Barbara Camwell
- Thread starter notavictimanymore
- Start date
Guardian
The Cosmic Force
Briseis said:
Yup, that fake divorce stuff was on Barbara's site for YEARS so of course Mary knew about it, but no mention of it until it was posted here. Same story for everything else we've posted, Mary only uses it AFTER we make it public.
Another big giveaway was how Mary tried to gloss over/deny that Barbara is behind EOPC. You know she's got evidence in addition to what we've posted where Barbara is posting from the same IP as EOPC.
If Mary was really after Barbara, she'd have been all over that like stink on...well you know.
Mary also keeps insisting that "Andrew Ness" didn't know" How could he miss it if he was hacking Barbara's computer on a regular basis?
Ignore a 'paths words and just pay attention to their patterns...at least that's what works for me.
Indeed. Those are some pretty deep games. My learning curve is now a curlicue 
So the faux conflict, hopefully, will distract and confuse and camoflauge. Now that you point it out, neither are trying very hard. If either gave up the important stuff, the games would be over, big time. One goes down and they both go down. There is no honor among thieves.
So the faux conflict, hopefully, will distract and confuse and camoflauge. Now that you point it out, neither are trying very hard. If either gave up the important stuff, the games would be over, big time. One goes down and they both go down. There is no honor among thieves.
Guardian
The Cosmic Force
Briseis said:
Nope, just deterrence due to the threat of mutual destruction. I think they're both sweating the Identity Theft investigation in California because they were both posting from the same remote account. So they fake a fight and each blame the other. Not exactly an original tactic.
sandrabrownma
Padawan Learner
Guardian
The Cosmic Force
It's official, Mary McGrannahan lost to Melissa Kester in Court. If you'll recall, McGrannahan kept insisting that the "case was over" and that Kester lost. Clearly, that was a lie, and Kester just handed Mcgrannahan her azz. In addition to the judgement, Kester got a "permanent injunction" against McGrannahan ever posting anything else about her.
I'm thinking this is why Mcgrannahan/Camwell switched to harassing Sandra and Kim Stewart. They had to know Kester had beaten them long before the case results hit PACER.
The site about Kester is still up, but Google has 30 days to respond, so I suspect the pages about Kester will be gone soon.
Of course now Camwell and McGrannahan will just concentrate even more on their other victims, as cowards always do when they've been beaten, but at least we have proof they're liars.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
MELISSA KESTER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 10-01215-CV-W-BP
)
MARY McGRANNAHAN, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Melissa Kester’s Motion for Summary
Judgment. (Doc. 47.) Kester moves for summary judgment on her defamation claim against
Defendant Mary McGrannahan. For relief, Kester seeks a permanent injunction ordering
McGrannahan to remove all defamatory statements from her internet websites and to abstain
from republishing those statements through any medium.1 McGrannahan did not file an
Opposition to Kester’s Motion, and the time for doing so has long since passed. For the reasons
set forth below, Kester’s Motion will be GRANTED.
1 Kester’s Complaint asserts two claims against McGrannahan: defamation (Count I) and prima
facie tort (Count II). (Doc. 1.) Kester prays for monetary and injunctive relief as a remedy for
these torts. (Id.) Kester appears to seek summary judgment on each of her two claims, as well as
on her prayer for both monetary and injunctive relief. (Docs. 47, 48.) However, the substance of
her briefing addresses only defamation and injunctive relief. As a result, the Court cannot
determine whether Kester is entitled to summary judgment on her prima facie tort claim, and it
cannot determine the value, if any, of her monetary damages. Primary Care Investors, Seven,
Inc. v. PHP Healthcare Corp., 986 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1993) (party must develop an
argument in order for a court to consider it); Comcast of Ill. X v. Multi-Vision Elecs., Inc., 491
F.3d 938, 947 (8th Cir. 2007) (damages must be based on evidence and cannot be speculative);
Howard Johnson Int'l, Inc. v. Inn Dev., Inc., No. CIV. 07-1024-KES, 2008 WL 5378247, at *9
(D.S.D. Dec. 22, 2008) (insufficient evidence to grant summary judgment as to value of
damages). Accordingly, the Court will construe Kester’s Motion as exclusively seeking
injunctive relief on the defamation claim. To the extent it seeks any other relief, it is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 1 of 15
2
I. Facts.
In moving for summary judgment, Kester relies primarily upon two evidentiary materials.
The first is her own affidavit. (Kester Aff., Doc. 47-2.) The second is the Rule 36 Requests for
Admission she served on McGrannahan. (Pl.’s Reqs. Admin. (“Requests”), Doc. 47-3.)
McGrannahan did not respond in any matter to these Requests, and thus they are deemed to be
admitted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3).2 McGrannahan did not file an Opposition to Kester’s
Motion. Therefore, the following statement of facts is taken from the undisputed evidentiary
record presented to the Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); L.R. 56.1(a).
Kester is a psychologist, consultant, and videographer, and she is based in Healdsburg,
California. McGrannahan is a resident of Kansas City, Missouri. In 2010, Kester contacted
McGrannahan regarding an idea for a documentary film. Kester proposed making a film about
McGrannahan’s experience with her abusive husband during their marriage and after his death.
Initially, McGrannahan was agreeable to working with and being filmed by Kester and her crew.
Thus, Kester made preparations and incurred expenses so that her crew could film McGrannahan
in Kansas City during August 2010. Kester intended to create a “sizzle reel” with this footage,
for use in pitching and marketing the proposed film. However, shortly after filming
McGrannahan became dissatisfied with Kester, for two reasons. First, McGrannahan felt the
sizzle reel did not sufficiently emphasize the death of her dog, which she claimed had been killed
by her deceased husband. Second, she felt Kester and her crew were taking too long to create the
2 Kester served the Requests on McGrannahan on January 4, 2012. (Mallin Aff. ¶ 8, Doc. 47-4;
Certificate of Service, Doc. 43.) These Requests sought admission of 36 factual matters at issue
in this case. (See Pl.’s Reqs. Admis., Doc. 47-3.) McGrannahan never responded to these
Requests. (Mallin Aff. ¶ 9.) As a result, McGrannahan is deemed to have admitted the factual
matters addressed in them. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3); Quasius v. Schwan Food Co., 596 F.3d 947,
950 (8th Cir. 2010). As a result, these factual matters have been “conclusively established” for
purposes of this case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b); Quasius, 596 F.3d at 950.
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 2 of 15
3
sizzle reel. When Kester attempted to address these issues, McGrannahan became
uncooperative, hostile, and verbally aggressive. In September 2010, Kester ceased all work on
the project and asked that McGrannahan no longer communicate with her.
Since then, McGrannahan has used the internet to make false statements about Kester,
concerning both her personal and professional lives. In October 2010, McGrannahan created the
website “www.AnotherHollywoodCockroach.blogspot.com” (www.AHC.com). (Requests ¶ 1.)
As of December 28, 2011, McGrannahan had authored or authorized 185 blog entries to this
website, and nearly all of them concern Kester in some manner. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 28.)
McGrannahan’s entries about Kester take three different forms. First, McGrannahan
made the following false assertions about Kester’s conduct:
That Kester extorted money from and preyed upon McGrannahan as a victim of
domestic violence; (Id. ¶ 4.)
That Kester distributed prescription drugs to McGrannahan; (Id. ¶ 5.)
That Kester lied about her professional experiences writing for television and film
projects; (Id. ¶ 7.)
That Kester sent McGrannahan several e-mails using the profile name “wallaby” in
which she defamed third persons; (Id. ¶ 8.)
That Kester hired a third person to stalk and harass McGrannahan; (Id. ¶ 9.)
That Kester has falsely represented herself as a licensed psychologist to employers
and the public, and that Kester has impersonated a psychologist; (Id. ¶ 11.)
That Kester sent nude photos of herself to Dana Gioia and discussed with him waxing
her pubic hair; (Id. ¶ 14.)
That Kester maintained accounts on the Facebook.com social media website under
the names “Angela Smith,” “Catherine Adjani,” and “Lauren Periera” for the sole
purpose of stalking third persons; (Id. ¶ 15.)
That Kester paid a third party to illegally appropriate copyrighted material authored
by McGrannahan; (Id. ¶ 18.)
