Report from Cyprus

[Alana]

Hi all!

Although i've been reading through the forum for a while now, this is my first post. I am not sure whether i am posting this in the right place, i just didn't see it fit under any other title.

My name is Irini (greek for peace :) ) and i live in Cyprus. Like in many other countries, there were those of us in Cyprus who declared our opposition to the War in Iraq and the Bush Regime this past weekend, by marching and demonstrating outside the US embassy on saturday morning. The small number of participants (we were not even 100) was attributed to the weather: "It's such a lovely sunny spring day; excellent to spend it with friends at coffee shops" i heard several say. The coffee shop culture won that morning, as it wins nearly daily in keeping the people uninformed, disinterested. And as we marched through busy streets and overflowing cafes, holding our banners, shouting slogans, we were greeted with looks of dissaproval. Our voices were disturbing to the ears, our presence was spoiling the sunny morning picture. "You are not changing anything by walking" said an old man who watched us from the doorway of his tailor shop. But we kept walking and shouting because that's what we were doing.

The almost 100 of us were later greeted by barbwires a kilometer away from the US embassy. That's how close they let us go. We shouted and blew our wistles, but it was obvious they did not want to hear. The TV channels and the journalists left the scene early; they had not much to report from our little demonstration. They heard us not when we opposed our government's aid towards the US army, which provides bases for landing and take off, which allows the use of our land, ports and air by US and British army vehicles. We marched back to the capital's main square feeling that we affected nothing of what is happening outside. But we felt a difference inside.

The events related to the anniversary of the 3 year occupation and war on Iraq came to an end last night, with attending a reading of Simon Levy's stage adaptation of Eliot Weinberger's essay, “What I Heard About Iraq”. I know that the SOTT page in June 18th 2003 presented an article by Weinberg titled "What Is Happening in America?"

http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article3807.htm.

Below you can read Weinberg's "What i heard about Iraq" if you are not familiar with it; I recommend it to all of you.

http://www.lrb.co.uk/v27/n03/wein01_.html

Here is also a link to the schedule of the world wide reading of the play:

http://www.fountaintheatre.com/WorldwideReadingofWHATIHEARDABOUTIRAQ.htm

Most of us were noding last night while forgotten by now quotes were rising again from the depths of memory. Sometimes you could hear a chuckle here and there accompany the absurdity and contradiction of sayings. But mostly it was a heavy silence in the audience of about 65. And yet i am sure some part of us wished for that reading to end, i admit i felt it, it was too much, all at once. Some part of our minds kept saying "this cannot be true, i'll wake up". Yet the names and the facts shushed it. Silence remained our punishment, for there were no voices left in our heads to convince us otherwise... You know how you think you understand something, you are aware of it, but something takes place and you know that only now you really Understand and you would have not known you understood better unless you reached the point when you did? Last night did this to me. Read the article...

 

[Borderfox]

The USA seems to have more control over Irish airports than the so called Irish government.They use two of Irelands major airports as transit points on their way too and from Iraq.The Irish government are too spineless to stop them it seems,and protest,however valid,has no impact whatsoever.Those who run our countrys and claim to be "democrats" couldnt care less about protests,They will simply dismiss the people who protest as "hippys" or "anarchists" or whatever is convienient.They need not worry about not being elected because most people are utterly brainwashed by their spin and propaganda.Democracy does not exist! the people in governments who claim to be for the people are only in it for personal gain,nothing more nothing less.Nothing will change in this world until people wake up and see things as they really are and strike out at those who run every aspect of most peoples lives,be that the media,governments,big buisness,the list goes on.

The greatest crime is to be a non conformist!!!!

 

[happyliza]

I am posting information on this thread regarding news on Cyprus as it is a general heading thus keeping pertinent reports all in the same place.
The latest information today is:

http://www.kpdailynews.com/index.php/cat/35/news/1304/PageName/CYPRUS_LOCAL_NEWS



"ISIL planning to spread its terror activities to Cyprus"
ISIL trying to spread its activities to Cyprus after Iraq and Syria wrote Politis newspaper in today's edition.

KP Daily News

ISIL trying to spread its activities to Cyprus after Iraq and Syria wrote Politis newspaper in today's edition.

According to Politis's report which is based on Russian Pravda newspaper after Hezbollah ISIL is warm to the idea of spreading its terror activities to Cyprus.

Politis wrote that according to Pravda newspaper ISIL is planning to build bases in Turkey, Azerbaijan and Cyprus. Newspaper also wrote that it is not yet clear which side of the island ISIL is trying to spread.

Another reference was given to Kuwaiti newspaper “Al Rai”s report in which it was claimed that Hezbollah is planning to build a base in Cyprus in order to hit Israel and that ISIS is planning to spread its activities to Cyprus.

 

[happyliza]

Press release by the Foreign Ministry on the developments in Iraq
13/06/2014



Cyprus strongly and unequivocally denounces the recent attacks in Iraq by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other terrorist groups, which have reportedly taken control of a number of Iraqi cities.

The rapidly unfolding events pose a very serious threat to the stability of Iraq and the wider region and highlight the dangerous repercussions of a major spill-over from the Syrian crisis.

Cyprus stands ready to assist the efforts by the international community to help the Iraqi people confront this very serious challenge.

