Apparently, Alastair Crooke and Larry Johnson are spreading disinformation - nefariously?
JEEP, it's really frustrating, deeply. I've been watching it developing for months, actually years, on and off. There were cases before when Russian aircraft were hit at their bases, standing there exposed to satellites, missiles and drones, and one group of commentators would call for the MoD to
finally build shelters (seen as exposing faults/ negligence on the RF part, and thus wrong), the other would bring up the treaty to cover it up (meaning supporting the authorities no matter what). Both types of comments would be picked up and spread around by public and media, depending with which side they identified more. In the meantime, no one had enough time and money to make it done.
One of the first orders issued by Belousov when he took over the MoD after Shoigu, was to protect the strategic aircraft sitting in the open at their airbases. (Unfortunately, haven't saved the link.)
Let's look at the
treaty then (same link as in my previous post):
Article XI (pp. 4-5)
1. For the purpose of confirming the accuracy of declared data on strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty and ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspection activities in accordance with this Article and Part Five of the Protocol to this Treaty.
[...]
4. Each Party shall conduct exhibitions and have the right to participate in exhibitions conducted by the other Party. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate distinguishing features and to confirm technical characteristics of new types, and to demonstrate the results of conversion of the first item of each type of strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty.
p. 6
Article XIV
1. This Treaty, including its Protocol, which is an integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.
2. This Treaty shall remain in force for 10 years unless it is superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. If either Party raises the issue of extension of this Treaty, the Parties shall jointly consider the matter. If the Parties decide to extend this Treaty, it will be extended for a period of no more than five years unless it is superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.
3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party. Such notice shall contain a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. This Treaty shall terminate three months from the date of receipt by the other Party of the aforementioned notice, unless the notice specifies a later date. [...]
4. As of the date of its entry into force, this Treaty shall supersede the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions of May 24, 2002, which shall terminate as of that date.
Came covid and then SVO.
From
WIKI (en):
2021 - On 26 January, Biden and Putin agreed in a phone call that they would
extend the treaty by five years. ... On 27 January, the Russian State Duma voted to ratify the extension. ... On 3 February ... Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that the U.S. had formally agreed to extend the treaty for five years, until 2026.
2022 (after a pause caused by covid)
In November 2022,
The Russian Foreign Ministry postponed a meeting with the U.S. meant to discuss resuming New START inspections. The US State Department responded that they were "ready to reschedule at the earliest possible date as resuming inspections is a priority for sustaining the treaty as an instrument of stability." The Russian Foreign Ministry did not give a reason for the delay, although the relations between the United States and Russia became critically strained after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022
2023
On 21 February 2023, during the
Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, Vladimir Putin announced the suspension of Russia's participation in the New START treaty, saying that
Russia would not allow the US and NATO to inspect its nuclear facilities. He claimed the United States was continuing to develop new nuclear weapons, and warned that any nuclear weapons tests conducted by the Americans would be countered by Russia developing and testing its own.
US
DoS claims it illegal
The United States is committed to full and mutual implementation of the New START Treaty. Consistent with that commitment, the United States has adopted lawful countermeasures in response to the Russian Federation’s ongoing violations of the New START Treaty. The Russian Federation’s purported suspension of the New START Treaty is legally invalid. [...]
BIANNUAL DATA EXCHANGE: After confirming that Russia would not fulfill its obligation to provide its biannual data update on March 30, 2023, the United States did not provide its March 30 biannual date update to Russia.
NOTIFICATIONS: Beginning June 1, 2023, the United States is withholding from Russia notifications required under the treaty, including updates on the status or location of treaty-accountable items such as missiles and launchers. Russia ceased fulfilling its notification obligation upon its purported suspension of the treaty on February 28, 2023.
