Was Gurdjieff a Stoic?

[EmeraldHope]

It all depends on the specific situation of course and what is best to make things easiest for the other person and ourselves. But for this a great control of the body, the emotions, and the the mind are essential. So one can be 'meek' but I think its about being able to be meek in the right way.

Think this is so. Seems external considering first, a measure of the specifics, the environment of a given situation with its many influences, choosing the right way; not so easy all the time. Seems when immediately pressed (as it exists often today), there is little mastery of balancing; it is often automated/mechanically programmed instead of coming from understanding of many natures. Perhaps like a practiced martial arts master of old, they have seen a thousand immediate threats and moves, and must choose correctly a response that serves both, given specifics, in the best way possible.

Perhaps it it also necessary to ask ourselves what the missing opposition at the time was to meek? The opposite of meek is prideful. Well, we all know that prideful goes hand in hand with both ego and psychopathy. I would say that the sophists would have most certainly fit the bill, as they were as deceitful as they were prideful. In that respect, the stoics would indeed be meek compared to sophists. I am sure there are other juxtopositions at the time as well.

 

[Anthony]

I've been thinking more and more about how 4th way and Stoicism relate to one another.
Cosmology: They considered the Sun to be a diety and that the only way for man to live is according to nature.
In Gurdjieff's view The Sun created Man as to serve Nature. This is where the Stoics stop, and Gurdjieff goes further.
Man is also created to develop himself, until he reaches the level of the Sun. Stoicism doesn't acknowledge any other influences.
In 4th way we get both fate and chance, in Stoicism only fate.

Stoicism seems to make a striking parallel with 4th way that it's almost eerie.

Stoic Psychology.
Epictetus: He stressed the importance of taking in impressions in a different way. (The Stoic mind was compared to a cleched fist, I think the same or similar is said by Nicoll)
Seneca: He seems to have understood how centres influence one another. (He advised relaxing the moving centre when angry)
Their Sage would in 4th way terms be called a one sided man, since they placed reason above all. In 4th way the aim is the ballanced man in whom all centres work accordingly.
There is no self observation in Stoicism or any kind of meditation, apart from reflection on certain aspects of the self.

 

[jclimacus]

Epictetus: He stressed the importance of taking in impressions in a different way. (The Stoic mind was compared to a cleched fist, I think the same or similar is said by Nicoll)
Seneca: He seems to have understood how centres influence one another. (He advised relaxing the moving centre when angry)
Their Sage would in 4th way terms be called a one sided man, since they placed reason above all. In 4th way the aim is the ballanced man in whom all centres work accordingly.
There is no self observation in Stoicism or any kind of meditation, apart from reflection on certain aspects of the self.

I'm not sure I agree with your last statement, Anthony, regarding self-observation among the Stoics. Take for example Epictetus, especially in the Enchiridion (translated: the Handbook) in which he reminds us that our proper concern is with "that which is within our power, such as opinion, aim, desires, aversions, and, in a word whatever are our own actions," as opposed to all that is beyond our control, such as" body, property, reputation, command, and, in one word, whatever are not our own actions," in short, external life. Which of course means knowing what is in one's mind/heart, and keeping a watch that this does not exceed beyond what it is in our power to govern. Granted, this is only implied in Epictetus, but the implication IMHO seems clear. How could one live as a stoic (a philosopher) and not know and study the contents of one's consciousness or the desires of one's heart? They, like Gurdjieff, weren't mere professors of a way, they attempted the task of bringing it off in their own being. If philosophy isn't approached in this way, one isn't a philosopher, one is merely a thinker, someone who takes to themselves an interest in mere curiosities. (An illuminating etymological comparison can be made between "curiosity" or "curio" and "wonder" which is what we ought to feel, at all times!)

 

[obyvatel]

Stoicism seems to make a striking parallel with 4th way that it's almost eerie.
......................................

There is no self observation in Stoicism or any kind of meditation, apart from reflection on certain aspects of the self.

Regarding self-observation, from Epictetus

[quote author=Epictetus: The Essential Writings]
The condition and characteristic of an uninstructed person is this: he never expects from himself profit (advantage) nor harm, but from externals. The condition and characteristic of a philosopher is this: he expects all advantage and all harm from himself.
.................
and in a word he watches himself as if he were an enemy lying in ambush.
[/quote]

Reading Stoic philosophy (working on Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus with Seneca on the list) is like reading a script which when internalized could lead to the growth of the "soul" as Needleman defined it in "Lost Christianity" (discussed here ) and what Gurdjieff described as "self-remembering".

Stoics work on overcoming emotions which arise from the "body" reaching the state of "apatheia" or freedom from emotions. Unless such freedom from lower emotions is achieved, higher emotions cannot be accessed. Analogy at the physical level could be the cellular receptor sites being occupied by a quality of ligands (lower emotions which limit growth of being) preventing a different quality of ligands (higher emotions like true faith, hope and love) from binding. And such a state becomes possible through the development of the soul.

