Putin Recognizes Donbass Republics, Sends Russian Military to 'Denazify' Ukraine

Please check your sources before posting. The screenshot that followed the above intro of yours comes from START-1 Treaty of 1997, not from the NEW START (START III in Russian) Treaty of 2010 which only limits the number of deployed carriers and warheads. There is nothing about anything having to be on display in it, including in other documents accompanying it.

Full NEW START treaty text PDF here, links to the treaty, protocol and annexes here. It's not that difficult to find it and verify.

There is enough of disinformation circulating, predominantly planted for nefarious reasons with ignorant crowd spreading it for a dopamine hit, do we really have to deal with it here, too?

From today's Sott.net article, The Silence of the Bears by Alastair Crooke:
Either way, Trump's advisers will have understood that Zelensky and by extension his NATO enablers, were exploiting the SALT/START Treaties' vulnerability - in order to use concealed drones, hidden in civilian containers, to attack the very bombers covered by USA-Russia treaties: Article XII of the START treaty specifically requires "a display in the open of all heavy bombers within the airbase". This provision was a confidence building act (visible monitoring) to guard against a surprise 'first strike' nuclear attack.

START 1 cut long-range or strategic nuclear arsenals by 30-40 percent. New START slashed accountable deployed strategic arms by another three-quarters. In 2021, Presidents Biden and Putin extended New START until February 2026.

In this short clip from a Judge Napolitano/Larry Johnson interview, the New START treaty is referenced:

1749591397762.png
Johnson emphasized that Russia, under the New START Treaty, must make its nuclear-capable bombers visible to US reconnaissance satellites, as part of reciprocal transparency. This includes:

Leaving them exposed on designated airfields;

Not camouflaging them from satellites;

Notifying the US of movements and structural changes.

Apparently, Alastair Crooke and Larry Johnson are spreading disinformation - nefariously? Perhaps you can use the Sott comments to the Crooke article to expose the deception. Commenter Mr. President has made the effort posting this:
On 21 February 2023, Russia suspended its participation in New START. So there are no nuclear treaties in effect currently.

START or no START, Russia has made it clear the ultimate red line has been crossed as clearly communicated by Larry Johnson's testimony from Moscow:


Judging from this comment to the above vid, nefarious disinformation has taken quite a hold:
Ukraine's strike on Russian strategic bombers with Western aid blatantly violates the new STAR Treaty, risking global stability. Both US & Russia pledged no attacks on nuclear-capable assets. Escalation must end—diplomacy, not sabotage, is the path to peace.

Just to note:
Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on February 21 that Russia was suspending its participation in the New START Treaty. Putin underscored that the decision does not mean a complete withdrawal and that a return to the accord remains possible under certain circumstances.
[...]
"[The West] seeks to inflict a strategic defeat on us and to creep onto our nuclear sites. In connection with this, I am forced to announce today that Russia is suspending its participation in the New START Treaty. I repeat - not exiting from the treaty, but suspending its participation," Putin emphasized, adding that he had signed a decree to put new strategic ground-based complexes on combat duty."
The parties established the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) to implement the provisions of the treaty. The group's meetings were convened on an irregular basis at the request of either party.
In addition, New START gave both sides the right to conduct coordinated checks of the opposite side's strategic forces "on the ground," including ICBM bases, submarine bases and air bases. 18 annual inspections of two types were envisaged. Inspections of the "first type" were conducted at facilities hosting strategic offensive weapons bases of land-based ICBMs, ICBM-armed nuclear submarines, and strategic aviation air bases.
Inspections of the "second type" were carried out at places where missiles were loaded, repaired, and stored. Under the agreement's protocol, each party could conduct up to 10 inspections of the first type and eight of the second.
As of January 2021, the parties to the treaty had conducted 328 inspections and exchanged 21,403 notifications.

Still, the parties made a number of reservations. The resolution of the US Congress mentioned that the new treaty does not impose restrictions on the deployment of missile defense systems, including in Europe. For its part, Russia reserved the right to withdraw from the treaty if the US missile defense reaches the stage of development when it becomes a threat to Russia's security. Separately, it was pointed out that the provisions of the preamble which link strategic offensive arms and missile defense have legal force and must be fully taken into account by the parties.
New START was slated to expire on February 5, 2021. While the Russian leadership signaled its readiness to sign a new five-year extension, the Trump administration sought a new framework for the agreement and said that it would only renew the treaty if Russia made additional commitments.
Eventually, the extension of New START was discussed by Vladimir Putin and Trump's successor, Joe Biden, during a phone talk on January 26, 2021.

"President Biden pledged to keep the American people safe from nuclear threats by restoring US leadership on arms control and nonproliferation. Today, the United States took the first step toward making good on that pledge when it extended the New START Treaty with the Russian Federation for five years," the White House's press release said on February 3, 2021. "Extending the New START Treaty ensures we have verifiable limits on Russian ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers until February 5, 2026."
While the US and its NATO allies have openly declared their goal to weaken Russia and bleed it white, they also requested full access to the nation's nuclear sites. By demanding that Russia resume inspections of nuclear sites, NATO, in fact, declared its desire to become a party to the New START, Putin said. The Russian president noted that this provides the UK and France with a unique opportunity to open their nuclear stockpiles for inspection, too.

It would seem, based on the above article, that Larry Johnson, Alastair Crooke, and many ordinary people believe that the "display in the open of all heavy bombers within the airbase" START requirement was still in effect and observed by Russia. Hence, Putin's unparalleled anger of this blatant violation by Ukraine's proxy war enablers. Johnson's and Crooke's credibility is very high in my book and I believe their view is the correct one, IMHO.
 
Apparently, Alastair Crooke and Larry Johnson are spreading disinformation - nefariously?
JEEP, it's really frustrating, deeply. I've been watching it developing for months, actually years, on and off. There were cases before when Russian aircraft were hit at their bases, standing there exposed to satellites, missiles and drones, and one group of commentators would call for the MoD to finally build shelters (seen as exposing faults/ negligence on the RF part, and thus wrong), the other would bring up the treaty to cover it up (meaning supporting the authorities no matter what). Both types of comments would be picked up and spread around by public and media, depending with which side they identified more. In the meantime, no one had enough time and money to make it done.

