Organic Portals: Human variation

moyal

Jedi
Here is his facebook page:

In the end, he made a free pdf (as I understand it) about the topic "Oraganic Portals" out of Lauras article (and extensive excerpts from Boris Mouravieff, Barbara Marciniak, Rudolf Steiner and others) plus "sexed it up" with some "fancy" pictures.
 

Possibility of Being

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maybe @AndrewMn could help me set a search engine checking mechanism for fraudulent material??

I'm not sure what exactly you mean by that, so with risking a misunderstanding on my part, I'd say it's neither necessary nor advisable. Why?

First, it's not that good idea IMO to leave decisions on what you come across on the web to your machine. It's way better to use your discernment and in a case of doubt, ask here on the forum, as you just did. This way not only you have a choice but also more people can benefit from it. And it's not that difficult to know what Laura's writings are legitimate: you can find everything on cassiopaea.org website and in Pilule Rouge online store listed here:

The other aspect is your asking AndrewMn for help. Most likely there is no one easy solution good for everyone (I stay open to be proved wrong) and would require communication between you two off the forum. This, in turn, would put AndrewMN in a difficult position since as you know, we strongly discourage private communication between members, and especially those who are relatively new.

So in short: learn, use your discernment, and when in doubt: ask. :)
 

Laura

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I was doing a little reading on David Chalmers today since Ark is having an exchange with him. Something on Wikipedia really caught my eye (look for the part in bold):


Chalmers is best known for formulating what he calls the "hard problem of consciousness," in both his 1995 paper "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness" and his 1996 book The Conscious Mind. He makes a distinction between "easy" problems of consciousness, such as explaining object discrimination or verbal reports, and the single hard problem, which could be stated "why does the feeling which accompanies awareness of sensory information exist at all?" The essential difference between the (cognitive) easy problems and the (phenomenal) hard problem is that the former are at least theoretically answerable via the dominant strategy in the philosophy of mind: physicalism. Chalmers argues for an "explanatory gap" from the objective to the subjective, and criticizes physicalist explanations of mental experience, making him a dualist. Chalmers characterizes his view as "naturalistic dualism": naturalistic because he believes mental states supervene "naturally" on physical systems (such as brains); dualist because he believes mental states are ontologically distinct from and not reducible to physical systems. He has also characterized his view by more traditional formulations such as property dualism.

In support of this, Chalmers is famous for his commitment to the logical (though, not natural) possibility of philosophical zombies.[13] These zombies, are complete physical duplicates of human beings, lacking only qualitative experience. Chalmers argues that since such zombies are conceivable to us, they must therefore be logically possible. Since they are logically possible, then qualia and sentience are not fully explained by physical properties alone; the facts about them are further facts. Instead, Chalmers argues that consciousness is a fundamental property ontologically autonomous of any known (or even possible) physical properties,[14] and that there may be lawlike rules which he terms "psychophysical laws" that determine which physical systems are associated with which types of qualia. He further speculates that all information-bearing systems may be conscious, leading him to entertain the possibility of conscious thermostats and a qualified panpsychism he calls panprotopsychism. Chalmers maintains a formal agnosticism on the issue, even conceding that the viability of panpsychism places him at odds with the majority of his contemporaries. According to Chalmers, his arguments are similar to a line of thought that goes back to Leibniz's 1714 "mill" argument; the first substantial use of philosophical "zombie" terminology may be Robert Kirk's 1974 "Zombies vs. Materialists".

Darned if that doesn't sound like "organic portals" to me.

Note that Robert Kirk has it backward: it's Zombie Materialists vs Conscious/Souled beings.
 

luc

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I was doing a little reading on David Chalmers today since Ark is having an exchange with him. Something on Wikipedia really caught my eye (look for the part in bold):



Darned if that doesn't sound like "organic portals" to me.

Interesting, since I'm currently reading his "The Conscious Mind" (but not stumbled upon the zombies yet!), I can see how he gets there: he makes the distinction between "psychological consciousness" and "pheonomenal consciousness". The first (psychological consciousness) describes all our reactions etc. - this could conceivably be a property of mere automatons as well. (They would be indistinguishable from real human beings.) This is how the Daniel Dennett/materialist types argue as well: we don't know, we could all be machines. Yes, reactions can be complex (language processing etc.), but they are still just "programs" that can be studied by psychology or science. But for Chalmers "phenomenal consciousness" is what we actually experience while all of that is going on - such as the experience of a color (as opposed to the mere reaction to a color). This for him is the hard problem of consciousness - this penomenal experience that is completely unnecessary for machines.

Now, his point is that we cannot explain our phenomenal experience in materialist terms, precisely because there COULD be "machine people" that would behave just the same just without the experience. Because they are possible, there lacks a (materialist) explanation for the existence of phenomenal experience.
 

