Grover Furr: Stalin was demonized

[Altair]

Maybe it would be a good idea to ask Cs for Stalin...Perhaps they could clue us in on some facts or details...

Indeed. If all that true what Grover Furr states about Stalin then we have to revise decades of history of Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

 

[Altair]

Poems of Stalin:

in English: _http://molossusexperiment.tumblr.com/fall1/stalin
in Russian: http://grachev62.narod.ru/stalin/t17/t17_001.htm

Stalin's letters to his mother:

in Russian: http://stalinism.ru/zhivoy-stalin/pisma-stalina-materi.html

Perhaps it can help to understand his personality?

 

[Jeremy F Kreuz]

One note based on my own experience: Don't rely on Wikipedia when it comes to events of political significance. I recently checked a few entries about the 2nd WW and compared en-de-pl-ru "facts". Boy, they do differ from each other.

well copied and thanks for the hint - ;D

 

[Navigator]

Well, demonized by the west doesn't mean we don't have reliable sources that support the pathological diagnosis. Lobaczewski was pretty much throwing Stalin into the psychopathy/characteropathy bandwagon, here is a quote from ponerology.com

Spellbinding: Such ruthless and egotistic beliefs traumatize and spellbind normal people, diminishing their ability for common sense. Some even come to view frontal characteropaths as having special powers. If a parent possesses this disorder, all their children will usually show evidence of this fact in their personalities. Lobaczewski characterizes Joseph Stalin as typifying such a characteropath.

And Harrison mentioned this too in the Ponerology 101 article:

In a passage decades before its time, he observed that less "successful" psychopaths are to be found in prisons, while successful ones are to be found in positions of power (i.e., "among political and military national leaders, labor union bosses, etc."). He cited two examples of leaders characterized by this "affective retardation", Hitler and Stalin, to whom he referred repeatedly in his books8 and who both showed a "lack of empathy, emotional cold­ness, unlimited ruthlessness and craving for power".

And this extract from Laura's intro to Political Ponerology leads to a physical hint for his pathology:

Comparative considerations also led the author to conclude that Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili, also known as Stalin, should be included in the list of this particular ponerogenic characteropathy, which developed against the backdrop of perinatal damage to his brain's prefrontal fields. Literature and news about him abounds in indications: brutal, charismatic snake-charming; issuing of irrevocable decisions; inhuman ruthlessness, pathologic vengefulness directed at anyone who got in his way; and egotistical belief in his own genius on the part of a person whose mind was, in fact, average. This state explains as well his psychological dependence on a psychopath like Beria. Some photographs reveal the typical deformation of his forehead which appears in people who suffered very early damage to the areas mentioned above.

 

[Possibility of Being]

Well, demonized by the west doesn't mean we don't have reliable sources that support the pathological diagnosis. Lobaczewski was pretty much throwing Stalin into the psychopathy/characteropathy bandwagon, here is a quote from ponerology.com

Keep in mind that Lobaczewski knew what was available. IF there was a concerted effort since 1920s to demonize Stalin, that's the version that he would know.

But I think I caught Furr on manipulation when it comes to his claim there was no Soviet invasion on Poland. I need to check a few more things and will come back to it very soon. :)

 

[Possibility of Being]

I don't know about his Stalin claims yet, but I find his arguments about "no Soviet invasion" weak at best and deceptive and manipulative at worst.

The point of reference:
_https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrg/research/mlg09/did_ussr_invade_poland.html

I'll go point by point adding my comments according to my current understanding.

Furr says:

[T]he truth is that the USSR did not invade Poland in September, 1939. ... I will present a lot of evidence in support of this statement. ...Furthermore, at the time it was widely acknowledged that no such invasion occurred. I'll demonstrate that too.

1. The Nonaggression Treaty Between Germany and the USSR of August 1939

I'll leave this one for a separate post.

2. The USSR did not invade Poland - and everybody knew it at the time

- When Poland had no government, Poland was no longer a state. (More detailed discussion below)

Sounds like a legalistic argument to me, but I don’t know how it actually works. But yes, the Polish government and majority of Polish army cowardly fled out of the country and there was basically no contact, no one to negotiate with, no one to coordinate anything within the country etc. for about two weeks until a new government-in-exile formed in France.

- How do we know the USSR did not commit aggression against, or "invade" Poland? Evidence:
1. The Polish government did not declare war on USSR.

Irrelevant, see for example the London Conventions for definition of aggression.
(again, don’t know about the “State” definition and how it applies)

2. The Polish Supreme Commander Rydz-Smigly ordered Polish soldiers not to fight the Soviets, though he ordered Polish forces to continue to fight the Germans.

irrelevant – that doesn’t make an aggression a nonaggression. Soldiers can surrender, flee, etc. - it doesn't mean there was no aggression.

3. The Polish President Ignaz Moscicki, interned in Rumania since Sept. 17, tacitly admitted that Poland no longer had a government.

again, true but not sure it’s relevant

4. Rumania had a military treaty with Poland aimed against the USSR. Rumania did not declare war on the USSR.

irrelevant – a third party’s reaction, or lack of, doesn’t make an aggression a nonaggression

5. France did not declare war on the USSR, though it had a mutual defense treaty with Poland.

as above, plus:

The Kasprzyski-Gamelin Convention signed on 19 May 1939 obliged both armies to provide help to each other in case of a war with Nazi Germany. As far as the previous pact is concerned, France showed her true colors already in 1938:

From a highly placed source in Paris... it became known that French ambassador to Poland, Léon Noël, wrote in October 1938: ‘It is of utmost importance that we remove from our obligations everything that would deprive the French government the freedom of decision on the day when Poland finds itself in war with Germany.' In his answer Georges Bonnet, French Foreign Minister at the time, reassured Noël, writing that ‘our agreement with Poland is full of gaps, needed to keep our country away from war.'"....

6. England never demanded that the USSR withdraw its troops from Western Belorussia and Western Ukraine, the parts of the former Polish state occupied by the Red Army after September 17, 1939.

Irrelevant, plus:

The Anglo-Polish military alliance refers to the alliance between the United Kingdom and the Polish Second Republic formalised by the Anglo-Polish Agreement in 1939 and subsequent addenda of 1940 and 1944,[1] for mutual assistance in case of military invasion from Germany, as specified in a secret protocol

Even if there are doubts about the secret protocol as Furr says, it’s still not a proof. Here is an excerpt showing that England did consider it invasion:

Somewhat belatedly Poland's Foreign Minister awoke to the dangerous possibility of the Soviet Union not honouring her Non-Aggression Pact with Poland. On 17 September, acting on instructions from Beck, Raczyński raised with the Foreign Office the issue of the interpretation of the Secret Protocol attached to the Agreement of 25 August, In an obvious attempt to utilise the already clearly useless agreement the Poles hoped that Clause 1 (B) of the Protocol which referred to the ‘European Powers other than Germany' could be considered to include the Soviet Union.