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 3 of 15
4
That Kester sent e-mails to McGrannahan in which she stated she was going to make
“mega money” off of McGrannahan’s story by appropriating it for her own ends; (Id.
¶ 19.)
That Kester lied about her employment history and has attempted to have sexual
relations with performance artists with whom she contracted for a charity event
during her tenure as Development Officer for the Arts at the Community Foundation
of Sonoma County; (Id. ¶ 20.)
That Kester falsely presents herself as a licensed psychologist and has attempted to
secure employment as an unlicensed psychologist; and (Id. ¶ 21.)
That Kester attempted to extort money from her film and production crew in order to
make a documentary film called Caught Dead. (Id. ¶ 22.)
Second, McGrannahan falsely asserted that Kester made the following statements about herself:
That Kester admitted to attempting to manipulate Dana Gioia into funding one of her
film projects; (Id. ¶ 6.)
That Kester accused her ex-husband, Matt Bail, of being psychologically abusive
towards her and being physically abusive and neglectful towards her children; (Id. ¶
12.)
That Kester stated her mother, Bronya Galef, was an alcoholic, a narcissist, and a bad
parent; (Id. ¶ 13.)
That Kester claimed to have engaged in telephone sex and sexual intercourse with
multiple married men; (Id. ¶ 16.)
That Kester said she wanted to have sexual relations with opera singer Rod Gilfry in
the presence of Gilfry’s unattractive wife; (Id. ¶ 17.)
That Kester said she would ensure the film Caught Dead was never made and that
McGrannahan forever remain impoverished; and (Id. ¶ 23.)
That Kester promised she would be able to live off of the proceeds of Caught Dead.
(Id. ¶ 24.)
Finally, McGrannahan fabricated e-mails and falsely attributed them to Kester, thereby it appear
as though the following false assertions about Kester are substantiated and credible:
That Kester wanted to seduce artists William O’Keeffe and Dominic Egan; (Id. ¶¶ 3,
10.)
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 4 of 15
5
That Kester sent McGrannahan several e-mails using the profile name “wallaby” in
which she defamed third persons; (Id. ¶ 8, 10.)
That Kester accused her ex-husband, Matt Bail, of being psychologically abusive
towards her and being physically abusive and neglectful towards her children; (Id. ¶
12, 10.)
That Kester stated her mother, Bronya Galef, was an alcoholic, a narcissist, and a bad
parent; (Id. ¶ 13, 10.)
That Kester claimed to have engaged in telephone sex and sexual intercourse with
men married to other women; (Id. ¶ 16, 10.)
That Kester said she wanted to have sexual relations with opera singer Rod Gilfry in
the presence of Gilfry’s unattractive wife; and (Id. ¶ 17, 10.)
That Kester sent e-mails to McGrannahan in which Kester stated she was going to
make “mega money” off of McGrannahan’s story by appropriating it for her own
ends. (Id. ¶ 19, 10.)
McGrannahan made each of these false statements with knowledge of their falsity and with the
specific intention of causing damage to Kester’s professional reputation. (Id. ¶¶ 1-24.)
McGrannahan’s website, www.AHC.com, is publicly accessible. (Id. ¶¶ 25-27.)
McGrannahan has directly contacted Kester’s family, friends, and professional colleagues,
including her former, current, and prospective employers, and directed them towards this
website. (Id. ¶¶ 29-35.) In particular, McGrannahan has directly contacted Kester’s professional
colleagues and made to them false statements about Kester. (Id. ¶ 29, 33-35.) Moreover,
McGrannahan has posted false information about Kester on at least ten publicly available
websites other than www.AHC.com, and some of these postings provides link to each other,
thereby increasing their online visibility and accessibility. (Id. ¶ 36.) As of December 28, 2011,
www.AHC.com had accumulated over 50,000 page views. (Id. ¶ 27.)
McGrannahan’s false statements have caused harm to Kester. A search for “Melissa
Kester” using the internet search engine Google.com returns links to McGrannahan’s websites.
(Kester Aff. ¶ 29-30.) Because of the volume and nature of these search results, prospective
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 5 of 15
6
employers have informed Kester they cannot hire her due to the risk of negative publicity. (Id. ¶
26, 32.) Employers have also avoided hiring Kester out of fear that they may become the next
subject of McGrannahan’s attacks. (Id. ¶ 32-33.) As a result, Kester’s ability to earn a living has
deteriorated as a direct result of McGrannahan’s false statements. (Id. ¶ 28.) In addition, Kester
has incurred monetary expenses in attempting to remove McGrannahan’s websites and in
bringing this legal action. (Id. ¶ 34; Mallin Aff. ¶ 5-6.) Finally, McGrannahan has contacted
Kester on several occasions and offered to stop posting the statements if Kester pays her money.
(Kester Aff. ¶ 36.).
II. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment.
Summary judgment is a way for a court to resolve a lawsuit without holding a trial.
Inland Oil & Transp. Co. v. United States, 600 F.2d 725, 728 (8th Cir. 1979). When a party
moves for summary judgment, the court’s role is to determine whether the evidentiary record
contains genuine issues of material fact. Connolly v. Clark, 457 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2006).
The court makes this determination by viewing the facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party. Heacker v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 676 F.3d 724, 726-27 (8th Cir.
2012). A party is entitled to summary judgment when the evidentiary record shows there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a); Heacker, 676 F.3d at 726-27. A court can grant summary judgment based
on a party’s failure to respond to Rule 36 requests for admission, so long as the resulting factual
admissions are dispositive of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b); Quasius v. Schwan Food Co., 596
F.3d 947, 950-51 (8th Cir. 2010).
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 6 of 15
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III. Discussion.
Kester moves for summary judgment on her defamation claim. As a remedy, Kester
seeks entry of a permanent injunction. The Court will address each of these issues in turn.
a. McGrannahan is liable for defamation.
Missouri tort law governs Kester’s defamation claim. Walker v. Barrett, 650 F.3d 1198,
1203 (8th Cir. 2011). Under Missouri law, the elements of defamation are: “1) publication, 2) of
a defamatory statement, 3) that identifies the plaintiff, 4) that is false, 5) that is published with
the requisite degree of fault, and 6) damages the plaintiff's reputation.” Overcast v. Billings Mut.
Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 62, 70 (Mo. 2000). The degree of fault required to hold a defendant liable
for defamation depends upon whether the plaintiff is a private or public figure. See, e.g., Nazeri
v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 309-10 (Mo. 1993) (reviewing principles of defamation
law). Under Missouri law, the degree of fault required when a plaintiff is a private figure is
negligence. Overcast, 11 S.W.3d at 70. Because the Court finds that Kester is a private figure,
she must show that McGrannahan acted negligently. Id.
The undisputed facts presented above establish that McGrannahan is liable for
defamation. The record shows that McGrannahan has made the following false statements about
Kester:
That Kester extorted money from and preyed upon McGrannahan as a victim of
domestic violence; (Id. ¶ 4.)
That Kester distributed prescription drugs to McGrannahan; (Id. ¶ 5.)
That Kester lied about her professional experiences writing for television and film
projects; (Id. ¶ 7.)
That Kester sent McGrannahan several e-mails using the profile name “wallaby,” in
which she defamed third persons; (Id. ¶ 8.)
That Kester hired a third person to stalk and harass McGrannahan; (Id. ¶ 9.)
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 7 of 15
8
That Kester has falsely represented herself as a licensed psychologist to future
employers and the public, and that Kester has impersonated a psychologist; (Id. ¶ 11.)
That Kester sent nude photos of herself to Dana Gioia and discussed with him waxing
her pubic hair; (Id. ¶ 14.)
That Kester maintained accounts on the Facebook.com social media website under
the names “Angela Smith,” “Catherine Adjani,” and “Lauren Periera” for the sole
purpose of stalking third persons; (Id. ¶ 15.)
That Kester paid a third party to illegally appropriate copyrighted material authored
by McGrannahan; (Id. ¶ 18.)
That Kester sent her e-mails, in which Kester stated she was going to make “mega
money” off of McGrannahan’s story by appropriating it for her own ends; (Id. ¶ 19.)
That Kester lied about her employment history and has attempted to have sexual
relations with performance artists with whom she contracted for a charity event
during her tenure as Development Officer for the Arts at the Community Foundation
of Sonoma County; (Id. ¶ 20.)