Cleopatre VII

Jedi Master
Interesting, since I'm currently reading his "The Conscious Mind" (but not stumbled upon the zombies yet!), I can see how he gets there: he makes the distinction between "psychological consciousness" and "pheonomenal consciousness". The first (psychological consciousness) describes all our reactions etc. - this could conceivably be a property of mere automatons as well. (They would be indistinguishable from real human beings.) This is how the Daniel Dennett/materialist types argue as well: we don't know, we could all be machines. Yes, reactions can be complex (language processing etc.), but they are still just "programs" that can be studied by psychology or science. But for Chalmers "phenomenal consciousness" is what we actually experience while all of that is going on - such as the experience of a color (as opposed to the mere reaction to a color). This for him is the hard problem of consciousness - this penomenal experience that is completely unnecessary for machines.

Now, his point is that we cannot explain our phenomenal experience in materialist terms, precisely because there COULD be "machine people" that would behave just the same just without the experience. Because they are possible, there lacks a (materialist) explanation for the existence of phenomenal experience.
I am also in the process of reading "The Conscious Mind". I do not agree with all the views of the author, but I think that in terms of philosophical workshop, he is really good. The terminology used by him and his attempts to strictly describe seemingly humanistic issues are also impressive. However, I will talk about the book in more detail when I read it completely.

Regarding the question of the philosophical zombies, I am not yet fully acquainted with this topic, but I think it may relate in some respects to the organic portals Laura is talking about. Gurdjieff also spoke about them. What I lack here is some axiomatization, and I don't think I will find it in Chalmers' ideas.

Hence, I think that profound research into consciousness is necessary. The main problem, however, is that, like researching logic within itself... We have nothing more immediate than consciousness, as Chalmers also mentions in his book!

From consciousness, in turn, the path seems to lead directly to time. So here we have two issues that are the most fundamental to me since I was 4 years old, and they can actually be one issue.

This research can also be linked to organic portals, but this is a matter for the future. I am currently in the process of researching consciousness, but looking for more inspiration as my current research seems to loop and circulate somewhere between philosophy, physics and neurobiology.
 

Andrian

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What does NPC stand for? I'm new to this thread so please excuse my ignorance.
It stands for "Non player character", the term derives from the world of the video games where the NPCs are interacting with the player during his journey through the video games. I think the said acronym it reflects quite neatly the OP.

As regarding the OP, they are where they are on their learning cycle. Me thinks we all were there some "time" ago, it's just a parto of the big journey towards home (7 D), doesn't matter the road one chooses to follow sto or sts, both of them are leading back home.

Edit: clarification.
 

Redrock12

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It stands for "Non player character", the term derives from the world of the video games where the NPCs are interacting with the player during his journey through the video games. I think the said acronym it reflects quite neatly the OP.

As regarding the OP, they are where they are on their learning cycle. Me thinks we all were there some "time" ago, it's just a parto of the big journey towards home (7 D), doesn't matter the road one chooses to follow sto or sts, both of them are leading back home.

Edit: clarification.
I went back a few pages on this thread and found the meaning of NPC. For sure, it reflects quite neatly the OP.
Thanks Andrian and Marek760
 

whitecoast

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If we keep in mind the definition of OPs as humans belonging to a soul pool of shared learning at a much lower level of development than most individuated human souls, nothing about that suggests they have no consciousness. I think that in fact may be Chalmers' point when driving home pan(proto)psychism. (I think it's even question-begging to say machines have no consciousness).
 

guimondaniel

Jedi Master
I hope I am way out in left field here - understand that even though I knew it took me decades to truly fathom what this split means for us - I have a distinct impression that we are less than 5% of the crowd, as sentient/ souled beings on this planet or Plato's cave (Republic part 7, if memory serves me...) And that is a pretty steep hill to climb in order to get anywhere! Unless what people call God is with you, because then, who will be against you?!
 

luc

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If we keep in mind the definition of OPs as humans belonging to a soul pool of shared learning at a much lower level of development than most individuated human souls, nothing about that suggests they have no consciousness. I think that in fact may be Chalmers' point when driving home pan(proto)psychism. (I think it's even question-begging to say machines have no consciousness).

Yes, I think so too. Chalmer's point was that it is logically possible (at least conceivable, even though it might be naturally impossible in this world) that there are human beings who completely lack conscious phenomenal experience, and yet from the outside are indistinguishable from real human beings. (Just like in the Turing test where a super-advanced non-conscious AI might be indistinguishable from human intelligence in its interactions.) That is to say, it's not our complex "mechanical" behavior that distinguishes us from "zombies" or AIs, it's our conscious experience.