[quote author=Lost Christianity]
The soul is the intermediate principle in human nature occupying the place between the Spirit and the body...

The power or function of the soul is attention; the development of attention is therefore approximately equivalent to the development and growth of the soul.
..................

Not only is virtue impossible without the development of attention, but also without attention there is no real sin.
[/quote]

The energy associated with the soul can be activated when "man experiences the psychological pain of contradiction" [Needleman]. Gurdjieff called this the struggle between "yes and no" leading to inner friction. Ordinary emotions (outward movement) expend this energy without feeding the soul.

[quote author=Lost Christianity]
Ego is the systematic affirmation of emotional reaction. This system is fueled by the energy of attention. Therefore as long as a man has no control over his attention, his possibilities remain imprisoned in the ego no matter what ideals he espouses and no matter what efforts he expends.
[/quote]


The process of growing the soul is said to first require the growth of "inner being" in terms of "Lost Christianity". This is akin to what Gurdjieff described with an analogy of a disordered house full of servants.

[quote author=ISOTM]
"Thus, in one teaching, man is compared to a house in which there is a multitude of servants but no master and no steward. The servants have all forgotten their duties; no one wants to do what he ought; everyone tries to be master, if only for a moment; and, in this kind of disorder, the house is threatened with grave danger. The only chance of salvation is for a group of the more sensible servants to meet together and elect a temporary steward, that is, a deputy steward. This deputy steward can then put the other servants in their places, and make each do his own work: the cook in the kitchen, the coachman in the stables, the gardener in the garden, and so on. In this way the 'house' can be got ready for the arrival of the real steward who will, in his turn, prepare it for the arrival of the master.
[/quote]

Per my understanding
Spirit = Master
Soul = Steward
Inner Being = Deputy Steward

Development of deputy steward or inner being is said to be facilitated by a specific type of moral asceticism, fragments of which exists in the external precepts of various religions. Stoic philosophy as practiced as a way of life was grounded in such asceticism which involves the struggle against lower emotions, constant efforts at self-remembering and external consideration in the midst of ordinary existence. So stoic philosophy appears to be of the same essence as 4th Way - osit.

 

[LQB]

..............
Development of deputy steward or inner being is said to be facilitated by a specific type of moral asceticism, fragments of which exists in the external precepts of various religions. Stoic philosophy as practiced as a way of life was grounded in such asceticism which involves the struggle against lower emotions, constant efforts at self-remembering and external consideration in the midst of ordinary existence. So stoic philosophy appears to be of the same essence as 4th Way - osit.

Thanks for that obyvatel - much appreciated!

 

[Laura]

Obyvatel's post appears to me to be part of the answer to what it means to be prepared in the terms of the Wise Virgins as mentioned in the last session and discussed in that thread.

 

[Menna]

External consideration for me brings struggle with the lower emotions. Practicing one brings the opportunity to practice the other.

 

[Approaching Infinity]

Just finished reading a good book: Stoicism by John Sellars (2006). He covers the history and legacy of Stoicism, as well as devotes a chapter to each of the three topics of their philosophy: logic, physics, and ethics. There are quite a few connections with Gurdjieff's philosophy. Some tidbits:

First of all there's the Stoics' materialism: everything is matter (but all matter has mind, thus they're really panpsychists, not materialists per se). Then there's the fact that their physics and logic (ontology and epistemology) are only tools toward the primary goal of philosophy: a way of living in the real world. Basically, healing and 'shaping' the soul. Thus, they focused on 'exercises', after theoretical learning (i.e., exoteric, mesoteric, esoteric), e.g., reviewing the day's events and actions. Their take on emotion is very Gurdjieffian, e.g., Epictetus's rejoinder to a student angered by his brother's anger: he should be more concerned with his OWN anger, not his brother's. Anyone who wasn't 'sage' material (i.e., everyone), was considered 'impious, foolish, mad.' In G's terms: merde. At the level of sage, there can be no disagreement. A sage cannot act counter to his understanding or knowledge. (And knowledge is not just information, but information applied, as in arts and crafts.) There's also the threefold division of man: impulses (motor center), desires (emotional center), and judgment (intellectual center). And the study of any part gives knowledge of the whole, thus their focus on physiology, for example, and the 'digestion' of information to become knowledge (a la G's hydrogens/enneagram). The Stoics also believed in the periodic destruction of the world, at which point it started up again (eternal recurrence). They also denied the immortality of the soul (Gurdjieff, too, at least for 'man' in quotation marks).