One of the first orders issued by Belousov when he took over the MoD after Shoigu, was to protect the strategic aircraft sitting in the open at their airbases. (Unfortunately, haven't saved the link.)

Let's look at the treaty then (same link as in my previous post):

Article XI (pp. 4-5)
1. For the purpose of confirming the accuracy of declared data on strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty and ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspection activities in accordance with this Article and Part Five of the Protocol to this Treaty.
[...]
4. Each Party shall conduct exhibitions and have the right to participate in exhibitions conducted by the other Party. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate distinguishing features and to confirm technical characteristics of new types, and to demonstrate the results of conversion of the first item of each type of strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty.

p. 6
Article XIV
1. This Treaty, including its Protocol, which is an integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall remain in force for 10 years unless it is superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. If either Party raises the issue of extension of this Treaty, the Parties shall jointly consider the matter. If the Parties decide to extend this Treaty, it will be extended for a period of no more than five years unless it is superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party. Such notice shall contain a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. This Treaty shall terminate three months from the date of receipt by the other Party of the aforementioned notice, unless the notice specifies a later date. [...]

4. As of the date of its entry into force, this Treaty shall supersede the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions of May 24, 2002, which shall terminate as of that date.

Came covid and then SVO.

From WIKI (en):

2021 - On 26 January, Biden and Putin agreed in a phone call that they would extend the treaty by five years. ... On 27 January, the Russian State Duma voted to ratify the extension. ... On 3 February ... Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that the U.S. had formally agreed to extend the treaty for five years, until 2026.

2022 (after a pause caused by covid)
In November 2022, The Russian Foreign Ministry postponed a meeting with the U.S. meant to discuss resuming New START inspections. The US State Department responded that they were "ready to reschedule at the earliest possible date as resuming inspections is a priority for sustaining the treaty as an instrument of stability." The Russian Foreign Ministry did not give a reason for the delay, although the relations between the United States and Russia became critically strained after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022

2023
On 21 February 2023, during the Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, Vladimir Putin announced the suspension of Russia's participation in the New START treaty, saying that Russia would not allow the US and NATO to inspect its nuclear facilities. He claimed the United States was continuing to develop new nuclear weapons, and warned that any nuclear weapons tests conducted by the Americans would be countered by Russia developing and testing its own.

US DoS claims it illegal

The United States is committed to full and mutual implementation of the New START Treaty. Consistent with that commitment, the United States has adopted lawful countermeasures in response to the Russian Federation’s ongoing violations of the New START Treaty. The Russian Federation’s purported suspension of the New START Treaty is legally invalid. [...]

BIANNUAL DATA EXCHANGE: After confirming that Russia would not fulfill its obligation to provide its biannual data update on March 30, 2023, the United States did not provide its March 30 biannual date update to Russia.

NOTIFICATIONS: Beginning June 1, 2023, the United States is withholding from Russia notifications required under the treaty, including updates on the status or location of treaty-accountable items such as missiles and launchers. Russia ceased fulfilling its notification obligation upon its purported suspension of the treaty on February 28, 2023.

INSPECTION ACTIVITIES: The United States is refraining from facilitating New START Treaty inspection activities on U.S. territory, specifically by revoking existing visas issued to Russian New START Treaty inspectors and aircrew members, denying pending applications for such visas, and by revoking the standing diplomatic clearance numbers issued for Russian New START Treaty inspection airplanes. The United States had been prepared to facilitate Russian New START Treaty inspection activities on U.S. territory since June 2022, and repeatedly conveyed that readiness to Russia; however, Russia chose not to exercise its right to conduct inspection activities and has also denied the United States its right under the treaty to conduct inspection activities since August 2022, when it refused to accept a U.S. inspection. Russia has not notified the United States of any intent to send a Russian inspection team to the United States since February 25, 2020.

Valid or not, since RF refused US inspections already in 2022, what would prevent her from sheltering her strategic aircraft?

For the sake of symmetry, here is Yandex translation of Russian Wiki entry on the treaty (it's long). Relevant excerpt:

Suspension of Russia's participation in the treaty​

On February 21, 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced in his Address to the Federal Assembly the suspension of Russia's participation in the New START Treaty. According to the statement, Russia will not allow inspection of its nuclear arsenal by NATO countries. Putin cited as one of the reasons for this decision the involvement of Western countries in Ukraine's planning of strikes against Russia's strategic aviation bases: "We know that the West is directly involved in the Kiev regime's attempts to strike our strategic aviation bases." Another reason, according to Putin, is NATO's request to extend the New START Treaty and allow NATO to inspect nuclear facilities in Russia, but since NATO is not a party to the treaty, the alliance must first join the treaty, as France and the United Kingdom are also nuclear powers. "Before we can return to the discussion, we need to understand what countries like France and the United Kingdom are seeking." Putin said that Russia is willing to consider NATO's accession to the New START Treaty: "We agree with this, please. <…> After all, NATO is not just one nuclear power, the United States, but also has nuclear arsenals in the United Kingdom and France." On the same day, he submitted a corresponding draft federal law to the State Duma.

After the decision to suspend membership in the New Start Treaty on February 21, 2023, the Russian Foreign Ministry said that Russia will continue to comply with the quantitative restrictions provided for by the treaty for the duration of its validity. Moscow, according to the ministry, will not take any steps towards the United States until the United States makes efforts "for general de-escalation and creating conditions for the resumption of full-fledged functioning" of the agreement.

On February 22, 2023, the first deputy head of the Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation of the Russian Defense Ministry, Yevgeny Ilyin, said that during the pause taken by Russia in the implementation of the agreement, it will comply with the START Treaty restrictions on the number of nuclear warheads, and the current notification process under the concluded agreements between the United States and the USSR should be implemented in full. Ilyin stressed that the defense Department actively monitors the fulfillment and violations of the US obligations assumed.

On February 28, 2023, Vladimir Putin signed a law suspending the Russian Federation's participation in the New START Treaty. According to the document, the decision to resume the country's participation can be made by the President of Russia

Has he delivered his decision to the other Party the way it's required by the treaty is unknown. But there were no diplomatic relations at that time working as they should, so perhaps the exact protocol was not possible, dunno.

