Long report published by the NYT on Dec 30th:
'The Separation: Inside the Unraveling U.S.-Ukraine Partnership', by Adam Entous
(This is the NYT reporter who wrote 'The Secret History of the War in Ukraine' back in March 2025, revealing (admitting) the extent of US and other Western military involvement in Ukraine. The byline says "Adam Entous conducted more than 300 interviews over more than a year with government, military and intelligence officials in Ukraine, the United States," and a dozen other NATO countries. So this is to be read as 'the inside scoop on the RU-UKR War in 2025', but from the vantage point that 'UKR really can win, but Team Trump is retarding them'...)
Version on archive.is
'The Separation: Inside the Unraveling U.S.-Ukraine Partnership', by Adam Entous
(This is the NYT reporter who wrote 'The Secret History of the War in Ukraine' back in March 2025, revealing (admitting) the extent of US and other Western military involvement in Ukraine. The byline says "Adam Entous conducted more than 300 interviews over more than a year with government, military and intelligence officials in Ukraine, the United States," and a dozen other NATO countries. So this is to be read as 'the inside scoop on the RU-UKR War in 2025', but from the vantage point that 'UKR really can win, but Team Trump is retarding them'...)
Version on archive.is
Even as Mr. Trump bullied Mr. Zelensky, he seemed to coddle Mr. Putin. When the Russian stiff-armed peace proposals and accelerated bombing campaigns on Ukrainian cities, Mr. Trump would lash out on Truth Social and ask his aides, “Do we sanction their banks or do we sanction their energy infrastructure?” For months, he did neither.
But in secret, the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. military, with his blessing, supercharged a Ukrainian campaign of drone strikes on Russian oil facilities and tankers to hobble Mr. Putin’s war machine. [...]
In so many ways, the partnership was breaking apart. But there was a counternarrative, spooled out largely in secret. At its center was the C.I.A.
Where Mr. Hegseth had marginalized his Ukraine-supporting generals, the C.I.A. director, Mr. Ratcliffe, had consistently protected his own officers’ efforts for Ukraine. He kept the agency’s presence in the country at full strength; funding for its programs there even increased. When Mr. Trump ordered the March aid freeze, the U.S. military rushed to shut down all intelligence sharing. But when Mr. Ratcliffe explained the risk facing C.I.A. officers in Ukraine, the White House allowed the agency to keep sharing intelligence about Russian threats inside Ukraine.
Now, the agency honed a plan to at least buy time, to make it harder for the Russians to capitalize on the Ukrainians’ extraordinary moment of weakness.
One powerful tool finally employed by the Biden administration — supplying ATACMS and targeting intelligence for strikes inside Russia — had been effectively pulled from the table. But a parallel weapon had remained in place — permission for C.I.A. and military officers to share targeting intelligence and provide other assistance for Ukrainian drone strikes against crucial components of the Russian defense industrial base. These included factories manufacturing “energetics” — chemicals used in explosives — as well as petroleum-industry facilities. [...]
In June, beleaguered U.S. military officers met with their C.I.A. counterparts to help craft a more concerted Ukrainian campaign. It would focus exclusively on oil refineries and, instead of supply tanks, would target the refineries’ Achilles’ heel: A C.I.A. expert had identified a type of coupler that was so hard to replace or repair that a refinery would remain offline for weeks. (To avoid backlash, they would not supply weapons and other equipment that Mr. Vance’s allies wanted for other priorities.)
As the campaign began to show results, Mr. Ratcliffe discussed it with Mr. Trump. The president seemed to listen to him; they had a frequent Sunday tee time. According to U.S. officials, Mr. Trump praised America’s surreptitious role in these blows to Russia’s energy industry. They gave him deniability and leverage, he told Mr. Ratcliffe, as the Russian president continued to “jerk him off.”
The energy strikes would come to cost the Russian economy as much as $75 million a day, according to one U.S. intelligence estimate. The C.I.A. would also be authorized to assist with Ukrainian drone strikes on “shadow fleet” vessels in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Gas lines would start forming across Russia.
“We found something that is working,” a senior U.S. official said, then had to add, “How long, we don’t know.” [...]