There is a history of safety issues with the builder of this pipeline
http://saneenergyproject.org/overview/
• In June, 2011, DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) inspectors cited Spectra Energy for 17 inadequacies in its pipeline safety operations and procedures, including problems with pipeline surveillance, emergency plans, and welding procedures.
• Texas Eastern, the subsidiary of Spectra Energy that proposes to build the NJ-NY Expansion Project, received the EPA’s seventh highest Federal Penalty Assessment on record (nearly $25 million adjusted for inflation to 2009 numbers), for PCB contamination.
• Spectra Energy’s underground gas storage reservoir in Moss Bluff, TX experienced catastrophic failure in 2004 with two explosions, spewing flames as high as 1,000 feet. An estimated 6 bcf of natural gas was consumed during the fire, which lasted nearly one week.
• On August 23, 2009, Spectra Energy’s Steckman Ridge, PA, natural gas compressor station experienced an “emergency shutdown,” releasing 1,629 pounds of lubricating oil and 6,460 pounds of methane (including 1,151 pounds of volatile organic compounds), coating a fertile agricultural, fishing and hunting region with potentially toxic industrial gear oil. The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) issued two Notices of Violation. Nearby landowners reported to FERC a total of 43 additional shutdowns and/or blowdowns at the same compressor station between August 2009 and June 2011.
• According to The Vancouver Sun, Spectra Energy’s Pine River natural gas processing plant is the top polluter in British Columbia, discharging 1.2 million tonnes of greenhouse gas pollutants. The company’s Fort Nelson gas plant was ranked the #3 polluter in BC.
• The plan is for the NJ-NY Expansion project to be monitored by the builder/Applicant (Spectra/its subsidiaries); the dEIS states, “The Applicants would operate and maintain the newly constructed pipeline facilities in the same manner as they currently operate and maintain their existing systems.” Given their past record, this is an assurance, not of safety, but of calamity.
4. Pipeline regulation and oversight in America is sorely inadequate.
• Spectra is excluded from regulations of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts.
• Fear of an explosion from this 30” high pressure pipeline is well placed. Nationwide, pipeline accidents result in, on average, a death every 3 weeks, and injuries or burns more than once a week.
• Before 2002, there was no federal regulation of pipelines. Nationwide, there are roughly 2.5 million miles of pipeline; of these, PHMSA has jurisdiction over just 174,000 miles of interstate lines. Just 7% of pipelines are subject to mandatory inspection. For the NJ-NY project, inspection is proposed only once every 7 years.
• There are only 88 auditors nationwide, who primarily review industry-supplied reports and do occasional field inspections. PHMSA reports 800-900 annual field inspections, or roughly just 10 per inspector.
• A senate bill calling for 40 additional inspectors and doubling the maximum fine, introduced after the San Bruno explosion, died in session. Tighter regulations are unlikely to pass under the current Congress.
• The inadequacy and inaccuracy of pipeline maps nationwide has been well documented.
• Steel pipes, such as the type suggested for the NJ-NY Expansion Project, corrode from moisture. When a pipeline loses thickness from corrosion, it is often “derated,” meaning that instead of replacing the damaged section, the pressure is lowered. The pressure had been lowered in the pipeline which blew up in San Bruno, CA, but a bad weld in the steel pipe could not withstand even that pressure.
• The principal means of detecting leaks is to search for desiccated grass and trees along the route, a method with obvious drawbacks in the underwater and paved urban areas this pipeline would traverse.
• “Pigs,” an inspection tool used to examine the interior of a pipeline, are limited by the diameter of the pipeline; when the diameter of a pipeline varies, as with the NJ-NY Expansion Project, the entire length of a pipeline cannot be examined by a pig.
5. The pipeline is an unnecessary infrastructure expense intended to enable export.
• The claim of increased local demand and stable pricing is a false premise. According to the NYS Energy Plan of 2009, “80% of New York State’s projected 5% gas demand growth [i.e., 4%] by 2020 will be in NYC and LI.” However, according to the same data, that baseline is 2007, and after 2010 demand is actually projected downward and then flat until 2020.
• This pipeline will extend the existing network of pipelines and proposed export facilities that will enable energy conglomerates to seek the highest global bidder. The result will be that our region will be more, not less, dependent on volatile supplies and prices, competing for gas with emerging markets in Latin America, Asia and elsewhere.