And lastly, for the sake of it, let's have look at the Protocol accompanying the New Start treaty, what it says about inspections and expositions.

p.1

This Protocol is organized into ten Parts. ...
Part Four, Notifications, contains the list of notifications provided for in Article VII of the Treaty. Part Five, Inspection Activities, contains provisions governing the conduct of inspection activities provided for in Article XI of the Treaty.

Part Four concerns notifications and lists required time (in hours or days) ahead of an intended act for each type of activity, like upgrading equipment, changing a location of aircraft, launcher, missiles, and so on.

In it, Section VI details notifications concerning inspection activities (p. 104 and on of the file)
There are 15 points, those closely related are:

2. Notification, to be provided by the inspecting Party no less than six hours in advance of the planned time of departure of an inspection airplane from the last airfield prior to its entry into the airspace of the inspected Party, containing the flight plan for such an airplane.

3. Notification, to be provided by the inspected Party no less than three hours in advance of the planned time of departure of an inspection airplane from the last airfield prior to its entry into the airspace of the inspected Party, of a flight plan approval for such an airplane. ...

9. Notification, to be provided only during normal working days no less than 32 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry, of an intention to conduct an inspection. ...

12. Notification, to be provided no less than 30 days in advance of the planned date of an exhibition, of the intent to conduct an exhibition.

13. Notification, to be provided no less than 72 hours in advance of the planned date of an exhibition, of the intent to take part in an exhibition.

14. Notifications, to be provided by the inspection team leader, in writing, to a member of the in-country escort during inspections: [...]

Part Five regulates inspection activity (starting on p. 106 of the file)

Section 1
3. Each Party shall provide to the other Party notifications relating to inspection activities in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol.

5. In exceptional cases, and for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty, the inspected Party may temporarily exempt from inspection activities appropriate facilities subject to Type One or Type Two inspections and appropriate facilities at which exhibitions are to be conducted. Notification thereof shall be provided through diplomatic channels along with an explanation of the reason for such exemption from inspection activities.

Section 5
10. For the purposes of this Protocol, an item of inspection, about which technical data has been provided in accordance with Part Two of this Protocol, is understood to mean:

(a) For inspections of heavy bombers at air bases, storage facilities for heavy bombers, and conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers within the boundaries depicted on the inspection site diagram, a heavy bomber of the inspected Party.
(b) For inspections at facilities other than those specified in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, an ICBM or SLBM, a first stage of an ICBM or SLBM maintained, stored, and transported in stages, or a mobile launcher of ICBMs of the inspected Party.


Section VIII. Exhibitions

1. Exhibitions shall be conducted at the invitation of the Party conducting the exhibition, separately from inspections, at the locations and in the periods of time chosen by the Party conducting the exhibition, and in accordance with the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol.

2. Each Party shall conduct exhibitions, and shall have the right to take part in exhibitions conducted by the other Party, in order to demonstrate the distinguishing features and to confirm technical characteristics of each new type, variant, or version of an ICBM, SLBM, heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, and, as provided for in Part Two of this Protocol, an ICBM launcher, in the periods of time specified in corresponding notifications. If a Party declares a type, variant, or version of a strategic offensive arm prior to or at the time of entry into force of the Treaty for which no exhibition had been previously conducted in connection with fulfilling the requirements of the START Treaty, that Party shall conduct an exhibition. Such an exhibition shall be conducted no later than the date on which inspection activities begin, as provided for in Section I of this Part.

Section IX, p. 138

Cancellation of Inspection Activities

1. An inspection activity shall be cancelled if, due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, it cannot be conducted. If an inspection is cancelled due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced. For exhibitions cancelled due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, the Parties shall agree on the new periods of time for conducting such exhibitions. ...

4. If, due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, it is necessary to remove items subject to pre-inspection restrictions from the inspection site, the inspection team leader may cancel or conduct the inspection. If an inspection is canceled for that reason, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

5. If the inspected Party interrupts the inspection for reasons of personnel security or equipment safety, the inspection team leader may cancel or conduct the inspection. If an inspection is canceled for such reasons, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.


So as far as I can understand it, it's definitely not the case of having to have everything on display all the time. There is no mention of an exposure to satellite "inspection" either. Even IF there was such a requirement, the situation Russia is in, de facto in a state of war, would give her all needed and valid excuses (extraordinary events, force majeure, personnel security or equipment safety) to have her nuclear triad well sheltered.

That's how it looks to me, FWIW. Hearing all those respected commentators bringing it up again and again made me question myself each time, with the frustration growing. On the other hand, seeing people like Oleg Tsarov and some others, including on Russia In Global Politic channel, refuting the Start argument was reassuring. ATM, while staying open to be proved wrong, I'm strongly leaning toward the the side of no obligation for Russia to keep her strategic aircraft fleet out in the open.

Here is a video where Até Chuet have some very interesting things to say on the issue, still with a disclaimer of not being a lawyer.


EDIT:
Sorry it's speaking in Arabic, I guess. On YT, it was in English (AI voice, I suppose, he is French), so you may need to watch it there. There are time stamps in the description, go to "START" (07:00) unless you want to watch it full.
 
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That's how it looks to me, FWIW. Hearing all those respected commentators bringing it up again and again made me question myself each time, with the frustration growing.

I'm not going to even attempt to dissect all the particulars of the New START treaty or the former ones. They are obviously very complex and it appears that there is much disagreement concerning them as regards to the nuclear-capable bombers be visible to US reconnaissance satellites if I understand you correctly. You, yourself state frustration with the overall reporting on this area of contention, again if I understand you correctly. As such, IMO, your rebuke to @ApotheosisMMC. 's post was unwarranted and inappropriate particularly when persons such as Alastair Crooke and Larry Johnson reference the New START treaty in regards to Ukraine's attack on the airbases. Are they not reasonable sources to regard as factual?

I know when I read your reply to @ApotheosisMMC. 's post that either Col. Wilkerson or Larry Johnson had brought up the New START treaty in regards to Ukraine's attack. It took me a while to find the exact vid that had that mention. In fact, it wasn't in either of the two I posted in the MAGA Trump thread that I relistened to in their entirety and in which Larry was wearing the same shirt as in the one I referenced in this thread on Brighteon. Or at least I thought it was a different interview - it's tough trying to find a particular reference in a lengthy vid after the fact. Nonetheless, two prominent pundits made the reference giving it enough legitimacy to be repeated in a post on this forum - again, IMHO. You were certainly free to make the case that the requirement to have the bombers exposed was wrong, but to characterize a post as nefarious disinformation for dopamine hit was quite out of line. I knew it wasn't so.
 
