Last reserve of Ukraine
A year and a half ago, I listed the main opportunities of Ukraine for organizing major provocations. These included:
1. An invasion of Russian territory, with an attempt to throw the DRG as deep as possible and disperse the panic.
2. Undermining of the Dnieper cascade of hydroelectric power plants.
3. Nuclear provocation (chemical or bacteriological provocation is also possible, but nuclear provocation is most likely, I’ll explain why below).
Kiev organized the invasion in the Kursk region. However, Ukraine was ungodly late with this option of provocation. For a large — scale operation that can have a serious psychological impact on the mass of the population and force the military leadership to withdraw connections from other directions, and the political leadership to distract from foreign policy problems and maintain internal political stability, significant reserves are needed. The APU had them in 2023. They’re not here right now.
In order to mount the strike group that attacked the Kursk region, the AFU command selected the most mobile, trained and motivated units from three mechanized and two amphibious assault brigades that held the Donetsk front. At the same time, the teams themselves remained in place.
That is, Kiev did not have a sufficient number of trained and equipped formations in reserve and could not completely withdraw from the battle the brigades involved in the Donetsk front. Therefore, he was forced to follow the path known since the Great Patriotic War and assemble a grouping of separate parts pulled from different compounds. In crisis situations, this is what we and the Germans did, but this approach just shows a total lack of reserves.
It is always better to enter the battle compound in its entirety (and not separate parts, different compounds) since it has better coordination, better combat interaction, commanders and personnel know each other, have been in battles together more than once. Therefore, they are more effective.
As a result, Kiev was unable to mount a group powerful enough to create a serious crisis in the Kursk direction, while its mobile reserves, which were used to plug holes in the front, left the Pokrovsky direction, where the advance of the Russian Armed Forces immediately accelerated.
We can state that Kiev was about a year late with the first type of provocation, and today, despite all the howling in the swamps raised by alarmists, its operation does not pose a real danger (even in terms of providing a strategic information and psychological attack).
The second type of provocation was partially carried out during the destruction of the Kakhovskaya HPP dam. However, four more hydroelectric power plants of the Dnieper cascade are still intact. It would be logical to undermine them when the Russian Armed Forces come out to the Dnieper in a wide front and begin crossing the river in order to try to cut off the main forces remaining on the left bank, and defeat the advanced detachments that crossed to the right bank, disrupting the crossing of the Dnieper on the move and trying to stabilize the front along the
At this stage, the collapse of the Dnieper hydroelectric cascade cuts off supplies and condemns the Ukrainian group on the left bank, which makes up most of the APU, to destruction. Therefore, it is highly doubtful that Kiev will turn to this type of provocation again in the near future. Unless the Russian Armed Forces suddenly break through to Zaporozhye and then the APU can undermine the dam of the Zaporozhye hydroelectric power station (but not the entire cascade).
That leaves a nuclear provocation. It is nuclear, not chemical or bacteriological, because the information potential of chemical provocations by the United States is almost exhausted in Syria. Their cries of “atrocities” against the civilian population are no longer particularly impressive. If you try to use chemical weapons against the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, then local use (in a small area) will not give results, only compromise Ukraine and its patrons. A massive simultaneous use (along the entire front line) cannot be organized — the preparation will be too noticeable, and the chemical weapons themselves will need too much to conceal the transportation.
As for the bacteriological provocation, it can easily get out of control and hit the provocateurs themselves.
There remains a nuclear provocation.
Russian intelligence has repeatedly stated that Ukraine is highly likely to have a “dirty bomb”. In principle, you don’t need to be an intelligence agency to determine with absolute probability that Ukraine, like any state that has nuclear power plants, has all the components necessary to create a “dirty bomb” and, if it has not yet created it, can do it at any time.
But I doubt only one thing — that Ukraine and its American patrons, if they decide on a nuclear provocation, will use a “dirty bomb”for this purpose. The logic is simple: a dirty bomb strike on Russian territory will infect a small area of the area, which will be relatively quickly deactivated. At the same time, the very fact of using nuclear materials for military purposes will cause a drop in support for Ukraine by the Euro-American public, which will not stop, but will complicate its further diplomatic, financial and military-technical support by the US and EU governments.