INSPECTION ACTIVITIES: The United States is refraining from facilitating New START Treaty inspection activities on U.S. territory, specifically by revoking existing visas issued to Russian New START Treaty inspectors and aircrew members, denying pending applications for such visas, and by revoking the standing diplomatic clearance numbers issued for Russian New START Treaty inspection airplanes. The United States had been prepared to facilitate Russian New START Treaty inspection activities on U.S. territory since June 2022, and repeatedly conveyed that readiness to Russia; however, Russia chose not to exercise its right to conduct inspection activities and has also denied the United States its right under the treaty to conduct inspection activities since August 2022, when it refused to accept a U.S. inspection. Russia has not notified the United States of any intent to send a Russian inspection team to the United States since February 25, 2020.
Valid or not, since RF refused US inspections already in 2022, what would prevent her from sheltering her strategic aircraft?
For the sake of symmetry, here is
Yandex translation of Russian Wiki entry on the treaty (it's long). Relevant excerpt:
Suspension of Russia's participation in the treaty
On February 21, 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced in his
Address to the Federal Assembly the
suspension of Russia's participation in the New START Treaty. According to the statement,
Russia will not allow inspection of its nuclear arsenal by NATO countries. Putin cited as one of the reasons for this decision the involvement of Western countries in Ukraine's planning of strikes against Russia's strategic aviation bases: "
We know that the West is directly involved in the Kiev regime's attempts to strike our strategic aviation bases." Another reason, according to Putin, is
NATO's request to extend the New START Treaty and allow NATO to inspect nuclear facilities in Russia, but since
NATO is not a party to the treaty, the alliance must first join the treaty, as France and the United Kingdom are also nuclear powers. "Before we can return to the discussion, we need to understand what countries like France and the United Kingdom are seeking." Putin said that Russia is willing to consider NATO's accession to the New START Treaty: "We agree with this, please. <…> After all, NATO is not just one nuclear power, the United States, but also has nuclear arsenals in the United Kingdom and France." On the same day, he
submitted a corresponding draft federal law to the State Duma.
After the decision to suspend membership in the New Start Treaty
on February 21, 2023, the Russian Foreign Ministry said that Russia will continue to comply with the quantitative restrictions provided for by the treaty for the duration of its validity. Moscow, according to the ministry, will not take any steps towards the United States until the United States makes efforts "for general de-escalation and creating conditions for the resumption of full-fledged functioning" of the agreement.
On February 22, 2023, the first deputy head of the Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation of the Russian Defense Ministry, Yevgeny Ilyin, said that during the pause taken by Russia in the implementation of the agreement,
it will comply with the START Treaty restrictions on the number of nuclear warheads, and the current notification process under the concluded agreements between the United States and the USSR should be implemented in full. Ilyin stressed that the defense Department actively monitors the fulfillment and violations of the US obligations assumed.
On February 28, 2023, Vladimir Putin signed a law suspending the Russian Federation's participation in the New START Treaty. According to the document, the decision to resume the country's participation can be made by the President of Russia
Has he delivered his decision to the other Party the way it's required by the treaty is unknown. But there were no diplomatic relations at that time working as they should, so perhaps the exact protocol was not possible, dunno.
And lastly, for the sake of it, let's have look at the
Protocol accompanying the New Start treaty, what it says about inspections and expositions.
p.1
This Protocol is organized into ten Parts. ...
Part Four, Notifications, contains the list of notifications provided for in Article VII of the Treaty. Part Five, Inspection Activities, contains provisions governing the conduct of inspection activities provided for in Article XI of the Treaty.
Part Four concerns notifications and lists required time (in hours or days) ahead of an intended act for each type of activity, like upgrading equipment, changing a location of aircraft, launcher, missiles, and so on.
In it, Section VI details notifications concerning inspection activities (p. 104 and on of the file)
There are 15 points, those closely related are:
2. Notification, to be provided by the inspecting Party no less than six hours in advance of the planned time of departure of an inspection airplane from the last airfield prior to its entry into the airspace of the inspected Party, containing the flight plan for such an airplane.
3. Notification, to be provided by the inspected Party no less than three hours in advance of the planned time of departure of an inspection airplane from the last airfield prior to its entry into the airspace of the inspected Party, of a flight plan approval for such an airplane. ...
9. Notification, to be provided only during normal working days no less than 32 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry, of an intention to conduct an inspection. ...