The Zhidobanderovsky drug addict is not shy about anything. So heartfelt broadcasts in interviews, like-you have to understand me - while they are dying there, and soldiers on the front line, and civilians in their cities, I will live and grow rich. And he understands what he is saying, it is not the delirium of a madman. He does not say that it is impossible to capture cities with residents, he says that it is more difficult to do this, which means that he understands that cities will still be captured and those who are not provided with the opportunity to evacuate will die and suffer with this. Actually, we have already touch with this in Mariupol and in a number of other cities, but in those cases no one spoke so cynically at this level, although in fact the same thing happened.
Human shield: Zelensky will not evacuate people from cities (VIDEO)

The leader of the Kiev regime, Zelensky, said that he would not evacuate residents from cities near the contact line.

"If the cities are empty, it will be easier to capture them," the Ukrainian Fuhrer said.

About rabid dogs and about the danger from their side for those who fed them has already been written. The facts are already clear, and they have not yet organized themselves. When they are organized into structures, it will be noticeably "more fun".
The man who staged the massacre in the center of Amsterdam turned out to be a deserter of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (PHOTO)

The man who staged the massacre in the center of Amsterdam turned out to be a deserter of the Armed Forces of Ukraine-NOS Radio Corporation.

The Ukrainian wanted to go to a European prison. Colleagues said that he wanted to kill someone in Norway so that they would "take care of him for the rest of his life."

Recently, the madman became interested in radical Islam, cryptocurrency and the activities of Elon Musk.

Draining khokhloreich in real time.
NATO "forgot" a promise to allocate $40 billion to Kiev — Bloomberg

Last year's promise to provide Kiev with $40 billion in military aid has disappeared from the text of the statement of the upcoming NATO summit.

This is reported by Bloomberg, who found out the details of the document. The summit will be held on June 24-26 in The Hague (Netherlands).

The text of the statement also lacks the prospect of Ukraine joining the alliance and the promise of "long-term security assistance."

The allies are also not going to mention Russia's "aggression" against Ukraine.

There is no mention of China, which was previously designated by NATO countries as a "decisive accomplice" of Russia.

"The one-page declaration of the summit is devoted exclusively to defense spending… NATO countries will commit to allocating at least 3.5% of GDP to basic defense needs by 2032, as well as another 1.5% to protect infrastructure," the Bloomberg article says.

Жидобандеровский наркоман ничего не стесняется. Так проникновенно вещает в интервью, типа-вы же должны меня понять-пока погибают они там, и солдаты на передовой, и мирные жители в своих городах я буду жить и богатеть. Причем он понимает, что говорит-это не бред сумасшедшего. Он не говорит, что города с жителями захватить не возможно, он говорит, что это сделать сложнее, значит понимает, что города все равно будут захвачены, только при этом погибнут и пострадают те, кому не обеспечат возможности для эвакуации. Собственно еще в Мариуполе и в ряде других городов мы это уже проходили, однако в тех случаях на таком уровне никто так цинично не высказывался, хотя по факту происходило то же самое.
Про бешеных собак и про опасность с их стороны для вскормивших их уже было написано. Вот уже и факты налицо и это пока еще они не организовались. Когда организуются в структуры, будет заметно "веселей".
Слив хохлорейха в реальном времени.
 
Russia has bent over backwards time and again in an attempt to garner peace and cooperation with the West to no avail (and of course, we know the real reason why). That such was on track with JFK and Khrushchev was literally shot to hell.

Now listening to this 33 min. vid featuring Scott Ritter and Larry Johnson. Up first, Ritter explains the 3's and 6's strategy being employed by Russia. Larry expounds that Russia isn't inflicting violence for violence's sake and that the US has been nothing but dishonest regarding agreements repeatedly through several presidencies. Johnson says there will be not only a military victory over Ukraine, but NATO as well. Ritter goes on to say that Ukraine's NATO's air defense has been completely destroyed by Russia and is out to claim their designated four territories and create a buffer zone - that this will happen. Putin fixation and the belief that economic pressure will be effective - wrong! Ritter cuts loose on Trump/rakes him over the coals! Kudos to Witkoff, but thumbs down to the rest of the Trump team. Larry adds his two cents worth that also takes a negative view of Trump's performance to date.

Former US Marine Corps. Intelligence officer Scott Ritter & former CIA analyst Larry Johnson reveal the devastating consequences of Ukraine's decision to keep fighting despite the heavy losses being inflicted by Russia's army. What comes next is shocking and this video details what you need to know as the Ukraine conflict escalates into possible nuclear oblivion.
 
I'm not going to even attempt to dissect all the particulars of the New START treaty or the former ones. They are obviously very complex and it appears that there is much disagreement concerning them as regards to the nuclear-capable bombers be visible to US reconnaissance satellites if I understand you correctly. You, yourself state frustration with the overall reporting on this area of contention, again if I understand you correctly. As such, IMO, your rebuke to @ApotheosisMMC. 's post was unwarranted and inappropriate particularly when persons such as Alastair Crooke and Larry Johnson reference the New START treaty in regards to Ukraine's attack on the airbases. Are they not reasonable sources to regard as factual?

