Trump announces that 50% aluminum tariffs would go into effect on June 4. I found one of the responses interesting so I asked Grok to analyze it:
Let’s break down the claims in the statement to assess their accuracy based on available data and insights, while critically examining the narrative and addressing each component.
Claim 1: "80% of the primary aluminum we need is smelt outside of the US"
Analysis: This claim appears to be broadly accurate but requires context. The United States has become heavily reliant on imported primary aluminum due to a significant decline in domestic smelting capacity. According to a 2022 Congressional Research Service report, the U.S. accounted for less than 2% of global primary aluminum production in 2021, ranking ninth globally.
The U.S. imports a substantial amount of its primary aluminum, with Canada being the largest supplier, accounting for over 75% of Canadian production exported to the U.S. in 2021. A 2020 Federal Register report noted that the U.S. imports around 4 million tons of aluminum annually, indicating a high import dependency.
While the exact figure of "80%" is not explicitly confirmed in the sources, the significant decline in U.S. primary aluminum production (from 20 smelters in 2000 to just four in 2024) and the reliance on imports, particularly from Canada, suggest that a large majority—likely close to or exceeding 80%—of the primary aluminum used in the U.S. is smelted abroad. This aligns with the claim, though the precise percentage may vary depending on the year and specific demand metrics.
Verdict: Likely true, with the caveat that the exact 80% figure is an approximation but consistent with high U.S. import dependency.
Claim 2: "No new smelting for 10+ years because we don’t have the electrical infrastructure to support it"
Analysis: This claim has two parts: the absence of new smelting capacity for over a decade and the reason being insufficient electrical infrastructure.
No new smelting for 10+ years: This is partially accurate.
No new primary aluminum smelters have been built in the U.S. since the 1980s until recently, with the exception of a new smelter announced in 2024 by Century Aluminum, funded by a $500 million Biden-Harris administration grant. This will be the first new U.S. smelter in 45 years, indicating no new smelters have been constructed in at least the last decade. However, some existing smelters have been restarted or expanded since the 2018 Section 232 tariffs, such as the New Madrid smelter in 2018, though it was later idled in 2024. Thus, while no new smelters were built, there have been some restarts, which slightly complicates the claim.
Insufficient electrical infrastructure: This is a significant factor and largely true. Primary aluminum smelting is highly energy-intensive, with electricity accounting for up to 40% of production costs. Many U.S. smelters, such as the Intalco and Wenatchee smelters, have closed or been idled due to high electricity costs and the inability to secure affordable, long-term power contracts, particularly for clean energy. For example, Alcoa’s Intalco smelter closure in 2023 was partly due to the failure to secure a below-market-rate energy contract. A post on X also highlights the challenge, noting that setting up a
new smelter would require a power grid capable of committing to 20+ years of service, which is difficult to secure. The aging U.S. electrical infrastructure and reliance on high-cost fossil fuel-based power (e.g., coal for the New Madrid smelter) put U.S. smelters at a disadvantage compared to countries like Canada, which use cheaper hydroelectric power.
However, the claim oversimplifies by suggesting electrical infrastructure is the sole barrier.
Other factors, such as high Chinese exports, global overcapacity, and environmental regulations, have also contributed to the decline of U.S. smelting. The new Century Aluminum smelter project indicates that with significant government investment, infrastructure challenges can be addressed, though it will take years to operationalize.
Verdict: Mostly true. No new smelters have been built in over a decade (closer to 45 years until the 2024 announcement), and electrical infrastructure limitations, particularly access to affordable and clean energy, are a major barrier. However, other economic and competitive factors also play a role.