Thus the Ambassador stated that 'he realised that His Majesty's government had probably throughout had in mind Italy. But his Government had throughout had in mind the Soviet.' Beck nevertheless could no more force the British to defend Poland against Soviet action than he could persuade them to open a western front.

The Cabinet meeting of 18 September discussed the subject of the Soviet invasion of Poland. Opening, Halifax pointed out that the provisions of the Anglo-Polish Agreement did not apply to the case of Soviet aggression. The discussion which subsequently took place merely confirmed the existing state of affairs. The Soviet invasion of Polish territory was not considered to have altered the situation and Chamberlain declared that: 'His Majesty's Government still retained complete confidence that on the conclusion of the war Poland would be restored.'

Ultimately it was decided to confine British action to that of issuing a formal protest The Poles nevertheless did hope for some stronger expression of British disapproval. A note handed to Halifax on 18 September by Raczyński contained a statement that 'the Polish Government reserve the right to invoke the obligation of its allies arising out of the treaties now in force'. Halifax let it be known that any assumption that the treaty could be interpreted to include, among the contingencies provided for, Soviet aggression was incorrect. He considered that 'we are free to take our own decision and to decide whether to declare war on the USSR or not . . .' Thus the final Polish attempt to activate the Anglo-Polish Treaty was doomed to failure. Britain's determination to dissociate herself from East European politics, particularly German expansionism, by means legal or otherwise, was extended to all other political developments in Eastern Europe. (Prażmowska, Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, 1939)

7. The League of Nations did not determine the USSR had invaded a member state.

Indeed. As it did nothing when in 1920 Poland seized Vilna, the same year invaded then Russian territory, in 1936 when Hitler broke the Treaty of Versailles several times, and in many other cases.

8. All countries accepted the USSR’s declaration of neutrality.

Not sure what "declaration of neutrality" Furr is talking about. There are two Wikipedia entries and USSR is not listed there. There was a remark on neutrality in R-M Pact and in USSR-Poland non-aggression Pact 1932, but they were bilateral agreements, the latter evidently broken under false pretense. On his subpage on "neutrality", Furr uses an argument that hence the Western powers did not mention USSR as a belligerent in some of their statements, that means they agreed that the USSR was not a belligerent power. Far stretched conclusion, IMO.

The Polish State Collapsed

That was the pretext used by USSR. Prof. Furr spends some time on a useless (IMO) textual criticism to prove there were different translations of notes exchanged between Molotov and Grzybowski (Polish Ambassador to USSR) and misrepresents that exchange by completely taking it out of context. I'll come back to it.

The Question of the State in International Law

Some poor acrobatics there, not convincing to me.

To be continued...

 

[Jeremy F Kreuz]

I dont know if Furr mentions the Winter War against Finland in 1939 - 1940, but it seems that there the Decision to invade another country was clearly on Stalin's side.

The Winter War (Finnish: talvisota, Swedish: vinterkriget, Russian: Зи́мняя война́, tr. Zimnyaya voyna)[25] was a military conflict between the Soviet Union and Finland in 1939–1940. It began with the Soviet invasion of Finland on 30 November 1939 (three months after the outbreak of World War II), and ended with the Moscow Peace Treaty on 13 March 1940. The League of Nations deemed the attack illegal and expelled the Soviet Union from the League on 14 December 1939

If Furr omits this conflict and discusses legalise on the Poland case, it seems he his whitewashing at least something crucial in establishing the truth about Stalin.

 

[Altair]

I dont know if Furr mentions the Winter War against Finland in 1939 - 1940, but it seems that there the Decision to invade another country was clearly on Stalin's side.

The Winter War (Finnish: talvisota, Swedish: vinterkriget, Russian: Зи́мняя война́, tr. Zimnyaya voyna)[25] was a military conflict between the Soviet Union and Finland in 1939–1940. It began with the Soviet invasion of Finland on 30 November 1939 (three months after the outbreak of World War II), and ended with the Moscow Peace Treaty on 13 March 1940. The League of Nations deemed the attack illegal and expelled the Soviet Union from the League on 14 December 1939

If Furr omits this conflict and discusses legalise on the Poland case, it seems he his whitewashing at least something crucial in establishing the truth about Stalin.

Well, I'm not sure who really started this War:

A book called "Recalling The Past For the Sake of the Future - The Causes, Results and Lessons of World War Two" was published in Moscow in 1985 by Novosti Press. (perhaps a better title would have been "Inventing the Past For the Sake of Socialist Reality") It says the Following:

"But the Finnish government, prodded by Western powers, rejected these proposals and broke off the talks on November 7, 1939. Helsinki apparently believed that taking a "firm line" toward the Soviet Union, with the support of Britain and the U.S., was in its best interests. Finland carried out mobilization amid frenzied militarist propaganda, concentrated its troops on the border with the U.S.S.R. and provoked one border incident after another. Armed provocation continued despite warnings from the Soviet side, and on November 30, 1939, hostilities began between Finland and the Soviet Union."

Source: _http://uralica.com/finnliv.htm

 

[Mark7]

Maybe it would be a good idea to ask Cs for Stalin...Perhaps they could clue us in on some facts or details...

Indeed. If all that true what Grover Furr states about Stalin then we have to revise decades of history of Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The Cs input may help to sort some of this. Did Stalin have frontal or other type of characteropathy? Was his paranoia in some ways justified?

I grew up with the idea that just about every geo-political evil in the world could be traced back to the USSR. It seems doubtful that Stalin was any sort of modern day Caesar, but if any of what Furr is claiming here is objective, it's worth knowing about.

Something Putin had to say about Stalin may be of some interest:

“What’s the real difference between [Oliver] Cromwell and Stalin? None whatsoever,” Putin said at
a press conference Thursday. Putin said Stalin deserves statues in his honor as much as the late British lord
protector, a “cunning fellow” who “played a very ambiguous role in Britain’s history.”But unlike Cromwell, Stalin
has a lack of state-endorsed monuments in his honor, Putin said.

Putin made the comments in response to a question about a Stalin monument possibly being erected in Moscow.
Authorities in the Russian capital recently announced plans to commemorate all Soviet leaders who lived in the city.
Putin said he could not influence the decisions of Moscow’s City Hall. But he cautioned, “We must treat all periods of
our history with care.” “It’s better not to stir things up … with premature actions,” he added.

Stalin, who led the Soviet Union from 1922 until his death in 1953, is credited with implementing political purges that
resulted in the deaths of several million people and the servitude of just as many in gulag prison camps. Cromwell led
a Protestant army to defeat the monarchy in the British Civil War, becoming the ruler of England from 1653 until his
death five years later.

Cromwell endorsed the execution of King Charles II, though he never conducted any mass purges.

