Web Browsers Leave 'Fingerprints' Behind as You Surf the Net

D69

Dagobah Resident
EFF Research Shows More Than 8 in 10 Browsers Have Unique, Trackable Signatures

San Francisco - New research by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has found that an overwhelming majority of web browsers have unique signatures -- creating identifiable "fingerprints" that could be used to track you as you surf the Internet.

The findings were the result of an experiment EFF conducted with volunteers who visited http://panopticlick.eff.org/. The website anonymously logged the configuration and version information from each participant's operating system, browser, and browser plug-ins -- information that websites routinely access each time you visit -- and compared that information to a database of configurations collected from almost a million other visitors. EFF found that 84% of the configuration combinations were unique and identifiable, creating unique and identifiable browser "fingerprints." Browsers with Adobe Flash or Java plug-ins installed were 94% unique and trackable.

"We took measures to keep participants in our experiment anonymous, but most sites don't do that," said EFF Senior Staff Technologist Peter Eckersley. "In fact, several companies are already selling products that claim to use browser fingerprinting to help websites identify users and their online activities. This experiment is an important reality check, showing just how powerful these tracking mechanisms are."

EFF found that some browsers were less likely to contain unique configurations, including those that block JavaScript, and some browser plug-ins may be able to be configured to limit the information your browser shares with the websites you visit. But overall, it is very difficult to reconfigure your browser to make it less identifiable. The best solution for web users may be to insist that new privacy protections be built into the browsers themselves.

"Browser fingerprinting is a powerful technique, and fingerprints must be considered alongside cookies and IP addresses when we discuss web privacy and user trackability," said Eckersley. "We hope that browser developers will work to reduce these privacy risks in future versions of their code."

EFF's paper on Panopticlick will be formally presented at the Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS 2010) in Berlin in July.

For the full white paper: How Unique is Your Web Browser?:
https://panopticlick.eff.org/browser-uniqueness.pdf

For more details on Pantopticlick:
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/05/every-browser-unique-results-fom-pa...

For more on online behavioral tracking:
http://www.eff.org/issues/online-behavioral-tracking

Contacts:

Peter Eckersley
Senior Staff Technologist
Electronic Frontier Foundation
pde@eff.org

Related Issues: Online Behavioral Tracking

src:__http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2010/05/13
 
Good article!

We sometimes have to remind ourselves just how exposed we are, even as I'm writing this and you're reading it.

The only option I can think of that would solve the issues in the article is to use a reputable virtual private network (of which I only know one, but I'm sure Internet anonymity is a niche market that will become increasingly popular) that will route all your traffic through a virtual NIC and assign you a new MAC address and IP address and, to put it simply, anonymise your entire Internet usage through a decentralised and distributed network (like what Tor was trying but failed to achieve).

So if you were using such a service, those who seek to observe and monitor your Internet activity will see your fingerprints as:
- the IP address assigned to you from an exit node of your choice from the VPN
- your browser information (ie some of the basic information available in the browser like codename, version, platform and online information)
- your HTTP Header Information (ie your browser sends a list of headers that can contain information about which type of images are supported, which kind of documents are supported, the character sets that are acceptable, cookies etc.) but you can manage if you allow or deny some parameters so check your browser configuration.

Of course even with a reputable VPN service, it is possible to de-anonymise you :
- when you visit a hostile server or a website which contains malicious code
- when you authenticate to a service online
- when you surf, because your behaviour online can reveal a lot about your life, your interests, your businesses, your relations, and your problems. This is the reason why search engines and companies concerned with statistical services and advertisements record your IP address or web sites visited by you and therefore profile you.

The best protection is being careful about what we do on the Internet.
 
Well , I wouldn't trust that much to VPN providers. I mean , maybe they are OK , but they have an easy access to your data.
I would rather suggest more cryptographic approach. More SSL is always good ;)
 
I agree with you completely. I've been following this for just five years now, but most of the VPN providers are weak with what they offer.

For example, Perfect Privacy have no corporate structural integrity against spying, they provide no multiplexing, and so offers very weak anonymity.

An observer can see the data passing from your machine to the VPN provider, and the traffic leaving the VPN provider. In a single-hop system, such as Perfect Privacy, JAP, Tor, Jondonym, Proxify, Turbohop or Anonymizer, it is known which exit node your traffic is entering/leaving is equal to the one you are connected to. The outgoing traffic can then be correlated to the encrypted traffic you are sending because all it's unencrypted traffic happens at the same time you get your encrypted traffic. This is so easy for a computer to do, it can be done passively. It does not require the VPN provider to cooperate at all. So a VPN that does multiplexing is necessary so that technique and passive ones are not effective.

