Israel-Palestine War: Hamas Breaks Out of Gaza, Israel Responds With Genocide

I wonder what Putin thinks of Trumps stance on Gaza?
Well, some think that Putin and Trump agreed already back in November that Russia exits Syria (for the benefit of Israel) while the US will exit Ukraine once Trump is in office.

It is possible, though it does not seem very likely. Russia and Iran did sign what amounts to basically a defense treaty last year, so it does not seem likely that Russia made a secret agreement to let Israel do whatever it wants. Or maybe giving up Syria was some kind of compromise.
 
Well, some think that Putin and Trump agreed already back in November that Russia exits Syria (for the benefit of Israel) while the US will exit Ukraine once Trump is in office.

It is possible, though it does not seem very likely. Russia and Iran did sign what amounts to basically a defense treaty last year, so it does not seem likely that Russia made a secret agreement to let Israel do whatever it wants. Or maybe giving up Syria was some kind of compromise.
One world order…. It’s still pretty obvious who’s in charge!
 
Hopefully Trump takes notice of the almost unanimously negative (and downright awful) responses to that video on his Truth Social page.
At least Trump is boosting dialogue between Arab countries, while the ceasefire hangs undecided.
All excerpts are from an egyptian telegram channel, also present on X :

A reminder there's a planned emergency Arab League Meeting in Cairo on March 4 to discuss rebuilding the Gaza Strip without displacing its Palestinian inhabitants.

Status report on the ceasefire by Hamas :

The ceasefire officially ended at the beginning of today March 2, 2025 at 12:00 midnight after the end of the first phase of the ceasefire and prisoner exchange in Gaza.

Hamas officially announced its rejection of extending the first phase of the prisoner exchange without officially negotiating the second phase, the Israeli occupation’s withdrawal from the Philadelphi corridor in the southern Gaza Strip, and the occupation’s approval of the “cessation of war” clause.

Netanyahu's Office Statement on the Discussion Session and the Ceasefire:

"
Israel is adopting the outlines proposed by US Presidential Envoy Steve Witkoff for a temporary ceasefire during the month of Ramadan and Jewish Passover.

On the first day of the agreement, half of the hostages, both living and dead, will be released, and at the end - if an agreement is reached on a permanent ceasefire - the remaining hostages, both living and dead, will be released.

Witkoff proposed the outlines for extending the ceasefire after expressing his admiration that at this stage there was no possibility of bringing the parties closer together to end the war, and that additional time was needed to hold talks on a permanent ceasefire."

"
'While Hamas has repeatedly violated the agreement, Israel has not. Under the agreement, Israel can return to fighting after the forty-second day if it feels that the negotiations are ineffective. This clause was supported in a side letter from the previous US administration, and was also supported by the Trump administration.'

While Israel has accepted Witkoff's plan to return our abductees, Hamas has so far maintained its refusal to accept it. If Hamas changes its position, Israel will immediately enter into negotiations on all the details of Witkoff's plan."

Hamas' statement on the respect of the first agreement :

Head of the Government Media Office in Gaza: The Israeli enemy is still evading its commitment regarding the humanitarian protocol in Gaza

- We have only received 75% of the number of trucks supposed to enter the Strip according to the agreement

- The Israelis has allowed the entry of only 80,000 tents out of 200,000 that were supposed to enter the Gaza Strip

- Only 15 makeshift mobile homes have entered out of 60,000 that were scheduled to enter Gaza
 


Grambach continued to read Glazer’s words: “…After the massacres of October 7 and the hostage-taking in Israel, both are acts of terror against innocent people, made possible by the dehumanization of the people on the other side of our walls. This is the Zone of Interest.”



Netanyahu’s office admits staff didn’t pass on alert hours before Oct. 7 attack
By ToI Staff Today, 6:04 am
Video :pinocchio:
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office acknowledged Saturday that the premier’s intelligence officer had received an Israel Defense Forces memo detailing suspicious Hamas activity three hours before the terror group’s October 7, 2023, invasion and onslaught, and didn’t pass it on. The premier’s office argued that this was justified given what it said was the document’s non-urgent framing.