[Edit: adding link]

_http://sputniknews.com/russia/20131219/185734707.html

 

[Miss.K]

I know more or less nothing of Stalin, but have been thinking lately about what the truth about him might be, and without knowing much, my guess was close to SeekinTruths that he was probably bad, but also probably demonized.

So I hope it's OK I tag along on this thread (thank you) to get updated on your findings, though I probably wont be of much help (sorry)

 

[SeekinTruth]

I dont know if Furr mentions the Winter War against Finland in 1939 - 1940, but it seems that there the Decision to invade another country was clearly on Stalin's side.

The Winter War (Finnish: talvisota, Swedish: vinterkriget, Russian: Зи́мняя война́, tr. Zimnyaya voyna)[25] was a military conflict between the Soviet Union and Finland in 1939–1940. It began with the Soviet invasion of Finland on 30 November 1939 (three months after the outbreak of World War II), and ended with the Moscow Peace Treaty on 13 March 1940. The League of Nations deemed the attack illegal and expelled the Soviet Union from the League on 14 December 1939

If Furr omits this conflict and discusses legalise on the Poland case, it seems he his whitewashing at least something crucial in establishing the truth about Stalin.

Well, I'm not sure who really started this War:

A book called "Recalling The Past For the Sake of the Future - The Causes, Results and Lessons of World War Two" was published in Moscow in 1985 by Novosti Press. (perhaps a better title would have been "Inventing the Past For the Sake of Socialist Reality") It says the Following:

"But the Finnish government, prodded by Western powers, rejected these proposals and broke off the talks on November 7, 1939. Helsinki apparently believed that taking a "firm line" toward the Soviet Union, with the support of Britain and the U.S., was in its best interests. Finland carried out mobilization amid frenzied militarist propaganda, concentrated its troops on the border with the U.S.S.R. and provoked one border incident after another. Armed provocation continued despite warnings from the Soviet side, and on November 30, 1939, hostilities began between Finland and the Soviet Union."

Source: _http://uralica.com/finnliv.htm

This is another issue where there have been claims that the USSR made a very generous offer to Finland for rearranging borders and trading territories similar to before WWI to gain access to Northern ports in defense of the pending Nazi attack to be able to better defend Leningrad. The Finns were to get more territories in the offer but refused. So, another murky issue that's not cut and dried.

 

[Possibility of Being]

I dont know if Furr mentions the Winter War against Finland in 1939 - 1940, but it seems that there the Decision to invade another country was clearly on Stalin's side.

I'm not there yet, but will keep in mind that's something to look for. [Added: Couldn't find anything said by Furr about Finland on his website nor by G-search.] I have huge gaps in my knowledge about history, and the WW2 always seemed like one big can of worms to me. Well, it's not different in this sense from any other part of our history, but that I know did not.

I grew up with the idea that just about every geo-political evil in the world could be traced back to the USSR. It seems doubtful that Stalin was any sort of modern day Caesar, but if any of what Furr is claiming here is objective, it's worth knowing about.

Me too, though most likely in a bit different way (Central/Eastern Europe). Hence the problem. For some reason Furr did something that made me curious. I'm not going to pretend I'll go into some deep research, but want at least to see how he presents his claims and his 'evidence'. Not very promising so far. But we know a few scientists/researchers (McCanney, for example) who started off with a good stuff and then went astray (with a little help from PTB or by themselves), so perhaps other parts of his writing are better.

Here is the continuation of my previous post. If anyone can see any errors or flaws in my thinking, please point it out!

When he talks about the Nonaggression Pact between the USSR and Germany (M-R Pact) he tries to show that USSR had no better option and "signed that pact not to "partition Poland" like the Allies had partitioned Czechoslovakia, but in order to defend the USSR." So he brings up the occupation and partition of Czechoslovakia as an argument ("Poland did it!") while that act had nothing to do with the M-R Pact and subsequent Soviets' entry to Poland, other than diminishing whatever was left of USSR confidence in the Western powers.

His 'strongest' argument (and the most disappointing) seems to be that little exchange:

By September 15 German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was writing to Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, German ambassador to Moscow, that if the USSR did not enter Eastern Poland militarily there would be a political vacuum in which "new states" might form:

Also the question is disposed of in case a Russian intervention did not take place, of whether in the area lying to the east of the German zone of influence a political vacuum might not occur. Since we on our part have no intention of undertaking any political or administrative activities in these areas, apart from what is made necessary by military operations, without such an intervention on the part of the Soviet Government there might be the possibility of the construction of new states there.
- http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns072.asp

Ribbentrop no longer referred to "Poland", only to "...the area lying to the east of the German zone of influence…" This shows that he considered that the Polish government was no longer functioning - no longer had sovereignty even in the East where there were no German forces and where the Soviets had not yet entered.

Schulenburg reported this to Molotov and summarized Molotov's reply (to Ribbentrop) the next day, September 16:

Molotov added that he would present my communication to his Government but he believed that a joint communique was no longer needed; the Soviet Government intended to motivate its procedure as follows: the Polish State had collapsed and no longer existed; therefore all agreements concluded with Poland were void; third powers [i.e. Germany] might try to profit by the chaos which had arisen…
- http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns073.asp

So even if the USSR had disagreed with the Germans and had held to the position that a Polish state still existed, the Soviets would have to deal with the fact that Germany no longer did. Germany considered that there was no longer a Polish state, and therefore the Secret Protocol about spheres of influence, agreed upon in the Secret Protocol to the M-R Pact a few weeks earlier, was no longer in effect.

Germany felt it was now free either to occupy what had been Eastern Poland right up to the Soviet border. Or - as we now know Hitler was planning - to form one or more pro-Nazi, anti-Soviet puppet states there. The USSR simply could not permit either of these outcomes.

Not only that Furr's conclusion (last two paragraphs) is far stretched and plain wrong, but he also shows a very little respect to his readers. Which is actually funny because he himself puts so much emphasis on his checking all footnotes and quoted sources in others' writings and here he expects his readers to take his words for face value. And in this case all it's needed is to follow his links to 'avalon' files and check previous and next telegrams exchanged between Berlin and Moscow - starting September 3 (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns061.asp) up to Sept 17. Anyway, at least that part (no invasion) of Furr's reasoning is IMO full of fallacies (by mistake or due to ideological biases) or just outright manipulation.

I'm reproducing here a part of those telegrams that show it was all a mutual M-R plot from the very beginning.

Ribbentrop, Sep 3

We definitely expect to have beaten the Polish Army decisively in a few weeks. We would then keep the area that was established as German sphere of interest at Moscow under military occupation. We would naturally, however, for military reasons, also have to proceed further against such Polish military forces as are at that time located in the Polish area belonging to the Russian sphere of interest.

