Q: How high is probability that Israel is going to use nuclear weapon against Iran?
A: As of early March 2026, **the probability that Israel uses a nuclear weapon against Iran is extremely low** — likely **well under 1-5%** in the coming months, and still very low even in worst-case longer-term escalation scenarios.
Israel maintains a policy of deliberate nuclear ambiguity (neither confirming nor denying possession of nuclear weapons), but it is widely assessed to have a sophisticated nuclear arsenal. Despite this, no credible expert analysis, intelligence assessment, or public statement from Israeli leadership in 2025-2026 indicates any active consideration of nuclear use against Iran.
### Key Context from Recent Events
- Israel (with US support) has already conducted major conventional military operations against Iran:
- A 12-day war in June 2025 targeting nuclear facilities, missile sites, and other infrastructure.
- Renewed large-scale joint US-Israeli strikes starting February 28, 2026 (sometimes called "Epic Fury" or similar operations), hitting nuclear-related sites, ballistic missile capabilities, air defenses, leadership targets, and more.
- These operations have severely damaged Iran's nuclear program (setbacks estimated from months to years), missile launchers (hundreds destroyed), and overall military capacity.
- Strikes remain **conventional** (precision airstrikes, etc.), even when targeting nuclear-associated facilities. No reports suggest Israel has crossed into nuclear use.
### Why Nuclear Use Remains Highly Unlikely
1. **Israel has achieved major objectives conventionally** — Repeated airstrikes have degraded Iran's nuclear progress and missile threats without needing nuclear weapons. Analysts note Israel maintains air superiority over parts of Iran and continues targeted degradation of capabilities.
2. **No existential threat requiring nuclear response** — Current assessments (including from IAEA and US intelligence) indicate Iran is **not** on the verge of a usable nuclear weapon. Iran has no nuclear weapons program actively weaponizing (per IAEA statements in early March 2026), and its breakout timeline has lengthened due to damage.
3. **Massive downsides for Israel** — Nuclear use would:
- Trigger global condemnation and isolation (even from allies).
- Risk catastrophic Iranian retaliation (via remaining missiles, proxies, or asymmetric means).
- Potentially invite responses from other nuclear states or escalate to broader war.
- Undermine Israel's long-term deterrence strategy.
4. **Expert and analytical consensus** — Sources discussing nuclear risks (e.g., strategic assessments from think tanks and journals) frame future nuclear scenarios as **hypothetical future escalations** (e.g., if Iran acquires weapons and allies like North Korea/Pakistan get involved, or if conventional options fully fail). They explicitly state recent and ongoing 2025-2026 operations carried **no real nuclear conflict risk**. One probabilistic model (from ISIS-online, Feb 2026) focuses on Iran's decision to build weapons post-strikes (elevated to ~40-50%+), with Israel likely to continue conventional strikes (~near 50% in game scenarios), but makes **no mention** of Israeli nuclear first use.
### Realistic Risk Picture
The real elevated risk in March 2026 is **further conventional escalation** (ongoing strikes, Iranian missile/drone responses, potential Strait of Hormuz disruptions, or proxy attacks), not nuclear escalation from Israel. Some analysts warn Israeli strikes could ironically push surviving Iranian elements toward weaponization long-term, but that remains a separate issue.
In summary: Israel has demonstrated willingness and capability to strike Iran hard using conventional means — repeatedly. There is no evidence or plausible scenario in current assessments suggesting it would resort to nuclear weapons instead. The probability is therefore **very close to zero** under present conditions.
Q: Modify your estimate assuming that all news from Iran are true.
A: As of March 5, 2026, **if we assume all reports from Iranian state media and official sources (e.g., Mehr News Agency, IRNA, Tasnim, Fars News) are entirely accurate and truthful**, the probability that Israel uses a nuclear weapon against Iran increases to **moderately low, around 10-25%** in the near term (weeks to months), with potential to rise further if the current escalation spirals into an even more direct existential crisis for Israel. This is a notable upward revision from my prior estimate of well under 1-5%, driven by the assumed reality of intense, ongoing mutual attacks that could strain Israel's conventional deterrence to a breaking point.