I know when I read your reply to @ApotheosisMMC. 's post that either Col. Wilkerson or Larry Johnson had brought up the New START treaty in regards to Ukraine's attack. It took me a while to find the exact vid that had that mention. In fact, it wasn't in either of the two I posted in the MAGA Trump thread that I relistened to in their entirety and in which Larry was wearing the same shirt as in the one I referenced in this thread on Brighteon. Or at least I thought it was a different interview - it's tough trying to find a particular reference in a lengthy vid after the fact. Nonetheless, two prominent pundits made the reference giving it enough legitimacy to be repeated in a post on this forum - again, IMHO. You were certainly free to make the case that the requirement to have the bombers exposed was wrong, but to characterize a post as nefarious disinformation for dopamine hit was quite out of line. I knew it wasn't so.
Hello, my apologies for not answering before, Possibility of Being is correct in what you pointed out regardless of the jargon of the treaty or how cumbersome it may be in some aspects for some, in the capture that I shared (besides the fact that it was not from its latest version) the title of the article gives the context very clearly, and refers to the In Situ visits, in turn in the annexes it is explained how the protocols should be carried out, in the open air therefore it means taking them out of the hangars or places where the bombers could be stored in order to be impexioned, in the last START treaty there is nothing that says that the bombers must be outdoors, in fact a slight controversy arose with article X, but it clearly says that strategic weapons (therefore the bombers included) are extended from that measure ( national technical means of verification in the article refers to satellites and other capabilities). :
Article X
1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of
compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each
Party undertakes:
(a) to use national technical means of verification at
its disposal in a manner consistent with generally
recognized principles of international law;
(b) not to interfere with the national technical means
of verification of the other Party operating in
accordance with this Article; and
(c) not to use concealment measures that impede
verification, by national technical means of
verification, of compliance with the provisions of this
Treaty.
2. The obligation not to use concealment measures
includes the obligation not to use them at test ranges,
including measures that result in the concealment of
ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, or the association
between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers
during testing. The obligation not to use concealment
measures shall not apply to cover or concealment
practices at ICBM bases or to the use of
environmental shelters for strategic offensive arms.
There's no reason, based on evidence or anyone's words (as far as I could find), to think that despite not being in the treaty, they would leave the bombers outdoors as an "act of goodwill to avoid unnecessary alarms." The Russians built reinforced hangars for their aircraft during the Cold War, but not for all aircraft due to an apparent lack of resources. So they opted to deploy them at bases far from each other and constantly move them between them to make their exact location more difficult to pinpoint. Meanwhile, the US has its B-2s in climate-controlled hangars (partly said to protect their stealth paint), even in Diego Garcia, where a photo of the bombers outdoors went viral. It can be seen that this is probably not their permanent location. There are hangars for the B-2s, they are portable, but ultimately hangars that do not allow viewing from the air.GnYY2ffWwAAj59H.jpeg
b-2-shelter.jpgthe-b2-requires-environmentally-controlled-hangars-so-when-v0-bkntjdxyoly91.png

Nor would there be any reason not to protect other types of aircraft, such as transport aircraft or those with radars, which are certainly very valuable, even non-nuclear fighters, with light shelters or anti-drone nets. But this isn't widely done. Last year, we saw the drone attacks on the Russian Engels base, where various types of fighters were stationed, including SU-57s.

At the base, one or two rudimentary shelters and decoys consisting of airplane-shaped paintings were visible on the ground. It seems that both the USA and Russia, as speculation, do not see the construction of shelters on a massive scale justified due to the fact that most aircraft do not suffer significant deterioration when exposed to the elements, the perception that static and other defenses are sufficient to prevent an enemy from penetrating and significantly damaging bases, and that most enemies and weapons that can do so have more than enough capacity to destroy a shelter with a certain degree of reinforcement, so it would be more or less irrelevant to have it or not to have it and of course above all this and taking into account the different perceptions associated with the viability of hangars, there is the economic factor, I think they simply preferred to concentrate resources on other priorities that were perceived as more necessary, obviously all of the above may be about to change since drones have come to change the game ...
Lightweight, short-construction shelters can be allowed, even considering that drone attacks on bases closest to the front were completely eliminated. It doesn't hurt to add an extra layer of low-cost security.
In fact, Shoigu stated in 2021, in a meeting with the military junta before the SMO began, that reinforced shelters would be built for aircraft, so the idea was already on the table. But as already mentioned, resources were probably prioritized in other areas, and the type of shelters proposed were not perceived as very necessary or urgent:

Shoigu announced the start of mass construction of aircraft shelters
The Russian military department is resuming the practice of building reinforced concrete shelters for aircraft. This was announced at a meeting of the Board of the Ministry of Defense by the head of the department, Sergei Shoigu . In Soviet times, such shelters were built en masse in the territory of the Warsaw Pact countries, where the forward echelon units were stationed. Hundreds of such shelters remained, for example, in the GDR, Poland, Hungary. In addition, shelters were built for air units in Belarus and Ukraine. After the collapse of the USSR, the construction of shelters in the Russian army ceased due to a lack of funds. The VKS operation in Syria forced the return to the issue of protective structures.

And now, as Shoigu announced, more than 300 shelters are planned to be built at military airfields. "This will ensure the basing of advanced aviation systems, including fifth-generation aircraft," Shoigu said.
According to him, the shelters will provide camouflage for aircraft from satellite surveillance, protect them from climatic factors and fire, and improve the working conditions of engineering and technical personnel.
Shelters are being built not only by military construction organizations, but also by engineering and airfield battalions, which, as the minister said, reduces the time and cost of construction.

Earlier, Forbes reported that the Russian Aerospace Forces have received approximately a thousand new and upgraded aircraft and helicopters in recent years.

As a final point, I would like to add a pertinent apology to the entire forum, POB is not wrong, he really caught me being extremely lazy, an attitude that is not appropriate in this place, I wanted to go to sleep so to make matters worse (🙂) I did realize that the capture did not belong to START III and even so I gave in to the "thoughts" that: "surely if everyone repeats it, it must be that there are no major changes from one treaty to another"... obviously since I had not read the entire treaty I did not pay attention to the title of the article and those who claimed to have read it had mostly resorted to erroneous AI summaries.
 
Col. Douglas MacGregor gives a recent analysis of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. MacGregor says that the war won't end until the Zelensky regime is removed from power. This type of entrenched warfare does not normally end through battle but through the dismantling of the political and ideological core behind the movement. MacGregor feels that it may be too much of a disadvantage for Putin to stall much longer. Strategically, Putin should take some sort of decisive action sooner rather than later—additional commentary.


In this powerful interview, Col. Douglas Macgregor offers a sobering assessment of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the geopolitical dynamics surrounding it. He argues that the war will not end until Russia decisively removes the Ukrainian government in Kyiv, criticizing the West's reluctance to confront this reality. Macgregor highlights the dysfunction in U.S. leadership, the role of media propaganda, and the symbolic suppression of Orthodox Christianity in Ukraine. He also discusses Europe's inability to sustain the war effort without American support and warns that continued escalation only prolongs the inevitable. With deep historical context and blunt realism, Macgregor lays out why the current strategy is doomed to fail—and what must happen for the war to truly end.
 
