You might find this interesting, a forum post from a Xerobank employee:
I've been getting some supporting private messages recently, stating that WSF [Wilders Security Forum] is being used for spreading disinformation about XeroBank services. In general, this is done by asking the same loaded questions over and over again, creating uncertainty in the illusion that they haven't been answered. Naturally it has been my attempt to respond quite patiently and diligently. While I would like to be able to maintain a more substantive relationship there, it appears there are a few bad apples that would rather use such a forum to abuse the resources and community it provides. This is unfair to Wilders and the people that run it, resulting in multiple threads clogging up their forum. XeroBank is obviously a controversial subject, making users excited and competitors upset. It is my proposal that none of the XeroBank team will substantially discuss XeroBank services on WSF, instead redirecting all discussion to our forum. If performed in conjunction with WSF moderators, this should curb forum abuse, and shift resource consumption and moderation powers to XeroBank forum where such discussions are welcome. I open this up to comment from the public and xb staff
I've gathered some Q&As on the Xerobank forum and posted them here, which sort of gives you a run-down of how they think.
1) Why is XB considered to be so secure?
Integrity. Our network and commercial structure is designed to distribute, decentralize, and mitigate threats to our users, even if it isn't easy or is inconvenient to us. Our corporation is located in a high privacy jurisdiction that makes us relatively immune to subpoenas from surveillance societies like US, UK, or EU. Our network is a multi-hop multi-jurisdictional network. That means whereas others just use single hop proxies, when using XeroBank your traffic hops through multiple jurisdictions. This results in breaking the trail of logging and data retention imposed by governments. Competitors fail to mention that just by using their service you are submitting your information to a surveillance society that can track and log all your data. We keep no logs, we do not allow fishing expeditions by anyone, including intelligence agencies. While that may seem rebellious, we choose not to play favorites: If the US government asked for information on a user, we wouldn't give it to them, just like if the Chinese government asked. We encrypt all user data and segregate it from the identity of users using a technology we developed called VAULTS. The end result is we cannot recover user data without the user's participation, nor is it stored insecurely, or in a single location where it could be stolen or compromised.
2)How many hops in the XB network?
At least two, every time you connect. For example, if your exit node is in the US, your entry node is not in the US.
3) Using OpenVPN is one's traffic encrypted from the client machine all the way until it leaves the exit node?
Yes, all traffic is encrypted from client's machine all the way till it hits the final destination on the internet
4) How secure is this encryption?
Very. First off, encryption strength isn't measured in bits. It is the quality of the cipher, the implementation, and it's use. For example, AES-CBC is not sufficient for protecting hard drive data, however AES-LRW is. Both are AES and are practically the same cipher. They are merely implemented and used differently. XeroBank employs pre-shared keys (more secure than horrible username/password), 2048 RSA is beyond sufficient for authenticating a Diffie Helman handshake. Please consult KeyLength for a rudimentary education. You will discover that 2048/256 is overkill. We use AES-256 and Blowfish encryption, which are exceptionally strong encryption protocols.
5) Is this traffic at all "sniffable" at any point in the chain by an entity other than a global passive adversary?
No, it is not sniffable at any time while in our network.
6) Is XB at all subject to MITM attacks?
No, XeroBank is not subject to Man In The Middle attacks. We do not allow 3rd parties to participate in our network.
7) Does XB use US/domestic exit nodes? Do domestic exit nodes pose any more or a risk if they are US based? With legacy accounts, where are the nodes likely to be?
XeroBank can place communication nodes in any country, because all traffic coming into it is encrypted and from another XeroBank node, breaking the chain of logging or tracking. Legacy account nodes exit through Germany.
8) During the course of an XB Open VPN session does one's IP address change periodically or does it remain the same? Does it matter?
The user gets a new static IP address for the period of their connection to XeroBank. This allows for exceptionally reliable communication while maintaining anonymity.
9) Do the same answers hold true for XB Mail when used with a Pro account? Is XB Mail encrypted all the way through?
xB Mail is a software client to connect to xerobank's secure mail system. Our mail servers are encrypted on multiple layers, and can only be reached through encrypted protocols so users don't have the opportunity to accidentally leak their information. All messages are stored on the XeroBank servers. This means two results: No matter where you check your mail from, it is always the same. If your computer breaks or is stolen, your messages are neither exposed nor lost. They are again, stored encrypted on our network, and only you as the user has the key to unlock them.
10) What would you say are the major advantages of Xerobank over some of the stronger, more reputable privacy services?
There are currently no stronger or more reputable privacy services.