That Kester falsely presents herself as a licensed psychologist and has attempted to
secure employment as an unlicensed psychologist; and (Id. ¶ 21.)
That Kester attempted to extort money from her film and production crew in order to
make a documentary film called Caught Dead. (Id. ¶ 22.)
That Kester admitted to attempting to manipulate Dana Gioia into funding one of her
film projects; (Id. ¶ 6.)
That Kester accused her ex-husband, Matt Bail, of being psychologically abusive
towards her and being physically abusive and neglectful towards her children; (Id. ¶
12.)
That Kester stated her mother, Bronya Galef, was an alcoholic, a narcissist, and a bad
parent; (Id. ¶ 13.)
That Kester claimed to have engaged in telephone sex and sexual intercourse with
multiple married men; (Id. ¶ 16.)
That Kester said she wanted to have sexual relations with opera singer Rod Gilfry in
the presence of Gilfry’s unattractive wife; (Id. ¶ 17.)
That Kester said she would ensure the film Caught Dead was never made and that
McGrannahan forever remain impoverished; and (Id. ¶ 23.)
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 8 of 15
9
That Kester promised she would be able to live off of the proceeds of Caught Dead.
(Id. ¶ 24.)
That Kester wanted to seduce artists William O’Keeffe and Dominic Egan; (Id. ¶¶ 3,
10.)
In addition, McGrannahan fabricated e-mails and falsely attributed them to Kester, thereby it
appear as though the following false assertions about Kester are substantiated and credible:
That Kester wanted to seduce artists William O’Keeffe and Dominic Egan; (Id. ¶¶ 3,
10.)
That Kester sent McGrannahan several e-mails using the profile name “wallaby” in
which she defamed third persons; (Id. ¶ 8, 10.)
That Kester accused her ex-husband, Matt Bail, of being psychologically abusive
towards her and being physically abusive and neglectful towards her children; (Id. ¶
12, 10.)
That Kester stated her mother, Bronya Galef, was an alcoholic, a narcissist, and a bad
parent; (Id. ¶ 13, 10.)
That Kester claimed to have engaged in telephone sex and sexual intercourse with
multiple married men; (Id. ¶ 16.)
That Kester said she wanted to have sexual relations with opera singer Rod Gilfry in
the presence of Gilfry’s unattractive wife; and (Id. ¶ 17, 10.)
That Kester sent e-mails to McGrannahan in which Kester stated she was going to
make “mega money” off of McGrannahan’s story by appropriating it for her own
ends. (Id. ¶ 19, 10.)
The record shows McGrannahan published each of these statements by posting them to her
internet websites and communicating them to other persons. Each of these statements identifies
Kester by name, and they make false factual assertions about her. These statements have
damaged Kester’s reputation among her personal and professional associates, and they have
made it more difficult for her to secure employment. Finally, the record shows that, at the least,
McGrannahan was negligent in making these statements. Accordingly, the record presented
establishes that McGrannahan is liable for defamation.
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 9 of 15
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b. Kester is entitled to a permanent injunction.
An injunction is a legal remedy designed to prevent future violations of the law. United
States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). When a court issues an injunction, it affects
a party’s behavior by ordering that party to engage in or abstain from certain conduct. Nken v.
Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 428 (2009). Because an injunction is enforceable by a court’s power of
contempt, it is an extraordinary remedy and should not be granted as a matter of course. Gunn v.
Univ. Comm. to End War in Viet Nam, 399 U.S. 383, 389 (1970). These principles have special
force when an injunction concerns speech, because of the danger the injunction will operate as an
unconstitutional prior restraint. Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 738 (2005) (collecting cases).
The Supreme Court has not decided whether it is constitutional for a court to issue a
permanent injunction against defamatory speech. Id. at 738-30 (declining to resolve issue).
However, under existing precedent it is clear that a court may enjoin unprotected speech.
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390-91 (1973)
(injunction against publication upheld, based on established recurring course of unprotected
speech). In addition, numerous courts have held that issuing a permanent injunction against
defamation is constitutional. E.g., Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200, 1206, 1208-09 (6th
Cir. 1990) (where statements adjudicated to be defamatory were frequent and recurring,
injunction granted to prevent additional harm to plaintiff’s personal reputation and business
relations); Hill v. Petrotech Res. Corp., 325 S.W.3d 302, 309 (Ky. 2010) (surveying caselaw, and
holding that speech adjudicated to be defamatory may be enjoined); Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc.
v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 349 (Cal. 2007) (“Accordingly, we hold that, following a trial at which
it is determined that the defendant defamed the plaintiff, the court may issue an injunction
prohibiting the defendant from repeating the statements determined to be defamatory.”). The
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 10 of 15
11
key is that an injunction must target speech that already has been found to be defamatory. E.g.,
Balboa Island, 156 P.3d at 344-45 (“Prohibiting a person from making a statement or publishing
a writing before that statement is spoken or the writing is published is far different from
prohibiting a defendant from repeating a statement or republishing a writing that has been
determined at trial to be defamatory and, thus, unlawful.”) (emphasis in original).
As set forth above, the record establishes that McGrannahan’s statements are defamatory.
Therefore, Kester has achieved success on the merits of her claim and she may be entitled to a
permanent injunction. Bank One, Utah v. Guttau, 190 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 1999) (permanent
injunction requires attaining success on the merits). Therefore, the Court will determine whether
to enter a permanent injunction by weighing the following factors: “(1) the threat of irreparable
harm to the moving party; (2) the balance of harm between this harm and the harm suffered by
the nonmoving party if the injunction is granted; and (3) the public interest.” Taylor Corp. v.
Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958, 967 (8th Cir. 2005).
The Court finds that these factors weigh in favor of entering a permanent injunction.
First, McGrannahan’s defamatory statements have caused Kester irreparable harm. These
statements have negatively impacted Kester’s personal and professional reputation, and they
prevented Kester from securing employment. That these statements are freely available and
accessible on the internet suggests that they will continue to cause her harm for an indefinite
future time. Second, the balance of harms favors Kester. As shown above, McGrannahan’s
defamatory statements have caused considerable harm to Kester, including to her livelihood.
E.g., Barlow v. Sipes, 744 N.E.2d 1, 8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding injunction in part, based
on damage to business’s reputation and goodwill). In contrast, an injunction will cause little
harm to McGrannahan, because defamatory speech about a private figure is of little value. E.g.,
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 11 of 15
12
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992). Third and finally, the public interest
favors an injunction, as shown by laws criminalizing harassment and stalking. 18 U.S.C. § 2261;
Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 160.775, 565.090, 565.225.
An injunction must state its terms specifically and describe in reasonable detail the acts
its restrains or requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d); Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 790 (8th
Cir. 2004); see Metro. Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Local 100, Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int'l
Union, 239 F.3d 172, 176-79 (2d Cir. 2001) (vacating as unconstitutionally vague an injunction
against “harassing” and “fraudulent or defamatory representations”); Wynn Oil Co. v. Purolator
Chem. Corp., 536 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1976) (rejecting injunction against “slandering and
disparaging”). Moreover, an injunction against defamatory speech must be tailored to the facts
presented and cannot sweep more broadly than is necessary. Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 738
(2005); Nolan v. Campbell, 690 N.W.2d 638, 653 (Neb. Ct. App. 2004) (“In order for the
injunction to pass constitutional muster, the suppression must be limited to the precise statements
already found libelous.”). The Court finds that the injunction set forth below meets this standard.
In particular, the Court notes that this injunction is similar to injunctions entered by other courts
in comparable factual circumstances. Doe v. Hofstetter, No. 11-cv-02209-DME-MJW (D. Colo.
Aug. 14, 2012); Saadi v. Maroun, No. 8:07CV01976T24MAP, 2009 WL 3617788 (M.D. Fla.
Nov. 2, 2009).
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 12 of 15
13
IV. Conclusion.
As set forth herein, the undisputed evidentiary record shows that McGrannahan is liable
for defamation and that Kester is entitled to a permanent injunction.
Accordingly, Plaintiff Melissa Kester’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 47) is
hereby GRANTED. Kester shall have judgment against Defendant Mary McGrannahan on her
prayer for permanent injunctive relief the defamation claim alleged in Count I.
