U.S. strikes within Pakistan — without notice

[sHiZo963]

U.S. strikes within Pakistan — without notice
Unilateral attack on al-Qaeda commander called a model for operations

By Joby Warrick and Robin Wright
updated 10:45 p.m. CT, Mon., Feb. 18, 2008

In the predawn hours of Jan. 29, a CIA Predator aircraft flew in a slow arc above the Pakistani town of Mir Ali. The drone's operator, relying on information secretly passed to the CIA by local informants, clicked a computer mouse and sent the first of two Hellfire missiles hurtling toward a cluster of mud-brick buildings a few miles from the town center.

The missiles killed Abu Laith al-Libi, a senior al-Qaeda commander and a man who had repeatedly eluded the CIA's dragnet. It was the first successful strike against al-Qaeda's core leadership in two years, and it involved, U.S. officials say, an unusual degree of autonomy by the CIA inside Pakistan.

Having requested the Pakistani government's official permission for such strikes on previous occasions, only to be put off or turned down, this time the U.S. spy agency did not seek approval. The government of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf was notified only as the operation was underway, according to the officials, who insisted on anonymity because of diplomatic sensitivities.

Model for the future

Officials say the incident was a model of how Washington often scores its rare victories these days in the fight against al-Qaeda inside Pakistan's national borders: It acts with assistance from well-paid sympathizers inside the country, but without getting the government's formal permission beforehand.

It is an approach that some U.S. officials say could be used more frequently this year, particularly if a power vacuum results from yesterday's election and associated political tumult. The administration also feels an increased sense of urgency about undermining al-Qaeda before President Bush leaves office, making it less hesitant, said one official familiar with the incident.

Independent actions by U.S. military forces on another country's sovereign territory are always controversial, and both U.S. and Pakistani officials have repeatedly sought to obscure operational details that would reveal that key decisions are sometimes made in the United States, not in Islamabad. Some Pentagon operations have been undertaken only after intense disputes with the State Department, which has worried that they might inflame Pakistani public resentment; the CIA itself has sometimes sought to put the brakes on because of anxieties about the consequences for its relationship with Pakistani intelligence officials.

Pakistan considered unreliable

U.S. military officials say, however, that the uneven performance of their Pakistani counterparts increasingly requires that Washington pursue the fight however it can, sometimes following an unorthodox path that leaves in the dark Pakistani military and intelligence officials who at best lack commitment and resolve and at worst lack sympathy for U.S. interests.

Top Bush administration policy officials -- who are increasingly worried about al-Qaeda's use of its sanctuary in remote, tribally ruled areas in northern Pakistan to dispatch trained terrorists to the West -- have quietly begun to accept the military's point of view, according to several sources familiar with the context of the Libi strike.

"In the past it required getting approval from the highest levels," said one former intelligence official involved in planning for previous strikes. "You may have information that is valid for only 30 minutes. If you wait, the information is no longer valid."

But when the autonomous U.S. military operations in Pakistan succeed, support for them grows in Washington in probably the same proportion as Pakistani resentments increase. Even as U.S. officials ramp up the pressure on Musharraf to do more, Pakistan's embattled president has taken a harder line in public against cooperation in recent months, the sources said. "The posture that was evident two years ago is not evident," said a senior U.S. official who frequently visits the region.

A U.S. military official familiar with operations in the tribal areas, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk about the operations, said: "We'll get these one-off flukes once every eight months or so, but that's still not a strategy -- it's not a plan. Every now and then something will come together. What that serves to do [is] it tamps down discussion about whether there is a better way to do it."

The target is identified

During seven years of searching for Osama bin Laden and his followers, the [n]U.S. government has deployed billions of dollars' worth of surveillance hardware to South Asia, from top-secret spy satellites to sophisticated eavesdropping gear for intercepting text messages and cellphone conversations[/b].