We express our solidarity and grave concern for the plight of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis who have fled their homes seeking refuge in other areas of the country and offer our condolences to the families of the victims.

Cyprus reiterates the critical importance of preserving the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Iraq.


The "L" in ISIL is Levant. Countries & regions located in the Levant region are Syria,Lebanon,Israel,Palestine, Jordan,Cyprus & Hatay

Could well be just ALL PSYOPS/ propaganda designed to scare people

 

[happyliza]

Start cure with the correct diagnosis
– by Michael Moran
- Cyprus Today – July 5, 2014
Foreign diplomats often seem oblivious to the true complexity of the situation in Cyprus. US Vice President Joe Biden’s recent warm words about a partnership between his government and the Greek Cypriot government suggests that he, too, hadn’t done his homework before arriving on the island. But given the new American interest in Cyprus, it might be worth recalling exactly how the current impasse on the island originated and why it still persists.
There are two, essentially conceptual, difficulties that have always stood in the way of attempts to resolve the unhappy state of affairs in Cyprus. The first is that there is no agreement among all the parties concerned about what the “Cyprus problem” is. Consequently it is hard to see how the issue could be resolved. For without agreement about what a problem is one could hardly expect to know what would count as its solution. It might be said that actually everyone is in perfect agreement about what is needed in Cyprus: the unification of the divided island. As we shall see, however, this glibly voiced remedy obscures more than it illuminates.
The second difficulty springs from the international community’s very different treatment of the two Cypriot communities since UN Security Council Resolution 186 of March 4, 1964. This was the moment when the – by then all-Greek Cypriot administration of Archbishop Makarios – was first officially referred to as “the government of Cyprus”. Initially, this administration was internationally understood to be a temporary de facto one, to be treated as such until the conflict in Cyprus could be resolved and the Turkish Cypriot vice-president, MPs and three ministers (or some other agreed Turkish contingent) could return to the government. But this reinstatement never happened. And by the late 1960’s, for complex reasons – including President Makarios’s intimidating relations with the Non-Aligned Movement as well as with the Soviet Union – the international community found it convenient to treat the purely Greek Cypriot administration as if it were indeed the de jure government of the whole island, a view universally shared today, except by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey.
Specifically, then, this second difficulty is how to reconcile the following two things: on the one hand, the UN’s apparent belief that there is nothing wrong with the present all-Greek government of Cyprus – that it is so unproblematic as, eg, to have been able alone to negotiate EU membership for the whole of Cyprus – and, on the other hand, the efforts the UN has been making, for an astonishing 50 years now, to replace that Greek Cypriot administration by a very different one, by an administration that would once more be shared with the Turkish Cypriots. Quite apart from what is said in the 1960 Cyprus Constitution, mustn’t there be at least some doubt about the adequacy, appropriateness, even some would say the legitimacy, of a Cyprus government which the UN itself has been trying so hard to change for so long?
We must always remember that those for whom the future of Cyprus is important include not only the Cypriots themselves but at least the three original “guarantor powers”, Britain, Greece and Turkey; the UN; the EU; and both the US and Russia. Whatever else it is, the Cyprus problem is not just a problem generated by, or existing between, Cypriots. With so many actors involved it is hardly surprising that perceptions about what is at stake in Cyprus can diverge widely.
Since 1974 Greek Cypriot leaders have seen the problem as one of “invasion and occupation“ of an essentially Greek island by a large alien power, Turkey, for no good reason. What they ideally want as a solution to this problem, caused in their view by Turkey, is the abolition of the current division of the island, the removal of the Turkish army from Cyprus, the return of their homes, property and businesses in the North – more or less a reversion to things the way they were before the 1974 “invasion”. As a concession to their Turkish compatriots, however, the Greeks have always claimed they were prepared to grant an appropriately small role to this Islamic minority in the present, allegedly perfectly legitimate, Hellenic government of Cyprus. This is, at any rate, what the Greek Cypriots could apparently quite happily accept: a form of reunification indeed; but one involving the assimilation of the Turks into the existing Greek Republic. True, there is talk now about the creation of two “constituent states” in the island. But for many Greek Cypriots this is already a barely tolerable idea, thrust upon them by the international community.
The Turkish Cypriot view is, needless to say, utterly incompatible with these Greek perspectives. For the Turks, the Cyprus problem emerged quite forcefully not in 1974 but in 1963 when Makarios attempted to change the Cyprus Constitution in such a way as to seriously limit the power and role of the Turkish Cypriots in the running of the country.
Moreover, the Turkish Cypriots maintain that Turkey had a perfectly legitimate reason for (as they would put it) “intervening” in Cyprus in 1974.
We may discern here in the present status quo a peculiar kind of equilibrium, a natural “resolution of forces”, as it were, both doubtless inconsistent with the 1960 Agreements: the Greeks have the government of the Cyprus Republic for themselves; but the Turks now possess one third of the island over which that government has no control.
Faced with their isolated situation, in 1983 the Turkish Cypriots declared the existence of their own state in the North. As everyone knows, this has been recognised as an independent state only by Turkey. For the Turkish Cypriots themselves the best outcome may well appear to be having the TRNC internationally recognised as a separate entity. For various reasons this doesn’t seem likely to happen. Nevertheless the Turks would instead, I think, be quite happy to accept some kind of confederal arrangement with a Greek state in the south. And such an arrangement could be made compatible with a single citizenship, and a “single international personality”, as the UN parameters for a solution stipulate. But for the Turkish side it would be important that the new Cypriot state be not simply a continuation of the wholly Greek-run Republic.
