong leadership following the loss of Goma to M23 is likely to encourage provincial governors (despite their affiliation to Kabila's PPRD party) and local power brokers to demand more autonomy for provinces. Such demands are most likely to come from western provinces, as eastern provinces would be more likely to side with Kabila in the face of a perceived Rwandan aggression. While such demands alone would be unlikely to pose a threat to Kabila, they would be an indication of the growing frustration and embolden both the local civilian population and the military to protest or mutiny.
Progress of M23 offensive: Despite the FARDC and Mai-Mai counter-offensive, M23 is likely to halt its offensive only if the Kinshasa government formally agrees to commence direct negotiations or if the on-going joint counter-offensive proves successful (which is increasingly unlikely given M23's advance from Sake towards Macha/Shasha). However, any stalling by Kinshasa or subsequent failure of the talks would further raise the threat to President Kabila's government. If Goma is still under M23 control in two weeks and there has been little progress on negotiations, the other three indicators are more likely to be activated. In case the counter-offensive fails and especially if M23 captures Bukavu, the risk to Kabila would become severe.