Yet some of the initial clues that led to the Libi strike were decidedly low-tech, according to an account supplied by four officials briefed on the operation. The CIA declined to comment about the strike and neither confirmed nor denied its involvement.

Hours before the attack, multiple sources said, the CIA was alerted to a convoy of vehicles that bore all the signatures of al-Qaeda officers on the move. Local residents -- who two sources said were not connected to the Pakistani army or intelligence service -- began monitoring the cluster of vehicles as it passed through North Waziristan, a rugged, largely lawless province that borders Afghanistan.

Eventually the local sources determined that the convoy carried up to seven al-Qaeda operatives and one individual who appeared to be of high rank. Asked how the local support had been arranged, a U.S. official familiar with the episode said, "All it takes is bags of cash."

Kamran Bokhari, director of Middle East analysis for Strategic Forecasting, a private intelligence group, said the informants could have been recruits from the Afghanistan side of the border, where the U.S. military operates freely.

"People in this region don't recognize the border, which is very porous," Bokhari said. "It is very likely that our people were in contact with intelligence sources who frequent both sides and could provide some kind of targeting information."

Precisely what U.S. officials knew about the "high-value target" in the al-Qaeda convoy is unclear. Libi, a 41-year-old al-Qaeda commander who had slowly climbed to the No. 5 spot on the CIA's most wanted list, was a hulking figure who stood 6 feet 4 inches tall. He spoke Libyan-accented Arabic and learned to be cautious after narrowly escaping a previous CIA strike. U.S. intelligence officials say he directed several deadly attacks, including a bombing at a U.S. military base in Afghanistan last year that killed 23 people.

Observing their prey

Alerted to the suspicious convoy, the CIA used a variety of surveillance techniques to follow its progression through Mir Ali, North Waziristan's second-largest town, and to a walled compound in a village on the town's outskirts.

The stopping place itself was an indication that these were important men: The compound was the home of Abdus Sattar, 45, a local Taliban commander and an associate of Baitullah Mehsud, the man accused by both the CIA and Pakistan of plotting the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on Dec. 27.

With all signs pointing to a unique target, CIA officials ordered the launch of a pilotless MQ-1B Predator aircraft, one of three kept at a secret base that the Pakistani government has allowed to be stationed inside the country. Launches from that base do not require government permission, officials said.

During the early hours of Jan. 29, the slow-moving, 27-foot-long plane circled the village before vectoring in to lock its camera sights on Sattar's compound. Watching intently were CIA and Air Force operators who controlled the aircraft's movements from an operations center at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada.

On orders from CIA officials in McLean, the operators in Nevada released the Predator's two AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, 100-pound, rocket-propelled munitions each tipped with a high-explosive warhead. The missiles tore into the compound's main building and an adjoining guesthouse where the al-Qaeda officers were believed to be staying.

Even when viewed from computer monitors thousands of miles away, the missiles' impact was stunning. The buildings were completely destroyed, and as many as 13 inhabitants were killed, U.S. officials said. The pictures captured after the attack were "not pretty," said one knowledgeable source.

Libi's death was confirmed by al-Qaeda, which announced his "martyrdom" on Feb. 1 in messages posted on the Web sites of sympathetic groups. One message hailed Libi as "the father of many lions who now own the land and mountains of jihadi Afghanistan" and said al-Qaeda's struggle "would not be defeated by the death of one person, no matter how important he may be."

A temporary impact

Publicly, reaction to the strike among U.S. and Pakistani leaders has been muted, with neither side appearing eager to call attention to an awkward, albeit successful, unilateral U.S. military operation. Some Pakistani government spokesmen have even questioned whether the terrorist leader was killed.

"It's not going to overwhelm their network or break anything up definitively," acknowledged a military official briefed on details of the Libi strike. He added: "We're now in a sit-and-wait mode until someone else pops up."

Richard A. Clarke, a former counterterrorism adviser to the Clinton and Bush administrations, said he has been told by those involved that the counterterror effort requires constant pressure on the Pakistani government.