Please discuss this at once with Molotov and see if the Soviet Union does not consider it desirable for Russian forces to move at the proper time against Polish forces in the Russian sphere of interest and, for their part, to occupy this territory. In our estimation this would be not only a relief for us, but also, in the sense of the Moscow agreements, in the Soviet interest as well.

Reply, Sep 5:

"We agree with you that at a suitable time it will be absolutely necessary for us to start concrete action. We are of the view, however, that this time has not yet come. It is possible that we are mistaken, but it seems to us that through excessive haste we might injure our cause and promote unity among our opponents. We understand that as the operations proceed, one of the parties or both parties might be forced temporarily to cross the line of demarcation between the spheres of interest of the two parties; but such cases must not prevent the strict execution of the plan adopted."

Ribbentrop, Sep 9

We are of course in accord with the Soviet Government that the validity of agreements arrived at in Moscow is not affected by local extension of our military operations. We must and will defeat the Polish Army wherever we meet it. Nothing in the Moscow arrangements is thereby altered. Military operations are progressing even beyond our expectations. The Polish Army, from all indications, is more or less in a state of dissolution. Under these circumstances, I consider it urgent that you resume the conversation with Molotov regarding the military intentions of the Soviet Government. It may be that the summoning of the Russian Military Attaché to Moscow indicates that decisions are in preparation there. I would therefore ask you to speak to Molotov on the subject again in an appropriate manner and to wire result.

Schulenburg, same:

Molotov told me today at 3 p. m. that at a Soviet military action would take place within the next few days. The summoning of the Military Attaché to Moscow was in fact connected with it. Numerous reservists would also be called.
and:
The Red Army has admitted to Lieutenant General Köstring (1) that the Soviet Union will intervene.

Schulenburg, Sep 10:

In today's conference at 4 p. m. Molotov modified his statement of yesterday by saying that the Soviet Government was taken completely by surprise by the unexpectedly rapid German military successes. In accordance with our first communication, the Red Army had counted on several weeks, which had now shrunk to a few days. ...

Then Molotov came to the political side of the matter and stated that the Soviet Government had intended to take the occasion of the further advance of German troops to declare that Poland was falling apart and that it was necessary for the Soviet Union, in consequence, to come to the aid of the Ukrainians and the White Russians "threatened" by Germany. This argument was to make the intervention of the Soviet Union plausible to the masses and at the same time avoid giving the Soviet Union the appearance of an aggressor. ...

Schul., Sep 14

Molotov summoned me today at 4 p. rm. and stated that the Red Arm had reached a state of preparedness sooner than anticipated. Soviet action could therefore take place sooner than he had assumed at our last conversation.... For the political motivation of Soviet action (the collapse of Poland and protection of Russian "minorities") it was of the greatest importance not to take action until the governmental center of Poland, the city of Warsaw, had fallen. Molotov therefore asked that he be informed as nearly as possible as to when the capture of Warsaw could be counted on. Please send instructions.

I would direct your attention to today's article in Pravda, carried by DNB, which will be followed by a similar article in Izvestia tomorrow. The articles serve [to prepare] the political motivation mentioned by Molotov for Soviet intervention.

Ribb., Sep 15 (for his full proposal of the joint communiqueé, see: _http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns072.asp)

...."In view of the complete collapse of the previous form of government in Poland, the Reich Government and the Government of the U.S.S.R. consider it necessary to bring to an end the intolerable political and economic conditions existing in these territories. They regard it as their joint duty to restore peace and order in these areas which are naturally of interest to them and to bring about a new order by the creation of natural frontiers and viable economic organizations." ...

Schul, Sep 16

I saw Molotov at 6 o'clock today and carried out instructions. Molotov declared that military intervention by the Soviet Union was imminent-perhaps even tomorrow or the day after. Stalin was at present in consultation with the military leaders and he would this very night, in the presence of Molotov, give me the day and hour of the Soviet advance.

Molotov added that he would present my communication to his Government but he believed that a joint communiqué was no longer needed; the Soviet Government intended to motivate its procedure as follows: the Polish State had collapsed and no longer existed; therefore all agreements concluded with Poland were void; third powers might try to profit by the chaos which had arisen; the Soviet Union considered itself obligated to intervene to protect its Ukrainian and White Russian brothers and make it possible for these unfortunate people to work in peace.

The Soviet Government intended to publicize the above train of thought by the radio, press, etc., immediately after the Red Army had crossed the border, and at the same time communicate it in an official note to the Polish Ambassador here and to all the missions here.

Molotov conceded that the projected argument of the Soviet Government contained a note that was jarring to German sensibilities but asked that in view of the difficult situation of the Soviet Government we not let a trifle like this stand in our way. The Soviet Government unfortunately saw no possibility of any other motivation, since the Soviet Union had thus far not concerned itself about the plight of its minorities in Poland and had to justify abroad, in some way or other, its present intervention. ...

Schul., Sep 17:

Stalin received me at 2 o'clock at night in the presence of Molotov and Voroshilov and declared that the Red Army would cross the Soviet border this morning at 6 o'clock along the whole line from Polozk to Kamenetz-Podolsk.

In order to avoid incidents, Stalin urgently requested that we see to it that German planes as of today do not fly east of the Bialystok-Brest-Litovsk-Lemberg Line. Soviet planes would begin today to bomb the district east of Lemberg.

I promised to do my best with regard to informing the German Air Force but asked in view of the little time left that Soviet planes not approach the above-mentioned line too closely today.

The Soviet commission will arrive in Bialystok tomorrow or day after tomorrow at the latest.

Stalin read me a note that is to be handed to the Polish Ambassador tonight, to be sent in copy to all the missions in the course of the day and then published. The note contains a justification for the Soviet action. The draft read to me contained three points unacceptable to us. In answer to my objections, Stalin with the utmost readiness so altered the text that the note now seems satisfactory for us. Stalin stated that the issuance of a German-Soviet communiqué could not be considered before two or three days.

So on the one hand, and given legal Poland borders at that time, Soviets' entry was an invasion, even though there was almost no fight. Firstly, there was a lot of confusion within Polish troops who had no idea what was going on and whether the Soviets were there as allies or as enemies, but there was also a clear order from the highest military levels not to fight against Russians. On the other hand, they had a pretty good reason to enter and secure the territory that used to be theirs. Not to mention that in long run it could have been much worse if they didn't.

And all of the above based on the premise that the documents captured by the American and British armies in 1945 and published in 1948 are real, not edited and not just forgeries...