12. Notification, to be provided no less than 30 days in advance of the planned date of an exhibition, of the intent to conduct an exhibition.
13. Notification, to be provided no less than 72 hours in advance of the planned date of an exhibition, of the intent to take part in an exhibition.
14. Notifications, to be provided by the inspection team leader, in writing, to a member of the in-country escort during inspections: [...]
Part Five regulates inspection activity (starting on p. 106 of the file)
Section 1
3. Each Party shall provide to the other Party notifications relating to inspection activities in accordance with Part Four of this Protocol.
5. In exceptional cases, and for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty, the inspected Party may temporarily exempt from inspection activities appropriate facilities subject to Type One or Type Two inspections and appropriate facilities at which exhibitions are to be conducted. Notification thereof shall be provided through diplomatic channels along with an explanation of the reason for such exemption from inspection activities.
Section 5
10. For the purposes of this Protocol, an item of inspection, about which technical data has been provided in accordance with Part Two of this Protocol, is understood to mean:
(a) For inspections of heavy bombers at air bases, storage facilities for heavy bombers, and conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers within the boundaries depicted on the inspection site diagram, a heavy bomber of the inspected Party.
(b) For inspections at facilities other than those specified in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, an ICBM or SLBM, a first stage of an ICBM or SLBM maintained, stored, and transported in stages, or a mobile launcher of ICBMs of the inspected Party.
Section VIII. Exhibitions
1. Exhibitions shall be conducted at the invitation of the Party conducting the exhibition, separately from inspections, at the locations and in the periods of time chosen by the Party conducting the exhibition, and in accordance with the Annex on Inspection Activities to this Protocol.
2. Each Party shall conduct exhibitions, and shall have the right to take part in exhibitions conducted by the other Party, in order to demonstrate the distinguishing features and to confirm technical characteristics of each new type, variant, or version of an ICBM, SLBM, heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, and, as provided for in Part Two of this Protocol, an ICBM launcher, in the periods of time specified in corresponding notifications. If a Party declares a type, variant, or version of a strategic offensive arm prior to or at the time of entry into force of the Treaty for which no exhibition had been previously conducted in connection with fulfilling the requirements of the START Treaty, that Party shall conduct an exhibition. Such an exhibition shall be conducted no later than the date on which inspection activities begin, as provided for in Section I of this Part.
Section IX, p. 138
Cancellation of Inspection Activities
1. An inspection activity shall be cancelled if, due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, it cannot be conducted. If an inspection is cancelled due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced. For exhibitions cancelled due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, the Parties shall agree on the new periods of time for conducting such exhibitions. ...
4. If, due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, it is necessary to remove items subject to pre-inspection restrictions from the inspection site, the inspection team leader may cancel or conduct the inspection. If an inspection is canceled for that reason, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.
5. If the inspected Party interrupts the inspection for reasons of personnel security or equipment safety, the inspection team leader may cancel or conduct the inspection. If an inspection is canceled for such reasons, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.
So as far as I can understand it, it's definitely not the case of having to have everything on display all the time. There is no mention of an exposure to satellite "inspection" either.
Even IF there was such a requirement, the situation Russia is in,
de facto in a state of war, would give her all needed and valid excuses (extraordinary events,
force majeure, personnel security or equipment safety) to have her nuclear triad well sheltered.
That's how it looks to me, FWIW. Hearing all those respected commentators bringing it up again and again made me question myself each time, with the frustration growing. On the other hand, seeing people like Oleg Tsarov and some others, including on Russia In Global Politic channel, refuting the Start argument was reassuring. ATM, while staying open to be proved wrong, I'm strongly leaning toward the the side of no obligation for Russia to keep her strategic aircraft fleet out in the open.
Here is a video where Até Chuet have some very interesting things to say on the issue, still with a disclaimer of not being a lawyer.
EDIT:
Sorry it's speaking in Arabic, I guess. On YT, it was in English (AI voice, I suppose, he is French), so you may need to watch it there. There are time stamps in the description, go to "START" (07:00) unless you want to watch it full.