slavronin
The Force is Strong With This One
Hi y'all,
I came across a brochure for the 2nd Annual Swine Flu Conference held in Washington, DC and was struck by how the scope of the topics and sessions appeared to be far too exaggerated even if the swine flu is a real epidemic.
From their brochure (http://www.new-fields.com/2ndISFC/brochure.pdf), topics include:
Now, a lot of these topics don't appear to be too alarming but after reading about some of these breakout sessions, it appears they really seem to be really talking about something different altogether which I could only speculate to be a natural disaster of a much larger scope, a sudden critical supply shortage, war, martial law, etc. I'm sure the PTB are also trying to implement a pandemic yet anyway but have planned multiple scenarios using game theory to still have a emergency command and management system in place to cover both their planned and unplanned scenarios.
The breakout sessions are:
There are a couple of interesting things to note from the listed sessions. Despite the last flu season proving H1N1 infection rates to be a few percent at most (which probably includes other types of flues with the swine flue), infection rates of 30-40% or 50% of the population are used for planning purposes. Additionally, despite actual mortality rates of those infected being less than one percent, the first session talks about mass fatality planning.
Even if one were to believe that 50% of the population could be infected in the next flu season, the session topics appear to imply that this will happen all at once with topic such as an overwhelmed telecommunications network, interruptions in food & fuel, crime surges, etc.
Some of the other topics are a little odd and stick out of place such as public works continuing to maintain water and sanitation services, “plan for reduced response capacity due to mechanical failure”, transforming school facilities into shelters, etc. In regards to public work facilities, most drinking water and wastewater facilities are automated and not personnel intensive at all and have other failsafes. I’m not sure why there would be reduced capacity for hospital and emergency medical services due to mechanical failures during an outbreak. Also, I’m not sure why anyone would want to create a shelter during an outbreak - that implies grouping a large amount of people together in close quarters. If there were an outbreak, obviously a quarantine would be needed.
Again, it appears PTB are doing contingency planning to try to maintain control in all sorts of likely and unlikely, planned and unplanned scenarios. However, I can’t help but have this feeling that all this planning is for something other than the swine flu.
I came across a brochure for the 2nd Annual Swine Flu Conference held in Washington, DC and was struck by how the scope of the topics and sessions appeared to be far too exaggerated even if the swine flu is a real epidemic.
From their brochure (http://www.new-fields.com/2ndISFC/brochure.pdf), topics include:
* Mass Fatality Management Planning
* Country Report and Situations Update
* Surveillance and Data Management
* Preparing Communities Strategies
* Local Partnership and Participation
* Delivery of Vaccine and Antiviral Medication
* Pandemic Influenza Medical Countermeasure
* Benefit-Risk Assessment
* Prevention Education Efforts and Risk Communication
* Command, Control and Management
* Emergency Response Management
* Business-Based Planning
* School-Based Planning
* Community-Based Planning
Now, a lot of these topics don't appear to be too alarming but after reading about some of these breakout sessions, it appears they really seem to be really talking about something different altogether which I could only speculate to be a natural disaster of a much larger scope, a sudden critical supply shortage, war, martial law, etc. I'm sure the PTB are also trying to implement a pandemic yet anyway but have planned multiple scenarios using game theory to still have a emergency command and management system in place to cover both their planned and unplanned scenarios.
The breakout sessions are:
Concurrent Break-out Session #1
Mass Fatality Management Planning
Develop and maintain plans, procedures, programs, and systems
Develop and implement training and exercise programs
Direct fatality management tactical operations
Activate fatality management operations
Conduct morgue operations
Manage ante-mortem data
Conduct final disposition
Concurrent Break-out Session #2
Psychological Issues
Public’s distress of exposure and safety
Breakdown of public services, utilities
Medical supplies shortage
Unwillingness to follow government orders
Concurrent Break-out Session #3
Business Continuity Planning
Allocate resources to protect your employees & customers during a pandemic
Find out which business risks are insured
Ensure safe travel during the pandemic
Identify when to reduce or even close operations
Concurrent Break-out Session #4
Continuity of Operations (COOP) and Continuity of Government Planning
When 50% or more of employees are out sick or taking care of their sick ones
When H1N1 flu pandemic unfold in two or three successive waves in a calendar year
Disruptions to public, private and critical infrastructure undermining your essential functions
Concurrent Break-out Session #5
Emergency Management Services
Prioritize antivirals & personal protective equipment for essential workforce
Overcome reduced response capacity caused by mechanical failure & a possible 30-40 percent drop in staff, to maintain
continuous operations
Protect the emergency management response operations center
Manage interruptions in food, fuel & essentials supply chains & establish stockpiles
Manage panic caused by sudden disruption of services & interruptions in essential goods & services
Concurrent Break-out Session #6
Law Enforcement Agencies
Protect police forces from falling ill & from being hurt in civil disturbances
Protect the delivery of vaccines & essential goods & services.
