Happiness
There is a previous discussion on conditions of happiness
here . In this post I will mostly quote from the "Intelligent Virtue" by Julia Annas.
Is happiness a state arising out of satisfying desires? In a resource constrained world, it is not possible to conceive of lasting happiness from this perspective. Hypothetically speaking, if there was a world where all desires were satisfied, we wish and it becomes so, would we be happy?
Annas writes
[quote author=Intelligent Virtue]
But it turns out to be problematic to remove neediness as an essential aspect of human nature. The author Julian Barnes, in a brilliant piece of writing, brings this point out. In one of his works he describes a man who finds himself in heaven, or rather in `New Heaven', an up-to-date version of heaven which is non-judgemental, and where you get everything you want, effortlessly and without any adverse consequences. The food is always exactly as you like it, and produces no fullness, indigestion, obesity, or the like. When you play golf, you always win; you excel in any sport or skill you take up.Your favourite soccer teams win; you meet any famous person you like. Your world conforms to what you want it to be, so that all your desires are fulfilled without any of the problems that arise from normal human neediness. What could possibly be the downside to such a life?
None appears for a while, but eventually the narrator realizes that he, and all the other happy people in New Heaven, will ultimately get bored with being able to satisfy any desire they have, with no bad effects, however they ring the changes. And then they will have nothing left to keep them going. When this becomes apparent to a person, he or she willingly goes out of existence. A life of having all your desires fulfilled without the problems created by human neediness leaves humans with nothing to live for, nothing to propel them onwards.
A life of complete desire-satisfaction, even without the problems involved in having needs, turns out to be essentially backward-looking, and leaves out anything that could get us to move forward with our lives. We recognize, even without any theory about it, that something is deeply lacking in an account of happiness that leaves us nothing to live for once our needs are met in a way that leaves no further neediness.
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Is happiness then a state of general satisfaction with life? This is the more academic definition of happiness used in some branches of social sciences and is the source of compiling data about index of happiness.
Annas writes
[quote author=Intelligent Virtue]
This kind of account takes happiness to be, not a local attitude had when desires are satisfied, but an attitude of global satisfaction with one's life as a whole. This is an improvement on the desire-satisfaction kind of account, since it involves not just a positive feeling but some kind of overall judgement about one's life as a whole, and thus some kind of evaluation of how one's life as a whole is going. If you are studying happiness in the social sciences, this is the obvious item to try to study, since we can ask people what their overall evaluation of their life is, and record answers, whereas asking people about their feelings or whether their desires are satisfied does not lend itself to measurement. Hence we find that, in the social sciences, numerous students of happiness in sociology and psychology departments study self-reports of life satisfaction, and this often leads to the assumption that life satisfaction is just what happiness is. This is the assumption behind the World Database of Happiness, which over a period of twenty years has amassed the results of questionnaires on life satisfaction and come up with numerous conclusions about happiness both in and between different nations.
There are obvious problems with this approach. One is that people can be expected to have a variety of views as to what it is to be satisfied with their lives. Some may respond that they have an affirmative attitude to their life as a whole because they have attained their major goals in life, even though emotionally they feel flat or even distressed. Others may respond affirmatively about their lives because they are feeling happy at the time they are asked, even though they have failed to attain, or lost, the things they have spent their lives attaining. Some may think that individual achievement matters for being positive about one's life; others may value family ties and connections more. It is thus quite unclear that people asked at a given time about satisfaction with their lives are answering the same question; and this obviously renders uncertain what is achieved by collecting the answers.
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In addition, the perspective about general life satisfaction also varies with time, and stage of life.
One common feature in the above perspectives about happiness is that it is a "state". The desire for happiness thus translates to achieving and holding on to a state. An alternative way to look at happiness while including the dynamic component of life experiences is that
happiness is more of a forward looking aim that propels us.