"The United States has gotten into a pattern where it sends a high-level delegation over to beat Musharraf up, and then you find that within a week or two a high-value target has been identified. Then he ignores us for a while until we send over another high-level delegation," Clarke said.

Some officials also emphasized that such airstrikes have a marginal and temporary impact. And they do not yield the kind of intelligence dividends often associated with the live capture of terrorists -- documents, computers, equipment and diaries that could lead to further unraveling the network.

The officials stressed that despite the occasional tactical success against it, such as the Libi strike, the threat posed by al-Qaeda's presence in Pakistan has been growing. As a senior U.S. official briefed on the strike said: "Even a blind squirrel finds a nut now and then. But overall, we're in worse shape than we were 18 months ago."

Link:
_http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23228197/

BTW, I find it funny and ironic that they "confirmed" Libi's death through al-Qaeda...

 

[Joe]

Deja Vu anyone? Or double deja Vu?

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/30/AR2006103000176.html

Pakistan Strike Called Response To U.S. Reports

Attack on School That Killed 80 Aimed at Al-Qaeda, Officials Say

Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, October 31, 2006

A missile strike that killed close to 80 people at an Islamic school in Pakistan early Monday was launched because of U.S. intelligence reports that senior al-Qaeda figures were hiding there, Pakistani intelligence officials said. The strike generated angry protests by religious and tribal leaders, who accused the government of doing Washington's bidding at the cost of Pakistani lives.

The country's major Islamic party charged that U.S. military planes carried out the attack, which demolished the school, located near the border with Afghanistan. Pakistani and U.S. military officials denied that, saying the raid was the work of Pakistani helicopter gunships and forces, though U.S. intelligence had prompted it.

"This was a training camp, and they had been warned to stop their activities," said Gen. Mahmud Ali Durrani, Pakistan's ambassador in Washington. "They did not pay heed, so they were hit by our gunships and all the people there were killed. There will be a lot of unhappy or misguided people saying we are killing our own people for the sake of the Americans, but we had a commitment to fight terrorism on our soil, and we made a decision."

Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, are widely believed to be hiding in the rugged Afghan-Pakistani border region, home to fiercely independent tribal peoples. Afghan officials also contend that Pakistan's side of the border is serving as a sanctuary for newly aggressive Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan.

The attack in the Bajaur tribal district near the village of Khar caused the highest number of deaths of any single anti-extremist attack in Pakistan since 2001, when Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, agreed to side with the United States to help overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The raid on the Islamic studies school, known as a madrassa, seemed to represent an abrupt shift from the Musharraf government's recent policy of seeking peaceful negotiations with extremists in the border regions. In the past several months, two peace deals were signed in the tribal areas of North and South Waziristan after sustained attacks there by the Pakistani military drew strong local opposition and caused heavy casualties on both sides.

"What a stupid operation, just one day before an accord between the local Taliban and the government. It has killed the entire spirit and the peaceful atmosphere in the tribal areas," said Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khan, who heads one of two major religious parties in parliament. Protesters who turned out in many towns Monday pledged to return to the streets Tuesday.

A similar strike occurred in January, when U.S. missiles devastated a nearby compound that authorities believed Zawahiri was visiting. Officials initially denied, then acknowledged, reports that a U.S. drone had carried out the strike, which killed 18 people. The incident set off protests across Pakistan and forced the Musharraf government to publicly condemn the U.S. action.

Among those killed Monday was Maulana Liaquat, an Islamic cleric allied with al-Qaeda who is believed to have hosted a dinner for Zawahiri in January that led to the missile strike in Damadola village. At a mass funeral for Liaquat and his followers Monday afternoon, news agencies reported, thousands of armed men shouted, "Down with Musharraf! Down with Bush!"

Some religious politicians from the area rejected the official version of events, saying it bore strong similarities to the January attack.