11) I have a feeling that the NSA/FBI/Feds in general have infiltrated all anonymity service providers. Why? Well, do you seriously think that terrorists are dumb enough to communicate through unsecure avenues? No. I guarantee that most of the USA intelligence and that of other countries come from so-called secure avenues of communication.
There are only three anonymity service providers (XeroBank, CryptoHippie, and JonDos). The rest are privacy service providers. And yes, the privacy service providers are compromised, but it doesn't require infiltration, their systems are weak and can be externally compromised without requiring their cooperation.
12) I believe that many of the OpenVPN providers are fronts of the gov't. It is ingenius to setup shop under the disguise as being an anonymity provider but really being the Feds. The global gov'ts have had almost 9 years now (since 9/11) to lockdown and infiltrate all means of global communication.[/quote]
Actually, it is much much worse than you imagine. It isn't the pay VPN service providers who are colluding...
13) If they really want to, all it needs is one little piece of paper signed by a judge and Xerobank as well as the others will be forced to cave.
We get about 65 court orders/investigations per year. None of them, not one, has ever resulting in compromising a user's identity from outgoing traffic.
14) I am curious though; how and why would you receive a court order?
Xero Networks USA would receive the CO. XNUSA would ask Xero Networks AG (Panama), and Panama would reply US does not have jurisdiction.
15) Are you referring that a court order would make you monitor any one server that the court order is deemed for, or are you referring to a court order in trying to figure out who client John Doe is who accessed the website of Jane Doe and tried to hack it on some prior date?
Neither would work. First is defeated by multiplexing, second is defeated by no logs. We can't travel back in time to trace the connection.
16) If the feds want you to tell them who hacked site A on date B, could you be able to determine who it was?
No. We can't even determine that for ourselves.
17) Another scenario would allow your monitoring software to determine that client John Doe was hacking site A on date B, and the feds had nothing to do with it. Are you going to report that person to the feds even if the feds don't request it?
Not that it happens, but no. Simply terminate the account and theoretically blacklist the credit card and incoming IP address block.
18) If client John Doe performs a malicious act on date A of any sort, and your software discovers it AND the feds come to you asking to find out who did it, are you then going to notify them of who it was?
It doesn't work like that, but no. It has to start with upstream complaints or outgoing anomaly panic.
19) Also, if the feds asked you to keep the account active and monitor every activity of client John Doe for a 2 month period of time, are you going to do it?
That would not be allowed to happen.
20) Your servers in the United States don't need a court order to be monitored. Due to the infamous and garbage Patriot Act, the NSA/CIA/FBI can just bully whoever they want whenever they please to do whatever they want them to do. Are you really going to risk your whole business by not complying with their threats? No.
First off, monitoring a node won't work to correlate outgoing traffic with identity. Our network is multihop. There are no US->US connections, etc. It goes in one country and out another. Automatically a multi-jurisdictional task force will be needed as the lowest hurdle. Then you deal with our multiplexing, which prevents passive traffic analysis, defeating all current passive domestic surveillance programs. Automatically an active multinational surveillance program will be needed at the next hurdle. Xero Networks AG is not within US jurisdiction and would cease operational protocols with Xero Networks USA, which is in US jurisdiction. XNAG would shut down all business rather than compromise integrity. It's why I'm a part of it. Integrity above all else.
21) Don't give me any of the "no logs" bologna either. It just doesn't pan out that way.
Things aren't much yes and no, more of opportunity and cost. Our "no logs" policy is very costly. It costs money in lawyers, violations fees, international corporate structure overhead, etc. We truly do not log, and we have excess bandwidth for our users instead of overselling like cheap services. Please read the XeroBank ARPF document. If we get upstream complaints about a certain type of traffic, we could in theory turn on SNORT to see if it can find that type of exit traffic. It would then have to be live traced back to an entry node, which is terribly difficult even when you have administrative access. It would then have to be associated with an access account cryptographic CNAME. That does not give us the user identity, only the offending account. We can simply turn off the account without compromising the user identity. This has never happened, but it is designed so that we can deal with bad content (traffic) without compromising context (identity anonymity). Aliases of aliases and one-way cryptographic transactions make this possible. It is a custom designed system called VAULTS, which we have built.
Imagine you were going to create a service that wasn't corrupt and you had the brightest minds in security and anonymity, and you were going to build a network the "right" way, so it wouldn't be compromised and the corporate structure was highly resistant to political and legal compromise, and then run it with people who are diehards in the belief of privacy, freedom, and liberty. Then you have XeroBank.