by Vladimir M. Chernousenko,
Scientific Director of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences
Institute of Physics in Kiev's Task Force for the
Rectification of the Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident
The Myths of Chernobyl,
and why I Wrote This Book
Accidents at nuclear power stations happen.
Between 1971 and 1986, in 14 countries,
there were 152 accidents.
From information provided by the
International Atomic Energy Agency
"It is not enough for a handful of experts
to attempt the solution of a problem,
to solve it and then to apply it.
The restriction of knowledge
to an elite group
destroys the spirit of society
and leads to its intellectual impoverishment."
Albert Einstein
I must help to dispel some dangerous myths. After the Chernobyl disaster the polarization of public opinion with regard to nuclear power as a source of energy became even more pronounced than before. At one extreme are the representatives of the nuclear industry, who believe, despite the growing scale of nuclear reactor accidents that the development of nuclear power must continue at an unrelenting pace. At the other extreme, we find the "Greens" and others demanding the immediate shut-down of all operating reactors and a ban on future construction of nuclear power stations.
In my view, both extremes are too simplistic.
In the history of civilization there have been occasions when people could not refrain from developing hazardous industrial processes. Nuclear power is, of course, the most prominent example. We must accept the facts and our enormous energy requirements, but it is also important not to forget that attempts to economize on safety provisions in such hazardous industries result in increased risk. And these increased risks may result in terrible tragedy, even in disasters whose consequences exceed national boundaries. It is certainly true that a nuclear power station working safely without any accident, is ecologically one of the cleanest of all industrial plants. However, a single accident, like the one at Chernobyl, can negate all advantages for centuries to come.
If we feel, therefore, that we do not now have the ideas and resources to create absolutely effective radiation safeguards, then it would be better to call a halt today. Tomorrow may be too late.
Unfortunately, international public opinion has already been confused by the myths concerning the causes and scale of the Chernobyl disaster and its consequences for millions of people. Probably, the birth of these myths may be traced back to the articles published in the Soviet press in May 1986. The public was assured that "the heroes of Chernobyl" were "entering the Zone", "studying the situation", "bringing the reactor in Block 4 under control", "bringing the situation under control".
In reality, no means were available to bring the reactor or even the whole situation under control. The reactor was dead. Its radioactive core had already been torn apart by the explosion. Almost all the radioactivity it could release, had already been set free by May 10, 1986. Millions of Curies of radionuclides from the gutted reactor had been scattered across the face of the earth. A transnational nuclear disaster had already happened.
Then was not the time to save the nuclear power station, but to save the people -- those living far beyond the boundaries of the 30-km Zone. However, the Government Commission charged with the rectification work (the "Liquidation of the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station" (LPA) "Likvidatsiya posledstvii avarii", stubbornly concentrated all its attention on the tiny 10-km Special Zone. It was into this small area that all the material resources were thrown, along with thousands of untrained and unprotected soldiers and reservists. The politicians had decided that the remaining three blocks of the station had to be brought back on-line, whatever the cost.
Hence, the birth of the myths of Chernobyl. A wave of disinformation swamped the Soviet press and then washed over the Western press.
A new wave of myths rippled out from the official report given by the Soviet (nuclear industry) representatives at the IAEA (International Atomic Engergy Agency) conference in August 1986. The report was full of vague formulations, unchecked data, and false conclusions as to the causes and scale of the disaster. Apparently, the IAEA was quite satisfied with it. All indications were that these conclusions were perfectly acceptable to top officials of the IAEA.
And the myths continue to be born. By the fifth anniversary of the tragedy, hundreds of books and articles had been written about Chernobyl. Of these, a number were written by people with no expert knowledge and are primarily emotional in character. Each of these seeks to throw light on one or another aspect of the disaster, usually concentrating on the first days or weeks.
The second category consists of works at least written by experts, but by experts who had no opportunity to personally check the situation in Chernobyl -- or, perhaps, who had dropped by briefly, but only after 1987, and often only for the purpose of having their photograph taken with the Sarcophagus in the background. This picture would then be included in their book to emphasize the author's personal involvement in the events described. Most of their factual information about what happened, most of their "reliable" data are gleaned from the official Soviet press. Unfortunately, even in the period of 'perestroika and glasnost' the Soviet press is far from being objective, and the information it offers is far from being totally reliable. The truth about the tragedy has been concealed by very severe censorship. The world has been shown "Potemkin villages" full of happily resettled inhabitants. From the days of the Tsars to those of Stalin, Russia always knew how to erect a facade -- and it is a well-known fact that the absence of reliable information, or of any information at all, creates ideal conditions for the birth of myths.