"Exactly like Damadola, there was a big flare before a missile hit the madrassa with a huge bang. Several minutes later, Pakistan army gunship helicopters appeared on the horizon firing aimlessly," said Sahibzada Haroon-ur Rashid, the local member of parliament from the religious Jamaat-e-Islami party. "I don't have an iota of doubt that the missile was fired from an American drone."

and this one from January 2006

http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-01-14-al-qaeda-no-2_x.htm

Al-Qaeda No. 2 wasn't on site during U.S. attack, officials say

USA TODAY

DAMADOLA, Pakistan (AP) — Pakistan on Saturday condemned a deadly airstrike in which the U.S. reportedly targeted al-Qaeda's second-in-command, as villagers whose homes were destroyed denied the militant was ever there and thousands of Pakistanis protested the attack.

The statement came after U.S. networks, citing unnamed American intelligence officials, reported that a CIA-operated Predator drone aircraft carried out the missile strike Friday and that it was aimed at Ayman al-Zawahri in the Bajur tribal region of northwestern Pakistan.

Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed did not directly blame the U.S. for the attack, which killed at least 17 people, but he said the government wanted "to assure the people we will not allow such incidents to reoccur."

Two Pakistani officials told The Associated Press on Saturday that the CIA had acted on incorrect information, and al-Zawahri was not in the village of Damadola when it came under attack. Al-Zawahri is ranked No. 2 in the al-Qaeda terror network, second only to Osama bin Laden.

"Their information was wrong, and our investigations conclude that they acted on a false information," said a senior intelligence official. His account was confirmed by a senior government official, who said al-Zawahri "was not there."

Meanwhile, sporadic protests broke out against the attack and hundreds of local tribesmen torched the office of the Associated Development Construction, a U.S.-funded aid group, in Khar, a small town near Bajur. The mob ransacked furniture and computers, but no injuries were reported, resident Haji Habibullah said.

An AP reporter who visited the scene in Damadola village about 12 hours after the airstrike saw three destroyed houses hundreds of yards apart. Villagers recounted hearing aircraft overhead moments before the attack. By their count at least 30 people died, including women and children.

A Counterpunch article about the Jan 2006 attack:

http://www.counterpunch.org/alberts03042006.html

In a January 13, 2006 predawn unauthorized airstrike, US missiles leveled three houses in Damadola, a remote Pakistan border village, blowing to bits 18 civilian inhabitants, mostly women and children, in an unsuccessful attempt to kill Osama bin Laden's chief lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, rumored to be attending a Muslim religious observance there. "That's our starting point tonight," said CBS Evening News anchor, Russ Mitchell, whose guest was Neil Livingstone, CEO of a Washington-based anti-terrorism consulting firm.

Russ Mitchell began, "Mr. Livingstone, at this point it looks like another one got away, but do you see any silver lining in this for the United States?" [italics added]. "Well," Livingstone replied, "I think there are a couple of silver linings, the first being that we probably nearly got him [italics added]. And," Livingstone continued, "the more that we force these guys to look over their shoulder and expect a Predator shooting Hellfire missiles at them, the less time they're going to have to plan attacks against us."

Notice wing nut McCain's comments on it:

"It is terrible when innocent people are killed," Senator McCain said in an interview on CBS's "Face the Nation." "We apologize, but [italics added] I can't tell you that we wouldn't do the same thing again. . . . This war on terror has no boundaries. . . . We have to go where these people are, and we have to take them out." (Jan. 15, 2006)

Mc Cain's opinion is particularly galling given that back in the 80's he was instrumental in funding the Taleban, "al-Qaeda" and the madrasses (often full of young boys) that the CIA likes to fire hellfire missiles at these days.