As for Caesar/Jesus links, Stoicism started with Zeno, who was a student of Crates the Cynic (Mack identifies the Q Jesus as a Cynic sage, which for all intents and purposes could just as well be a Stoic sage; e.g., Musonius Rufus left behind a collection of sayings). Chryssipus was from Cilicia and his student Antipater from Tarsus (same as St. Paul). Curiously, ALL early/middle Stoic texts are lost to us (destroyed). And oddly, many late Stoics revered Cato. I find that strange, given that Caesar was a much clearer exemplar of Stoic sagacity. E.g., Seneca's descriptions of Cato sound more like Caesar:

For greatness that surpasses ordinary common limits does not occur frequently. But I wonder whether this same Marcus Cato, with whom our discussion started, may not even surpass our ideal. ... Cato was a true father of his country, and far worthier than others who have since been granted this title, to have altars raised in his memory. One day when we are finally freed from slavery, if that ever happens, Cato will be deified; and Rome will then have a god by whose name it need not be ashamed to swear.

A Stoic was a 'dual citizen' (kind of like Jesus): a member of his city/state, as well as a cosmopolitan (citizen of the cosmos). This description of Zeno's position, from Plutarch, sounds like something Caesar might have supported:

our household arrangement should not be based on cities or parishes, each one marked out by its own legal system, but we should regard all humans as our fellow citizens and local residents, and there should be one way of life and order, like that of a herd grazing together and nurtured by a common pasture [i.e., law].

 

[Laura]

Yes, reading Parenti's "The Assassination of Julius Caesar" really highlights the pathological nature of Cato and his pals as well as the fact that if anybody was a Stoic in the true sense, in that dynamic, it was Caesar.

What interests me, of course, is the fact that Gurdjieff's ideas and teachings demonstrate the probable survival of a truly ancient system for a very, very long time. And, as I mentioned elsewhere, the fact that this system includes cyclic catastrophes that relate in some way to the behavior of humanity suggests that this, too, was part of the "inner teaching" of Stoicism.

It does seem that it is possible that the Mithraic Mysteries may have been a repository for some of these ideas. What is interesting is that just at the time the worship of Divus Julius disappeared, not one, but TWO religions emerged: The Mysteries of Mithras and Christianity.

 

[Anthony]

What would be a good book off our recommended reading list that shows
what exactly was going on culturally or morally at the time when Caesar was assassinated.
I was thinking that maybe there are parallels to our current situation.

 

[Laura]

What would be a good book off our recommended reading list that shows
what exactly was going on culturally or morally at the time when Caesar was assassinated.
I was thinking that maybe there are parallels to our current situation.

Michael Parenti's "The Assassination of Julius Caesar." Really excellent book. Also, Gelzer's "Caesar: Politician and Statesman." Those two are pretty much must reads.

 

[Palinurus]

Found a paper today from 2010 with the title Posidonius on Emotions and Non-Conceptual Content written by BILL WRINGE Department of Philosophy, Bilkent University, 06800 Bilkent, Ankara, Turkey and published in Prolegomena 10 (2) 2011: 185–213

I seem unable to produce a direct link to this PDF article but entering the following in goggle or any other search engine gives you the link anyway:

Posidonius on Emotions
and Non-Conceptual Content
BILL WRINGE
Department of Philosophy, Bilkent University, 06800 Bilkent, Ankara, Turkey

I hope the following quotes will give interested readers an inkling into what this is all about.

ORIGINAL SCIENTIFIC ARTICLE / RECEIVED: 04–02–10 ACCEPTED: 27–05–11

ABSTRACT: In this paper I argue that the work of the unorthodox Stoic Posidonius
– as reported to us by Galen – can be seen as making an interesting contribution
to contemporary debates about the nature of emotion. Richard Sorabji has
already argued that Posidonius’ contribution highlights the weaknesses in some
well-known contemporary forms of cognitivism. Here I argue that Posidonius
might be seen as advocating a theory of the emotions which sees them as being,
in at least some cases, two-level intentional phenomena. One level involves judgments,
just as the orthodox Stoic account does. But Posidonius thinks that emotions
must also include an element sometimes translated as an “irrational tug”. I
suggest that we see the “irrational tug” as involving a second level of intentional,
but non-conceptual representation. This view satisfies two desiderata: it is a view
which would have been available to Posidonius and which is compatible with the
views reported to us; and it is a view which is independently attractive. It also
makes Posidonius’ position less far removed from that of orthodox Stoics than it
might otherwise do, while remaining genuinely innovative.