Furthermore, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. McGrannahan shall immediately remove from any and all websites all materials
she has authored that contain material the Court has found to be defamatory, including all
statements that assert:
a. That Kester extorted money from and preyed upon McGrannahan as a
victim of domestic violence;
b. That Kester distributed prescription drugs to McGrannahan;
c. That Kester lied about her professional experience writing for television
and film projects;
d. That Kester sent McGrannahan e-mails using the profile name “wallaby”
in which she defamed third persons, and that Kester authored any such emails;
e. That Kester hired a third person to stalk and harass McGrannahan;
f. That Kester has falsely represented herself as a licensed psychologist to
future employers and to the public, and that Kester has impersonated a
psychologist;
g. That Kester sent nude photos of herself to Dana Gioia and discussed with
him waxing her pubic hair;
h. That Kester maintained accounts on the Facebook.com social media
website under the names “Angela Smith,” “Catherine Adjani,” and
“Lauren Periera” for the sole purpose of stalking third persons;
i. That Kester paid a third party to illegally appropriate copyrighted material
authored by McGrannahan;
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 13 of 15
14
j. That Kester sent e-mails to McGrannahan in which Kester stated she was
going to make “mega money” off of McGrannahan’s story by
appropriating it for her own ends, and that Kester authored such any emails;
k. That Kester lied about her employment history and has attempted to have
sexual relations with performance artists with whom she contracted for a
charity event during her tenure as Development Officer for the Arts at the
Community Foundation of Sonoma County;
l. That Kester falsely presents herself as a licensed psychologist and has
attempted to secure employment as an unlicensed psychologist;
m. That Kester attempted to extort money from her film and production crew
in order to make a documentary film called Caught Dead;
n. That Kester admitted to attempting to manipulate Dana Gioia into funding
one of her film projects;
o. That Kester accused her ex-husband, Matt Bail, of being psychologically
abusive towards her and being physically abusive and neglectful towards
her children, and that Kester authored any e-mails discussing such
accusations;
p. That Kester stated her mother, Bronya Galef, was an alcoholic, a
narcissist, and a bad parent, and that Kester authored any e-mails
discussing such statements;
q. That Kester claimed to have engaged in telephone sex and sexual
intercourse with multiple married men, and that Kester authored any emails
discussing such claims;
r. That Kester said she wanted to have sexual relations with opera singer
Rod Gilfry in the presence of Gilfry’s unattractive wife, and that Kester
authored any e-mails expressing such a desire;
s. That Kester said she would ensure the film Caught Dead was never made
and that McGrannahan forever remain impoverished;
t. That Kester promised she would be able to live off of the proceeds of
Caught Dead; and
u. That Kester wanted to seduce artists William O’Keeffe and Dominic
Egan, and that Kester authored any e-mails expressing such a desire.
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 14 of 15
15
2. McGrannahan shall take all steps necessary to contact third-party service
providers to ensure that the statements described above are permanently removed from the
internet immediately.
3. McGrannahan shall be enjoined from republishing, either verbally, electronically,
or through any other medium, the statements the Court has found to be defamatory. In
particular, McGrannahan shall be enjoined from making or repeating such statements to Kester’s
professional colleagues, employers, business associates, clients, friends, acquaintances and
family.
4. This Permanent Injunction is binding upon McGrannahan and her respective
officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys, as well as those persons in active concert or
participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Beth Phillips
BETH PHILLIPS, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DATE: October 26, 2012
I'm thinking this is why Mcgrannahan/Camwell switched to harassing Sandra and Kim Stewart. They had to know Kester had beaten them long before the case results hit PACER.
The site about Kester is still up, but Google has 30 days to respond, so I suspect the pages about Kester will be gone soon.
Of course now Camwell and McGrannahan will just concentrate even more on their other victims, as cowards always do when they've been beaten, but at least we have proof they're liars.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
MELISSA KESTER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 10-01215-CV-W-BP
)
MARY McGRANNAHAN, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Melissa Kester’s Motion for Summary
Judgment. (Doc. 47.) Kester moves for summary judgment on her defamation claim against
Defendant Mary McGrannahan. For relief, Kester seeks a permanent injunction ordering
McGrannahan to remove all defamatory statements from her internet websites and to abstain
from republishing those statements through any medium.1 McGrannahan did not file an
Opposition to Kester’s Motion, and the time for doing so has long since passed. For the reasons
set forth below, Kester’s Motion will be GRANTED.
1 Kester’s Complaint asserts two claims against McGrannahan: defamation (Count I) and prima
facie tort (Count II). (Doc. 1.) Kester prays for monetary and injunctive relief as a remedy for
these torts. (Id.) Kester appears to seek summary judgment on each of her two claims, as well as
on her prayer for both monetary and injunctive relief. (Docs. 47, 48.) However, the substance of
her briefing addresses only defamation and injunctive relief. As a result, the Court cannot
determine whether Kester is entitled to summary judgment on her prima facie tort claim, and it
cannot determine the value, if any, of her monetary damages. Primary Care Investors, Seven,
Inc. v. PHP Healthcare Corp., 986 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1993) (party must develop an
argument in order for a court to consider it); Comcast of Ill. X v. Multi-Vision Elecs., Inc., 491
F.3d 938, 947 (8th Cir. 2007) (damages must be based on evidence and cannot be speculative);
Howard Johnson Int'l, Inc. v. Inn Dev., Inc., No. CIV. 07-1024-KES, 2008 WL 5378247, at *9
(D.S.D. Dec. 22, 2008) (insufficient evidence to grant summary judgment as to value of
damages). Accordingly, the Court will construe Kester’s Motion as exclusively seeking
injunctive relief on the defamation claim. To the extent it seeks any other relief, it is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 1 of 15
2
I. Facts.
In moving for summary judgment, Kester relies primarily upon two evidentiary materials.
The first is her own affidavit. (Kester Aff., Doc. 47-2.) The second is the Rule 36 Requests for
Admission she served on McGrannahan. (Pl.’s Reqs. Admin. (“Requests”), Doc. 47-3.)
McGrannahan did not respond in any matter to these Requests, and thus they are deemed to be
admitted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3).2 McGrannahan did not file an Opposition to Kester’s
Motion. Therefore, the following statement of facts is taken from the undisputed evidentiary
record presented to the Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); L.R. 56.1(a).
Kester is a psychologist, consultant, and videographer, and she is based in Healdsburg,
California. McGrannahan is a resident of Kansas City, Missouri. In 2010, Kester contacted
McGrannahan regarding an idea for a documentary film. Kester proposed making a film about
McGrannahan’s experience with her abusive husband during their marriage and after his death.
Initially, McGrannahan was agreeable to working with and being filmed by Kester and her crew.
Thus, Kester made preparations and incurred expenses so that her crew could film McGrannahan
in Kansas City during August 2010. Kester intended to create a “sizzle reel” with this footage,
for use in pitching and marketing the proposed film. However, shortly after filming
McGrannahan became dissatisfied with Kester, for two reasons. First, McGrannahan felt the
sizzle reel did not sufficiently emphasize the death of her dog, which she claimed had been killed
by her deceased husband. Second, she felt Kester and her crew were taking too long to create the
2 Kester served the Requests on McGrannahan on January 4, 2012. (Mallin Aff. ¶ 8, Doc. 47-4;
Certificate of Service, Doc. 43.) These Requests sought admission of 36 factual matters at issue
in this case. (See Pl.’s Reqs. Admis., Doc. 47-3.) McGrannahan never responded to these
Requests. (Mallin Aff. ¶ 9.) As a result, McGrannahan is deemed to have admitted the factual
matters addressed in them. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3); Quasius v. Schwan Food Co., 596 F.3d 947,
950 (8th Cir. 2010). As a result, these factual matters have been “conclusively established” for
purposes of this case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b); Quasius, 596 F.3d at 950.
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 2 of 15
3
sizzle reel. When Kester attempted to address these issues, McGrannahan became
uncooperative, hostile, and verbally aggressive. In September 2010, Kester ceased all work on
the project and asked that McGrannahan no longer communicate with her.
Since then, McGrannahan has used the internet to make false statements about Kester,
concerning both her personal and professional lives. In October 2010, McGrannahan created the
website “www.AnotherHollywoodCockroach.blogspot.com” (www.AHC.com). (Requests ¶ 1.)