As Juan Cole pointed out today:

http://www.juancole.com/2008/02/mccains-holiday-from-history-in.html

The PPP (Pakistan Political Party) was overthrown in 1977 by Gen. Zia ul-Haq, a fundamentalist general who had his boss, PM Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto hanged on trumped-up charges in 1979 and who kept promising new elections that never came. Gen. Zia sponsored the Muslim fundamentalist Mujahidin that Ronald Reagan called "freedom fighters," and which included the early al-Qaeda. He also put enormous resources into making an atomic bomb. Nowadays a leader of that description would be part of Bush's axis of evil. But Reagan cozied up to Zia like a cat to catnip.

And McCain went out to cozy up to the military dictator himself, in February of 1984. McCain supported the Reagan jihad, cynically deploying radical Muslim extremists like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar against leftist secularists in Afghanistan.

Here is what McCain was up to when the radical Muslim extremist Gen. Zia was in power in Pakistan, according to UPI, Feb. 17, 1984:

'Senator John Tower, R-Texas, and Rep. John McCain, R-Ariz., arrived in the Pakistani capital Friday evening for the start of a three-day visit.

During their stay, the legislators will meet Pakistan's military president, General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, and other top officials. . .

While in Pakistan, they will also visit an Afghan refugee tent village on the outskirts of Peshawar, near the border with Soviet-occupied Afghanistan.

On arrival at Islamabad airport, they were received by U.S. Ambassador Deane Hinton and Pakistani Defense Secretary Aftab Ahmad Khan.'

Now McCain is the big expert on problem solving in Pakistan. McCain is the Pied Piper of Hamelin; he'll be glad to get rid of your rat problem, but at the price of making your children disappear

So lest we take any holidays from history, I have some questions for John McCain. Did you or did you not know about Gen. Zia's nuclear weapons program? Did you wink at it? If so doesn't that make you a proliferator of weapons of mass destruction to a radical Muslim extremist regime?

And what about this AP article from 1985:

' Rep. Tom Loeffler, R-Tex., presented the "Freedom Fighter of the Year" award to Afghan resistance leader Wali Khan on behalf of the U.S. Council for World Freedom on Oct. 3.

Loeffler called on Congress and the American people to "broaden support" for freedom fighters in Afghanistan, reminding listeners of America's own fight for freedom.

Congress has agreed to give $15 million in covert assistance to the Afghan cause, the first time the legislators have "stepped forward" with aid since the beginning of the conflict, according to Loeffler. . .

Accepting the award on behalf of Khan was Pir Syed Ahmed Gailani, head of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, for which Khan commands 20,000 resistance fighters.

Other congressmen who joined Loeffler included Rep. Eldon Rudd and Rep. John McCain, both Arizona Republicans. '

So how much support did John McCain give to the precursors of the Taliban in Afghanistan? To the budding al-Qaeda?

As I wrote in my article on Bhutto:

http://www.sott.net/articles/show/146215

General Zia then was given the necessary support and assurances by the representatives of the US empire in order to feel confident to force Bhutto from office and later hang him on trumped-up charges of corruption. He then went about establishing strict Islamic law and a brutal penal code. Zia changed the punishment for damage against property from a fine or imprisonment (or both) to the amputation of the right hand of the offender. For robbery, the right hand and left foot of the offender was the price.

For adultery the new punishment was flogging (100 lashes) for both men and women, if unmarried and, if married, the culprit was stoned to death. Zia also promoted military officers on the basis of religious devotion. The Koran and other religious material becomes compulsory reading material in army training courses and according to journalist Kathy Gannon "Radical Islamist ideology began to permeate the military and the influence of the most extreme groups crept into the army." The BBC also acknowledged that Zia's self-declared "Islamization" policies created a "culture of jihad" within Pakistan that continues until present day. And all of it rubber-stamped by the "greatest democracy on earth".

General Zia also created tens of thousands of madrassas, or religious boarding schools, the very same madrasses referred to by Donald Rumsfeld when he said:

"Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?"

The lies couldn't really be any more clear, if only the mainstream media would report it.

Joe