While the so-called Annan Plan of 2002 – 2004 largely met these criteria and was accepted by the Turkish side, the Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly rejected it. And their reasons for this rejection were quite compatible with Turkish apprehensions about the Greek’s determination to hang on to power in Cyprus rather than share it. After all, the then Greek Cypriot president, Tassos Papadopoulos, explicitly urged his citizen “to defend the Republic of Cyprus, saying NO to its abolition”
Since the failure of the Annan Plan, the UN and the EU appear t have accepted the Greek Cypriot reminder that the international community has no right to try to impose a solution to the “internal” problems of a sovereign state. Everybody knows, of course, that, whatever it may be conceived to be, the “Cyprus problem” is by no means a purely internal one. So what about the other interested parties outside Cyprus? Are they poised, separately or jointly, to help? To say the least, this is far from clear.
Two of the guarantor powers, Greece and Turkey, agree in all essentials with their respective communities on the island and hence have traditionally had little scope for agreement with each other. It is possible, however, that the current dramatic contrast in the conditions of the two “mother” countries may have some positive effect in Cyprus.
Turkey has many internal problems yet she has not been very adversely affected by the recent European financial crisis. Despite European misgivings about the official handling of the recent unrest in Turkey, and about Turkey’s human rights record more generally, the governing AK Party has achieved things that would have seemed inconceivable 10 years ago: most notably, their remarkable reduction of the political power of the Turkish army. Yet difficult though it will be, finding a solution in Cyprus is important for Turkey’s EU membership bid. Whether Turkey still really wants or needs to be in the EU seems to be an open question.
Greece is at the present time in a state of turmoil. Solving the Cyprus problem is hardly an immediate priority. With the recent danger of a collapse in the eurozone, which was averted by the EU’s imposition of draconian measures on the Greek economy, social instability in Greece is likely to continue. While quite this degree of volatility hasn’t been experience in Greek Cyprus, the situation there is also worrying. Greek and Greek Cypriot banks were intimately connected. With considerable reluctance, the Cyprus government has had to accept a bailout deal with its euro area partners and the IMF. To receive a 10 billion euro loan in March 2013, savers in the country’s two largest banks were forced to take huge losses on deposits over 100,000 euros. The bank’s shareholders suffered even greater losses.
Further harsh measures are likely for 2014 if Cyprus is to continue to meet all bailout targets set for it. One bright light shines at the end of this dark tunnel: the discovery of deposits of hydrocarbons in the seas around Cyprus. Here, surely, is a genuine prospect both for economic recovery for the South and for their seeking early rapprochement with the North and with Turkey. For a pipeline to Turkey is the obvious way to Europe. Alas, to date there is no clear sign that the Greek Cypriots intend to seize this opportunity.
Britain is the odd man out among the Cyprus guarantors. Her main concern has been to retain at least one strategic military base on the island to serve the interests of Nato in a regions where the West has few friends. This is a region where it is important to retain oil supplies; to keep a satellite eye on Russia; to discourage real or imagined “rogue states” fomenting terrorism and especially, to prevent them developing nuclear arms. Britain therefore has never minded too much what new arrangements emerge in Cyprus provided there is stability, so that her bases and other military installations can function.
As regards the US it seems safe to say the White House sees things in Cyprus in much the same way as Britain does, except that the US is particularly keen to retain good relations with Turkey, which it tries to envisage as an essentially Western-oriented, democratic country providing a model for other less amenable Islamic states in the region. And of course the US has a number of military bases in Turkey and has always helped Turkey to equip and update the second largest army in Nato. Turkey agreed in September 2011 to allow the installation of the early warning radar system, a crucial part of Nato’s nuclear missile defence project, on Turkish soil. All this could mean that the US might show some sympathy with the Turkish conception of the Cyprus problem. On the other hand, there is still a powerful Greek lobby and an even more powerful Jewish lobby in America, and Turkey’s current contretemps with Israel, and still seemingly ambivalent relations with Iran, can’t be altogether reassuring to US diplomats.
Russia’s interest in Cyprus needs more careful attention that it usually gets. The Greek Cypriots have often bought arms from Russia, most memorably the S-300 missiles which they attempted to install near Paphos in 1998. There is of course and often neglected connection between Russia and the Greek Cypriots via Orthodox Christianity. Politically more important that this spiritual liaison, however, is the existence of significant Russian financial activities in Greek Cyprus, including the not entirely transparent operations of at least half a dozen Russian banks and various offshore facilities. In December 2011 Russia agreed to loan 2.5 billion euros to Greek Cyprus on very favourable terms. We have to assume, I think, that Russia will have difficulty in supporting the Turkish call for a radical change in the present Cyprus Republic.
Could an international conference about the island help? It must certainly be more useful than simply continuing the predictably futile exchanges between the two Cypriot communities alone. But the obstacles to a positive outcome remain considerable. Apart from all the political complexities I have all too briefly alluded to, two things need urgent attention: some agreement has to be reached about what the “Cyprus problem” is; and the international community must also acknowledge that it can’t both regard the present Cyprus government as entirely unproblematic while, at the same time, seeking fundamentally to change it.