The admission came in response to a Channel 12 report that said the IDF had drafted a document setting out the numerous worrying signs of Hamas activity in Gaza that night and sent it out to the intelligence officers of seven key Israeli leaders, including Netanyahu and then-defense minister Yoav Gallant.

Gallant’s office was unable to reach his intelligence officer, who, therefore, did not receive the document at that time, the report said.

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Netanyahu’s intelligence officer and the other five all received the document. But Netanyahu’s officer did not pass the information up the chain, according to the report.

The IDF did not investigate why the material was not passed on, the report said, because its investigations of the October 7 failures, published during the past week, did not touch on the political echelon.

The report quoted the IDF officer who oversaw the IDF’s intelligence investigation, Moshe Schneid, as saying: “I didn’t check what went on there [in the chain of command in the Prime Minister’s Office] because I was very wary of probing the political echelon. I met the prime minister’s intelligence officer several times in the street and I was careful not even to ask him about it.”

The report also quoted outgoing IDF chief Herzi Halevi saying that the IDF did not publicize the fact that the Prime Minister’s Office was alerted to Hamas’s suspicious activity three hours ahead of the invasion “even though this could have helped us in the face of the bad things that are being said about us. We are very responsible and discreet. It’s a shame this is not reciprocated.”

It quoted Halevi adding: “If the prime minister’s intelligence officer was a person of integrity, he should already have told [Netanyahu] that he knew about [Hamas preparations just before the attack] and did not update [Netanyahu]. [The officer] did not do this.”

Netanyahu has repeatedly made clear that he received no specific advance warning ahead of the Hamas attack.

Responding to the report, Netanyahu’s office accused Halevi of trying to shirk responsibility for the October 7 attacks.

“It is very unfortunate that the chief of staff chooses to publicly attack a moral and trustworthy officer in the IDF,” said the Prime Minister’s Office in a statement, “while attempting to shift the responsibility for the October 7 lapse onto his subordinates.”

The intelligence officer received the message along with a report that Hamas was operating as usual and that the IDF Southern Command would hold a discussion in the morning, according to the premier’s office, which said the officer then forwarded the message to Netanyahu’s military secretary Avi Gil but decided not to wake him up as the message did not indicate any urgency.

Netanyahu’s office added that the intelligence officer was not interviewed as part of the IDF investigations and said he was not allowed to attend the presentation of the findings.

“Prime Minister Netanyahu has full confidence in the military secretariat of his office,” his office said.

Netanyahu, who served as premier from 2009 to 2021 and again from early 2023, has adamantly refused to acknowledge any responsibility for the failure to prevent the October 7 onslaught. He has said he received no information about anything out of the ordinary before the attack began.

The IDF’s extensive investigations have found it picked up on signs of unusual Hamas activity, but refused to believe this indicated a planned major attack following a yearslong ruse that convinced the security establishment that Hamas wasn’t interested in war. The army’s chief of staff Halevi will step down in the coming days.

 
So if Russia and the US come to an agreement on Ukraine, it could be implied that Russia will perhaps back away from its relations with Iran. And that would be when the opportunity opens up for Israel to do its stuff. All the pieces on the geopolitical chessboard would move.
 
Hello to all. Since I am as bugged as many may be in regard of Trump's attitude in regard of Palestine, I wish to offer my two cents, only in a perspective of sharing one idea (that may be wrong of course).

I do believe in the concept of some firm & difficult to solve lock, at the White House. After Kennedy left, we have been spectating a succession of true warmongers, fully supporting Israel. And we know that Kennedy was firmly opposed to Israel. When he left, it has been an open dam. Eh... Decades of partnerships and agreements. What has been happening below the curtain, as well...