XI Conclusion
In the central sections of this paper, I set out a view of emotions (or at least
pathê) as involving, but not being completely constituted by non-conceptual
representations. I also tried to make a case for thinking that a view like
this was available to, and could have been endorsed by Posidonius. I have
not claimed that he actually endorsed such a view: there is no direct evidence
for this. But the arguments that he is reported as having put forward
would certainly support such a view better than any other that was available
to him. So, if he had a coherent view (which, of course, we cannot be
sure of) it is likely to have been this.
However, I have tried not only to provide an interpretation of Posidonius’
position, but to argue that such a view should be attractive to contemporary
philosophers. My reasons for thinking this should already be
apparent: here I shall just try to summarise them. The view that I have
outlined has many of the advantages of mainstream cognitive theories of
emotions: it agrees with them that emotions are intentional states and can
stand in rational relationships with other kinds of mental states. However,
it also accommodates some points which mainstream cognitivist views
seem to have difficulty with. In particular it can easily allow for the fact
that animals and young children have emotions. It can also explain how
we can have emotions which run counter to our explicit beliefs. This is
possible because we can have a non-conceptual representation whose content
contradicts the content of our conceptual representations.
Furthermore, unlike some of the contemporary cognitivist accounts
which I criticised at the beginning of this paper, the position that I am discussing
can accommodate these points in a way that does not seem ad hoc.
The claim that we have non-conceptual representations as well as conceptual
ones, and that these representations are implicated in standard cases
of emotions are based on general theoretical considerations and not just on
a need to deal with perceived counter-examples to a particular version of
cognitivism. We need to specify that a particular kind of non-conceptual
content is involved – namely proto-propositional; but again, the existence
of non-conceptual content of this sort can be motivated on other grounds.
In short, the view that emotions have non-conceptual contents is one
which is remarkably plausible. It is also prefigured to a striking degree
in Posidonius’ writings – or at least those reports of them which have
come down to us from Galen. We would do well to appropriate Posidonius’
views.

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[Buddy]

Found a paper today from 2010 with the title Posidonius on Emotions and Non-Conceptual Content written by BILL WRINGE Department of Philosophy, Bilkent University, 06800 Bilkent, Ankara, Turkey and published in Prolegomena 10 (2) 2011: 185–213
...

I'm finding it very interesting so far. I see lots of tentative connections here with personal experience, cognitive science material and what I think I remember about Gurdjieff and an idea attributed to him about Man really having only the rudiments (proto-propositional?) of emotions - at least in terms of a personal ownership - and at least until they are developed through Work.

Does that sound like a reasonable assessment of at least one Gurdjieff connection so far?

 

[Palinurus]

I'm finding it very interesting so far. I see lots of tentative connections here with personal experience, cognitive science material and what I think I remember about Gurdjieff and an idea attributed to him about Man really having only the rudiments (proto-propositional?) of emotions - at least in terms of a personal ownership - and at least until they are developed through Work.

Does that sound like a reasonable assessment of at least one Gurdjieff connection so far?

It's a bit of a rhetorical question you're posing but you're right on the money I think.

I for one was pleasantly surprised to find such detailed attention for the pre-verbal component of emotions and the implied difference of approach that fact is supposed to necessitate when working to develop them by observing them, or when trying to redirect these impulses via reflection on their metabolisms.

 

[Tristan]

I found two titles that may be able to provide more information regarding the teachings of the stoics on emotions, and especially as regards the position of Posidonius.


Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation
Richard Sorabji

Abstract

The Stoics (Chrysippus, Seneca, Epictetus) tell us how to get rid of unwanted emotions by re-evaluating situations (cognitive therapy). In their view, an emotion is a pair of value judgements that harm or benefit if at hand, and that it is appropriate to react. Bodily and mental shocks (e.g., crying) are not part of the emotion. One Stoic, Posidonius, protested that such judgements are neither necessary nor sufficient for emotion, not necessary, for example, for emotion produced by melody, or in animals. Seneca replied that what is produced by music and the arts, or in animals, is only preliminary shocks or ‘first movements’. Others (Galen) suggested that bodily factors are important and need separate physical treatment, and recent brain studies (LeDoux) explain why. But the Stoics are right that cognitive therapy can often on its own remove unwanted emotion. Moreover, their two judgements are the right targets for re-evaluation, and it is a muddle to be sad (William James) because I cry. Crying is only a shock. We need not share the Stoic ideal of apatheia — freedom from all emotions — just freedom from unwanted ones. Some Christians (Origen, Evagrius) took up the idea of first movements and converted them from preliminary shocks into preliminary ‘bad thoughts’, which act as temptations. They worked out a whole art of nipping them in the bud to achieve the Stoic ideal of apatheia. But Augustine favoured Aristotle's emotion in moderation, except for example for lust, which he saw as disobedient to will.

http://www.amazon.com/Emotion-Peace-Mind-Agitation-Temptation/dp/0199256608

Also: The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy
J. Sihvola, T. Engberg-Pedersen

http://www.amazon.com/Emotions-Hellenistic-Philosophy-Synthese-Historical/dp/0792353188