As of December 28, 2011, McGrannahan had authored or authorized 185 blog entries to this
website, and nearly all of them concern Kester in some manner. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 28.)
McGrannahan’s entries about Kester take three different forms. First, McGrannahan
made the following false assertions about Kester’s conduct:
That Kester extorted money from and preyed upon McGrannahan as a victim of
domestic violence; (Id. ¶ 4.)
That Kester distributed prescription drugs to McGrannahan; (Id. ¶ 5.)
That Kester lied about her professional experiences writing for television and film
projects; (Id. ¶ 7.)
That Kester sent McGrannahan several e-mails using the profile name “wallaby” in
which she defamed third persons; (Id. ¶ 8.)
That Kester hired a third person to stalk and harass McGrannahan; (Id. ¶ 9.)
That Kester has falsely represented herself as a licensed psychologist to employers
and the public, and that Kester has impersonated a psychologist; (Id. ¶ 11.)
That Kester sent nude photos of herself to Dana Gioia and discussed with him waxing
her pubic hair; (Id. ¶ 14.)
That Kester maintained accounts on the Facebook.com social media website under
the names “Angela Smith,” “Catherine Adjani,” and “Lauren Periera” for the sole
purpose of stalking third persons; (Id. ¶ 15.)
That Kester paid a third party to illegally appropriate copyrighted material authored
by McGrannahan; (Id. ¶ 18.)
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 3 of 15
4
That Kester sent e-mails to McGrannahan in which she stated she was going to make
“mega money” off of McGrannahan’s story by appropriating it for her own ends; (Id.
¶ 19.)
That Kester lied about her employment history and has attempted to have sexual
relations with performance artists with whom she contracted for a charity event
during her tenure as Development Officer for the Arts at the Community Foundation
of Sonoma County; (Id. ¶ 20.)
That Kester falsely presents herself as a licensed psychologist and has attempted to
secure employment as an unlicensed psychologist; and (Id. ¶ 21.)
That Kester attempted to extort money from her film and production crew in order to
make a documentary film called Caught Dead. (Id. ¶ 22.)
Second, McGrannahan falsely asserted that Kester made the following statements about herself:
That Kester admitted to attempting to manipulate Dana Gioia into funding one of her
film projects; (Id. ¶ 6.)
That Kester accused her ex-husband, Matt Bail, of being psychologically abusive
towards her and being physically abusive and neglectful towards her children; (Id. ¶
12.)
That Kester stated her mother, Bronya Galef, was an alcoholic, a narcissist, and a bad
parent; (Id. ¶ 13.)
That Kester claimed to have engaged in telephone sex and sexual intercourse with
multiple married men; (Id. ¶ 16.)
That Kester said she wanted to have sexual relations with opera singer Rod Gilfry in
the presence of Gilfry’s unattractive wife; (Id. ¶ 17.)
That Kester said she would ensure the film Caught Dead was never made and that
McGrannahan forever remain impoverished; and (Id. ¶ 23.)
That Kester promised she would be able to live off of the proceeds of Caught Dead.
(Id. ¶ 24.)
Finally, McGrannahan fabricated e-mails and falsely attributed them to Kester, thereby it appear
as though the following false assertions about Kester are substantiated and credible:
That Kester wanted to seduce artists William O’Keeffe and Dominic Egan; (Id. ¶¶ 3,
10.)
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 4 of 15
5
That Kester sent McGrannahan several e-mails using the profile name “wallaby” in
which she defamed third persons; (Id. ¶ 8, 10.)
That Kester accused her ex-husband, Matt Bail, of being psychologically abusive
towards her and being physically abusive and neglectful towards her children; (Id. ¶
12, 10.)
That Kester stated her mother, Bronya Galef, was an alcoholic, a narcissist, and a bad
parent; (Id. ¶ 13, 10.)
That Kester claimed to have engaged in telephone sex and sexual intercourse with
men married to other women; (Id. ¶ 16, 10.)
That Kester said she wanted to have sexual relations with opera singer Rod Gilfry in
the presence of Gilfry’s unattractive wife; and (Id. ¶ 17, 10.)
That Kester sent e-mails to McGrannahan in which Kester stated she was going to
make “mega money” off of McGrannahan’s story by appropriating it for her own
ends. (Id. ¶ 19, 10.)
McGrannahan made each of these false statements with knowledge of their falsity and with the
specific intention of causing damage to Kester’s professional reputation. (Id. ¶¶ 1-24.)
McGrannahan’s website, www.AHC.com, is publicly accessible. (Id. ¶¶ 25-27.)
McGrannahan has directly contacted Kester’s family, friends, and professional colleagues,
including her former, current, and prospective employers, and directed them towards this
website. (Id. ¶¶ 29-35.) In particular, McGrannahan has directly contacted Kester’s professional
colleagues and made to them false statements about Kester. (Id. ¶ 29, 33-35.) Moreover,
McGrannahan has posted false information about Kester on at least ten publicly available
websites other than www.AHC.com, and some of these postings provides link to each other,
thereby increasing their online visibility and accessibility. (Id. ¶ 36.) As of December 28, 2011,
www.AHC.com had accumulated over 50,000 page views. (Id. ¶ 27.)
McGrannahan’s false statements have caused harm to Kester. A search for “Melissa
Kester” using the internet search engine Google.com returns links to McGrannahan’s websites.
(Kester Aff. ¶ 29-30.) Because of the volume and nature of these search results, prospective
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 5 of 15
6
employers have informed Kester they cannot hire her due to the risk of negative publicity. (Id. ¶
26, 32.) Employers have also avoided hiring Kester out of fear that they may become the next
subject of McGrannahan’s attacks. (Id. ¶ 32-33.) As a result, Kester’s ability to earn a living has
deteriorated as a direct result of McGrannahan’s false statements. (Id. ¶ 28.) In addition, Kester
has incurred monetary expenses in attempting to remove McGrannahan’s websites and in
bringing this legal action. (Id. ¶ 34; Mallin Aff. ¶ 5-6.) Finally, McGrannahan has contacted
Kester on several occasions and offered to stop posting the statements if Kester pays her money.
(Kester Aff. ¶ 36.).
II. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment.
Summary judgment is a way for a court to resolve a lawsuit without holding a trial.
Inland Oil & Transp. Co. v. United States, 600 F.2d 725, 728 (8th Cir. 1979). When a party
moves for summary judgment, the court’s role is to determine whether the evidentiary record
contains genuine issues of material fact. Connolly v. Clark, 457 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2006).
The court makes this determination by viewing the facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party. Heacker v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 676 F.3d 724, 726-27 (8th Cir.
2012). A party is entitled to summary judgment when the evidentiary record shows there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a); Heacker, 676 F.3d at 726-27. A court can grant summary judgment based
on a party’s failure to respond to Rule 36 requests for admission, so long as the resulting factual
admissions are dispositive of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b); Quasius v. Schwan Food Co., 596
F.3d 947, 950-51 (8th Cir. 2010).
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 6 of 15
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III. Discussion.
Kester moves for summary judgment on her defamation claim. As a remedy, Kester
seeks entry of a permanent injunction. The Court will address each of these issues in turn.
a. McGrannahan is liable for defamation.
Missouri tort law governs Kester’s defamation claim. Walker v. Barrett, 650 F.3d 1198,
1203 (8th Cir. 2011). Under Missouri law, the elements of defamation are: “1) publication, 2) of
a defamatory statement, 3) that identifies the plaintiff, 4) that is false, 5) that is published with
the requisite degree of fault, and 6) damages the plaintiff's reputation.” Overcast v. Billings Mut.
Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 62, 70 (Mo. 2000). The degree of fault required to hold a defendant liable
for defamation depends upon whether the plaintiff is a private or public figure. See, e.g., Nazeri
v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 309-10 (Mo. 1993) (reviewing principles of defamation
law). Under Missouri law, the degree of fault required when a plaintiff is a private figure is
negligence. Overcast, 11 S.W.3d at 70. Because the Court finds that Kester is a private figure,
she must show that McGrannahan acted negligently. Id.
The undisputed facts presented above establish that McGrannahan is liable for
defamation. The record shows that McGrannahan has made the following false statements about
Kester:
That Kester extorted money from and preyed upon McGrannahan as a victim of
domestic violence; (Id. ¶ 4.)