 

[Jeremy F Kreuz]

Russia media is also increasingly discussing Stalin - here a article (only in Russian - and mine is not yet good enough to understand/translate fully)

Миф о Сталине: разоблачение фальсификаций - http://politrussia.com/istoriya/menya-sprosili-nuzhen-456/
(The Stalin Myth: dispelling falsifications)

Right now about 52% of Russians have a positive opinion of Stalin, while only 30% a negative one. The article points out that USSR's population actually grew considerably during the Stalin era (no mean feat, considering the damage wrought by WW2), as compared to the decrease during the "liberal" rule of the 1990s. Moreover, even at the height of the Purges, a smaller proportion of USSR's population were repressed than are imprisoned in the United States today. That Stalin presided over a tremendous developmental leap forward goes without saying.

 

[Jeremy F Kreuz]

Russian Insider ran a lenghty article of Alexander Mercouris on the Molotov - ribbentrop pact, which I think is relevant for this discussion.

The Truth About the Soviet German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23rd 1939 and Its Secret Protocol - http://russia-insider.com/en/history/truth-about-soviet-german-non-aggression-pact-23rd-august-1939-and-its-secret-protocol

The Truth About the Soviet German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23rd 1939 and Its Secret Protocol

In no part of its text does the Secret Protocol assign Polish or Baltic territory to the USSR or Nazi Germany
Alexander Mercouris Subscribe to 92

The anniversary of the end of the Second World War has, as is now routine, resurrected the subject of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact of 23rd August 1939.

The subject was even brought up during Putin’s press conference with Merkel on 10th May 2015. Here is what Putin said:

“Concerning the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, let me draw your attention to the historical events, when the Soviet Union… It is not even so important who was in charge of diplomacy at the time. Stalin was in charge, of course, but he was not the only person thinking about how to guarantee the Soviet Union’s security. The Soviet Union made tremendous efforts to put in place conditions for collective resistance to Nazism in Germany and made repeated attempts to create an anti-Nazi bloc in Europe.

“All of these attempts failed. What’s more, after 1938, when the well-known agreement was concluded in Munich, conceding some regions of Czechoslovakia, some politicians thought that war was inevitable. Churchill, for example, when his colleague came back to London with this bit of paper and said that he had brought peace, said in reply, ‘Now war is inevitable.’

“When the Soviet Union realised that it was left to face Hitler’s Germany on its own, it acted to try to avoid a direct confrontation, and this resulted in signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In this sense, I agree with our Culture Minister’s view that this pact did make sense in terms of guaranteeing the Soviet Union’s security. This is my first point.

“Second, I remind you that after the Munich Agreement was signed, Poland itself took steps to annex part of Czech territory. In the end, following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the division of Poland, they fell victim to the same policy that they tried to pursue in Europe.”

The relevance of this pact both to Russia’s celebration of the Soviet victory in the Second World War, and to the international situation today, is not obvious, given that today’s Russia is not the USSR and Putin is not Stalin.

However it constantly gets brought up, especially by East European politicians who, out of hostility to Russia, seek to apportion blame equally between Germany and Russia for the start of the Second World War.

That claim is false. It is Putin’s version that is correct, as a simple statement of the facts shows.

The facts are very simple and straightforward and are well-known, and problems of interpretation are (or should be) few.

The starting point is that Stalin had no plans in the spring or early summer of 1939 to attack Poland, and had no territorial claims against Poland.

Hitler by contrast did. In fact not only did Hitler plan to attack Poland, but he was resolved to do so.

At the end of March 1939 he told General Brauchitsch, the head of the German army, that he would attack Poland if Poland did not surrender Danzig to him.

On 3rd April 1939 he gave a formal directive to his generals to prepare plans to do so.

On 28th April 1939 he denounced his non-aggression pact with Poland and threatened Poland publicly in a speech to the Reichstag, saying he would cease to look for a peaceful settlement with Poland if Poland did not give him Danzig and did not abandon its alliance with Britain.

On 23rd May 1939, in a secret speech made to the top German leadership in his office in the New Chancellery, he put the issue beyond any further doubt, making his decision to attack Poland absolutely clear.

There is no instance of Hitler committing himself to attack a country and then failing to do so. Hitler would have attacked Poland in August 1939 whether Germany had agreed a Non-Aggression Pact with the USSR or not. Perhaps the only thing that might have deterred him was a formal alliance between Poland, the USSR and the Western powers.

That however did not happen, and the story of the diplomacy that preceded the signing in Moscow on 23rd August 1939 of the Non-Aggression Pact shows why.

In the event of a German attack on Poland, Britain and France were committed by the guarantees they gave Poland in March 1939 to come to its defence.

The only outstanding issue in the diplomacy leading up to the war was therefore whether Britain, France and Poland would be able to ally themselves with the USSR to defeat or deter Germany.

The need for such an alliance was obvious and was explained by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons in a speech he gave on 3rd April 1939:

“To stop here with a guarantee to Poland would be to halt in No-man’s Land under fire of both trench lines and without the shelter of either…. Having begun to create a Grand Alliance against aggression, we cannot afford to fail. We shall be in mortal danger if we fail…. The worst folly, which no one proposes we should commit, would be to chill and drive away any natural co-operation which Soviet Russia in her own deep interests feels it necessary to afford.”

The story of the diplomacy of 1939 is that “chill and drive away” co-operation with the USSR is precisely what the Western Powers did.

An alliance with the USSR against Hitler ought to have been a straightforward matter given the intense hostility between the USSR and Nazi Germany and Soviet efforts throughout the 1930s to forge an alliance against Nazi Germany.

Conditions however for forging such an alliance had never been worse than they were in the spring of 1939.

Britain and France had spurned a Soviet offer of alliance in 1938 and had sacrificed at the Munich Conference (from which the USSR was excluded) the USSR’s ally Czechoslovakia.

On 28th March 1939 Franco’s troops occupied Madrid, the capital of the USSR’s only other European ally, Republican Spain. Britain and France, whose policy had been instrumental in sealing the fate of the Republican Spain, actually recognised Franco’s regime as the legitimate government of Spain on 27th February 1939 – before Madrid fell.

Not surprisingly, and as Putin correctly says, by April 1939 Stalin had as a result become deeply suspicious of the British and French. The debacles in Czechoslovakia and Spain will have taught him that Britain and France preferred an accommodation with Hitler, if that was humanly possible, to an alliance with him. The possibility that in a war with Hitler the British and French might leave him and the USSR hanging out to dry, must in the spring of 1939 have appeared very real to him

In a speech to the Communist Party Conference in Moscow on 10th March 1939 Stalin made his suspicion and disillusionment with the Western powers absolutely clear when he said that he would “not let our country be drawn into conflict by warmongers, whose custom is to let others pull their chestnuts out of the fire.”

Very few Western writers have been prepared to acknowledge the influence on Soviet policy of Western policy during the Czech crisis of 1938, and over the course of the Spanish Civil War. Westerners, who are so acutely sensitive to Russian actions, real or imagined, are invariably blind to the effect their actions have on Russia. This has been true in recent years as well, as the West’s misreading of Russia’s reaction to NATO’s expansion and to Western policy in Ukraine and Georgia, shows. It was equally true in 1939.