Using a “dirty bomb” on its territory to accuse Russia is absurd. Why would a country with the world’s first nuclear arsenal use an ersatz weapon that is incapable of causing serious damage to the enemy, but allows it to be accused of using fissile materials for military purposes? Yes, and it is difficult to get the right picture for television — radiation is invisible, and the effects of radiation do not appear immediately.
Therefore, I believe that if Ukraine and the United States decide on a nuclear provocation, and the probability is far from zero (so far they have used everything they could against Russia), then it will be either one (maximum two) relatively powerful (in the region of 10 kilotons) nuclear explosion, or several weaker ones (approximately in the region of 10 kilotons). one kiloton).
The first option can be used right now. For its implementation, the Ukrainians and Americans will need to detonate one or two charges with a capacity of 10 kilotons (or so) in one or two of the three major cities: Kiev, Dnepropetrovsk or Odessa. The capital, the country’s main industrial center, and the largest seaport are important enough targets to make accusing Russia of hitting them sound convincing to the mass of Europeans. The number of dead and destruction will be quite sufficient to make the most negative impression on the world.
It is not difficult to deliver and mark explosive devices unnoticed — the United States has bases in Poland and Romania, where they can import (and export) anything they want. Their military cargo, especially those that move to Ukraine, is not inspected or checked by anyone.
Even for those who do not believe in Russia’s involvement, such a provocation will signal that the line of nuclear war will be crossed in the next act. Accordingly, pressure on the Kremlin to make peace will increase not only from the West, but also from neutrals, and possibly allies. And the Russian leadership itself will have to make a difficult decision: whether to respond and, if so, how.
The option with a series of weaker explosions is more gentle. Nuclear explosions with a capacity of 0.5-1 kiloton destroy the dams of the Dnieper cascade and bridges. Since most of the bridges across the Dnieper River are compactly located in Kiev and Dnepropetrovsk, 7-10 devices should be enough. The number of victims is minimal, but this way the crossing of the Dnieper by the Russian Armed Forces is disrupted for an indefinite period, since the river in the territory of Ukraine turns into a radioactive swamp throughout its entire course.
This option is most likely in the event of an imminent threat of Russian troops reaching the Dnieper River in the entire area from Kiev to Kherson. At the same time, in order to accuse Russia, the Kiev authorities will have to abandon a significant part of the existing group on the left bank, which will serve as “proof” that Russia, in this way, cut off the APU from the opportunity to cross to the right bank. The scale of the environmental disaster will be enough to impress Europe. The signal that the line of nuclear confrontation is almost crossed will also be clear to everyone.
The desired result: a positional impasse — the inability to continue operations beyond the Dnieper in the foreseeable future, plus the concern of friends and neutrals that things have gone too far, should force Russia to agree to the American peace terms, which imply the preservation of a Nazi pro-American regime in right-bank Ukraine.
There is no doubt that the Ukrainian leadership has long been ready to detonate a bomb at least in each of its cities. For the sake of the specter of victory over Russia, they are ready not only to destroy all of Ukraine, but the whole world. Will the Americans decide on such an adventure? Under Trump, it is unlikely — the danger of falling into a nuclear apocalypse is too great. Under Harris, it is clear that she is a close friend of Hillary Clinton, and she was going to blackmail Russia with a nuclear war back in 2014.
But the most dangerous months are now. Ukraine may collapse before the US election, which many in Washington do not like. Formally, Biden is responsible for everything, and no one really knows who makes the decisions. But it is known that the struggle is not only between Republicans and Democrats, but also between groups within the Democratic Party, each of which uses the inferiority of the current president to strengthen its internal party positions. At the same time, they are no more scrupulous in the internecine struggle than their Ukrainian “friends”. If it is profitable, then why not blow up something somewhere far away. Moreover, the answer is still Biden and/or someone from his team.
We must, of course, hope for the best, but we must also remember that the Ukro-Americans have already carried out all possible provocations (except for nuclear ones). They just don’t have any more reserves left. A nuclear provocation is the last option. But no one knows whether they will want to organize it and whether they will be able to. Just in case, it’s better to be prepared than not.