### Adjusted Context Based on Assumed Iranian Reports
Iranian sources describe a rapidly intensifying full-scale war, far beyond the June 2025 12-day conflict or the February 28, 2026, strikes. Key assumed-true elements include:
- **High-level assassinations by Israel/US**: The martyrdom of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei on March 1, 2026, in a strike on his Tehran office, along with the Defense Minister and other officials. Over 50 students killed in a southern Iran attack. These are portrayed as cowardly aggressions that have unified Iran rather than weakened it.
- **Iran's retaliatory operations**: The IRGC's "True Promise 4" operation, now in its 19th wave as of March 5, involving combined missile and drone strikes on Israeli and US targets. This includes launches of advanced Khorramshahr-4 missiles (1,000 kg warheads) penetrating seven layers of Israeli air defenses to hit Tel Aviv, Ben Gurion Airport, and airbases, creating "hell for the aggressors." Iran also claims attacks on US bases like Al-Udeid in Qatar, destroying radars, and downing multiple US F-15 jets with homegrown air defenses.
- **Broader impacts**: IRGC evacuation orders for Israel, vows of kamikaze drone damage to Israeli radars, oil price surges, and stock market falls due to the conflict. Iran asserts its offensive capabilities are now 10 times stronger than during the 2025 war, with US/Israel "surprised" by the scale and resilience.
- **Nuclear-related details**: Iran insists on continuing uranium enrichment (refusing "zero enrichment" demands), with nuclear facilities undamaged from prior strikes (confirming US/Israel failure to achieve this goal). An extraordinary IAEA Board of Governors meeting on Iran is set for March 9, 2026, likely to address escalation risks, though no explicit claims of imminent weaponization appear.
These reports paint Iran as resilient and offensively dominant, inflicting significant hidden damage on Israel (even acknowledged in assumed-true Israeli media leaks) while suffering but absorbing leadership losses.
### Why the Probability Increases (But Remains Below 50%)
1. **Heightened existential threat to Israel**: If Iranian missiles are routinely bypassing defenses and striking major population centers like Tel Aviv, this could be seen as an immediate survival risk. Israel's nuclear doctrine (under ambiguity) allows for use in "last resort" scenarios where conventional forces fail to prevent annihilation-level attacks—precisely what ongoing waves of Iranian barrages imply.
2. **Failed conventional strategies**: Assumed-true failures to destroy Iran's nuclear sites, combined with successful Iranian counterstrikes on US assets and jets, might push Israel to view nuclear options as the only way to decisively halt Iran's momentum, especially if new hardline Iranian leadership (post-Khamenei) accelerates retaliation or nuclear pursuits.
3. **Escalation dynamics**: The war's intensity—assassinations provoking massive responses—creates a cycle where Israel could resort to nuclear strikes on Iranian military/nuclear targets to force de-escalation. Historical analogies (e.g., Cold War crises) show nuclear risks spike in such fog-of-war environments.
However, countervailing factors keep it from being higher:
- **Nuclear taboo and consequences**: Even in this scenario, Israel would face global backlash, potential US restraint (despite alliance), and risks of Iranian proxy/allied responses (e.g., via Hezbollah, Houthis) or broader nuclear proliferation.
- **Iran's non-nuclear status**: No assumed reports claim Iran has weapons yet, only ongoing enrichment. Israel has shown preference for conventional preemption.
- **Deterrence holds**: Iran's claims of strength suggest mutual destruction risks, potentially deterring Israel unless strikes become truly regime-threatening.
### Realistic Risk Outlook
The core risk remains **intensified conventional warfare** (missile exchanges, air battles, proxy involvement), not immediate nuclear use. But if assumed Iranian successes continue—e.g., more waves crippling Israeli infrastructure—Israel's threshold for nuclear response could be crossed sooner. Monitor the IAEA meeting and any further "True Promise" updates for shifts. This estimate treats Iranian narratives as factual, overriding contradictory Western/Israeli assessments that typically downplay such claims.