Manage a surge in crime & meet routine requests at the same time
Control & diffuse social unrest & public disorder
Isolate prisons & other facilities
Concurrent Break-out Session #7
First Responders: Fire Department
Protect fire department first responders from falling ill & from being hurt in civil disturbances
Continue to respond to routine fire outbreaks while responding to pandemic-related calls
Effectively transition into All-Hazards Incident Management Responders
Effectively undertake mass vaccinations
Enforce quarantines
Concurrent Break-out Session #8
First Responders: Public Works
Protect public works first responders from falling ill or being hurt in civil disturbances
Control traffic, evacuation & mass transportation
Ensure the minimal delivery of clean water & sanitation services
Ensure the stability of vital communications networks
Overcome an overwhelmed telecommunications network caused by a surge in telework employees, homebound calls, &
the increased search for public services
Concurrent Break-out Session #9
911 Call Center Services
Effectively manage the 911 call center during the crisis
Develop call center surge capacity
Secure call center operations
Anticipate technical problems
Ensure that frequent, honest & reliable information is released to the public
Concurrent Break-out Session #10
Hospital and Emergency Medical Services
Prioritize the use of antivirals for the essential workforce
Anticipate interruptions in food, fuel and essentials supply chains & establish stockpiles
Plan for reduced response capacity due to mechanical failure & lack of personnel
Maintain continuous operations during a pandemic
Plan for 30-40 percent drop in labor force
Protect the emergency operations center
Concurrent Break-out Session #11
Workplace Planning
Effectively work with 30-40 percent less employees.
Account for your employees.
Establish remote offices & flexible work plans; identify the business functions that can be outsourced.
Secure your workplaces.
Train your workers to screen for symptoms & know what to do when workers fall ill.
Concurrent Break-out Session #12
School / University Pandemic Planning
Train teachers to screen for symptoms & know what to do when students / teachers fall ill
Transport ill students
Identify when to reduce or close down your school
Effectively transform school facilities into shelters
Continue learning through alternative routes like the web telephone, mail, radio and TV
Communicate effectively with staff, parents and students
Concurrent Break-out Session #13
Airlines, Travel, Airport, Quarantine and Border Health Services
International & Federal guidelines
Measures to prevent the spread of communicable diseases
Apprehension, examination and release
Aviation & Transportation Security Act, 2002 (49 U.S.C. 114)
Are tools available to ensure patient does not pose risk to fellow travelers?
Concurrent Break-out Session #14
Infectious Medical Waste
Infectious waste management
Packaging disposable infectious waste
Engineering controls
Pathological waste management
Exposure control plan
Concurrent Break-out Session #15
Swine Flu: Agriculture Perspective & Interventions
H1N1 sources and transmission
How do animal pathogens evolve?
How to protect the public from exposure to zoonotic pathogens
Analytical methods to detect, quantify, identify, monitor and control processes
Sources & human exposure control management
There are a couple of interesting things to note from the listed sessions. Despite the last flu season proving H1N1 infection rates to be a few percent at most (which probably includes other types of flues with the swine flue), infection rates of 30-40% or 50% of the population are used for planning purposes. Additionally, despite actual mortality rates of those infected being less than one percent, the first session talks about mass fatality planning.
Even if one were to believe that 50% of the population could be infected in the next flu season, the session topics appear to imply that this will happen all at once with topic such as an overwhelmed telecommunications network, interruptions in food & fuel, crime surges, etc.
Some of the other topics are a little odd and stick out of place such as public works continuing to maintain water and sanitation services, “plan for reduced response capacity due to mechanical failure”, transforming school facilities into shelters, etc. In regards to public work facilities, most drinking water and wastewater facilities are automated and not personnel intensive at all and have other failsafes. I’m not sure why there would be reduced capacity for hospital and emergency medical services due to mechanical failures during an outbreak. Also, I’m not sure why anyone would want to create a shelter during an outbreak - that implies grouping a large amount of people together in close quarters. If there were an outbreak, obviously a quarantine would be needed.
Again, it appears PTB are doing contingency planning to try to maintain control in all sorts of likely and unlikely, planned and unplanned scenarios. However, I can’t help but have this feeling that all this planning is for something other than the swine flu.