• In June, 2011, DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) inspectors cited Spectra Energy for 17 inadequacies in its pipeline safety operations and procedures, including problems with pipeline surveillance, emergency plans, and welding procedures.
• Texas Eastern, the subsidiary of Spectra Energy that proposes to build the NJ-NY Expansion Project, received the EPA’s seventh highest Federal Penalty Assessment on record (nearly $25 million adjusted for inflation to 2009 numbers), for PCB contamination.
• Spectra Energy’s underground gas storage reservoir in Moss Bluff, TX experienced catastrophic failure in 2004 with two explosions, spewing flames as high as 1,000 feet. An estimated 6 bcf of natural gas was consumed during the fire, which lasted nearly one week.
• On August 23, 2009, Spectra Energy’s Steckman Ridge, PA, natural gas compressor station experienced an “emergency shutdown,” releasing 1,629 pounds of lubricating oil and 6,460 pounds of methane (including 1,151 pounds of volatile organic compounds), coating a fertile agricultural, fishing and hunting region with potentially toxic industrial gear oil. The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) issued two Notices of Violation. Nearby landowners reported to FERC a total of 43 additional shutdowns and/or blowdowns at the same compressor station between August 2009 and June 2011.
• According to The Vancouver Sun, Spectra Energy’s Pine River natural gas processing plant is the top polluter in British Columbia, discharging 1.2 million tonnes of greenhouse gas pollutants. The company’s Fort Nelson gas plant was ranked the #3 polluter in BC.
• The plan is for the NJ-NY Expansion project to be monitored by the builder/Applicant (Spectra/its subsidiaries); the dEIS states, “The Applicants would operate and maintain the newly constructed pipeline facilities in the same manner as they currently operate and maintain their existing systems.” Given their past record, this is an assurance, not of safety, but of calamity.
4. Pipeline regulation and oversight in America is sorely inadequate.
• Spectra is excluded from regulations of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts.
• Fear of an explosion from this 30” high pressure pipeline is well placed. Nationwide, pipeline accidents result in, on average, a death every 3 weeks, and injuries or burns more than once a week.
• Before 2002, there was no federal regulation of pipelines. Nationwide, there are roughly 2.5 million miles of pipeline; of these, PHMSA has jurisdiction over just 174,000 miles of interstate lines. Just 7% of pipelines are subject to mandatory inspection. For the NJ-NY project, inspection is proposed only once every 7 years.
• There are only 88 auditors nationwide, who primarily review industry-supplied reports and do occasional field inspections. PHMSA reports 800-900 annual field inspections, or roughly just 10 per inspector.
• A senate bill calling for 40 additional inspectors and doubling the maximum fine, introduced after the San Bruno explosion, died in session. Tighter regulations are unlikely to pass under the current Congress.
• The inadequacy and inaccuracy of pipeline maps nationwide has been well documented.
• Steel pipes, such as the type suggested for the NJ-NY Expansion Project, corrode from moisture. When a pipeline loses thickness from corrosion, it is often “derated,” meaning that instead of replacing the damaged section, the pressure is lowered. The pressure had been lowered in the pipeline which blew up in San Bruno, CA, but a bad weld in the steel pipe could not withstand even that pressure.
• The principal means of detecting leaks is to search for desiccated grass and trees along the route, a method with obvious drawbacks in the underwater and paved urban areas this pipeline would traverse.
• “Pigs,” an inspection tool used to examine the interior of a pipeline, are limited by the diameter of the pipeline; when the diameter of a pipeline varies, as with the NJ-NY Expansion Project, the entire length of a pipeline cannot be examined by a pig.
5. The pipeline is an unnecessary infrastructure expense intended to enable export.
• The claim of increased local demand and stable pricing is a false premise. According to the NYS Energy Plan of 2009, “80% of New York State’s projected 5% gas demand growth [i.e., 4%] by 2020 will be in NYC and LI.” However, according to the same data, that baseline is 2007, and after 2010 demand is actually projected downward and then flat until 2020.
• This pipeline will extend the existing network of pipelines and proposed export facilities that will enable energy conglomerates to seek the highest global bidder. The result will be that our region will be more, not less, dependent on volatile supplies and prices, competing for gas with emerging markets in Latin America, Asia and elsewhere.