Claim 3: "Every 1 primary aluminum job supports 7 downstream"
Analysis: This claim suggests a multiplier effect where each primary aluminum job supports seven jobs in downstream industries (e.g., rolling, extruding, or manufacturing products like aluminum sheets, plates, or extrusions). The sources do not provide a direct 1:7 ratio, but they do support a significant downstream job impact. A 2018 Economic Policy Institute report notes that Section 232 tariffs led to over 2,000 new jobs in downstream aluminum industries from 22 new and expansion projects, while primary aluminum restarts created over 1,000 jobs. A 2021 report further states that 55 downstream projects supported nearly 4,500 additional workers. These figures suggest a substantial multiplier effect, though not precisely 1:7
The Aluminum Association’s 2024 report indicates that the U.S. aluminum industry (including primary, secondary, and downstream segments) supports nearly 700,000 jobs (direct, indirect, and induced) and $228 billion in economic impact. While primary aluminum jobs have declined by nearly 70% since 2013, mid- and downstream jobs (e.g., sheet/plate and recycling) have grown or remained steady, indicating a strong downstream dependency. A post on X claims that one Canadian aluminum job supports 13 American jobs, suggesting an even higher multiplier for cross-border supply chains, but this is not directly comparable to the 1:7 claim for U.S. primary jobs.
The 1:7 ratio may be an estimate or exaggeration, but the broader point that
primary aluminum jobs support multiple downstream jobs is supported by the economic interconnectedness of the aluminum value chain. The exact ratio depends on the definition of “downstream” and the economic model used (e.g., IMPLAN models cited in).
Verdict: Plausible but not directly verified. The 1:7 ratio is not explicitly confirmed, but primary aluminum production supports significant downstream employment, likely in a comparable range.
Claim 4: "This will kill US aluminum jobs"
● Analysis: This claim is alarmist and speculative, implying that the reliance on foreign smelting and lack of new smelting capacity will devastate U.S. aluminum jobs. The reality is nuanced: Primary aluminum jobs:
The U.S. primary aluminum sector has already seen significant job losses, with 18 of 23 smelters closing between 2010 and 2017, eliminating roughly 13,000 jobs. The closure of smelters like New Madrid in 2024 and Intalco in 2023 further reduced primary jobs. Only four smelters remain operational, with a combined capacity of about 650,000 tons. The decline in primary production, driven by high energy costs, global competition, and aging facilities, has already severely impacted jobs in this sector.
● Downstream and secondary jobs: Despite the decline in primary production, mid- and downstream aluminum jobs (e.g., rolling, extruding, and recycling) have remained stable or grown. The Aluminum Association reports that 98% of U.S. aluminum jobs are in mid- and downstream segments, with growth in recycling (+12.5%) and sheet/plate (+6.0%) jobs between 2022 and 2024. The U.S. has offset some primary production losses with increased secondary (recycled) aluminum production, which accounted for 78% of U.S. aluminum production in 2021. Investments in recycling, such as Golden Aluminum’s Next Generation Mini Mill, further support job growth in less energy-intensive segments.
● Future outlook: The claim that reliance on foreign smelting “will kill” jobs ignores mitigating factors.
The new Century Aluminum smelter, expected to double U.S. primary capacity, could create jobs, though it will take years to complete. Federal investments through the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and decarbonization grants are supporting the industry, particularly in recycling and downstream segments. However,
continued reliance on imports, especially from Canada, which is part of the U.S. defense supply chain, may not necessarily “kill” jobs if downstream industries continue to thrive. The X post’s alarmist tone may reflect sentiment about the vulnerability of primary jobs but overlooks the resilience of downstream and secondary segments.
Verdict: Partially true but exaggerated. The decline in primary aluminum production has already reduced jobs in that sector, and infrastructure limitations pose ongoing challenges. However, downstream and recycling jobs are stable or growing, and new investments may mitigate further losses. The claim overstates the immediate threat to the broader aluminum industry.
Overall Assessment
The statement is mostly accurate but contains some simplifications and exaggerations:
The U.S. does rely heavily on imported primary aluminum (likely around 80%).No new smelters have been built in over a decade (until the 2024 announcement), and electrical infrastructure is a significant barrier, though not the only one.
The 1:7 job multiplier is plausible but not directly verified, though primary jobs do support significant downstream employment. The claim that this “will kill US aluminum jobs” is alarmist, as downstream and recycling jobs are resilient, and new investments may create opportunities, though primary jobs remain at risk.
End of Grok Analysis.
Very revealing, isn't it? This is why Trump would be seeking a third term, there is no time, 4 years is not enough. Xi Jinping has been in power for 12 years as China's top leader and Vladimir Putin has been in power for 25 years, considering his terms as president and prime minister of Russia.