# Michael Moran is a former British academic who has lived in North Cyprus since 1988. He has written several books on the international politics of Cyprus.

 

[happyliza]

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the brink of environmental disaster
By Kerem Hasan – Chief Reporter – Cyprus Today

The TRNC is on the brink of environmental “catastrophe” as trees and plants on the highest slopes have started to show signs of drying out in the excessive drought conditions.
The growing water shortage has left one the country’s 18 reservoirs – the largest, in Gemikonagi, with a capacity of 4.12 million cubic metres – completely day.
The remaining 17 reservoirs are at “record low” levels according to officials.
They are blaming global warming and environmental factors, and say the only real solution now seems to be the underwater pipeline being constructed from Turkey, which will bring 75 million cubic metres of water to North Cyprus annually.
Water Works Department head Turgay Hassoz told Cyprus Today: “With the Gemikonagi reservoir dry, the remaining 17 are at an average 18% full which makes it the lowest ever recorded.
We can only ask all residents to use water responsibly and sparingly, and to avoid unnecessary use”
Forestry Department head, Cemil Karzai said the scale of the drought’s impact had been revealed during a visit to Alevkayasi and other forests in the north-west of the country.
“These areas are the coolest in the country, but even there, crops, trees and plants are showing signs of beginning to dry up, and we haven’t even reached the peak temperatures of summer yet”
“We have noticed an increased number of foxes in towns and cities. This shows that because there is not much food in the mountains and woodlands, they are beginning to come down in search for food. Other animals will follow at this rate”.
Hasan Sarpten, chairman of the Biologists’ Association, blamed the lack of winter rainfall for the current drying up of trees and plants, and commented: “What is needed is for the Forestry to put in trees and plants which are resistant to drought”.
Last month, a commission connected to the Food, Agriculture and Energy Ministry found that 830,000 donums had received insufficient levels of rainfall, leading to a loss of 96.7 million TL to producers.
The general agriculture insurance fund has allocated 20 million TL to cover drought losses, but this has been heavily criticised as too low by farmers. Orhan Aydeniz, chairman of the Cyprus Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion, for Reforestation and the Protection of Natural Habitats, said: “We are on the brink of a major catastrophe, and there is nothing much that can be done, because this is a global problem.
“The problem is that we had not much rainfall this year, and temperatures are into the high 30 and 40 degrees C, which has caused the water in reservoirs to evaporate rapidly.
What will happen to wildlife when animals cannot find any food to eat? The whole food chain could be affected.”

 

[happyliza]

http://cyprusscene.com/2014/07/14/water-pipeline-from-turkey-headaches-greek-cypriots/

(There is a map of the project but I couldn't post it here).

U-tube video of how this project of the century is being constructed can been seen on the link below:


Published on Nov 28, 2013

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Water Supply Project (KKTC Su Temin Projesi)


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-l1EGkCoNrY&feature=youtu.be&app=desktop

Water Pipeline from Turkey headaches
Greek Cypriots

Water ProjectWhile the countdown of the water transfer project that foresees water being transferred from Turkey to the TRNC via an underwater pipeline system simply known as the Project of the Century is nearing completion, it is leading to economic and political headache for the Greek Cypriot administration.

According to an article published in the Greek Cypriot Press, the Greek Cypriot administration created a council consisting of Greek Cypriot MP’s to deal with the negative repercussions the water will have for south Cyprus.

The South believes that once water reaches Northern Cyprus the property value of the TRNC will rise and in the case of a solution being found to the Cyprus problem, the Turkish Cypriots will demand more money for the return of their lands.

Greek Cypriot farmers and producers are also worried that with the arrival of the water the Turkish Cypriot farmers and producers will have an advantage over them as they will be able to develop in their fields and the Greek Cypriots won’t be able to compete with the Turkish Cypriots price wise as well.

 

[happyliza]

Cyprus Conflict in a Nutshell by Dr Christian Heinze

Cyprus Conflict in a Nutshell

With the start of 2015 we are heading into the 41st year since the Turkish intervention in Cyprus to stop the communal bloodshed which was followed by the division of the island by the insertion of the UN green line buffer zone between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities.

Since then there have been stop/go attempts to reach a solution which seem to have stopped yet again and the prospect of a settlement seems to be at a standstill despite concern and encouragement being expressed by Ban ki Moon in his recent report to the UN.

So what is the current situation and what are the options to finally settle the Cyprus issue. The following article by, who was the Assistant to the late President of the Constitutional Court of the “Republic of Cyprus” in Nicosia in 1962/63, brings the issue into sharp focus.

http://cyprusscene.com/2015/01/20/cyprus-conflict-in-a-nutshell-by-dr-chr..



By Dr Christian Heinze – 10. January 2015
1.