But maybe we can salvage some understanding of OPs from Chalmer's point: it's about the depth of "phenomenal" experience, i.e. "what it feels like to live, think etc.". It might be that for an OP, this kind of experience is somewhat limited, especially when it comes to "deeper experience" of conscience, of connectedness, of deeper semi-aware "higher" motivations or plans and so on.

But the distinction is by no means sharp or clear. Essentially, we all operate according to a "cognitive science model" (that at least theoretically could be described completely, and that is what the PTB are trying). However, for the souled individual, there is a subtle "pipeline" to a world that goes beyond programming, beyond stimulus-reaction (no matter how complex), and includes subtle insights, feelings and motivations that are "not of this world". This is part of qualitative experience. And it makes (souled) human behavior completely unpredictable to cognitive science to the degree that those humans base their decisions on this subtle "extra experience".

This is not exactly what Chalmers meant, but I found his discussion of "philosophical zombies" quite stimulating when thinking about OPs.

BTW, Chalmers sums up some of his ideas about zombies (and the philosophical tradition that goes with it) on his website - pretty funny too in a geeky sort of way:

 

Recto

Jedi
But maybe we can salvage some understanding of OPs from Chalmer's point: it's about the depth of "phenomenal" experience, i.e. "what it feels like to live, think etc.". It might be that for an OP, this kind of experience is somewhat limited, especially when it comes to "deeper experience" of conscience, of connectedness, of deeper semi-aware "higher" motivations or plans and so on.

But the distinction is by no means sharp or clear. Essentially, we all operate according to a "cognitive science model" (that at least theoretically could be described completely, and that is what the PTB are trying). However, for the souled individual, there is a subtle "pipeline" to a world that goes beyond programming, beyond stimulus-reaction (no matter how complex), and includes subtle insights, feelings and motivations that are "not of this world". This is part of qualitative experience. And it makes (souled) human behavior completely unpredictable to cognitive science to the degree that those humans base their decisions on this subtle "extra experience".

Another interesting aspect of OPs embodied by zombies is the representation of their essence as a group. Rarely do we see in fiction a, not really threatening, single zombie; instead we've the depiction of endless, self-organizing swarms, that do represent as a synergistic whole a frightening perspective (I always think of the body snatchers as a good depiction). Funnily enough, the few examples I've seen in pop-culture of single zombies main characters (e.g. iZombie) are humanized to the extreme, hence loosing what characterized them in the first place.

I haven't read the work of Gustave LeBon on crowd psychology, however I think the "cognitive science model" the PTB are trying to map out is based on what makes a single individual tick (then generalize it to a crowd to gain control over them). Since being an OP is in essence a group thing, maybe crafting a group cognitive model (in opposition of souled individuals' particulate cognitive model) could provide more insight into what may be another qualitatively different aspect of theirs.
 

whitecoast

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But maybe we can salvage some understanding of OPs from Chalmer's point: it's about the depth of "phenomenal" experience, i.e. "what it feels like to live, think etc.". It might be that for an OP, this kind of experience is somewhat limited, especially when it comes to "deeper experience" of conscience, of connectedness, of deeper semi-aware "higher" motivations or plans and so on.
Very true. We only need to look at ourselves as well, and our own history and accounting of previous thoughts, feelings, and behaviors to see when we were less aware and less conscious than normal but otherwise operating in a matter that is (superficially at least) indistinguishable when we're consumed by our routines.

Chalmer's hypothesis about certain discrete qualia being associated with certain forms of "processing" or whatever you want to call it reminds me of the C's comment about (A) consciousness being the prime substance of the universe, and (B) that "matter" according to the C's is much "bigger" than our highly atomized understanding (if you pardon the pun). So an atom of experience may equate fundamentally to the whole occasion of experience and all its contingent contributors to its realization (a la Whitehead). Gurdjieff's own models of the human psych rely heavily on materialistic analogies of hydrogens of particular vibrations and (semi)tones, where the qualia of experience are discrete substances in themselves which transform and evolve according to how they interact with other physical, vital, and cosmic influences/substances.

Re: Turing, I always did find his notion of "an intelligence is anything that is able to convince you that it is intelligent" to be ponerized from the get-go. But I did see a kernel of something interesting in it, in that a machine, something less conscious, somehow becomes "more alive" by feeding lies to a conscious being such that he or she thinks the machine is a person. When convinced, the true person has in themselves a miniature mental model of this "person" on the other side of the screen. And in a sense they have been given greater reality by virtue of the machine convincing them. In essence they are swallowing an individual's light of understanding and taking up real space in a real person's head by means of convincing them. That made me think of OPs doing the same with the higher centers of those with individuated souls.
 
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