That Kester distributed prescription drugs to McGrannahan; (Id. ¶ 5.)
That Kester lied about her professional experiences writing for television and film
projects; (Id. ¶ 7.)
That Kester sent McGrannahan several e-mails using the profile name “wallaby,” in
which she defamed third persons; (Id. ¶ 8.)
That Kester hired a third person to stalk and harass McGrannahan; (Id. ¶ 9.)
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 7 of 15
8
That Kester has falsely represented herself as a licensed psychologist to future
employers and the public, and that Kester has impersonated a psychologist; (Id. ¶ 11.)
That Kester sent nude photos of herself to Dana Gioia and discussed with him waxing
her pubic hair; (Id. ¶ 14.)
That Kester maintained accounts on the Facebook.com social media website under
the names “Angela Smith,” “Catherine Adjani,” and “Lauren Periera” for the sole
purpose of stalking third persons; (Id. ¶ 15.)
That Kester paid a third party to illegally appropriate copyrighted material authored
by McGrannahan; (Id. ¶ 18.)
That Kester sent her e-mails, in which Kester stated she was going to make “mega
money” off of McGrannahan’s story by appropriating it for her own ends; (Id. ¶ 19.)
That Kester lied about her employment history and has attempted to have sexual
relations with performance artists with whom she contracted for a charity event
during her tenure as Development Officer for the Arts at the Community Foundation
of Sonoma County; (Id. ¶ 20.)
That Kester falsely presents herself as a licensed psychologist and has attempted to
secure employment as an unlicensed psychologist; and (Id. ¶ 21.)
That Kester attempted to extort money from her film and production crew in order to
make a documentary film called Caught Dead. (Id. ¶ 22.)
That Kester admitted to attempting to manipulate Dana Gioia into funding one of her
film projects; (Id. ¶ 6.)
That Kester accused her ex-husband, Matt Bail, of being psychologically abusive
towards her and being physically abusive and neglectful towards her children; (Id. ¶
12.)
That Kester stated her mother, Bronya Galef, was an alcoholic, a narcissist, and a bad
parent; (Id. ¶ 13.)
That Kester claimed to have engaged in telephone sex and sexual intercourse with
multiple married men; (Id. ¶ 16.)
That Kester said she wanted to have sexual relations with opera singer Rod Gilfry in
the presence of Gilfry’s unattractive wife; (Id. ¶ 17.)
That Kester said she would ensure the film Caught Dead was never made and that
McGrannahan forever remain impoverished; and (Id. ¶ 23.)
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 8 of 15
9
That Kester promised she would be able to live off of the proceeds of Caught Dead.
(Id. ¶ 24.)
That Kester wanted to seduce artists William O’Keeffe and Dominic Egan; (Id. ¶¶ 3,
10.)
In addition, McGrannahan fabricated e-mails and falsely attributed them to Kester, thereby it
appear as though the following false assertions about Kester are substantiated and credible:
That Kester wanted to seduce artists William O’Keeffe and Dominic Egan; (Id. ¶¶ 3,
10.)
That Kester sent McGrannahan several e-mails using the profile name “wallaby” in
which she defamed third persons; (Id. ¶ 8, 10.)
That Kester accused her ex-husband, Matt Bail, of being psychologically abusive
towards her and being physically abusive and neglectful towards her children; (Id. ¶
12, 10.)
That Kester stated her mother, Bronya Galef, was an alcoholic, a narcissist, and a bad
parent; (Id. ¶ 13, 10.)
That Kester claimed to have engaged in telephone sex and sexual intercourse with
multiple married men; (Id. ¶ 16.)
That Kester said she wanted to have sexual relations with opera singer Rod Gilfry in
the presence of Gilfry’s unattractive wife; and (Id. ¶ 17, 10.)
That Kester sent e-mails to McGrannahan in which Kester stated she was going to
make “mega money” off of McGrannahan’s story by appropriating it for her own
ends. (Id. ¶ 19, 10.)
The record shows McGrannahan published each of these statements by posting them to her
internet websites and communicating them to other persons. Each of these statements identifies
Kester by name, and they make false factual assertions about her. These statements have
damaged Kester’s reputation among her personal and professional associates, and they have
made it more difficult for her to secure employment. Finally, the record shows that, at the least,
McGrannahan was negligent in making these statements. Accordingly, the record presented
establishes that McGrannahan is liable for defamation.
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 9 of 15
10
b. Kester is entitled to a permanent injunction.
An injunction is a legal remedy designed to prevent future violations of the law. United
States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). When a court issues an injunction, it affects
a party’s behavior by ordering that party to engage in or abstain from certain conduct. Nken v.
Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 428 (2009). Because an injunction is enforceable by a court’s power of
contempt, it is an extraordinary remedy and should not be granted as a matter of course. Gunn v.
Univ. Comm. to End War in Viet Nam, 399 U.S. 383, 389 (1970). These principles have special
force when an injunction concerns speech, because of the danger the injunction will operate as an
unconstitutional prior restraint. Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 738 (2005) (collecting cases).
The Supreme Court has not decided whether it is constitutional for a court to issue a
permanent injunction against defamatory speech. Id. at 738-30 (declining to resolve issue).
However, under existing precedent it is clear that a court may enjoin unprotected speech.
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390-91 (1973)
(injunction against publication upheld, based on established recurring course of unprotected
speech). In addition, numerous courts have held that issuing a permanent injunction against
defamation is constitutional. E.g., Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200, 1206, 1208-09 (6th
Cir. 1990) (where statements adjudicated to be defamatory were frequent and recurring,
injunction granted to prevent additional harm to plaintiff’s personal reputation and business
relations); Hill v. Petrotech Res. Corp., 325 S.W.3d 302, 309 (Ky. 2010) (surveying caselaw, and
holding that speech adjudicated to be defamatory may be enjoined); Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc.
v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 349 (Cal. 2007) (“Accordingly, we hold that, following a trial at which
it is determined that the defendant defamed the plaintiff, the court may issue an injunction
prohibiting the defendant from repeating the statements determined to be defamatory.”). The
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 10 of 15
11
key is that an injunction must target speech that already has been found to be defamatory. E.g.,
Balboa Island, 156 P.3d at 344-45 (“Prohibiting a person from making a statement or publishing
a writing before that statement is spoken or the writing is published is far different from
prohibiting a defendant from repeating a statement or republishing a writing that has been
determined at trial to be defamatory and, thus, unlawful.”) (emphasis in original).
As set forth above, the record establishes that McGrannahan’s statements are defamatory.
Therefore, Kester has achieved success on the merits of her claim and she may be entitled to a
permanent injunction. Bank One, Utah v. Guttau, 190 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 1999) (permanent
injunction requires attaining success on the merits). Therefore, the Court will determine whether
to enter a permanent injunction by weighing the following factors: “(1) the threat of irreparable
harm to the moving party; (2) the balance of harm between this harm and the harm suffered by
the nonmoving party if the injunction is granted; and (3) the public interest.” Taylor Corp. v.
Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958, 967 (8th Cir. 2005).
The Court finds that these factors weigh in favor of entering a permanent injunction.
First, McGrannahan’s defamatory statements have caused Kester irreparable harm. These
statements have negatively impacted Kester’s personal and professional reputation, and they
prevented Kester from securing employment. That these statements are freely available and
accessible on the internet suggests that they will continue to cause her harm for an indefinite
future time. Second, the balance of harms favors Kester. As shown above, McGrannahan’s
defamatory statements have caused considerable harm to Kester, including to her livelihood.
E.g., Barlow v. Sipes, 744 N.E.2d 1, 8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding injunction in part, based
on damage to business’s reputation and goodwill). In contrast, an injunction will cause little
harm to McGrannahan, because defamatory speech about a private figure is of little value. E.g.,
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 11 of 15
12
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992). Third and finally, the public interest
favors an injunction, as shown by laws criminalizing harassment and stalking. 18 U.S.C. § 2261;
Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 160.775, 565.090, 565.225.
