"Redact study on virus mutations–or don’t publish it” says NSAB of Biosecurity

[JGeropoulas]

I’m all for government not playing the role of censor, especially in the realm of scientific research. But on the other hand, regarding deadly viral strains, the arguments presented here make a lot of sense to me as well. http://www.sott.net/articles/show/240455-New-Scientists-May-Unleash-Censored-Weaponized-Bird-Flu-Data

The article below says there hasn’t been found any middle ground between censorship and full disclosure. To me the middle ground would be full disclosure, but banning research which requires the revival of dormant or extinct viruses “just in case” there’s an outbreak–an outbreak which is very unlikely if they don’t revive the dormant virus.

Years ago, I remember how ominous it sounded reading about researchers digging up bodies of those who died from the Spanish Flu to get samples to work with. This “research” has always seemed like just the standard cover story of “trying to protect us” so we’ll enable them to prepare the very thing that will “attack” us.

Here are the excerpts from a recent article in Popular Science (June 2012), which included this great quote:

“To every man is given the key to the gates of heaven. The same key opens the gates of hell. And so it is with science” – Richard Feynman

Communicable Science
by Jacob Ward

Last year, Nature and Science prepared to publish research describing how to mutate H5Nl, a deadly bird flu, into more contagious forms. The papers could help scientists create a treatment should a similar mutation occur in nature. But according to the u.s. government, the papers could also help terrorists create a weapon.

The federal National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity is a group of scientists that helps the government identify such "dual use" research that could endanger the public. The journals submitted the work to the NSABB, and the board asked them to either not publish it or to strike details. The request not to publish was unusual. The request to redact was unprecedented.

The government wants to keep risky information secret so that terrorists can't use it to make weapons. Scientists seek to share such data publicly so they can quickly collaborate to counteract any risk. No one has yet found any middle ground. [So we’re stuck with the government’s position, which of course, ensures there’ll be no counteraction of risks to us]…

The conflict between national security and open science is intensifying. Scientists who accept public funds (which is most of them) must increasingly keep their findings secret. It used to be that research only became classified if it was funded by a national-security-related agency like the Department of Defense, which spends millions on infectious-disease research each year. But now, under some of the 50 semiclassified designations, any federal agency can gag researchers.

Charles Chiu, head of the University of California at San Francisco's Viral Diagnostics and Discovery Center, says that a potentially disastrous virus like H5Nl occurs naturally every 10 years: "This is a time bomb." He thinks that with international cooperation and $100 million, systems-based research could identify every dangerous reservoir of animal-to-human infection on Earth. And for $100 billion it could characterize the features of 90 percent of those infections. "With the right amount of researchers and money, you'd get ahead of any dangers," he says-natural or man-made. " [as rational as that plan is, the problem as always, is that good science will co-opted by bad people, especially psychopathic ones]

This approach doesn't just limit science. It makes us less safe. [Exactly] Viruses spread by nature are a greater threat than viruses spread by terrorists, and shared data is essential to fight both.
The use of shared data is already transforming virology. The field is moving from hypothesis-based research, which tests a single proposition, to systems-based research, which looks for patterns in all available data. More quickly spotting infectious diseases that might cross over from animals to humans (like HlV, SARS and H5Nl did) will require pooling databases and international samples.