The Cyprus Conflict consists in the claim raised by the Greek Cypriots to reign over the whole island and the claim held by the Turkish Cypriots to govern themselves within a part of the island’s territory. The Conflict gains weight by the respective “motherlands” Greece and Turkey supporting the conflicting parties. It is further aggravated by the UN, the EU and most governments denying communication with the Turks of the island as is usually extended to States, instead referring them to an agreed establishment of a common Cypriot State with the Greek Cypriots. They have thus assumed the role of additional partners to the Conflict. An agreement on conditions for the formation of a Greek-and-Turkish State of Cyprus has not been reached in 50 years of negotiations. Instead, at the latest since 1955, the Greek Cypriots have employed every means to harm the Turkish Cypriots in order to enforce their submission.
2.
For ending the Conflict, four alternatives exist:



1. Subjugation of the Turkish Cypriots by military or quasi-military force to the Greek-Cypriot claims.

2. Greek agreement with Turkish self-government in part of the island’s territory.

3. Voluntary submission of the Turkish Cypriots to Greek-Cypriot claims under conditions accepted by the Greek Cypriots.

4. The UN, the EU and/or a number of relevant governments recognize the Turkish Cypriot State existing in part of the island’s territory without consent of the Greek conflicting party.
3.

Alternative 1. can be left out of consideration because no power exists able or willing to break the prospective Turkish resistance. Moreover, the UN, the EU and relevant governments have called upon each other not to violate the defacto-border delimitating the territories inhabited by Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Alternative 2. has no chance of realization as long as the UN, the EU and relevant governments deny recognition of Statehood to the Turkish Cypriot community. For as long as this stance preCyprus Map 1974 - 2015 imagevails, the Greek conflicting party is able to derive advantages from upholding its claim of much greater weight than that of disadvantages resulting from Turkish reactions.

Alternative 3. is hampered by the interest of the Greek Cypriots in unlimited rule over the major part of Cyprus prevailing over the formation of a Cypriot state implying Turkish self-government and sovereignty over part of the territory of the island. As long as the possibility exists of the Turkish Cypriots being forced, by the disadvantages connected with non-recognition of their state, to renounce to self government or its durable protection, Alternative 3. is also hampered by the Greek interest in the chance of gaining sovereignty over the whole island with the Turkish Cypriots in it.

Alternative 4. would end the Conflict, because it would discontinue the chance for the Greek conflicting party of gaining supremacy over the whole island and would thus dissolve the substance of the Conflict.
4.

The question which one of the four Alternative merits priority should be considered from the aspect of durable peace, which is linked with the relationship between the interests involved. This implies also the question of the meaning of International Public Law for the Cyprus Conflict.
4.1

As peace requires the absence of violence, such alternatives must be excluded as are connected with a relevant potential for future violence.

Under the conditions prevailing in Cyprus, this applies to alternatives involving subjugation of the Turkish Cypriots, be it by means of military force or other forms of compulsive pressure. This is due to prospects of successful durable assertion of the claim for self government with the help of Anatolian and Cypriot Turks prepared for a high degree of sacrifice. This prospect can probably be reduced by international pressure so that activities are postponed, but only at the price of more vigilant reappearance as circumstances change. This is not paralleled by any similar prospect of durable enforcement of the Greek claims. Because the ethically highly esteemed ideal of self government, enhanced by the interest in common welfare and relying on national support from the neighbourhood affords higher political weight than interests of the Greek Cypriots (whose enjoyment of self government is secured and unchallenged and accompanied by every chance of prosperity) in subjugating the Turkish Cypriots and possessing a greater part of the island’s territory.

This argues against solutions of a pattern like that of the Annan-Plan. An attempt at a voluminous and vast regulation of a great number of conceivable individual conflicts as forms the substance of this plan creates additional food for dispute without deciding the underlying basic conflict. It puts the Greek party in a position enabling it to pursue further their claim for supremacy by diligently utilizing powers and plan-positions. It is therefore bound to increase instead of terminating the Conflict. Even if the Turkish Cypriots or their leadership are successfully deceived about this consequence, their concurrence serves only to postpone the renewed outbreak of dispute into the future. Moreover, the real conditions prevailing in Cyprus struggle against any “solution” that misses an effective, power-based assurance of Turkish Cypriot territorial self government. Permanent peace requires at the least autonomous Turkish executive power and court jurisdiction not subject to any Greek influence. Given the present stage of negotiations the position of the Greek conflicting party is far remote from such an option.

Therefore, Alternative 4. alone appears compatible with permanent peace. Given the latent policy of the UN, the EU and relevant governments, no durable agreement can be expected from the conflicting parties. Even if an agreement were brought about by means of pressure, it would not promise permanent pacification. Whether the Conflict continues or is brought to a definite end lies therefore in the hands of the powers and governments mentioned.
4.2

It is true that absence of violence does not suffice for peace deserving that name. Peace in a meaning corresponding with the essential substance of man requires a certain measure of order and adequate solution of conflicts by enforcement or equalization of interests. The policy applied to Cyprus by the United Nations, by Europe and by relevant governments since 1960 is guided by certain formalities. It relies in particular on the assumption that legitimacy or illegitimacy of statehood in Cyprus and its territorial scope is based solely on recognition by the UN and/or relevant governments and that the creation of the Turkish State of North Cyprus must be punished with non-recognition and all its grave consequences for the population purely because of the application of force involved. Peace in the meaning mentioned depends however on many factors of cohabitation like for instance factors pertaining to ethics, religion, civilization, tradition, economy, supply of goods and services, relationships of military and other powers or to property. It also depends on aggressive or tolerant inclinations of the population of a relevant environment. The exclusion of all these factors from the foundation of the international policy towards Cyprus adds decisively to the fact that it was impossible to end the Conflict in spite of decades long efforts.