What you need is a true multi-hop anonymity network, meaning that your connection is automatically routed through at least two anonymous proxies in other countries before it reaches the Internet, bypassing restrictive firewalls and circumventing any Internet censorship, and it would be nice if it used crowding and traffic padding,. Most VPN services only offer weak privacy because they do not provide true anonymity, and do not address data-retention and data-logging threats. So you need a service that channels your traffic across multiple anonymous servers located in non-logging jurisdictions to defeat data-logging and data-retention directives.

You would also need your identity and payments to be kept separate from your account, possibly via dead drops of some sort. So that the VPN service, who keep no logs to begin with, could not even link you - the customer - to your usage. Anything less than this is pointless. And in addition, this will not protect you from the PTB. It will protect you from say a domestic adversary, but definitely not a global one.

So far, I've only found Xerobank to be offering this. I'm sure more will pop up in the future, but they will need to be scrutinised very closely.

Anonymity is a very rare property in this universe, especially when you move so close to a mathematical and abstract system as network traffic.
 
You might find this interesting, a forum post from a Xerobank employee:

I've been getting some supporting private messages recently, stating that WSF [Wilders Security Forum] is being used for spreading disinformation about XeroBank services. In general, this is done by asking the same loaded questions over and over again, creating uncertainty in the illusion that they haven't been answered. Naturally it has been my attempt to respond quite patiently and diligently. While I would like to be able to maintain a more substantive relationship there, it appears there are a few bad apples that would rather use such a forum to abuse the resources and community it provides. This is unfair to Wilders and the people that run it, resulting in multiple threads clogging up their forum. XeroBank is obviously a controversial subject, making users excited and competitors upset. It is my proposal that none of the XeroBank team will substantially discuss XeroBank services on WSF, instead redirecting all discussion to our forum. If performed in conjunction with WSF moderators, this should curb forum abuse, and shift resource consumption and moderation powers to XeroBank forum where such discussions are welcome. I open this up to comment from the public and xb staff

I've gathered some Q&As on the Xerobank forum and posted them here, which sort of gives you a run-down of how they think.

1) Why is XB considered to be so secure?

Integrity. Our network and commercial structure is designed to distribute, decentralize, and mitigate threats to our users, even if it isn't easy or is inconvenient to us. Our corporation is located in a high privacy jurisdiction that makes us relatively immune to subpoenas from surveillance societies like US, UK, or EU. Our network is a multi-hop multi-jurisdictional network. That means whereas others just use single hop proxies, when using XeroBank your traffic hops through multiple jurisdictions. This results in breaking the trail of logging and data retention imposed by governments. Competitors fail to mention that just by using their service you are submitting your information to a surveillance society that can track and log all your data. We keep no logs, we do not allow fishing expeditions by anyone, including intelligence agencies. While that may seem rebellious, we choose not to play favorites: If the US government asked for information on a user, we wouldn't give it to them, just like if the Chinese government asked. We encrypt all user data and segregate it from the identity of users using a technology we developed called VAULTS. The end result is we cannot recover user data without the user's participation, nor is it stored insecurely, or in a single location where it could be stolen or compromised.

2)How many hops in the XB network?

At least two, every time you connect. For example, if your exit node is in the US, your entry node is not in the US.

3) Using OpenVPN is one's traffic encrypted from the client machine all the way until it leaves the exit node?

Yes, all traffic is encrypted from client's machine all the way till it hits the final destination on the internet

4) How secure is this encryption?

Very. First off, encryption strength isn't measured in bits. It is the quality of the cipher, the implementation, and it's use. For example, AES-CBC is not sufficient for protecting hard drive data, however AES-LRW is. Both are AES and are practically the same cipher. They are merely implemented and used differently. XeroBank employs pre-shared keys (more secure than horrible username/password), 2048 RSA is beyond sufficient for authenticating a Diffie Helman handshake. Please consult KeyLength for a rudimentary education. You will discover that 2048/256 is overkill. We use AES-256 and Blowfish encryption, which are exceptionally strong encryption protocols.

5) Is this traffic at all "sniffable" at any point in the chain by an entity other than a global passive adversary?

No, it is not sniffable at any time while in our network.

6) Is XB at all subject to MITM attacks?

No, XeroBank is not subject to Man In The Middle attacks. We do not allow 3rd parties to participate in our network.

7) Does XB use US/domestic exit nodes? Do domestic exit nodes pose any more or a risk if they are US based? With legacy accounts, where are the nodes likely to be?

XeroBank can place communication nodes in any country, because all traffic coming into it is encrypted and from another XeroBank node, breaking the chain of logging or tracking. Legacy account nodes exit through Germany.

8) During the course of an XB Open VPN session does one's IP address change periodically or does it remain the same? Does it matter?

The user gets a new static IP address for the period of their connection to XeroBank. This allows for exceptionally reliable communication while maintaining anonymity.