And then, keeping in mind some old concepts, it has to do with the one going by that "draining the swamp" was already a hardly insurmontable task for Trump, at the time of his last mandate. I have been made to agree on the idea that there could be, indeed, some very firm locks actually quite hard to solve. I accept this, but of course keeping in mind that it's solvable! And this idea is that there may truly exist things that cannot be resolved in a finger's snap. It's hard to realize but I know there are, at the White House.

And so, I believe that if Trump could, he would just grab Netanyahu by the neck and throw him out. Let's not forget that the reality of things at the White House is indeed "Kennedy" :-) I am aligning my reality perspective with this, instead of considering the billions that Trump allocates to Israel. We have, here, a super hint at something, but we would tend to listen to more materialistic "evidences".

But I am as bugged as many.

In addition, I believe that Trump is a very humane person, and can perfectly discern the objectivity balance in regard of Palestine. I have room as well that he may simply go "country first", this producing zero interest in regard of Palestine. Some basic "business" attitude. But I believe that it transpires that something is wrong and that it does not match, somewhere. Our interrogations and perplexity is a sign.
 
"This is your last warning!": Trump says that he is sending everything what Israel needs to finish the ethnic cleansing in Gaza.
[...]
Trump added that he is “sending Israel everything it needs to finish the job.”

“This is your last warning!
For the leadership, now is the time to leave Gaza, while you still have a chance,”
he wrote. “Also, to the People of Gaza: A beautiful Future awaits, but not if you hold Hostages. If you do, you are DEAD!”
People of Gaza are not holding the Hostages.
 
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IDF carried out Hannibal Directive, new 'Sword of Damocles' operation on October 7
27 Feb. 2025

The Israeli Air Force was carrying out a new "the Sword of Damocles" operation - a code name only being revealed on Thursday for the first time - to attack many Hamas commanders and their headquarters around 10:30 a.m. on October 7, 2023, just as it was carrying out the "Hannibal Directive" of gunning down anything that moved around the Israel-Gaza border.
The Air Force has been questioned about if the forces it had invested in attacking Hamas commanders deep in Gaza would have been better used (...)
Air Force sources have said that they wish this air power had been used differently on October 7, given that protecting the villages and the border should have been a higher priority than killing top Hamas officials.
In contrast, IDF southern command sources have indicated that they believe that the attack on the Hamas commanders and headquarters significantly reduced the number of invaders who would have streamed into Israel absent those attacks.
Some sources said that there were concerns that tens of thousands or even more Gazans might have invaded Israel
Further, the Air Force said that many pilots were reluctant about hitting potential hostages even after the Hannibal Directive was issued.

We see here a form of "conflicting decision-taking", at the time.

The Air Force would basically state that "the use of force has been not appropriate". They hint at "a different use" as being more efficient. We may as well consider something like "a completely different strategy" rather than "a different use". I suppose some have been told "go there and raze the whole".

The IDF would say "it's all good what we do is the thing to do".

This left me thinking about the overuse of weaponry during the Kibbutz attack. Frightnening tons of bombs seem to have been used, there, for Israeli LSD kibbutz people, allegedly at the hand of some "paragliding guys". The aftermath pictures shows an absolute devastation and it has been revealed that the helicopters may have been quite firing at "all that was moving". We eventually ended up figuring out that most of the victims died because of the Israeli army.

This has been triggering independant news outlets such as "The Electronic intifada" and the Grayzone to focus more deeply on this specific Rave party & the Hannibal directive. A disproportionate use of force has been, yet, quite the only element appearing clearly. Now that we hear about a second directive, this could represent a binder for independant journalists.

Still, I would personally remain very cautious about all that comes from the mouth of the IDF/Israel. The above article features such statements. The Air Force seems quite uncomfortable here and I don't know what this means. The C's have been stating that October 7 was an inside job. In addition, it appears that the footages of the Hamas attack have been provided by the IDF (!), for the world to contemplate the events... All together, it seems that Israel has been quite managing more parameters than thought. This would make perfect sense in the context of an inside job. Some have even been hinting at "AI" as being present in those footages.
  • Is the finding that "Israel has been activating the Damocles" another of those "kindly provided by the IDF"?
  • Is the finding of such "Damocles order" the sign that the snake is eating its own tail - an additional bug in their perfectly oiled inside job scheme?
  • Is the Air Force seeing that things are turning wrong for Israel, and they are starting to talk?
That's what I come up with. I have been firmly checking things around the "inside job" angle since the C's told us that.
 
