MIDEAST-CRISIS/BAGHDADI-FRANCE-VIGILANCE (URGENT):France on high alert for revenge attacks following death of Baghdadi
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PARIS, Oct 27 (Reuters) - French Interior Minister Christophe Castaner, in a letter to police prefects seen by Reuters, called on Sunday for increased vigilance to prevent possible revenge attacks following the death of
Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
"...
The possible intensification of jihadist propaganda following this death, which could possibly call for acts of vengeance, requires the most extreme vigilance, notable during public events in your departments in coming days," Castaner said.
(Reporting by Sophie Louet Writing by Geert De Clercq Editing by Catherine Evans)
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The final neutralization of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi if on the one hand puts a definitive stop to the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in the Middle East, the same cannot be said for the continuity of the mad jihadist ideal. Persecuted by the followers of the Fu-Caliph, by the militiamen of the prince of terror Oussama bin Laden, as well as by a myriad of Islamist groups scattered all over the world, the Jihad fi-sabiliIlah (understood as the struggle / battle for the cause of God), will represent the ultimate goal of existence for thousands of individuals for decades.
The ideal of a definitive affirmation of Islam as a planetary creed is what guides the thoughts and actions of a multitude of preachers, the Tablighs. With their words, aimed at obtaining new conversions or a change of forbidden habits on the part of the faithful of Islam, they do nothing but root in the already diverted minds of marginalized subjects an iron will for revenge against a world that has rejected them or as more and more often it happens, they create a dangerous consensus on the part of many who recognize themselves as "a symbol", in this case, the Sha'aria.
The initial success of ISIS, an acronym for Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, also known as Daesh (Al Dawla Al Islamiya fi al Iraq wa al Sham), is an irrefutable fact. Within a few years it first gathered around thousands of individuals willing to sacrifice themselves in the name of the Islamist creed, then exported the jihadist ideal throughout the West, carrying out heinous acts in order to broaden the pool of support among the extremists even more reluctant to action, finally, created the basis for a revival of actions by autonomous cells.
After all, ISIS else has done nothing but follow in the footsteps of al Qaeda, starting from completely opposite assumptions. If bin Laden's organization considered the creation of an Islamic state premature by subjecting it to obtaining a basis of popular consensus, Daesh wanted to imprint its "trademark" on controlling portions of territory by subjecting them to its own domain. A phenomenon of Islamization from the very top of Salafi Islam that puts the supposed sharaitic obligation of conversion to any other compromise, in spite of the Koran, which stresses that "there is no compulsion in religion. The right way is well distinguished from the error. Whoever therefore rejects the idol and believes in Allah, clings to the firmer handle without the risk of failure. Allah is hearing, wise. "(Koran 2: 256).
The short-term risks are many. Revenge will be the watchword of the mujaheddin left orphaned by their guide and it is possible that some lone wolves will self-trigger in the name of the deceased at Baghdadi in the next few hours. But the latent danger also comes from al Qaeda and from the allied groups that certainly will intend to fill the void left by the ISIS that, while continuing to exist as a local organization, will have to completely reform the ranks to return to being fully operational internationally.
The Jihad is a constantly evolving network as economic and human losses are easily filled by the influx of capital obtained from harmless donations as well as from funding from states adjoining the Islamist ideology, while new mujaheddin levers are bred from Asian fields to European banlieues.
A network in reconstitution, therefore, that will act according to specific strategies dictated by the experiences of al Qaeda and Isis, based on the errors committed in the planning of the Islamist expansion: on the part of al Qaeda it has been lethal to undertake actions delocalized from a specific base of command, in this becoming an easily identifiable target; by the Daesh, the enormity of the initially conquered territories has led to a military collapse as a direct consequence of the impossibility of garrisoning the areas under its control. Hence the need to export guerrilla warfare also to Europe, especially for propaganda and recruitment, while exposing itself to the partial failure in terms of logistical organization and communication. A figure that, as highlighted, cannot alarm the jihadist leadership as their following is unfortunately destined to grow.
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