Despite his suspicions, Stalin did nonetheless make the Western powers an offer of alliance on 17th April 1939. As late as 15th August 1939 he continued making it, though by this point it’s clear he had lost hope in it.

The reason the alliance did not happen is because Poland rejected it and Britain and France were not prepared to pressure Poland to accept it.

The Poles made their position clear during the visit of Polish foreign minister Beck to London in early April 1939.

In private discussions Beck told the British: “there were two things which it was impossible for Poland to do, namely, to make her policy dependent upon either Berlin or Moscow. Any pact of mutual assistance between Poland and Soviet Russia would bring an immediate hostile reaction from Berlin and would probably accelerate the outbreak of a conflict.” While the British could negotiate with Soviet Russia if they liked – and even undertake obligations towards her, “these obligations would in no way extend the obligations undertaken by Poland.”

The Poles stuck firmly by this position throughout the ensuing crisis, categorically rejecting proposals for an alliance with the USSR or for Soviet troops to enter Poland to fight the Germans alongside them.

It was this Polish refusal to accept the offer of a Soviet alliance and of Soviet aid, and the failure of the Western powers to override it, that ultimately caused the failure of the negotiations for an alliance with the USSR.

That this was a catastrophic failure of Western policy, which deprived the Western powers of the means to defend Poland — which they were committed to defending — was widely understood at the time and was said in a speech in the House of Commons by the former British Prime Minister David Lloyd George:

“If we are going in without the help of Russia we are walking into a trap. It is the only country whose arms can get there…. If Russia has not been brought into this matter because of certain feelings the Poles have that they do not want the Russians there, it is for us to declare the conditions, and unless the Poles are prepared to accept the only conditions with which we can successfully help them, the responsibility must be theirs.”

The British and the French were not prepared “to declare the conditions” and the Poles refused to change their stance.

By mid August 1939 this had become clear to Stalin, at which point, given the certainty of a German attack on Poland, the attractions for Stalin of the Non-Aggression Pact Hitler was offering had become overwhelming. Given Stalin’s deep suspicions of both the Germans and the West, and the West’s failure to agree his offer of alliance, a peace agreement with Germany that minimised the risk to the USSR of a hostile Germany on its western border, made obvious sense.

The whole issue has been muddled by constant misrepresentation of the Non-Aggression Pact’s Secret Protocol, which is invariably misrepresented as an agreement by Stalin and Hitler for a cynical carve up of Eastern Europe.

The language of the Secret Protocol (reproduced below, together with that of the Non-Aggression Pact and of the subsequent Protocols which amended it) does not bear that out.

In no part of its text does the Secret Protocol assign Polish or Baltic territory to the USSR or to Nazi Germany.

The purpose of the Secret Protocol is made clear both by its text and by its context - a pending German attack on Poland. It was to prevent the German army, after it defeated Poland, marching into regions (eastern Poland, the Baltic States and Bessarabia), which the USSR considered vital for its own security. In private conversations (alluded to in the text of the Secret Protocol) Stalin and Molotov made clear to Ribbentrop that that would be unacceptable and that were it to happen the Non-Aggression Pact would be dead. As its text says, the Secret Protocol was intended to put the substance of these conversations into writing.

Using today’s language, the Secret Protocol set out Stalin’s red lines, the crossing of which by Nazi Germany would not be tolerated, and which would lead to war. In the context of a pending German attack on Poland, they made total sense. Far from converting the Non-Aggression Pact into some sort of secret alliance, insisting on them was a basic precaution, which made the Non-Aggression Pact possible by placing a limit on German expansion, which for Stalin and Molotov was its whole point.

In the event, when Nazi Germany did cross the red lines on 22nd June 1941, the Non-Aggression Pact was dead, and war followed.

The issue has been clouded because of certain steps the USSR took between the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact on 23rd August 1939 and the German attack on the USSR on 22nd June 1941.

Following the German attack on Poland, in October 1939, in an act that understandably continues to cause great bitterness in Poland, the USSR annexed eastern Poland, which was predominantly but by no means exclusively populated by Ukrainians and Byelorussians.

Over the course of the winter of 1939-1940 the USSR fought a brief but bitter war with Finland, which resulted in the Soviet annexation of Karelia.

In June 1940, following the defeat by Nazi Germany of France, the USSR annexed the three Baltic States, which in October 1940 it had previously pressured into agreeing mutual defence arrangements.

Lastly, in July 1940 the USSR annexed Bessarabia (today’s Moldova), which it acquired from Romania.

These actions were not authorised by the Secret Protocol or by any of the other Protocols the USSR concluded with Nazi Germany. There is nothing in the text of the Secret Protocol of 23rd August 1939 that authorises such annexations. The Soviet annexation of the Baltic States and of Bessarabia took place almost a year after the Secret Protocol was signed, making the Secret Protocol’s relevance to these annexations dubious, to say the least.

At the time all of these actions were construed both by the Germans and by the West for what they were – anti-German actions intended to strengthen the USSR’s position in light of Nazi Germany’s growing power in Europe. Hitler did not prevent them, not because he agreed to them, but because as he was fully occupied in the West when they happened, he lacked the means to prevent them.

Hitler did however eventually attack the USSR on 22nd June 1941, and in his speech declaring war on the USSR (which directly alluded to the Secret Protocol) he bitterly complained about these Soviet actions, which he made clear he saw as directed against Germany.

In relation to Finland and the Baltic States he said the following:

“The first results were evident in fall 1939 and spring 1940. Russia justified its attempts to subject not only Finland, but also the Baltic states, by the sudden false and absurd claim that it was protecting them from a foreign threat, or that it was acting to prevent that threat. Only Germany could have been meant. No other power could enter the Baltic Sea, or wage war there. I still had to remain silent. The rulers of the Kremlin continued.

“Consistent with the so-called friendship treaty, Germany removed its troops far from its eastern border in spring 1940. Russian forces were already moving in, and in numbers that could only be seen as a clear threat to Germany.

“According to a statement by Molotov, there were already 22 Russian divisions in the Baltic states in spring 1940.

“Although the Russian government always claimed that the troops were there at the request of the people who lived there, their purpose could only be seen as a demonstration aimed at Germany.”

In relation to the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia he said the following, making clear how grudgingly he accepted it:

“Russia’s threatened attack on Rumania was intended not only to take over an important element in the economic life not only of Germany, but of Europe as whole, or at least to destroy it.

“With boundless patience, the German Reich attempted after 1933 to win over the southeastern European states as trading partners. We, therefore, had the greatest possible interest in their domestic stability and order.

“Russia’s entrance into Rumania and Greece’s ties to England threatened to rapidly transform this area into a general battleground.