The development of substantial parameters for peace around Cyprus and their application to the Conflict results in Alternative 4. as described above and consisting in a termination of the Conflict by recognizing the quality of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus as a State not only to be recommended in order to prevent violence but also to be preferred in the interest of permanent pacification.
4.2.1

By international comparison, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities are more strongly than others characterized as different in many respects and consolidated by their ethnicity, religion, culture and tradition. On the Greek side, this consolidation and characterization is reinforced by particularities of the Orthodox Church and by its alliance with the national movement of the 19th century. In the second half of the 20th century, this alliance led (in a way typical for Diaspora conditions) to a combination of the political power accumulated within the Greek community with the religious authority of the clergy which forms, together with its clientele, a stringently organized Greek-Cypriot hierarchy. This development culminated (since 1950) in a claim for supremacy entertained by the whole Greek community under Archbishop Makarios and based on a historicising hybrid Hellenic ideology. This intensified the contrast of the Greek against the Turkish community much more effectively than the loose organization and religious or ideological orientation of the Turkish side.

Not this difference between the communities as such but the claim of the Greek community for supremacy constitutes the decisive factor preventing peace in Cyprus because such supremacy amounts to foreign rule entailing the probability of negative effects on and discrimination of the Turkish community. Regardless of whether such foreign rule or discrimination emanates from a monarch or from a larger community (a “majority”) or another stronger power, this probability justifies a claim for self government. The superior interest in securely providing peace with the help of government power may, under certain conditions, demand renunciation to self government if the probability of discrimination is slight, particularly if it is reduced through the safeguard of basic or special rights for the inferior group and – in cases where a community is composed of members of different religions – of a separation of government and religion. The Greek conflicting party considered the violent pursuit of its claim for self government since 1955 as justified by the foreign nature of and the probability of discrimination connected with British rule. The Greeks would not be satisfied with special rights.

When discrimination of the Turkish community, which had resisted the Greek recent violent fight for union with Greece and had become victim of pogroms in return, became imminent at the withdrawal of British sovereignty over the island (1960), the Turkish Cypriots were prepared to accept the probability on condition of guarantees for enumerated special rights. Treaties and a constitution to this effect were written down and signed, albeit, on the part of the Greek side, with the reservation to continue pursuing their claim for unlimited sovereignty which was published almost at the same time. In 1963 and 1964 the Greek leadership acted in breach of the special Turkish rights and formally declared their abolition. In the Cyprus Conflict, the probability of discrimination and foreign rule became certainty. It was realized by the Greek Cypriots attempting since 1955 (organized murderous campaign under Grivas and Makarios) to violently subjugate the Turkish Cypriots, particularly in 1963/64 by means of Turkish pogroms conducted by irregular armed fighters that were instructed by the Greek part of the designated government of “Cyprus”, and in 1974 by military intervention of Greece. The certainty of imminent discrimination continues unto the presence due to explicit maintenance of the Greek aim for supremacy and due to the Greek policy of harming the Turkish Cypriots as intensely as possible on every occasion offering itself in order to compel their submission. The Cyprus Conflict is thus characterized by Greek attacks against the requirements for peace in Cyprus and by Turkish defence against these attacks. Greek aggression constitutes the decisive obstacle for peace around Cyprus
4.2.2

Surrendering the island to Greek rule would amount to a much more severe reduction of the position of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea than the surrender of a smaller part of the island would mean for the Greek position. In this context, realistic political evaluation cannot leave aside the nearness of the island to the Anatolian main and its distance from Greece in relation to its size as well as its limited economic and greater military importance. It is true that by the partition brought about by Greek policy, both communities lose part of their area of settlement, but gain unlimited self government. It is precisely this interest in self government which was used by the Greek conflicting party in reasoning their own aggressive terrorist and military violence and their claim for supremacy from 1950 onwards, while they denied the same right to the Turkish community. The Greek demand for supremacy upheld in negotiations about unification since 1964 endangers the security of the Turkish community which raises no similar claim. Its quest for security gains weight through the greater number of Greek population of the island, through their ideological efforts, through violent Greek aggression between 1955 and 1974 and through the Greek policy demonstrating since 1964 their resolution of harming Turkish Cypriots according to opportunity. By arranging the pogroms against the Turkish Cypriots in 1963/64 instead of rendering the government protection they owed to the Turkish community, the Greek leadership, then forming part of the “government of Cyprus” gave evidence of the need of the Turkish community of a State of their own as a basic requirement for peace. Accordingly, adequate participation of the Turkish Cypriots in advantages deriving from unification under Greek rule cannot be expected. It is true that partition of the island results in a considerably larger personal loss of home and property on the part of Greek than on the part of Turkish Cypriots. However, viewed from the aspect of interest in peace this attribution of loss constitutes a compensation justified by the responsibility of the Greek community for its violent aggression and breach of confidence in the course of the attempt at founding a Republic of Cyprus in 1960 and for its failure. Moreover, the loss has lost considerable weight due to the economic development of South Cyprus, and there remains the possibility of compensation not only within the Greek but also between the Greek and Turkish communities.