This takes the cake.
The Zionists annihilated the hell out of the Gaza Strip and reduced it back to the Stone Age with plenty of help from the usual suspected countries. Then put it back together, or the Zionists will dump the Epstein file.

So, how can the participating EU members truly afford this endeavor when the global economic engines are misfiring?

ROME, March 8 (Reuters) - The foreign ministers of France, Germany, Italy, and Britain said on Saturday they supported an Arab-backed plan for the reconstruction of Gaza that would cost $53 billion and avoid displacing Palestinians from the enclave.

"The plan shows a realistic path to the reconstruction of Gaza and promises – if implemented – swift and sustainable improvement of the catastrophic living conditions for the Palestinians living in Gaza," the ministers said in a joint statement.

Marianne PICARD , Economiste - France, Belgique et LuxembourgPublié le 28 janvier 2025 - Mis à jour le 29 janvier 2025
Economic activity in France quickened in Q3 2024, with quarterly growth coming in at 0.4%, compared with 0.2% in Q1 and Q2. This uptick is explained by the Paris Olympic and Paralympic Games, estimated to have added 0.2 percentage points to Q3 growth. At the end of Q3, carry-over growth for 2024 was 1.1%.​

The economy is not expected to have grown at all in Q4 2024 due to the boost from the Paris Olympics washing out. This would put full-year 2024 growth at 1.1%, unchanged year on year, mainly driven by foreign trade and public spending, with private domestic demand (excluding inventories) stagnating. Average annual CPI inflation eased from 4.9% in 2023 to 2% in 2024. In 2025, growth is predicted to slow to 0.8% and inflation to 1.1%, with prevailing high levels of uncertainty hampering growth: household consumption is set to grow but by less than originally expected, with the recovery in private investment pushed back to 2026. Growth should then pick up in 2026 – assuming political instability eases – to 1.1%, the level of potential growth. However, the output gap will still be negative at the end of 2026. Inflation is set to pick up slightly, to 1.3%.

This scenario is compatible with the adoption of a 2025 Budget Bill in the early part of the year (probably at the end of Q1), with the public deficit shrinking by less than would have been the case under a Barnier budget to reach 6% of GDP in 2025, compared with 6.2% in 2024. It will probably fall to around 5.5% of GDP in 2026.​

Looking back on the last few quarters: an uptick in economic activity linked to the Paris Olympic and Paralympic Games

Economic activity in France quickened in the third quarter of 2024, with quarterly growth of 0.4% in volume, compared with 0.2% in both the first and the second quarter. This uptick is explained by the Paris Olympic and Paralympic Games, estimated to have added 0.2 percentage points to third-quarter GDP. Revenue from ticket sales and broadcasting rights was recognised by Insee (the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies) as an output of services at the time of the games, in line with the national accounts.

At the end of the third quarter, carry-over growth for 2024 was 1.1%.

Outlook for the fourth quarter of 2024: zero growth as the effect of the Paris Olympics washes out

Overall economic activity likely held steady in the fourth quarter as the effects of the Paris Olympics washed out, with the resulting quarter-on-quarter drop offsetting underlying growth of around 0.2%. This quarterly forecast for the fourth quarter is in line with the most recent forecasts from Banque de France (“Monthly Business Survey – Start of January”) and Insee (“Economic Outlook – December 2024: Activity awaiting renewed confidence”).​

Changes in 2024: growth stable at 1.1%, buoyed by foreign trade and the public sector​