9) Do the same answers hold true for XB Mail when used with a Pro account? Is XB Mail encrypted all the way through?

xB Mail is a software client to connect to xerobank's secure mail system. Our mail servers are encrypted on multiple layers, and can only be reached through encrypted protocols so users don't have the opportunity to accidentally leak their information. All messages are stored on the XeroBank servers. This means two results: No matter where you check your mail from, it is always the same. If your computer breaks or is stolen, your messages are neither exposed nor lost. They are again, stored encrypted on our network, and only you as the user has the key to unlock them.

10) What would you say are the major advantages of Xerobank over some of the stronger, more reputable privacy services?

There are currently no stronger or more reputable privacy services.

11) I have a feeling that the NSA/FBI/Feds in general have infiltrated all anonymity service providers. Why? Well, do you seriously think that terrorists are dumb enough to communicate through unsecure avenues? No. I guarantee that most of the USA intelligence and that of other countries come from so-called secure avenues of communication.

There are only three anonymity service providers (XeroBank, CryptoHippie, and JonDos). The rest are privacy service providers. And yes, the privacy service providers are compromised, but it doesn't require infiltration, their systems are weak and can be externally compromised without requiring their cooperation.

12) I believe that many of the OpenVPN providers are fronts of the gov't. It is ingenius to setup shop under the disguise as being an anonymity provider but really being the Feds. The global gov'ts have had almost 9 years now (since 9/11) to lockdown and infiltrate all means of global communication.[/quote]

Actually, it is much much worse than you imagine. It isn't the pay VPN service providers who are colluding...

13) If they really want to, all it needs is one little piece of paper signed by a judge and Xerobank as well as the others will be forced to cave.

We get about 65 court orders/investigations per year. None of them, not one, has ever resulting in compromising a user's identity from outgoing traffic.

14) I am curious though; how and why would you receive a court order?

Xero Networks USA would receive the CO. XNUSA would ask Xero Networks AG (Panama), and Panama would reply US does not have jurisdiction.

15) Are you referring that a court order would make you monitor any one server that the court order is deemed for, or are you referring to a court order in trying to figure out who client John Doe is who accessed the website of Jane Doe and tried to hack it on some prior date?

Neither would work. First is defeated by multiplexing, second is defeated by no logs. We can't travel back in time to trace the connection.

16) If the feds want you to tell them who hacked site A on date B, could you be able to determine who it was?

No. We can't even determine that for ourselves.

17) Another scenario would allow your monitoring software to determine that client John Doe was hacking site A on date B, and the feds had nothing to do with it. Are you going to report that person to the feds even if the feds don't request it?

Not that it happens, but no. Simply terminate the account and theoretically blacklist the credit card and incoming IP address block.

18) If client John Doe performs a malicious act on date A of any sort, and your software discovers it AND the feds come to you asking to find out who did it, are you then going to notify them of who it was?

It doesn't work like that, but no. It has to start with upstream complaints or outgoing anomaly panic.

19) Also, if the feds asked you to keep the account active and monitor every activity of client John Doe for a 2 month period of time, are you going to do it?

That would not be allowed to happen.

20) Your servers in the United States don't need a court order to be monitored. Due to the infamous and garbage Patriot Act, the NSA/CIA/FBI can just bully whoever they want whenever they please to do whatever they want them to do. Are you really going to risk your whole business by not complying with their threats? No.

First off, monitoring a node won't work to correlate outgoing traffic with identity. Our network is multihop. There are no US->US connections, etc. It goes in one country and out another. Automatically a multi-jurisdictional task force will be needed as the lowest hurdle. Then you deal with our multiplexing, which prevents passive traffic analysis, defeating all current passive domestic surveillance programs. Automatically an active multinational surveillance program will be needed at the next hurdle. Xero Networks AG is not within US jurisdiction and would cease operational protocols with Xero Networks USA, which is in US jurisdiction. XNAG would shut down all business rather than compromise integrity. It's why I'm a part of it. Integrity above all else.

21) Don't give me any of the "no logs" bologna either. It just doesn't pan out that way.

Things aren't much yes and no, more of opportunity and cost. Our "no logs" policy is very costly. It costs money in lawyers, violations fees, international corporate structure overhead, etc. We truly do not log, and we have excess bandwidth for our users instead of overselling like cheap services. Please read the XeroBank ARPF document. If we get upstream complaints about a certain type of traffic, we could in theory turn on SNORT to see if it can find that type of exit traffic. It would then have to be live traced back to an entry node, which is terribly difficult even when you have administrative access. It would then have to be associated with an access account cryptographic CNAME. That does not give us the user identity, only the offending account. We can simply turn off the account without compromising the user identity. This has never happened, but it is designed so that we can deal with bad content (traffic) without compromising context (identity anonymity). Aliases of aliases and one-way cryptographic transactions make this possible. It is a custom designed system called VAULTS, which we have built.