For the same reasons for which it grants peace to Cyprus, partitioning the island will, in spite of being unpopular in Greece, serves peace between Turkey and Greece as well. The same applies to other substantial international interests or conflicts as may be connected – albeit hardly visible – with Cyprus. In particular, an interest in an expansion of the EU cannot be regarded as serving in itself the interest in peace. In the case of Cyprus it contributes to the contrary to the aggravation and continuation of the Conflict.
4.2.3

To be discussed under aspects of interest in peace remain the reasons on which the international policy towards the Cyprus Conflict (UN, EU, relevant governments) is based. This meets with the difficulty that such reasons are only vaguely documented. Numerous private or scientific opinions exist but they lack authority as they are subject to dispute. Official evaluation of subject matters of the kind dealt with in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 of this article are almost completely missing. Sources for binding evaluations are restricted to the resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations, because positions held by the EU or relevant governments restrict themselves to adopting the contents of such resolutions and do not go beyond their meaning. They all amount to the assumption that in 1960 a Republic of Cyprus was created which continues to exist and enjoys the protection extended to States by international public law (1) and that the violent creation of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus is incompatible with this protection (2). There from derives an obligation not to recognize this Turkish Republic (3). As concerns the Cyprus Conflict, these considerations prove incompatible with the interest in permanent peace.

(1) A notion of the State designed to support the interest in peace must be defined by an in fact and permanently existing supreme power governing a defined territory. Towards this definition, the meaning of international recognition or non-recognition is confined to its reasoning concerning the fulfilment of requirements of the notion of the State in an individual case. Instrumentalising the notion of State for the pursuit of particular interests is bound to damage the interest in peace. Since 1960 or, at the latest, since 1963, the formation of such a power of State covering the whole territory of Cyprus was hampered by the Greek Cypriot powers detaching themselves from the co-government of the Turkish Cypriot powers (which the Greek leadership had merely pretended to concede) without which the establishment of a supreme power over all Cyprus proved impossible. This is why the Greek Cypriot community is entitled to the protection accorded to States by international law only insofar as it has established a supreme power over a defined part of the territory of the island since 1974.

(2) As no “Republic of Cyprus” existed during the steps taken between 1964 and 1984 towards the establishment of a Turkish Republic of North Cyprus and as boundaries of the Greek State of Cyprus in being from 1964 onwards were not established before its delimitation in 1974, the powerful help rendered by Turkey to the establishment of the Turkish Cypriot State could not contradict any right of a Cypriot State. But even if Turkish force had encroached upon Greek rights, this would have been necessary in order to counteract the breach of the Cyprus peace treaties of 1959/60 by Greek violence directed at subjugating the Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, the Turkish exercise of power was based on a treaty right of intervention.

(3) Eventually no international law can prevent the foundation of States or the changing of State territory even if violently performed if this performance constitutes the only remedy for the preservation of durable peace, because international law enjoys no other legitimacy than the service it renders to peace. The concept of any and all instances of violence forming a legal obstacle for the creation of a State or for a change of State territory or forming the basis for non-recognition or for an obligation of One Day Justicenon-recognition is incompatible with the notion of State deriving from the task of establishing peace. Therefore, contrary to the opinion probably held by a majority of authors, a rule containing such obligation cannot gain validity in any of the forms in which international law can originate, and particularly not by observance which is the only form claimed as a source for the obligation of non-recognition of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus. This rule is verified by attempts at realizing the rights in question having repeatedly resulted, without attaining their objective, in massive strife of greater scale, and by violently enforced changes creating permanent peace. Violent changes in the world of States cannot be prevented and are once and again needed in the interest of peace. They are present all through the order of the day of history and gain by permanence the quality of customary law.

It cannot however be excluded but must be recognized as a basic rule, that the foundation of a State in connection with an encroachment on an existing State contravenes the interest in peace. Therefore, non-recognition as a means of repairing the encroachment can prove necessary in the interest of peace. The correct evaluation as a condition or as an obstacle for peace cannot be derived from mere formalities but can only be ascertained by applying criteria of the kind discussed in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 of this article. In any case non-recognition as a sanction against violence serves peace only if a chance exists for the attainment of the result pursued and if the peace-providing effects clearly outweigh the disturbance of peace connected with it.

To the Cyprus Conflict, none of the requirements for the sanction of non-recognition applies. Non-recognition prevents pacification of the island. The call by the UN Security Council for non-recognition contrasts with its call to respect the borders of the Turkish Cypriot Republic, thus preventing the realization of purported rights of the Greek community. As has become evident after 50 years having passed since its proclamation, the sanction cannot enforce its objective. Most importantly, the detriment inflicted on the Turkish Republic and first of all on its population and on a peaceful situation (damages caused in its creation having been widely overcome) by means of the embargo connected with non-recognition preventing international communication including the exchange of goods and services and in particular of transport services is out of proportion with the objective of supporting the Greek interest in supremacy by prohibiting Turkish self government.

In this context it should be noted that even the United Nations have not enacted or proclaimed a legal obligation of relevant governments not to recognize the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus. As the recommendation of non-recognition contained in resolutions of the Security Council is not expressly based on Chapter VII (Art. 41) of the UN-Charter, they have no legally binding effect.
4.2.4

Other arguments used in favour of the Greek claims, the validity of which could be assumed as deriving from the support given to the claims by the prevailing Cyprus policy (while these arguments are not used officially in the context of the policy of the United Nations) call for the following remarks:

(1) Partition as advocated in the present homepage results in the destruction of rights of residence and property of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. These rights are required to step back behind the interest in peace. This result is caused by the violent unpeaceful treaty-despising policy of the Greek leadership of the majority of those affected and must be compensated within their community. As concerns damages suffered by the Turkish community, their behaviour proves sufficiently their preference of security and self government to their surrendered rights. They are entitled to reparations payments by the Greek Republic of Cyprus.