An injunction must state its terms specifically and describe in reasonable detail the acts
its restrains or requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d); Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 790 (8th
Cir. 2004); see Metro. Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Local 100, Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int'l
Union, 239 F.3d 172, 176-79 (2d Cir. 2001) (vacating as unconstitutionally vague an injunction
against “harassing” and “fraudulent or defamatory representations”); Wynn Oil Co. v. Purolator
Chem. Corp., 536 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1976) (rejecting injunction against “slandering and
disparaging”). Moreover, an injunction against defamatory speech must be tailored to the facts
presented and cannot sweep more broadly than is necessary. Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 738
(2005); Nolan v. Campbell, 690 N.W.2d 638, 653 (Neb. Ct. App. 2004) (“In order for the
injunction to pass constitutional muster, the suppression must be limited to the precise statements
already found libelous.”). The Court finds that the injunction set forth below meets this standard.
In particular, the Court notes that this injunction is similar to injunctions entered by other courts
in comparable factual circumstances. Doe v. Hofstetter, No. 11-cv-02209-DME-MJW (D. Colo.
Aug. 14, 2012); Saadi v. Maroun, No. 8:07CV01976T24MAP, 2009 WL 3617788 (M.D. Fla.
Nov. 2, 2009).
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 12 of 15
13
IV. Conclusion.
As set forth herein, the undisputed evidentiary record shows that McGrannahan is liable
for defamation and that Kester is entitled to a permanent injunction.
Accordingly, Plaintiff Melissa Kester’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 47) is
hereby GRANTED. Kester shall have judgment against Defendant Mary McGrannahan on her
prayer for permanent injunctive relief the defamation claim alleged in Count I.
Furthermore, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. McGrannahan shall immediately remove from any and all websites all materials
she has authored that contain material the Court has found to be defamatory, including all
statements that assert:
a. That Kester extorted money from and preyed upon McGrannahan as a
victim of domestic violence;
b. That Kester distributed prescription drugs to McGrannahan;
c. That Kester lied about her professional experience writing for television
and film projects;
d. That Kester sent McGrannahan e-mails using the profile name “wallaby”
in which she defamed third persons, and that Kester authored any such emails;
e. That Kester hired a third person to stalk and harass McGrannahan;
f. That Kester has falsely represented herself as a licensed psychologist to
future employers and to the public, and that Kester has impersonated a
psychologist;
g. That Kester sent nude photos of herself to Dana Gioia and discussed with
him waxing her pubic hair;
h. That Kester maintained accounts on the Facebook.com social media
website under the names “Angela Smith,” “Catherine Adjani,” and
“Lauren Periera” for the sole purpose of stalking third persons;
i. That Kester paid a third party to illegally appropriate copyrighted material
authored by McGrannahan;
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 13 of 15
14
j. That Kester sent e-mails to McGrannahan in which Kester stated she was
going to make “mega money” off of McGrannahan’s story by
appropriating it for her own ends, and that Kester authored such any emails;
k. That Kester lied about her employment history and has attempted to have
sexual relations with performance artists with whom she contracted for a
charity event during her tenure as Development Officer for the Arts at the
Community Foundation of Sonoma County;
l. That Kester falsely presents herself as a licensed psychologist and has
attempted to secure employment as an unlicensed psychologist;
m. That Kester attempted to extort money from her film and production crew
in order to make a documentary film called Caught Dead;
n. That Kester admitted to attempting to manipulate Dana Gioia into funding
one of her film projects;
o. That Kester accused her ex-husband, Matt Bail, of being psychologically
abusive towards her and being physically abusive and neglectful towards
her children, and that Kester authored any e-mails discussing such
accusations;
p. That Kester stated her mother, Bronya Galef, was an alcoholic, a
narcissist, and a bad parent, and that Kester authored any e-mails
discussing such statements;
q. That Kester claimed to have engaged in telephone sex and sexual
intercourse with multiple married men, and that Kester authored any emails
discussing such claims;
r. That Kester said she wanted to have sexual relations with opera singer
Rod Gilfry in the presence of Gilfry’s unattractive wife, and that Kester
authored any e-mails expressing such a desire;
s. That Kester said she would ensure the film Caught Dead was never made
and that McGrannahan forever remain impoverished;
t. That Kester promised she would be able to live off of the proceeds of
Caught Dead; and
u. That Kester wanted to seduce artists William O’Keeffe and Dominic
Egan, and that Kester authored any e-mails expressing such a desire.
Case 4:10-cv-01215-BP Document 49 Filed 10/26/12 Page 14 of 15
15
2. McGrannahan shall take all steps necessary to contact third-party service
providers to ensure that the statements described above are permanently removed from the
internet immediately.
3. McGrannahan shall be enjoined from republishing, either verbally, electronically,
or through any other medium, the statements the Court has found to be defamatory. In
particular, McGrannahan shall be enjoined from making or repeating such statements to Kester’s
professional colleagues, employers, business associates, clients, friends, acquaintances and
family.
4. This Permanent Injunction is binding upon McGrannahan and her respective
officers, agents, servants, employees and attorneys, as well as those persons in active concert or
participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Beth Phillips
BETH PHILLIPS, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DATE: October 26, 2012
Well, that's a step in the right direction. Also gives us ideas about what to do and how to do it on other cases. Obviously, if the complaint is beefed up with the necessary damage evidence, a monetary award can also be obtained. If you'll send me the case docs privately, I'll peruse them and send them on to our attys. in California for possible further action.
This is really GREAT!
This is really GREAT!
sandrabrownma
Padawan Learner
Thanks for posting. I have forwarded it to my attorney as well.
Guardian
The Cosmic Force
Laura said:
I don't think Kester even asked for a monetary award from McGrannahan, because she doesn't have anything.
Camwell, on the other hand, is another story. From what I'm told, the order also applies to her and her websites as McGrannahan's "agent" plus there's still an active order for Camwell's computer she never complied with.
Kester's lawyer will still have to send copies of the Order to google and Mcgrannahan and Camwell's other hosts to get the stuff taken down.
While this certainly isn't the end of all the legal stuff, especially where Barbara is concerned, it's really nice to see Kester beat Mcgrannahan, and prove she was lying.
Guardian
The Cosmic Force
sandrabrownma said:
Good. I know I can't finish posting all the expose stuff about Camwell, Ness, Moody's, etc. until your lawyer and the rest of the legal stuff is done ...so tell them to hurry up 'kay
Until then, Yeah Melissa Kester! Whoo Hooo! Nice legal butt whooping on Mary McGrannahan!
Guardian
The Cosmic Force
Laura said:
OK, I'll email you the .pdf's There's a bunch I got off PACER
Yes it is! One down, one to go.
Now we know why they totally dropped Kester and switched to harassing Sandra and Kim Stewart too. They had to have known about this Order when it was filed for last summer. Kester got them shaking in their boots.
Guardian
The Cosmic Force
Yup! I just checked the dates, and Mcgrannahan and/or Camwell stopped posted about Kester and started in on Kim Stewart right after the Order for Summary Judgement was files.
There was a huge delay because the Judge in the case retired, and it was assigned to a new Judge, but McGrannahan/Camwell knew Kester had beaten them, so they just changed victims.
There was a huge delay because the Judge in the case retired, and it was assigned to a new Judge, but McGrannahan/Camwell knew Kester had beaten them, so they just changed victims.
Guardian
The Cosmic Force
This is a complete case summary, and you can see how long it took. Almost 2 years from start to finish.
4:10-cv-01215-BP Kester v. McGrannahan
Beth Phillips, presiding
Date filed: 12/08/2010
Date of last filing: 11/05/2012
History
Doc.