Full-year 2024 growth is estimated at 1.1%, unchanged year on year, mainly driven by foreign trade and public spending (contributing 0.9 and 0.5 percentage points of growth respectively) linked to the carry-over growth already observed. Household consumption is set to have slowed slightly, growing 0.8% in volume in 2024, compared with 0.9% in 2023, despite average annual CPI inflation falling from 4.9% in 2023 to 2% in 2024. Total investment is estimated to have fallen by 1.6% in 2024 after having grown by 0.8% in 2023. Investment by non-financial corporations (down 1.9% in the year, after having risen by 3.1% in 2023) and, above all, by households (down 5.9%, compared with 8.2% in 2023) likely continued to be affected by the previous tightening of financial conditions. Meanwhile, government investment is estimated to have remained relatively buoyant, up 3% (compared with a 7.1% increase in 2023). Furthermore, destocking in the run-up to the end of 2023 is estimated to have shaved 0.5 percentage points off 2024 growth.

The public deficit is predicted to have increased significantly in 2024, to 6.2% of GDP (compared with 5.5% in 2023, already an overshoot), well in excess of both the 4.4% written into the 2024 Budget Bill in autumn 2023 and the 5.4% included in the 2024 Stability Programme in spring 2024. This public deficit forecast – intended to be cautious – is slightly higher than the latest government forecast (6.1% in Barnier’s Budget Bill) but in line with the more recent European Commission forecast. A deficit of this size would result in the debt-to-GDP ratio rising sharply to 112.9% (up from 109.9% in 2023).​

2025 forecasts: economic activity slows, affected by uncertainty​

In 2025, growth is predicted to slow to 0.8%. We recently revised down our forecast by 0.2 percentage points in light of current uncertainty on both the domestic political front (in particular the no confidence motion that brought down the Barnier government and the absence, at this stage, of a 2025 Budget Bill) and the trade policy front (following Donald trump’s US presidential election win). These high levels of uncertainty will undoubtedly affect households and businesses, which will tend to wait for the right time to spend on consumer goods and services (for households) and on investment and recruitment (for businesses).

Household consumption is nevertheless set to grow in 2025, albeit modestly, to 0.7%, supported by continuing disinflation. Inflation as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) should ease to an annual average of 1.1%. Meanwhile, investment should hold steady in 2025, with investment by non-financial corporations falling slightly (down 0.2%) and household investment more or less flat (up 0.1%). The contribution of foreign trade to growth is likely to be zero, with imports and exports growing at more or less the same pace. Modest restocking should add 0.1 percentage points to full-year growth. Budgetary measures are likely to hamper growth to some extent, with the pace of government consumption expenditure slowing sharply, up 0.6% by volume, compared with 2% in 2024, and government investment slowing (up 0.5%, compared with 3% in 2024).

Nevertheless, we expect only a slight fall in the public deficit in 2025, to 6% of GDP, causing the debt-to-GDP ratio to rise to 116.8%. Some fiscal measures proposed by the Barnier government (e.g. freezing pensions) are no longer an option, while others are hampered by constraints preventing their retroactive application. Moreover, one can well imagine that François Bayrou and his government wish to avoid their predecessors’ fate (a no confidence vote) and are thus going to have to make concessions to ensure that this is the case (as, indeed, they already have done). The Bayrou government will thus make less progress on reducing the deficit in 2025 than Barnier was proposing to do, and will not succeed in its goal of containing it at 5.4% of GDP.​

2026 forecasts: higher growth, at the level of potential growth​

Growth will probably pick up in 2026 – assuming the uncertainty dissipates to some degree – to 1.1%, the level of potential growth. However, the output gap will still be negative at the end of 2026. Inflation is predicted to quicken slightly, though remaining well below the ECB’s 2% target, with CPI inflation coming in at 1.3%.

Investment should bounce back, growing by 1.5%, with private investment driven by the delayed effect of ECB rate cuts and structural requirements arising from the twofold transition (digital and ecological). Investment by non-financial corporations is set to increase by 1.7%, and household investment to grow by 2.1%. Based on our assumptions for 2026, household consumption – no longer undermined by uncertainty – will quicken, growing by 1.1%. The contribution to growth of foreign trade and changes in inventories is predicted to be zero. Government consumption expenditure and investment are likely to once again slow (increasing by 0.4% and 0.3% respectively).