It is true that, while the loss of settling territory for Greek Cypriots is less than one third and that for the Turkish Cypriots more than two thirds of the territory of the island, the number of the affected Greek Cypriots and the extent of property taken from them is several times as large as the loss suffered on the Turkish Cypriots. This is the consequence of the distribution of settlement of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots over the whole island before the violent changes caused by the Greek community that culminated in enforced migrationCyrprus confict in a nutshell of more than 100.000 Greek and more than 20.000 Turkish Cypriots to the south and the north of the island respectively. It also reflects the overwhelming power employed and threatening to be employed by the Greeks of Cyprus in the violent pursuit of their aspirations and the inferiority of the Turkish Cypriots. Arguably, however, the interest in permanent peace may require a certain adjustment of this relationship through intercommunial restitution or compensation. Justified mutual claims can be raised pursuant to the recognition of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus.

(2) The Greek party claims that Greek rule over Cyprus derives from the majority principle of democracy as the type of government best serving the interest in peace. This politically powerful argument ignores that the majority principle relies on the compensation of interests provided by a constantly changing formation of majorities within the limits of certain common basic interests of a homogeneous “demos”. This requirement cannot materialize in a relationship like that of the communities of Cyprus between a closed majority and a closed minority that pursue permanently opposed ideals in basic matters of political cohabitation.

(3) Another argument close to the prevailing policy holds that State borders should define a territory large enough to enable the existence of a community and that they should coincide with geographical unities. The island of Cyprus should therefore belong to one single State and not be divided. The economic uprise of the Greek Republic of South Cyprus since 1964 proves however that it does not depend on unification. Independent prosperity of the Turkish Republic is prevented primarily as a result of non-recognition. Any and all advantages to be expected from cooperation can be realized through recognition, for example on a federal basis.

(4) It is occasionally concluded from peaceful coexistence of the two communities of Cyprus during long periods of history that the allegation of impossibility of the cohabitation of the Cypriot communities goes back to their preoccupation with facile and superficial or imposed sentiments or interests, which can be overcome with the help of the sanction of non-recognition. This view overlooks that the violent pursuit of the Greek claim for supremacy was and is being prevented since its origin by the Osman and at least until 1955 by the British rule and since 1974 by the presence of Turkish troops.
5.

As a result, peace around Cyprus can most probably be secured by recognizing the Greek Republic of South Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus. Preference would be owed to an agreement of the conflicting parties to this effect that could comprise conditions equalizing bilateral interests. Subject matters of agreement could be the delimitation of the territories of the two States, diverse claims and compensations, the deployment of military forces, cooperation for example in the framework of the European Union, or the management of residual rights deriving from the Cyprus Treaties of 1959/60. Such agreements can (only) be expected as soon as the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus has been recognized or as its recognition becomes imminent without any doubt. Therefore, ending the Conflict lies not in the hands of the Greek and Turkish conflicting parties but in the hands of relevant governments or their organisations endowed with the competence for such recognition.

Edit: Correction on copy/paste

 

[Alana]

Cyprus Conflict in a Nutshell by Dr Christian Heinze

I didn't have the heart to read this, skimming through was painful enough.

As a Greek Cypriot, whose family was all bombed out of their houses in 1974 and left with nothing, never to return again, I feel offended to read this piece of historical inaccuracy and agenda-promotion. Why isn't mr heinze talking about the financial and military help that Turkey received from the USA in order to invade Cyprus? They wanted to protect the Turkish Cypriots from the Greek Cypriots my behind! As if the Turkish government ever protected its own population on its own land. Makarios did all he could for the Turkish Cypriots. People from both communities lived together in peace for many many years. There were nationalistic psychopaths from both parts, one side wanting Cyprus to merge with mother-Greece, and the other to merge with mother-Turkey. Those were the ones fighting with each other. It was actually a coup against Makarios, who did not want Cyprus to become Greek but keep the island with all its citizens, that gave the pretext for the invasion.

Seriously, talk of disproportional use of power. Turkey has the second biggest army in NATO, and Cyprus has ... just a small army. Even if some TC people were abused by some GC, it gives Turkey no right to invade with all its army and bomb the hell out of the island, and then proceed to occupy one third of it for the next 40 years!

And yes, mr heinze wants the division of the island. Well, he will probably have it because this is the kind of pressure that the GC government receives from the US. To "agree to a solution", meaning, the division. It's part of the reason why the EU ruined the Cyprus economy and caused friction in the relationship between Russia and Cyprus. They wanted to isolate Cyprus from the protection of Russia, cut it in pieces and feast upon it. That's still their plan, it's on the way. Especially now that Cyprus found gas in the sea surrounding it.

I used to feel mad and then deeply sad thinking of how unfair the situation in my country is. But since I became aware of how unfair it is EVERYWHERE, and even worst in other places, I gave up hope for Cyprus. Not because it is not important to me, au contraire! But because above all I am citizen of the world, and as the whole world burns, Cyprus is not my priority anymore.