[quote author=Intelligent Virtue]
As ancient authors point out, it doesn't make sense to ask why you aim to be happy, in the way it certainly makes sense to ask why you aim to have pleasant feelings or to have desires satisfied, rather than choosing to have some other aims. Living happily is essentially an overall aim, in eudaimonist thinking, and this gives it the right place in our lives. Living happily is not feeling good, getting what you want, or feeling satisfied with your life. How could any of these serve as an aim, inspire you to do anything? When we aim at living happily we are aiming at going forward in certain ways, getting somewhere in what we are doing. Hence the static conception of happiness which takes it to be pleasure is ill situated to make sense of any connection with virtue, which is itself essentially dynamic and forward-looking. Again, it is no surprise that philosophers with a static conception of happiness have seen little connection of that with virtue.
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Possibly the most significant problem about virtue's relation to happiness imported by thinking of the latter in terms of pleasant feelings or satisfaction is that it leads us to confuse the circumstances of a life with the living of it. We have seen this confusion with virtue; but it happens with happiness too. Feeling pleased is essentially a passive part of my life. I can be active in bringing it about: eating appropriate food when hungry, engaging in activities that appeal to me. But feeling pleased, like any feeling, is not itself part of the way I live my life. As with other circumstances stances of my life, it is not up to me whether feelings of pleasure or satisfaction come from experiences, including the satisfaction of desires; it is only up to me to manage this in so far as I can. Pleasure thought of as feeling or satisfaction is essentially passive, part of the materials making up my life but hardly part of actively living it. Hence pleasant feelings or satisfaction come to be thought of, on a `feelings' view of happiness, as episodes in my life. But then they are just part of the circumstances of my life. Aiming at pleasure, understood as a way of living my life, will come, on this view, to nothing more than manipulating other circumstances so that I get as many of these episodes as I can. If we think of happiness this way we will see no plausible connection with virtue.
Indeed, virtue comes to be seen as just one item in the life I am leading, with nothing to encourage me even to see it as crucial in my life. This is perhaps the position some people find themselves in who want to be good, but also want to be rich and successful, and then ask why virtue should be a more important item in their lives than money or success. If we are not clear that virtue is part of the living of my life, rather than the circumstances of it, we will be hard put to it to find any reason for systematically preferring virtue to pleasure (or, come to that, pleasure to virtue) as we live our lives. The decision between them will come to appear a matter of personal preference, or even arbitrary. I prefer virtue to pleasure; you prefer the opposite. This fails to take virtue seriously, and shows the importance of being clear about the distinction between the circumstances and the living of a life.
On the eudaimonist approach, none of these problems arise. Neither virtue nor happiness is a matter of the circumstances of my life. (This is consistent with the point that that these circumstances might put constraints on happiness.)
Both living virtuously and living happily are ways of living my life, dealing with the materials I have to hand, making the best of the life I have led up to now. Problems about their relation are problems as to the relations between ways of living my life. If I ask, about my life, how best I can live happily from now on, this is a practical question, to which answers will take the form: living honestly, say, or living dishonestly. Which I choose will make a difference to whether I live happily; it will make a difference, for example, to how I earn my living. `Earning my living' is not itself an answer to how best to live happily: earning a living is part of the material to be given a shape by honesty or dishonesty. Moreover, happiness, taken as living happily is clearly an ongoing activity, not a static condition to be achieved and then rested in. And happiness as living happily is not a determinate, any more than a static condition. Virtue doesn't makes me happy by getting me to an already clearly defined goal, as I might be given feelings of pleasure by winning a game or a prize.
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Happiness, on a eudaimonist view, is the way I live my life overall.
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What, after all, is the alternative? How could it be just the circumstances of our lives that make us happy, or not? How can stuff make you happy? As we constantly discover, a big house, a car, money, holidays, don't make us happy if we cannot make the right use of them in our lives. On their own they do nothing for us; how can they? A shop flyer I saw gets
something right: `Money doesn't make you happy, shopping does.' Stuff is irrelevant for happiness until you do something with it, even shopping.
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Given that so much in contemporary work on happiness searches for happiness in the circumstances of our lives, it bears repeating that money, health, beauty, even relationships don't make us happy; our happiness comes at least in part from the way we do or don't actively live our lives, doing something with them or acting in relation to them. Happiness is at least in part activity. If we fully take this on board, putting the feel-good accounts of happiness on one side, it becomes clearer why what makes us happy couldn't just be stuff sitting there in our lives, or passive states of feeling or satisfaction. To live happily we require something with as much dynamism and internal drive as happiness itself has, and the virtues provide this.
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