An LNG carrier central to Russia’s sanctioned Arctic gas trade was
rocked by an explosion around 4 a.m. on March 3 roughly 150 nautical miles southeast of Malta, in an incident Moscow said was a Ukrainian attack and that could ripple through the Kremlin’s fragile LNG shadow fleet logistics network.
Photos taken after the blast show at least one cargo compartment fully blown open, with extensive fire damage visible across much of the hull and deck.
Satellite images earlier on March 4 showed the vessel still afloat, but according to Libyan port officials the vessel has now sunk.
All
30 crew members escaped via life rafts and were rescued, according to Russian and Maltese authorities.
Russia’s Ministry of Transport said in a statement that “on March 3, the Russian gas carrier
Arctic Metagaz was attacked in close proximity to the territorial waters of the European Union member state of Malta.”
The tanker was en route from Murmansk “carrying cargo cleared in accordance with all international regulations,” the ministry said, adding that “the attack was carried out off the coast of Libya by
unmanned Ukrainian boats.”
“Thanks to the coordinated efforts of Maltese and Russian rescue services, all 30 crew members, all Russian citizens, were rescued,” it said.
“We classify this incident as an act of international terrorism and maritime piracy, a gross violation of the fundamental norms of international maritime law,” the statement added, alleging the attack was carried out “with the connivance of the authorities of EU member states.”
Ukraine has not publicly commented.
The vessel, currently sailing as
Arctic Metagaz and previously known as
Everest Energy, has been one of the most closely tracked ships involved in exports from Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project, majority owned by Novatek.
On Aug. 25, 2024, under its former name, it became the third vessel to load LNG from the sanctioned Utrenniy terminal at Arctic LNG 2. It returned to the terminal on Sept. 6 and Oct. 5, 2024, making three liftings during the project’s first export season.
In September 2024, the vessel also
became the first ever conventional, non-ice-class LNG carrier to transit the Northern Sea Route (NSR), a high-risk passage typically reserved for specialized Arc7 ice-class tankers.
The decision underscored the extent to which Russia was prepared to stretch operational norms to keep gas flowing despite Western sanctions that have limited access to ice-class tonnage, insurance and buyers.
The risks became evident in August 2025 when
Arctic Metagaz again attempted an NSR transit but
became stuck near the ice edge, halting and reversing course in heavy sea ice.
The episode highlighted the hazards of deploying non-ice-class vessels in Arctic waters and the logistical strain facing Arctic LNG 2, which lacks sufficient purpose-built carriers.
During the 2024 season, the vessel offloaded at the
Saam floating storage unit (FSU) on August 29 and at the
Koryak FSU on September 22.
After the initial Arctic campaign,
Arctic Metagaz spent much of the winter and spring of 2024/25 circling the eastern Mediterranean loaded with cargo, reflecting the difficulty of placing sanctioned LNG in stable end markets.
It returned north near Kola Bay on May 24, 2025, preparing to resume shadow fleet operations for the summer navigation window.
Following its 2025 ice entrapment it discharged a cargo at China’s Beihai terminal on October 13, 2025 – the ninth Arctic LNG 2 delivery to that facility.
On November 25, 2025, the vessel loaded LNG from the Saam FSU and returned to Asia via the Suez Canal, offloading at Beihai on January 3, 2026.
It loaded again on Feb. 18 during a rare triple ship-to-ship (STS) transfer near Murmansk – the cargo believed to have been aboard when the explosion occurred.
That
triple STS marked the first known simultaneous LNG transfers from both Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 onto separate conventional carriers, underscoring Russia’s increasingly complex maritime choreography to sustain exports.
If the incident is confirmed as a deliberate attack, it could significantly complicate logistics for Novatek.
The company has just 11 shadow fleet LNG carriers at its disposal, according to shipping data – already too few to carry the project’s full nameplate capacity. Arctic LNG 2 is currently operating at roughly 30% of that level of 3mtpa, constrained largely by shipping limitations.
The loss or long-term sidelining of even one vessel would represent a meaningful blow to the project’s transport capacity.
The blast also raises immediate routing questions.
Seven Arctic LNG 2 shadow fleet vessels have continued using the Mediterranean, Suez Canal and Red Sea corridor despite regional instability.
One of them,
Arctic Pioneer, is currently holding outside Port Said after a northbound Suez transit. The vessel delivered Arctic LNG 2 cargo to Beihai on February 11 and was likely returning toward Murmansk to reload.
Its pause near Egypt may signal that Moscow is reassessing whether to continue risking Mediterranean passages – or whether to reroute via the Cape of Good Hope, adding weeks to voyages and further tightening available tonnage.
For a project already operating below capacity due to sanctions and shipping constraints, the explosion off Malta underscores the vulnerability of Russia’s Arctic LNG shadow fleet – and the mounting risks facing vessels that form the backbone of its sanctioned gas exports.