Myth 1 (for further details see Chapters 1- 3): The design of the RBMK-1000 reactor is impeccable. It was the operating staff that caused the explosion.
Myth 2 (see Chapter 1): The radionuclides emitted from the shattered reactor represent only 3% of the full 192-ton charge of uranium.
Myth 3 (see Chapter 3): The partial technical changes to which the 15 RMBK-1000 reactors still in operation were subjected after the disaster have eliminated any danger of a second accident.
Myth 4 (see Chapter 1): Only 31 people died as a result of the accident and the cleanup operations.
Myth 5 (see Chapters 1 and 4): The concentration of attention on the 30-km Zone and on the decontamination and restarting of the three other reactors at Chernobyl was both permissible, given the radiation situation, and essential, given the need for electricity.
Myth 6 (see Chapter 4): Before the accident there already existed a proper, scientifically developed contingency plan backed up with all the necessary technical resources, and all designed to cope with a nuclear disaster of such a scale.
Myth 7 (see Chapter 5): With the completion of the Sarcophagus, rectification was essentially completed. The Sarcophagus is a tomb full of highly radioactive waste and is designed to last for 30 years. It is perfectly safe and presents no threat to people or environment.
Myth 8 (see Chapter 6): Work in ultra-high radiation fields was carried out with the help of robots. The men who entered such fields were equipped with the appropriate protective gear.
Myth 9 (see Chapter 7): When "rectifiers", after their service in the Zone, began to fall ill and die, the link between their illness and the time they had spent in radiation fields was recognized. They were given the necessary medicines and treatment while welfare assistance was also available to their families.
Myth 10 (see Chapter 8): People living outside the 30-km Zone, but in areas affected by the emission of radionuclides, were warned in good time of the danger which threatened them and were given iodine treatment. The civil defense system worked effectively.
Myth 11 (see Chapter 9): The "35-rem safe lifetime dose" guideline for people living in contaminated areas (as proposed by Academician Il'yin and apparently supported by the leading officials of the IAEA) is scientifically sound and will not result in damage to health.
Myth 12 (see Chapters 1, 8, and 9): There is no reason to think that tens of thousands of children in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the Russian republic received radiation doses to their thyroid glands hundreds of times greater than the internationally permitted maximum dose.
Myth 13 (see Chapter 11): There is no reason to think that in the affected areas there is a continuing rise in the number of ailments caused by radiation, received either externally or internally through inhalation or contaminated food.
Myth 14 (see Chapters 1 and 11): The doses which people have received while living in contaminated areas will not have a genetic effect.
Myth 15 (see Chapter 12): The disaster will have no long-term impact on the environment, will not damage flora and fauna.
Myth 16 (see Chapter 13): The protective measures taken in the summer of 1986 in the 30-km Zone have prevented any leakage of radionuclides into the surface and ground waters.
Myth 17 (see Chapters 13 and 15): The radioactive pollution of the floodlands of the river Pripyat and of the silt of the Kiev Reservoir does not create any threat to the Dniepr basin or, ultimately, to the Black Sea.
Myth 18 (see Chapter 14): The existing national and international norms created to protect the civilian population from radiation are scientifically sound and will prevent any damage to the health of future generations.
Myth 19 (see Chapter 15): In the event of another nuclear accident anywhere in the world, scientific expertise and technical resources exist which are adequate for the task of decontaminating huge areas.
Myth 20 (see Chapters 14 and 15): The storage facilities for fuel waste and liquid waste at Chernobyl (and also at other Soviet nuclear power stations), the total content of which, in terms of radioactivity, amounts to more than 20 billion Curies, pose no threat to the world.
Myth 21 (see Chapters 1 and 15): The 800 - 1000 "tombs" which were dug in the (30-km) Zone to dump more than 500 million cubic meters of high-level and low-level radioactive debris present no danger to the world's aquifers.
From the preceding (incomplete) catalogue of myths it is seen that this book attempts to bring into the open true facts about the way the Chernobyl disaster has been handled -- from April 1986 up to August 1991.
I deliberately chose to present the interviews in their original tone which is sometimes emotional. Along with personal messages conveying horror, pain, grief, disappointment, frustration, and anger, the reader will find reports and data presented in the language of science. These different messages provide an adequate overall picture of Chernobyl. They reflect the many facets of the tragedy.