No. Dates Description
50
Filed: 11/05/2012
Entered: 11/07/2012
Docket Text Mail Returned
49
Filed & Entered: 10/26/2012
Docket Text Order on Motion for Summary Judgment
Filed & Entered: 06/01/2012
Docket Text Notice of docket modification
45
Filed & Entered: 06/01/2012
Terminated: 06/01/2012
Docket Text Motion for Summary Judgment
46
Filed & Entered: 06/01/2012
Terminated: 06/01/2012
Docket Text Motion for Summary Judgment
47
Filed & Entered: 06/01/2012
Terminated: 10/26/2012
Docket Text Motion for Summary Judgment
48
Filed & Entered: 06/01/2012
Docket Text Suggestions in Support of Motion
44
Filed & Entered: 05/31/2012
Docket Text Order Transferring/Reassigning Case
43
Filed & Entered: 01/04/2012
Docket Text Certificate of Service
42
Filed & Entered: 12/07/2011
Docket Text Mail Returned
41
Filed & Entered: 11/30/2011
Docket Text In Chambers Conference
40
Filed: 11/14/2011
Entered: 11/15/2011
Docket Text Mail Returned
39
Filed & Entered: 11/02/2011
Docket Text Order on Motion for Reconsideration
38
Filed & Entered: 10/13/2011
Terminated: 11/02/2011
Docket Text Motion to Withdraw as Attorney
37
Filed & Entered: 10/05/2011
Terminated: 11/02/2011
Docket Text Motion for Reconsideration
36
Filed & Entered: 08/26/2011
Docket Text Order on Motion to Strike
32
Filed & Entered: 05/05/2011
Docket Text Electronic Transcript
31
Filed & Entered: 05/03/2011
Terminated: 08/26/2011
Docket Text Motion to Strike
29
Filed: 04/20/2011
Entered: 04/27/2011
Docket Text Status Conference
23
Filed & Entered: 04/18/2011
Docket Text Mail Returned
24
Filed & Entered: 04/18/2011
Terminated: 08/26/2011
Docket Text Motion to Strike
28
Filed: 04/18/2011
Entered: 04/20/2011
Docket Text Reply Suggestions to Motion
Filed & Entered: 04/11/2011
Docket Text Notice of docket modification
21
Filed: 04/01/2011
Entered: 04/11/2011
Docket Text Suggestions in Opposition to Motion
20
Filed & Entered: 03/24/2011
Docket Text Order
19
Filed & Entered: 03/14/2011
Docket Text Suggestions in Opposition to Motion
18
Filed & Entered: 03/07/2011
Terminated: 08/26/2011
Docket Text Motion to Expedite
17
Filed & Entered: 03/03/2011
Docket Text Order
16
Filed & Entered: 03/01/2011
Docket Text Suggestions in Support of Motion
15
Filed: 02/24/2011
Entered: 02/25/2011
Terminated: 08/26/2011
Docket Text Motion to Quash
14
Filed & Entered: 01/18/2011
Docket Text Order on Motion to Expedite
13
Filed: 12/30/2010
Entered: 01/03/2011
Docket Text Answer to Complaint
Filed & Entered: 12/21/2010
Docket Text Notice of docket modification
Filed & Entered: 12/20/2010
Docket Text Notice of docket modification
9
Filed & Entered: 12/20/2010
Terminated: 12/20/2010
Docket Text Motion to Expedite
10
Filed & Entered: 12/20/2010
Docket Text Notice of filing
11
Filed & Entered: 12/20/2010
Docket Text Jury Demand
12
Filed & Entered: 12/20/2010
Terminated: 01/18/2011
Docket Text Motion to Expedite
8
Filed & Entered: 12/14/2010
Docket Text Order on Motion for TRO
5
Filed & Entered: 12/10/2010
Docket Text NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT
6
Filed & Entered: 12/10/2010
Docket Text Return of Service of Complaint Executed
7
Filed & Entered: 12/10/2010
Docket Text Notice of filing
Filed & Entered: 12/09/2010
Docket Text NOTICE OF MAGISTRATE ASSIGNMENT
2
Filed & Entered: 12/09/2010
Docket Text Notice of EAPADMIN
3
Filed & Entered: 12/09/2010
Terminated: 12/14/2010
Docket Text Motion for TRO
4
Filed & Entered: 12/09/2010
Docket Text Suggestions in Support of Motion
Filed & Entered: 12/08/2010
Docket Text Summons Issued
1
Filed & Entered: 12/08/2010
Docket Text Complaint
4:10-cv-01215-BP Kester v. McGrannahan
Beth Phillips, presiding
Date filed: 12/08/2010
Date of last filing: 11/05/2012
History
Doc.
No. Dates Description
50
Filed: 11/05/2012
Entered: 11/07/2012
Docket Text Mail Returned
49
Filed & Entered: 10/26/2012
Docket Text Order on Motion for Summary Judgment
Filed & Entered: 06/01/2012
Docket Text Notice of docket modification
45
Filed & Entered: 06/01/2012
Terminated: 06/01/2012
Docket Text Motion for Summary Judgment
46
Filed & Entered: 06/01/2012
Terminated: 06/01/2012
Docket Text Motion for Summary Judgment
47
Filed & Entered: 06/01/2012
Terminated: 10/26/2012
Docket Text Motion for Summary Judgment
48
Filed & Entered: 06/01/2012
Docket Text Suggestions in Support of Motion
44
Filed & Entered: 05/31/2012
Docket Text Order Transferring/Reassigning Case
43
Filed & Entered: 01/04/2012
Docket Text Certificate of Service
42
Filed & Entered: 12/07/2011
Docket Text Mail Returned
41
Filed & Entered: 11/30/2011
Docket Text In Chambers Conference
40
Filed: 11/14/2011
Entered: 11/15/2011
Docket Text Mail Returned
39
Filed & Entered: 11/02/2011
Docket Text Order on Motion for Reconsideration
38
Filed & Entered: 10/13/2011
Terminated: 11/02/2011
Docket Text Motion to Withdraw as Attorney
37
Filed & Entered: 10/05/2011
Terminated: 11/02/2011
Docket Text Motion for Reconsideration
36
Filed & Entered: 08/26/2011
Docket Text Order on Motion to Strike
32
Filed & Entered: 05/05/2011
Docket Text Electronic Transcript
31
Filed & Entered: 05/03/2011
Terminated: 08/26/2011
Docket Text Motion to Strike
29
Filed: 04/20/2011
Entered: 04/27/2011
Docket Text Status Conference
23
Filed & Entered: 04/18/2011
Docket Text Mail Returned
24
Filed & Entered: 04/18/2011
Terminated: 08/26/2011
Docket Text Motion to Strike
28
Filed: 04/18/2011
Entered: 04/20/2011
Docket Text Reply Suggestions to Motion
Filed & Entered: 04/11/2011
Docket Text Notice of docket modification
21
Filed: 04/01/2011
Entered: 04/11/2011
Docket Text Suggestions in Opposition to Motion
20
Filed & Entered: 03/24/2011
Docket Text Order
19
Filed & Entered: 03/14/2011
Docket Text Suggestions in Opposition to Motion
18
Filed & Entered: 03/07/2011
Terminated: 08/26/2011
Docket Text Motion to Expedite
17
Filed & Entered: 03/03/2011
Docket Text Order
16
Filed & Entered: 03/01/2011
Docket Text Suggestions in Support of Motion
15
Filed: 02/24/2011
Entered: 02/25/2011
Terminated: 08/26/2011
Docket Text Motion to Quash
14
Filed & Entered: 01/18/2011
Docket Text Order on Motion to Expedite
13
Filed: 12/30/2010
Entered: 01/03/2011
Docket Text Answer to Complaint
Filed & Entered: 12/21/2010
Docket Text Notice of docket modification
Filed & Entered: 12/20/2010
Docket Text Notice of docket modification
9
Filed & Entered: 12/20/2010
Terminated: 12/20/2010
Docket Text Motion to Expedite
10
Filed & Entered: 12/20/2010
Docket Text Notice of filing
11
Filed & Entered: 12/20/2010
Docket Text Jury Demand
12
Filed & Entered: 12/20/2010
Terminated: 01/18/2011
Docket Text Motion to Expedite
8
Filed & Entered: 12/14/2010
Docket Text Order on Motion for TRO
5
Filed & Entered: 12/10/2010
Docket Text NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT
6
Filed & Entered: 12/10/2010
Docket Text Return of Service of Complaint Executed
7
Filed & Entered: 12/10/2010
Docket Text Notice of filing
Filed & Entered: 12/09/2010
Docket Text NOTICE OF MAGISTRATE ASSIGNMENT
2
Filed & Entered: 12/09/2010
Docket Text Notice of EAPADMIN
3
Filed & Entered: 12/09/2010
Terminated: 12/14/2010
Docket Text Motion for TRO
4
Filed & Entered: 12/09/2010
Docket Text Suggestions in Support of Motion
Filed & Entered: 12/08/2010
Docket Text Summons Issued
1
Filed & Entered: 12/08/2010
Docket Text Complaint