Imagine you were going to create a service that wasn't corrupt and you had the brightest minds in security and anonymity, and you were going to build a network the "right" way, so it wouldn't be compromised and the corporate structure was highly resistant to political and legal compromise, and then run it with people who are diehards in the belief of privacy, freedom, and liberty. Then you have XeroBank.
 
well it loks like a good service ..but :D

6) Is XB at all subject to MITM attacks?

Quote
No, XeroBank is not subject to Man In The Middle attacks. We do not allow 3rd parties to participate in our network.

While that is true for them , its not for you , they are not telling the whole story here. XB is not owner of your private network , and does not know how you connect to them , so smart attacker could perform a mitm attack if combined with other vectors and for example human laziness (through which i mean actions like - First I click OK and if nothing happens then its ok ;) )

also when they say there are 2 nodes , then it means that traffic is decrypted on the middle node - so they have some sort insight , i mean they dont have to keep logs , but still , they could see decrypted traffic flowing on that host - but thats just my quick assumption , i do not know their infrastructure , but i use OpenVpn myself and I know it quite well - both server and client , since i often set it up myself.

Anyway , its good to see services like this . Hopefully this is not some sort of FED`s honeynet ;)

Somewhere on EFF site there is a how-to where you can read how to blend in daily users.
There is an old saying , when you are between crows , behave like a crow.
So unique and custom browser actually makes it worse unless you are uber-leet hero of the net.
Just my 5 cents :rolleyes:
 
another good article

Most browsers silently expose intimate viewing habits

The vast majority of people browsing the web are vulnerable to attacks that expose detailed information about their viewing habits, including news articles they've read and the Zip Codes they've entered into online forms.

According to results collected from more than 271,000 visits to a site called What the internet knows about you, 76 percent of users exposed their browser histories, with the proportion of those using Apple's Safari and Google Chrome browsers even higher. Surprisingly, the percentage was also higher among browsers that turned off JavaScript.


While the underlying browser history disclosure vulnerability was disclosed a decade ago, researchers on Thursday disclosed a variety of techniques that make attacks much more efficient. Among other things, the researchers described an algorithm that can scan as many as 30,000 links per second. That makes it possible for webmasters to stealthily gobble up huge amounts of information within seconds of someone visiting their site.

What's more, the researchers showed how webmasters can launch attacks that detect Zip Codes entered into weather or movie listings sites, find search terms entered into Google and Bing, and discover specific articles viewed on Wikileaks and dozens of popular news sites.

"While limited in scope due to resource limitations, our results indicate that history detection can be practically used to uncover private, user-supplied information from certain web forms for a considerable number of internet users and can lead to targeted attacks against the users of particular websites," the researchers, Artur Janc and Lukasz Olejnik, wrote.

The results, presented at the Web 2.0 Security and Privacy conference in Oakland, California, are the latest convincing evidence that anonymity on the net is largely a myth. Separate research released earlier this week showed that 84 percent of browser users leave digital fingerprints that can uniquely identify them. It stands to reason that attacks that combine both methods could unearth even more information most presume is private.

Last month, Mozilla said it would add protections to its upcoming Firefox 4 that would plug the gaping information disclosure vulnerability, which is known to plague every major browser. Most browser publishers, Microsoft included, have offered a variety of workarounds, but have said fixing the weakness will be extremely difficult because it's at the core of the HTTP standard.

To exploit the history-pilfering weakness, webmasters must compare a victim's HTTP response code against a list of specific web addresses, a requirement many have long said limited the effectiveness of practical attacks. Janc and Olejnik's streamlined method largely sidesteps this shortcoming by checking users against an initial list of the 6,417 most poplar internet addresses. A second list then scans for visits to specific pages on any of the websites found during the primary check.

The list on secondary links was drawn from a host of sources, including searches designed to enumerate every known page within a given domain. When one of 80 news sites was detected, the algorithm queried recent RSS feeds to detect specific articles the end user might have viewed. Users found to have visited weather or movie listing websites were also checked against every valid Zip Code in the United States.

Just over 9 per cent of people who took the test exposed their five-digit Zip Code, which provides a close approximation of a user's physical location.

The results were based on 271,576 visitors who executed 703,895 tests from September 2009 through the following February. Of those users, 243,068 completed both a primary and secondary scans.

Many more details are available in a PDF of their report, which is here. ®

sec:__http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/05/20/browser_history_attack/
 
This browser might be worth looking at for anyone who wants to minimize their online footprint. It's a fork of Chrome with all the creepy bits stripped out.

_https://epicbrowser.com
 
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