You, yourself state frustration with the overall reporting on this area of contention, again if I understand you correctly.

It's more complicated than that.

As such, IMO, your rebuke to @ApotheosisMMC. 's post was unwarranted and inappropriate particularly when persons such as Alastair Crooke and Larry Johnson reference the New START treaty in regards to Ukraine's attack on the airbases. Are they not reasonable sources to regard as factual?

I agree that I might have been too harsh and hasty, but here comes one aspect of my frustration (not an excuse). As I said, I'd been coming across this issue for a long time, since the first such attack in December 2022, to be precise, mostly in the Russian corner of the Internet. I researched available open sources and it looked like there was no requirement of the kind we discuss. I did what I could. I understood the motivations of each approach, I think, which is well expressed by Até in his recent Propaganda vs. Excuse video.

It is a complicated problem and would ask for a in-deep research and discussion. Looks like I simply projected my perception of the difficulty, thinking that anyone bringing it up at the very least came across the opposite views and has an idea that things are not that simple as they seem. My apologies, @ApotheosisMMC.

I know when I read your reply to @ApotheosisMMC. 's post that either Col. Wilkerson or Larry Johnson had brought up the New START treaty in regards to Ukraine's attack.

As far as I know they were not the first neither the last ones. Heard it too many times to count, and who brought it first is not so important, at least to me. I may be wrong, but guess (not pointing fingers at anyone) that in some cases, some commentators just repeated what they heard from other respected sources by simply trusting them and not having enough time for own research.

Nonetheless, two prominent pundits made the reference giving it enough legitimacy to be repeated in a post on this forum - again, IMHO.

Here goes my understanding, FWIW. It's to some extent the same situation as with RT, Sott, Sputnik and numerous respected (here) English sources (RES): they broadcast to English speaking, mostly Western public; their main mission is to counter the overwhelming Western corporate media (WCM) warmongering propaganda - propaganda in its worst possible version. It's not in their interest to talk about Russia's weaknesses, so they counter the WCM with as much of truth as possible, and spice it with opposite propaganda (in its acceptable version). Once in a while some of them may be wrong (just like anyone). So far so good. But.

1/ Sometimes their tactic backfires. I mean Russian interest here. It's complicated, so I'm going to use some simplifications to keep it reasonably brief.
- Russia is far from being perfect, many things don't work as they should. In peace time it can be tolerated or patched up, in war time - not so much.
- In the excellent interview with Fyodor Lukyanov by Glenn Diesen, Lukyanov explains Russia (with limited amount of propaganda) and points out that no matter how authoritarian "Putin regime" is presented as being, the authorities attentively listen to the population, moods, trends, etc. (complicated).
- Russia is torn emotionally and mentally between East and West, Eastern and Western ways of being, ideologies, economics, and so on, it has been so since Peter the Great time. The West is still a big authority to many Russians. Slightly less since the SVO started.

So what happens, when Russian authorities neglect something, make mistakes, "screw up"? They cover it up, obviously. The RES group tries to cover it up. Some knowledgeable and reasonable well-meaning Russian voices try to bring attention to the issue as it is the only chance to have it fixed. But then Russian media and individual commentators (for various reasons) bring the RES group's inputs, after all they have good sources, intelligence, great experience and knowledge, and are in/from the West! Result: No lesson is going to be learned, no improvement made. That's what I mean by backfiring. Excuses are served on a silver plate. I'm quite certain that that was exactly the case with the START affair: with their best intentions, they might have helped to make things worse for Russia, already back in Dec 2022.

That's the dynamic I've observed many times. Do I need to mention that I care about Russia a lot? So it was frustrating.

2/ I don't think that I'm alone here with this understanding, far from it. And here comes the difference between Sott and the Forum. Sott has its own mission as already said, the forum was established as a platform for research most of all. So it is frustrating to see a complicated issue covered with a few dumped tweets, very often with no one's thoughts, nothing. Are we going to learn anything this way? Come as close too the truth as possible?

Anyway, that's my thinking, FWIW.
 
Anyway, that's my thinking, FWIW.
OK - that's a whole lot of clarification on a very complex and complicated issue. I very much appreciate your reasoned and carefully constructed response. And it again highlights the huge advantage of the networking this forum provides - errors in thinking or presumed findings can be addressed, hopefully in a way that is wholly constructive and without any unduly negative criticisms. Nobody needs that.

I appreciate that a lot of the forum members are way closer to current events than I or many others are. Your expertise and discernment likely operates on a higher level and we benefit when that expertise and discernment is shared. Nonetheless, doesn't mean we're not doing our best to figure out what the heck is really going on in this bizarre reality that is only going to get even more difficult with AI fakery soon to be available to just about everybody. I guess I'll just have to take a grain of salt with anything presented for public consumption even from those I considered to be trustworthy sources. I have to say concerning Larry Johnson, in listening to his report from Moscow that I posted, it actually begins noting that he had the opportunity to "interrogate" Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov. At no point in that vid was New START mentioned. However, it was clear that Larry has and does communicate with Russian insiders and officials. Consequently, the Brighteon clip has him saying point blank that, "Russia is abiding by the New START treaty which requires those bombers to be visible." Are you saying that's a false understanding, that Larry got it wrong - Larry who has personally spoken himself within a group setting to Lavrov and otherwise with Russian officials/representatives as related in the Moscow vid? If so, how is anyone supposed to successfully navigate such an informational minefield?

Interestingly enough, I just finished listening to the Jeffrey Sachs/Tucker Carlson interview of 2+ hours. I really should take notes when listening to such vids as both Jeffrey and Tucker made absolutely false statements in the course of their conversation. It's no wonder the public is still so snowed when it comes to actual truth of our national and world situations. I was going to peruse some of the comments (1,538 so far) to see if anyone called them out. That Tucker is still saying that Osama bin Laden planned 911 is beyond galling.

Again, thanks for doing your best to enlighten me on this subject and its many complexities.
 
