What oddities accompany the Hamas attack on Israel: a Military Chronicle breakdown
Each circumstance is important both individually and as a set of questions to Israel's security system.
Oddity #1 - Israel was unaware of the preparations for the attack.
Gaza is a narrow piece of land of (
Военная хроника) 365 square kilometers. It was thought to be bugged and watched by the Israeli army and intelligence services up and down, but the attack revealed that this was not the case. Supposedly, Hamas had developed a system for coordination and communication that excluded electronic contact, and somehow the Palestinians managed to hide everything from Israel's intelligence agencies.
Oddity #2 - Israel failed to prevent the attack.
Shortly before the October 7 strike on the checkpoints and major cities, Hamas was bringing in MLRS, ground forces, paragliders and other equipment in an organized manner. The preparations and first steps went unnoticed, no preemptive strike was launched.
Oddity #3 - the alarms on the border did not go off.
The electronic systems on the border, which Israel has invested billions of dollars to build and equip, have proved useless. The numerous cameras and sensors also failed to detect and stop the Palestinian attack, as did the combat patrols, which for some reason were simply not around. Palestinian drones were quietly able to hit automatic machine guns and sensor turrets, and Hamas assault teams quietly blew up the fence and crossed the border. No one is trying to attack them. Hundreds of IDF soldiers have been killed right in the camps, in barracks, and sleeping because of a failed alarm system.
Oddity #4 - Hamas tactics.
Contrary to popular belief, the Palestinians did not bypass IDF fortifications and bases. They aggressively stormed (
Военная хроника) both checkpoints and bases where armored vehicles were located. However, Hamas did not use tanks - apparently due to the low skill level of the attackers or lack of necessity. It is still unclear where the sentries, the guards on duty and the covering forces were at that time.
Oddity #5 - the readiness of combat equipment.
The Israeli Merkava Mk.4 tank destroyed by a copter drop was hit in one of the most unprotected areas - the top. The Trophy active defense system appears to have been disabled. In the footage of the tank destruction and the capture of the crew, it is clearly visible that the vehicle's gun is shrouded. This suggests that the crew did not prepare the vehicle for combat and counted only on intimidation, which is not only a gross violation of instructions, but also simply stupid in such an attack.
Oddity #6 - panic in border towns.
All localities, especially in a region like the Gaza Strip, should have plans in place in case the conflict escalates. But there was no organized warning or evacuation. The local security forces were so small and poorly armed that they were quickly eliminated by the Palestinians.
Oddity #7 - the difference in coordination between the IDF and Hamas.
Until about noon on Oct. 7, the Israeli government had little response to the fighting. It is Saturday morning, Shabbat in the country. Only at 2-15 p.m. did security forces begin to round up reservists and organize retaliatory raids. However, the death of Yonatan Steinberg, commander of the Nahal Infantry Brigade, indicates a hasty response by what forces they could at least somehow muster at once. It appears that Nahal's intervention in the fighting against Hamas was initiated by the brigade commander and was not the result of a direct order from the General Staff.
Meanwhile, the IDF is expected to launch a military operation inside neighborhoods in the Gaza Strip over the next two days. However, operations in open terrain and in residential areas are different. An attempt by Israeli ground troops to enter the Palestinian enclave will almost certainly be accompanied by a high death toll on both sides.
to give an respond, so their plans failed. 