• In June, 2011, DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) inspectors cited Spectra Energy for 17 inadequacies in its pipeline safety operations and procedures, including problems with pipeline surveillance, emergency plans, and welding procedures.
• Texas Eastern, the subsidiary of Spectra Energy that proposes to build the NJ-NY Expansion Project, received the EPA’s seventh highest Federal Penalty Assessment on record (nearly $25 million adjusted for inflation to 2009 numbers), for PCB contamination.
• Spectra Energy’s underground gas storage reservoir in Moss Bluff, TX experienced catastrophic failure in 2004 with two explosions, spewing flames as high as 1,000 feet. An estimated 6 bcf of natural gas was consumed during the fire, which lasted nearly one week.
• On August 23, 2009, Spectra Energy’s Steckman Ridge, PA, natural gas compressor station experienced an “emergency shutdown,” releasing 1,629 pounds of lubricating oil and 6,460 pounds of methane (including 1,151 pounds of volatile organic compounds), coating a fertile agricultural, fishing and hunting region with potentially toxic industrial gear oil. The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) issued two Notices of Violation. Nearby landowners reported to FERC a total of 43 additional shutdowns and/or blowdowns at the same compressor station between August 2009 and June 2011.
• According to The Vancouver Sun, Spectra Energy’s Pine River natural gas processing plant is the top polluter in British Columbia, discharging 1.2 million tonnes of greenhouse gas pollutants. The company’s Fort Nelson gas plant was ranked the #3 polluter in BC.
• The plan is for the NJ-NY Expansion project to be monitored by the builder/Applicant (Spectra/its subsidiaries); the dEIS states, “The Applicants would operate and maintain the newly constructed pipeline facilities in the same manner as they currently operate and maintain their existing systems.” Given their past record, this is an assurance, not of safety, but of calamity.
4. Pipeline regulation and oversight in America is sorely inadequate.
• Spectra is excluded from regulations of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts.
• Fear of an explosion from this 30” high pressure pipeline is well placed. Nationwide, pipeline accidents result in, on average, a death every 3 weeks, and injuries or burns more than once a week.
• Before 2002, there was no federal regulation of pipelines. Nationwide, there are roughly 2.5 million miles of pipeline; of these, PHMSA has jurisdiction over just 174,000 miles of interstate lines. Just 7% of pipelines are subject to mandatory inspection. For the NJ-NY project, inspection is proposed only once every 7 years.
• There are only 88 auditors nationwide, who primarily review industry-supplied reports and do occasional field inspections. PHMSA reports 800-900 annual field inspections, or roughly just 10 per inspector.
• A senate bill calling for 40 additional inspectors and doubling the maximum fine, introduced after the San Bruno explosion, died in session. Tighter regulations are unlikely to pass under the current Congress.
• The inadequacy and inaccuracy of pipeline maps nationwide has been well documented.
• Steel pipes, such as the type suggested for the NJ-NY Expansion Project, corrode from moisture. When a pipeline loses thickness from corrosion, it is often “derated,” meaning that instead of replacing the damaged section, the pressure is lowered. The pressure had been lowered in the pipeline which blew up in San Bruno, CA, but a bad weld in the steel pipe could not withstand even that pressure.
• The principal means of detecting leaks is to search for desiccated grass and trees along the route, a method with obvious drawbacks in the underwater and paved urban areas this pipeline would traverse.
• “Pigs,” an inspection tool used to examine the interior of a pipeline, are limited by the diameter of the pipeline; when the diameter of a pipeline varies, as with the NJ-NY Expansion Project, the entire length of a pipeline cannot be examined by a pig.
5. The pipeline is an unnecessary infrastructure expense intended to enable export.
• The claim of increased local demand and stable pricing is a false premise. According to the NYS Energy Plan of 2009, “80% of New York State’s projected 5% gas demand growth [i.e., 4%] by 2020 will be in NYC and LI.” However, according to the same data, that baseline is 2007, and after 2010 demand is actually projected downward and then flat until 2020.
• This pipeline will extend the existing network of pipelines and proposed export facilities that will enable energy conglomerates to seek the highest global bidder. The result will be that our region will be more, not less, dependent on volatile supplies and prices, competing for gas with emerging markets in Latin America, Asia and elsewhere.