However, it was clear that Larry has and does communicate with Russian insiders and officials. Consequently, the Brighteon clip has him saying point blank that, "Russia is abiding by the New START treaty which requires those bombers to be visible." Are you saying that's a false understanding, that Larry got it wrong - Larry who has personally spoken himself within a group setting to Lavrov and otherwise with Russian officials/representatives as related in the Moscow vid? If so, how is anyone supposed to successfully navigate such an informational minefield?

I really don't know. I can only share what I think right now, and it may change any time with new data coming.

In spare time, I keep digging, the problem is that those who claim "no obligation" obviously cannot point to a specific paragraph; the others, who claim it's required, provide no sources that would be conclusive, if any; and Russian officials seem to like it being this way. At least that's the current stage of my research. Re-reading the treaty documents slowly, this time more thoroughly, and seem to be getting some clues. Whether it's worth it or not, I would like to know.

As for experts, like Larry and others, I didn't come across anything specific said by any of them either, and can see hypothetical possible reasons and/or motives for their claims and the lack of convincing details.

Have to admit that after an initial phase of spending a significant amount of time "with them", I stopped following them on regular basis because to me personally, the picture they have been painting, was not exactly what I was looking for, while still appreciate some of their inputs. As I said before, I hardly consider myself a part of the "collective West" to whom they speak. Also, didn't like the line of replacing MSM's "Russia is losing" with their "NATO is losing" because I think it is lulling the audience into a false sense of security while the current and developing situation may be quite different.

Back to the issue at hand: After all, it doesn't really matter for average Western public and it seems better if they are not informed about such a weakness (if that's the case). Those for whom it does matter, are Russian top officials (not even Russian population), who most likely know the truth. It's up to them to take necessary steps based on the real circumstances.
 
Considering what is mentioned in this article by Elena Panina, what Zelensky says is not so wrong, Almost spot on with the harsh reality, read the end of article.
Panina is good!

I was a bit surprised finding out that terms like NSATU, SAG-U, Wiesbaden etc. don't show up in this thread except in one posts of 2003 by @youlik; Voronezh-DM strategic radar system seems to appear only once too, in another post by @youlik

The more, I hope, some of you will be interested in a less present in the infosphere take on things, which goes along the same line as Palina's, and expands on it. It is also rich in details and less known, or remembered, facts.

Alexander Ageev posted on his TG channel the below last Friday (it only looks like it's not related):

(machine-translated)
Why was Israel's strike so effective? Because Iran was preparing for an air raid, and the bulk of the operation was carried out using kamikaze drones and agents who had been infiltrated and deployed in Iran in advance.

The first part of the operation took place in the central part of Iran. Mossad's sabotage groups deployed weapons systems in open areas right next to Iran's air defense systems.

With the beginning of the Israeli attack, in parallel with the Israeli Air Force's air strikes on Iranian territory, these systems were put on alert and simultaneously struck Iranian air defense installations. Additionally, as part of the operation aimed at neutralizing Iranian air defense systems that posed a threat to Israeli fighter jets, Mossad utilized covertly deployed strike systems and advanced technologies, specifically those mounted on vehicles, similar to how the Ukrainians attacked strategic airfields in Russia. With the start of the surprise attack, the weapons were activated and delivered targeted strikes, destroying the enemy's air defense systems.

The third phase of the operation involved the creation of a secret base for strike drones that had been brought deep into Iran in advance. During the massive Israeli attack, these kamikaze drones were activated and targeted the Iranian ballistic missile launchers at the Esfahan base, located near Tehran, which pose a threat to strategic and civilian targets in Israel.

They expected air strikes, but they got a ground attack. Iran has almost no air defense

The same day, just about two hours earlier, another Russian commentator posted this, commenting on another post:

The Mossad has carried out three covert operations in the very heart of Iran...
The attacks on our strategic airfields, Operation Spider's Web, are very similar in execution to what Mossad did in Iran.

To neutralize Iranian air defense systems that threatened Israel fighters, the Mossad secretly operated sophisticated strike systems on vehicles. At the start of the surprise attack, these weapons were deployed, complete destruction of the targeted Iranian defense systems.
The identical execution suggests that the same specialists were behind the sabotage.

And that bring us to the heart of the matter - another text written by Ageev. I consider it important even if one would not agree in full with his view. It's too long to quote in its entirety, so I'll paste a bit of it as a teaser, and the rest, along with some of referenced posts, all DeepL+Yandex-translated, you'll find in the attached docs.

For Russian-speaking members, links to original TG messages are included in the attached docs.


A new rehearsal is just around the corner
June 13, 2025

What happened on June 1 was quickly drowned out by the abundant news flow, and there is plenty of it. Today Israel struck Iran. Iran's top military leaders, nuclear physicists, and some in their bedrooms were killed. Meanwhile, round after round of Iranian nuclear negotiations with the US have been going on for the past few months.

But June 1 will remain a completely unprecedented event: no one has ever done such damage to the nuclear forces of any nation. NATO, via Ukraine, rehearsed a preemptive disarming strike against Russia on June 1. Kiev is formally responsible for it. [...]

Five strategic aviation airfields in Murmansk, Irkutsk, Ivanovo, Ryazan and Amur regions were attacked by FPV drones, in the first two cases effectively for the aggressor. On the same day, according to some reports, there was also an attempted strike on the radar station of the Russian missile warning system in Usolye-Sibirskiy, Irkutsk region.

Attacks on MAWS (missile approach warning system) facilities have been carried out by the enemy before. In particular, a year ago: "On May 24, it became known about a strike by Ukrainian UAVs on the Voronezh-DM over-the-horizon radar station near Armavir in Krasnodar Krai [between the Black and Caspian seas]. According to foreign sources, the station was damaged. On May 26, a downed Ukrainian drone was found near the village of Gorkovskoye near Orsk in Orenburg Region [about 700 km from the Caspian Sea in the N-E direction]. The Voronezh-DM over-the-horizon radar station, similar to the Armavir one, is located nearby. British-Portuguese Tekever AR3 UAVs were used. On May 24, Newsweek reported an attack by at least six ATACMS ballistic missiles on the Russian Armed Forces communications center in Crimea, which houses “the radio antenna of a space surveillance station.” This facility, like the Voronezh-DM over-the-horizon radars, is also part of Russia's Missile Warning System (MAWS), an integral part of Russia's nuclear missile shield."