As regards the public finances, our scenario assumes that the public deficit will fall to 5.5% of GDP in 2026, with public debt reaching 119.4% of GDP.​

06.02.2025 PDF
In summary
The downward revision of our forecasts for the German economy is in line with the preliminary estimate of a 0.2% contraction in GDP in 2024. Activity in the first three quarters of 2024 was supported in particular by public consumption, despite limited budgetary resources. Household consumption, on the other hand, weighed on growth. Households switched to savings because of low consumer confidence in a context of mediocre economic performance, and because purchasing power gains were still too timid. The rise in investment in other products would not be enough to offset the collapse in construction investment and the fall in productive investment. Gross fixed capital formation is likely to continue to be penalised by the long lag in the pass-through of past interest rate rises and by the deterioration in Germany's industrial sector. Net exports are expected to continue to contract, due to a fall in exports and an increase in imports. Inflation continues to slow, albeit at a slower pace, averaging 2.5% in 2024.

Economic activity in 2025 would be underpinned by public consumption and, to a lesser extent, by a slight increase in household consumption. We forecast a very slight recovery in GDP to 0.2% in 2025. We expect activity to accelerate in the second half of 2025, taking GDP to 0.8% in 2026, slightly above the economy's potential, but clearly below the growth seen over the last decade. The disinflationary process would continue, with inflation averaging 2.1% in 2025 and stabilising at 2% in 2026.

The deterioration in the economic and financial situation of companies was limited, which helped to keep the unemployment rate at very low levels. Nevertheless, the manufacturing industry has been negatively affected by the new context of higher energy prices. Besides energy prices, there are other structural challenges linked to labour shortages and the transformation of production, leading to uncertainty about the medium-term economic outlook.

The German industry has been in recession since production peaked in 2017. In November 2024, industrial production was 29 points below the trend recorded between 1990 and 2019. We forecast a 5.5% decline in productive investment in 2024, followed by a marked moderation in the fall to 0.5% in 2025, and a very slight recovery of 2% in 2026.

2024.09.08 PDF

In summary

Despite inflationary pressures and high interest rates, Italian growth proved "resilient" in 2023. Growth picked up slightly at the start of 2024, with a 0.3% increase in GDP, leaving an overhang of 0.6% for the year. Lower inflation combined with a stable labour market should support a modest recovery in consumption in the coming quarters, though consumer caution and a high savings rate may prevent a stronger recovery.

Business investment remains hindered by high financing costs but could benefit from the Transition 5.0 plan. The construction sector is expected to hold up in 2024 despite the end of the "Superbonus", as it will be supported by the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP), and in particular the funds allocated to public works and infrastructure projects.

Growth is expected to continue to stabilise in 2025 as household consumption firms on controlled inflation and a gradual decline in interest rates. Though business investment will benefit from the positive effects of monetary easing and stronger domestic demand, the end of the "Superbonus" will continue to weigh on the construction sector. Exports are expected to grow in step with a modest improvement in global demand, particularly from emerging markets. Italy is expected to generate moderate economic growth of close to 1% in 2025.

In June 2024, annual inflation remained at 0.8% for the third consecutive month, while core inflation held steady at 2%, but the trend was contrasted from one product category to the next. Energy product prices are heading downwards, although the decline slowed from -11.6% in May to -8.6% in June. Inflation on unprocessed food prices also decreased substantially, from 2.2% in May to 0.4% in June

Sofia TOZY, Economist, Italy and Scandinavian countries

March 06, 2025 7:00 am
 
So they’re going to rebuild Gaza, AND invest €800 billion in a collective armed forces to defeat Russia all in the next few years? What’s in that cake and how do they get it into the bong?
I might be wrong but I read this announcement as Germany France and UK agreeing that the plan is a good one. It doesn't say they were going to contribute.
 
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