“Despite our principles and customs, and despite the fact that the Rumanian government had brought on these troubles itself, I urgently advised them, for the sake of peace, to bow to Soviet extortion and cede Bessarabia.”

Even in relation to Poland Hitler bitterly complained that the victory over Poland had been “gained exclusively by German troops”, making his anger at the USSR’s annexation of eastern Poland obvious.

Since Hitler’s speech of 22nd June 1941 does not bear out claims of a cynical Soviet German carve-up of eastern Europe in August 1939, it is very rarely quoted in the West, though it is one of the most important speeches of Hitler’s career.

Of course what Hitler said would by itself count for little. In this case however his words are fully borne out both by the historical record and by the text of the Non-Aggression Pact and of the Secret Protocol.

This has been known for decades, allowing the British historian A.J.P. Taylor to say of the Non-Aggression Pact as long ago as 1961:

“However one spins the crystal and tries to look into the future from the point of view of 23 August 1939, it is difficult to see what other course Soviet Russia could have followed. The Soviet apprehensions of a European alliance against Russia were exaggerated, though not groundless. But, quite apart from this - given the Polish refusal of Soviet aid, given too the British policy of drawing out negotiations in Moscow without seriously striving for a conclusion - neutrality, with or without a formal pact, was the most that Soviet diplomacy could attain; and limitation of German gains in Poland and the Baltic was the inducement which made a formal pact attractive.”

(A.J.P. Taylor: The Origins of the Second World War, Hamish Hamilton, 1961)

Nothing in the vast tide of literature that has been written on this subject since those words were written has challenged their truth. Despite the constant obfuscation there continues to be around this issue, they remain the best — and ought to be the last — words on the subject.

Putin’s words during his press conference with Merkel on 10th May 2015 show that on this issue too the historical truth is known in Russia, even if for political reasons it is being denied elsewhere.

Here follows the text of the Non-Aggression and of its Secret Protocols:

TEXT OF SOVIET GERMAN NON AGGRESSION PACT Dated 23rd August 1939

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics desirous of strengthening the cause of peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R and proceeding from the fundamental provisions of the Neutrality Agreement concluded in April 1926 between Germany and the U.S.S.R., have reached the following agreement:

ARTICLE I

Both High Contracting Parties obligate, themselves to desist from any act of violence, any aggressive action, and any attack on each other, either individually or jointly with other powers.

ARTICLE II

Should one of the High Contracting Parties become the object of belligerent action by a third power, the other High Contracting Party shall in no manner lend its support to this third power.

ARTICLE III

The Governments of the two High Contracting Parties shall in the future maintain continual contact with one another for the purpose of consultation in order to exchange information on problems affecting their common interests.

ARTICLE IV

Neither of the two High Contracting Parties shall participate in any grouping of powers whatsoever that is directly or indirectly aimed at the other party.

ARTICLE V

Should disputes or conflicts arise between the High Contracting Parties over problems of one kind or another, both parties shall settle these disputes or conflicts exclusively through friendly exchange of opinion or, if necessary, through the establishment of arbitration commissions.

ARTICLE VI

The present treaty is concluded for a period of ten years, with the provision that, in so far as one of the High Contracting Parties does not denounce it one year prior to the expiration of this period, the validity of this treaty shall automatically be extended for another five years.

ARTICLE VI

The present treaty shall be ratified within the shortest possible time. The ratifications shall be exchanged in Berlin. The agreement shall enter into force as soon as it is signed.

Done in duplicate, in the German and Russian languages.

MOSCOW, August 23, 1939.

For the Government of the German Reich:

V. RIBBENTROP

With full power of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:

V. MOLOTOV

———————

FIRST SECRET PROTOCOL dated 23rd August 1939

On the occasion of the signature of the nonaggression treaty between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the undersigned plenipotentiaries of the two parties discussed in strictly confidential conversations the question of the delimitation of their respective spheres of interest in Eastern Europe.

These conversations led to the following result:

In the event of a territorial and political transformation in the territories belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern frontier of Lithuania shall represent the frontier of the spheres of interest both of Germany and the U.S.S.R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna territory is recognized by both parties.
In the event of a territorial and political transformation of the territories belonging to the Polish state, the spheres of interest of both Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narev, Vistula and San. The question whether the interests of both parties make the maintenance of an independent Polish state appear desirable and how the frontiers of this state should be drawn can be definitely determined only in the course of further political developments. In any case both governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly understanding.
With regard to southeastern Europe, the Soviet side emphasizes its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares complete political disinterest in these territories.
This protocol will be treated by both parties as strictly secret.

Moscow, Aug. 23, 1939.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GERMAN REICH: VON RIBBENTROP

WITH FULL POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S.S.R.: V. MOLOTOV Secret Supplementary Protocol

———————

SECOND SECRET PROTOCOL dated 28th September 1939

The undersigned delegates establish agreement between the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the U.S.S.R. concerning for the concerning the following matters:

The secret supplementary protocol signed on Aug. 23, 1939 is amended at No. 1 in that the territory of Lithuania comes under the U.S.S.R. sphere of interest, because on the other side the administrative district ”Woywodschaft” of Lubin and parts of the administrative district of Warsaw come under the German sphere of influence (cf., map accompanying the boundary and friendship treaties ratified today). As soon as the Government of the U.S.S.R. takes special measures to safeguard its interests on Lithuanian territory, the present Germany-Lithuanian border will be rectified in the interests of simple and natural delimitation, so that the territory of Lithuania lying southwest of the line drawn on the accompanying map will fall to Germany.

It is further established that the economic arrangements in force at the present time between Germany and Lithuania will be in no way damaged by the aforementioned measures being taken by the Soviet Union.

Moscow, Sept. 28, 1939.

VON RIBBENTROP FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GERMAN REICH.

V. MOLOTOV ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S.S.R.

——————————–

THIRD SECRET PROTOCOL dated 10th January 1941

Graf von Schulenburg, the German Ambassador, acting for the Government of the German Reich, and the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the U.S.S.R., V. M. Molotov, acting for the Government of the U.S.S.R., have agreed upon the following points:

The Government of the German Reich renounces its claims to the portion of the territory of Lithuania mentioned in the Sept. 28, 1939 Secret Protocol and shown on the included map.
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is prepared to compensate the Government of the German Reich for the territory mentioned in Point 1 of this protocol by payment of the sum of 7,500,000 gold dollars, or 31,500,000 reichsmarks to Germany.Payment of the sum of 31.5 million reichsmarks will be accomplished by the U.S.S.R. in the following way: one-eighth, i.e., 3,937,500 reichsmarks, in shipments of nonferrous metal within three months of ratification of this treaty, and the remaining seven-eighths, 27,562,500 reichsmarks, in gold by a deduction from the German payments in gold which the German side was to bring up by Feb. 11, 1941. On the basis of the correspondence concerning the Feb. 11, 1940 economic agreement between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the second section of the agreement between the chairman of the German economic delegation, Herr Schnurre and the people’s commissar for U.S.S.R. foreign trade, Herr A. I. Mikoyan.