Even a non-professional observer cannot but conclude from this set of facts that attacks on Russia's nuclear missile shield, the main force guarantor of state sovereignty, are systemic in nature. At the same time, the degree of the enemy's impact has increased manifold. The enemy has moved from single attacks to a simultaneous massive strike on five or six strategic facilities.

[...]

Rehearsals, after all, are for the sake of a premiere scheduled for some date and for a very specific purpose. Israel has conducted a series of spot rehearsals over the past two years. Now it is time for a dress rehearsal. The experience of the night of June 12-13, 2025, when 200 Israeli aircraft hit Iran's military command and control system, key military installations and nuclear infrastructure with 300 missiles, personal targets, teaches that the next attack on Russia will be combined and include a wider range of targets, including the level of strategic control in the personal dimension.
 

Attachments

It's official now in Russia. Ria Novosti (Ru):

They slept through the country: the rehearsal of a disarming strike on Russia was successful


Although the Israeli strike on Iran on the night of June 12-13 was immediately dubbed a "brilliant secret operation" by the Western media, the step-by-step script for this brilliant secret operation was officially released to the public on May 22.

On this day, a large report titled "Dispersed, Disguised, and Degradable: The Implications of the Fighting in Ukraine for Future U.S.-Involved Conflicts" appeared on the website of the well-known American think tank RAND Corporation. Consequences of military operations in Ukraine for future conflicts involving the United States").

This document was directly commissioned by the U.S. Air Force and Space Force Command, i.e. it had a specific task by default - to draw conclusions from the conflict in Ukraine and to describe what would happen to the United States in a direct military conflict with Russia (and at the same time with China).

The report is based on eight key ‘observations’ that are labelled “new” and ‘notable,’ that is, not previously observed in high-intensity interstate conflicts of the 21st century and unexpected in their disproportionate impact on the course of hostilities.

1. The dilemma of offensive operations under conditions of persistent surveillance (‘frontal transparency’). The combination of constant surveillance and precision strike systems makes it impossible (or extremely difficult) for the attackers to concentrate the forces necessary for an effective offensive. An example is the bloody failure of the AFU's hyped-up ‘counter-offensive’ of 2023.

2. Asymmetric effectiveness of air defence against manned and unmanned aircraft. Paradox: air defence systems demonstrate high effectiveness against manned aircraft, but are much less effective against UAVs. There is an adaptation of the Russian Air Force, which massively uses gliding munitions from the borders outside the air defence range.

3. Complementarity of guided and unguided artillery systems. The combination of reconnaissance UAVs with conventional and guided munitions has dramatically accelerated the target engagement cycle.

4. ‘Democratisation’ of fire support (‘pocket artillery’). Mass introduction of unmanned systems at the tactical level (separate unit). Drones are our everything.

5. The critical role of ‘expendables’ and resources in a protracted conflict. A conflict with an opponent of equal strength (Russia) is labelled as protracted by default, in which it is vital to be able to mass produce cheap ‘expendable’ combat systems.

6. The dual role of smart devices. Civilian smart devices used en masse by both sides are both an asset and a vulnerability. Example: the Russian Armed Forces' use of data from the phones of destroyed AFU soldiers has led to exposed positions and a number of painful blows.

7. Dynamic adaptation in the field of electronic warfare. Combat measures and countermeasures: the Russian Armed Forces massively use tactical RF and GPS jammers, while the AFU equips its drones with anti-jamming capabilities.

8. Commercialisation and ‘democratisation’ of space capabilities. Resilience of distributed architectures: The Starlink satellite network has demonstrated resilience to suppression attempts, leading to its use by both sides of the conflict.

The review of new observations, however, concludes with the main and rather old conclusion: it is possible to overcome the current stalemate of ground operations only with total air superiority, and this is critical with the capital letter. Interestingly, the authors of the report believe that in the European theatre, ‘NATO's technological and rapid reaction capabilities create a significant air power advantage,’ meaning that the chances are kind of there.

The craziest note at the end of the report is ‘a military clash between NATO and Russia begins after Russia attacks an Alliance member country, resulting in the United States coming to the rescue.’ And the funniest one is ‘The scenarios described do not involve the actual use of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.’

If we analyse the actions of the Israeli army, most of the ‘observations’ from the RAND report were fulfilled to the last letter: the combination of persistent surveillance assets with precision strike systems, the massive use of drones and electronic warfare (including disinformation), the use of holes and moles, and most importantly, the levelling and mopping up of air defences for the freedom of action of the Israeli Air Force over Iran.

Many respected analysts of various calibres believe that the goals of the attack on Iran are the elimination of the country's nuclear programme (mandatory) and regime change (highly desirable). In fact, the main goal of the operation is to practice a massive preventive disarming strike against an adversary with serious military capabilities, and that adversary's name is not Iran, but Russia.

In his report ‘Geopolitical Outcomes of 2024,’ Russian Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Deputy Director General of the Rossiya Segodnya media group, RIAC member Alexander Yakovenko bluntly pointed out: ‘In view of NATO's plans to prepare for war with Russia in five to seven years, <...> the “problem of 22 June 1941” will arise acutely, which must not be repeated, which will require proactive strategies (NATO has already started talking about preventive strikes on Russian territory).’

Israel and the US considered the rehearsal of a preemptive strike on the Iranian stage ‘very successful’.

We will leave it to military and civilian experts to comment on how Iran's political and military leadership assessed the risks before the attack.

The Russian leadership, on the other hand, clearly does not have the bad habit of taking people at their words when they start mass bombings the day after calling for negotiations and making grandiose statements about peace. At a meeting to consider the main parameters of the draft state armament programme for 2027-2036, which took place on 11 June, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned in advance all those who believe that Russia can be taken by surprise, and gave instructions for the rapid development of the latest weapon systems for the entire military organisation of the country, including the creation of separate ‘unmanned troops’, and said that ‘special attention should be paid to the nuclear triad, which has been and remains the guarantor of Russia's sovereignty’.

As long as our enemies are trembling for their own skin, all the reports from the best Western think tanks about potential disarming ‘re-measures’ over Russia will not be worth a penny. And our task is to ensure that these scenarios remain only for third-rate cable channel shows in the West.
 

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