Russian President
Vladimir Putin met with top generals late this week ahead of a planned trip to Belarus as
Ukrainian concerns persist about a renewed offensive emanating from that country, in particular, aimed at Kyiv.
However, while it continues to monitor Russian movements in Belarus, the White House is reportedly skeptical of Moscow’s ability to mount such an attack with
limited ammunition supplies and degraded capabilities.
Putin met with Defense Minister Gen.
Sergei Shoigu, Chief of the General Staff Gen.
Valery Gerasimov, and overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine Gen.
Sergey Surovikin at the Joint Forces Headquarters on December 16 in a possible prelude to his planned Belarus trip to meet his Belarusian counterpart
Alexander Lukashenko.
The Institute for the Study of War (
@TheStudyofWar) has a deep dive into this planned meeting and its implications for greater
Moscow-Minsk ties and the war on the far side of the
Pripyat Marshes. Most likely, Putin will press for further integration of the two countries that have increasingly become one and the same, particularly since the 2021-2022 buildup of Russian troops before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Another campaign against Kyiv is of course a worst-case scenario, but the meeting and its surrounding noise is more likely designed to keep Ukraine convinced that an attack from Belarus is possible at any time.
Ukraine’s
worries of a new
Kyiv offensive may well be a mix of both actual concern and its continued masterclass in information warfare. For a country fighting for its life, it’s better to sound the worst possible alarm in hopes that means even greater support. It just makes sense.
But Russia has used up an immense amount of seasoned manpower, ammunition, vehicles, and other supplies in its nearly 10-month-long war. It seems somewhat unlikely that Russia, or Russia and Belarus together, could mount a strategically successful operation against Kyiv, which has been further hardened against such attack since the war began.
Russia failed spectacularly at taking the capital of Ukraine with the full might of its at the time fresh fighting force. Doing it again severely degraded would be hard to comprehend. In addition, Russia has had major trouble holding ground in the east and south it had won early on, losing huge swathes of it in recent months. The idea that they would be able to take the capital and hold it while also meeting demands elsewhere on the battlefield is highly questionable.
That's not to say that a feint couldn't take place in an attempt to pull critical Ukrainian resources off the front lines.
Another possibility is some sort of push from Belarus from the western part of its border with Ukraine. The terrain is more difficult, any element of surprise would be non-existent, and such an operation would be right under the noses of NATO surveillance assets. This would make Ukraine's job of punishing such an action far easier. It would also likely lead to even more military support for Ukraine, due to its proximity to NATO's borders.
Once again, this could happen, even on a smaller scale, just as a feint or even a sacrificial actual operation aimed at pulling resources away from the south and east. Any real operation there with actual aims beyond that would be focused on trying to interdict the supply lines that run from NATO member countries into Ukraine. A tall order considering Russia's capabilities and the basic geography of the region.
Once again, the threat alone of such an operation, especially paired with a military buildup of significant scale, could keep Ukrainian forces tied down near the border and thus potentially making its front-line presence thinner. More specifically, the threat from Belarus could limit the number of troops Ukraine could mass for operations to break Russia’s new defensive lines holding the Donbas, southern Ukraine, and ultimately Crimea.
What Russia has is manpower, albeit poorly equipped and poorly trained, which could be used to take advantage of any redistribution of Ukrainian forces from the front. At the very least it could stymie Ukraine's ability to retake more territory, especially Crimea, in the not so distant future. Still, this is a pretty desperate and flimsy strategy that Ukraine would likely overcome.
Intelligence will play an absolutely critical role in assessing what is real and what isn't in terms of Russian intent along Ukraine's northern border. The better the intelligence, the more Ukraine can maximize its forces along the active front.
And we must caveat this analysis with the reality that anything is possible at this point. Russia has acted in bizarre and self defeating ways throughout this conflict, so it is possible that they throw massive amounts of lives and equipment at Kyiv again, for whatever purpose, regardless of how illogical it may seem.
Before we head into the latest coverage from Ukraine,
The War Zone readers can get caught up on our previous rolling coverage
here.
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rollingstones.com
www.thedrive.com
️The Rostec State Corporation has significantly increased the production of launchers and ammunition for the Iskander operational-tactical missile system;
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