This protocol has been prepared in both German and Russian (two originals) and goes into effect upon being ratified.

Moscow, Jan. 10, 1941.

(Illegible, presumably von Schulenburg) FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GERMAN REICH

V. MOLOTOV ACTING FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S.S.R.

 

[Jeremy F Kreuz]

Another article on Russian inisder which I think is relevant

Stalin Offered to Send a Million Troops to Stop Hitler If Britain and France Agreed to Anti-Nazi Pact - http://russia-insider.com/en/history/stalin-planned-send-million-troops-stop-hitler-if-britain-and-france-agreed-pact/ri6770

Stalin Offered to Send a Million Troops to Stop Hitler If Britain and France Agreed to Anti-Nazi Pact

Two weeks before the war, Stalin proposed the pact, but neither the British nor French delegations accepted
Nick Holdsworth

This article originally appeared in The Telegraph

Papers which were kept secret for almost 70 years show that the Soviet Union proposed sending a powerful military force in an effort to entice Britain and France into an anti-Nazi alliance.

Such an agreement could have changed the course of 20th century history, preventing Hitler’s pact with Stalin which gave him free rein to go to war with Germany’s other neighbours.

The offer of a military force to help contain Hitler was made by a senior Soviet military delegation at a Kremlin meeting with senior British and French officers, two weeks before war broke out in 1939.

The new documents, copies of which have been seen by The Sunday Telegraph, show the vast numbers of infantry, artillery and airborne forces which Stalin’s generals said could be dispatched, if Polish objections to the Red Army crossing its territory could first be overcome.

But the British and French side - briefed by their governments to talk, but not authorised to commit to binding deals - did not respond to the Soviet offer, made on August 15, 1939. Instead, Stalin turned to Germany, signing the notorious non-aggression treaty with Hitler barely a week later.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, named after the foreign secretaries of the two countries, came on August 23 - just a week before Nazi Germany attacked Poland, thereby sparking the outbreak of the war. But it would never have happened if Stalin’s offer of a western alliance had been accepted, according to retired Russian foreign intelligence service Major General Lev Sotskov, who sorted the 700 pages of declassified documents.

“This was the final chance to slay the wolf, even after [British Conservative prime minister Neville] Chamberlain and the French had given up Czechoslovakia to German aggression the previous year in the Munich Agreement,” said Gen Sotskov, 75.

The Soviet offer - made by war minister Marshall Klementi Voroshilov and Red Army chief of general staff Boris Shaposhnikov - would have put up to 120 infantry divisions (each with some 19,000 troops), 16 cavalry divisions, 5,000 heavy artillery pieces, 9,500 tanks and up to 5,500 fighter aircraft and bombers on Germany’s borders in the event of war in the west, declassified minutes of the meeting show.

But Admiral Sir Reginald Drax, who lead the British delegation, told his Soviet counterparts that he authorised only to talk, not to make deals.

“Had the British, French and their European ally Poland, taken this offer seriously then together we could have put some 300 or more divisions into the field on two fronts against Germany - double the number Hitler had at the time,” said Gen Sotskov, who joined the Soviet intelligence service in 1956. “This was a chance to save the world or at least stop the wolf in its tracks.”

When asked what forces Britain itself could deploy in the west against possible Nazi aggression, Admiral Drax said there were just 16 combat ready divisions, leaving the Soviets bewildered by Britain’s lack of preparation for the looming conflict.

The Soviet attempt to secure an anti-Nazi alliance involving the British and the French is well known. But the extent to which Moscow was prepared to go has never before been revealed.

Simon Sebag Montefiore, best selling author of Young Stalin and Stalin: The Court of The Red Tsar, said it was apparent there were details in the declassified documents that were not known to western historians.

“The detail of Stalin’s offer underlines what is known; that the British and French may have lost a colossal opportunity in 1939 to prevent the German aggression which unleashed the Second World War. It shows that Stalin may have been more serious than we realised in offering this alliance.”

Professor Donald Cameron Watt, author of How War Came - widely seen as the definitive account of the last 12 months before war began - said the details were new, but said he was sceptical about the claim that they were spelled out during the meetings.

“There was no mention of this in any of the three contemporaneous diaries, two British and one French - including that of Drax,” he said. “I don’t myself believe the Russians were serious.”

The declassified archives - which cover the period from early 1938 until the outbreak of war in September 1939 - reveal that the Kremlin had known of the unprecedented pressure Britain and France put on Czechoslovakia to appease Hitler by surrendering the ethnic German Sudetenland region in 1938.

“At every stage of the appeasement process, from the earliest top secret meetings between the British and French, we understood exactly and in detail what was going on,” Gen Sotskov said.

“It was clear that appeasement would not stop with Czechoslovakia’s surrender of the Sudetenland and that neither the British nor the French would lift a finger when Hitler dismembered the rest of the country.”

Stalin’s sources, Gen Sotskov says, were Soviet foreign intelligence agents in Europe, but not London. “The documents do not reveal precisely who the agents were, but they were probably in Paris or Rome.”

Shortly before the notorious Munich Agreement of 1938 - in which Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister, effectively gave Hitler the go-ahead to annexe the Sudetenland - Czechoslovakia’s President Eduard Benes was told in no uncertain terms not to invoke his country’s military treaty with the Soviet Union in the face of further German aggression.

“Chamberlain knew that Czechoslovakia had been given up for lost the day he returned from Munich in September 1938 waving a piece of paper with Hitler’s signature on it,” Gen Sotksov said.

The top secret discussions between the Anglo-French military delegation and the Soviets in August 1939 - five months after the Nazis marched into Czechoslovakia - suggest both desperation and impotence of the western powers in the face of Nazi aggression.

Poland, whose territory the vast Russian army would have had to cross to confront Germany, was firmly against such an alliance. Britain was doubtful about the efficacy of any Soviet forces because only the previous year, Stalin had purged thousands of top Red Army commanders.

The documents will be used by Russian historians to help explain and justify Stalin’s controversial pact with Hitler, which remains infamous as an example of diplomatic expediency.

“It was clear that the Soviet Union stood alone and had to turn to Germany and sign a non-aggression pact to gain some time to prepare ourselves for the conflict that was clearly coming,” said Gen Sotskov.

A desperate attempt by the French on August 21 to revive the talks was rebuffed, as secret Soviet-Nazi talks were already well advanced.

It was only two years later, following Hitler’s Blitzkreig attack on Russia in June 1941, that the alliance with the West which Stalin had sought finally came about - by which time France, Poland and much of the rest of Europe were already under German occupation.