Robert Kirkconnell
Jedi
Writing the article was an excellent idea -- thanks again it all. Kniall sure did a good job of editing it, and I love the conjoined elephant and donkey!! This is too much fun!
Kniall said:I see another article in the making
I wonder though, is there something 'good' we can salvage from the actions of those 'pioneers in the New World'? I think there were also good intentions among those who brought 'industriousness' to America. That industriousness eventually grew into a monster, but is it necessarily evil in itself? There are cases of European settlers in the Americas who cooperated with the natives and quickly adapted to the 'natural laws' of the land, albeit under religious ideologies they brought with them. In their narratives, remember, as they come down to us today anyway, many of them were escaping prosecution and oppressive circumstances 'back home'. They weren't all rampaging, racist 'imperialists'. And then there's the fact that many of the natives died as a result of not having the same immunological defenses the Europeans had to viruses. So, there may be some middle ground to explore between 'settlers committed genocide on 18 million natives' and 'our forefathers conquered a barren land populated with just a few savages'.
Just throwing some issues in there that might be teased out from the overall narrative, which, I agree, is as you described.
Americans have made many contributions they can be proud of. It's just that you have to be careful how you explain that to them because they will grasp at anything to avoid coming first to the painful (but actually liberating) point of realizing that, on the whole, the American Dream is a Nightmare, for themselves and the rest of the planet.
During the very long period from 1629 to 1775, the present area of the United States was settled by at least four large waves of English-speaking immigrants. The first was an exodus of Puritans from the east of England to Massachusetts during a period of eleven years from 1629 to 1640. The second was the migration of a small Royalist elite and large numbers of indentured servants from the south of England to Virginia (ca. 1642-75). The third was a movement from the North Midlands of England and Wales to the Delaware Valley (ca. 1675-1725). The fourth was a flow of English-speaking people from the borders of North Britain and northern Ireland to the Appalachian backcountry mostly during the half-century from 1718 to 1775.
These four groups shared many qualities in common. All of them spoke the English language. Nearly all were British Protestants. Most lived under British laws and took pride in possessing British liberties. At the same time, they also differed from one another in many other ways: in their religious denominations, social ranks, historical generations, and also in the British regions from whence they came. They carried across the Atlantic four different sets of British folkways which became the basis of regional cultures in the New World.
By the year 1775 these four cultures were fully established in British America. They spoke distinctive dialects of English, built their houses in diverse ways, and had different methods of doing much of the ordinary business of life. Most important for the political history of the United States, they also had four different conceptions of order, power and freedom which became the cornerstones of a voluntary society in British America.
Today less than 20 percent of the American population have any British ancestors at all. But in a cultural sense most Americans are Albion’s seed, no matter who their own forebears may have been.5 Strong echoes of four British folkways may still be heard in the major dialects of American speech, in the regional patterns of American life, in the complex dynamics of American politics, and in the continuing conflict between four different ideas of freedom in the United States. The interplay of four “freedom ways” has created an expansive pluralism which is more libertarian than any unitary culture alone could be. That is the central thesis of this book: the legacy of four British folkways in early America remains the most powerful determinant of a voluntary society in the United States today.
[…]
In this work “folkway” will have a different meaning. It is defined here as the normative structure of values, customs and meanings that exist in any culture. This complex is not many things but one thing, with many interlocking parts. It is not primarily biological or instinctual in its origins, as Sumner believed, but social and intellectual. Folkways do not rise from the unconscious in even a symbolic sense—though most people do many social things without reflecting very much about them. In the modern world a folkway is apt to be a cultural artifact—the conscious instrument of human will and purpose. Often (and increasingly today) it is also the deliberate contrivance of a cultural elite. A folkway should not be thought of in Sumner’s sense as something ancient and primitive which has been inherited from the distant past. Folkways are often highly persistent, but they are never static. Even where they have acquired the status of a tradition they are not necessarily very old. Folkways are constantly in process of creation, even in our own time.7
After 1629 the major folk movements began to occur, in the series of waves that are the subject of this book. As we have seen, the first wave (1629-40) was an exodus of English Puritans who came mainly from the eastern counties and planted in Massachusetts a very special culture with unique patterns of speech and architecture, distinctive ideas about marriage and the family, nucleated settlements, congregational churches, town meetings, and a tradition of ordered liberty.
The second wave brought to Virginia a different set of English folkways, mainly from a broad belt of territory that extended from Kent and Devon north to Northamptonshire and Warwickshire. This culture was characterized by scattered settlements, extreme hierarchies of rank, strong oligarchies, Anglican churches, a highly developed sense of honor and an idea of hegemonic liberty.
The third wave (ca. 1675-1715) was the Friends’ migration, which carried yet another culture from the England’s North Midlands to the Delaware Valley. It was founded on a Christian idea of spiritual equality, a work ethic of unusual intensity, a suspicion of social hierarchy, and an austerity which Max Weber called “worldly asceticism.” It also preserved many elements of North Midland speech, architecture, dress and food ways. Most important, it deliberately created a pluralistic system of reciprocal liberty in the Delaware Valley.
The fourth great migration (1717-75) came to the backcountry from the borderlands of North Britain—an area which included the Scottish lowlands, the north of Ireland and England’s six northern counties. These emigrants were of different ethnic stocks, but shared a common border culture which was unique in its speech, architecture, family ways and child-rearing customs. Its material culture was marked by extreme inequalities of condition, and its public life was dominated by a distinctive ideal of natural liberty.
Each of these four folk cultures in early America had a distinctive character which was closer to its popular reputation than to many academic “reinterpretations” in the twentieth century. The people in Puritan Massachusetts were in fact highly puritanical. They were not traditional peasants, modern capitalists, village communists, modern individualists, Renaissance humanists, Victorian moralists, neo-Freudian narcissists or prototypical professors of English literature. They were a people of their time and place who had an exceptionally strong sense of themselves, and a soaring spiritual purpose which has been lost beneath many layers of revisionist scholarship.
The first gentlemen of Virginia were truly cavaliers. They were not the pasteboard protagonists of Victorian fiction, or the celluloid heroes of Gone with the Wind. But neither were they self-made bourgeois capitalists, modern agro-businessmen, upwardly mobile yeomen or “plain folk.” Most were younger sons of proud armigerous families with strong Royalist politics, a devout Anglican faith, decided rural prejudices, entrenched manorial ideals, exalted notions of their own honor and at least the rudiments of an Aristotelian education. The majority of Virginia’s white population were indentured servants, landless tenants and poor whites—a degraded rural proletariat who had no hope of rising to the top of their society. Not a single ex-servant or son of a servant became a member of Virginia’s House of Burgesses during the late seventeenth century. The mythical, figures of Virginia cavaliers and poor whites were solidly founded in historical fact.
The culture of the Delaware Valley was dominated by British Quakers and German Pietists whose Christian beliefs had a special moral character. Here again, their culture has been distorted by historical revisionists who have variously “reinterpreted” them as utopian cranks, manipulative materialists, secular pluralists and the “first modern Americans.” The modernity of the Delaware Valley has been much exaggerated, and the primitive Christian roots of William Penn’s “holy experiment” have too often been forgotten.
The backsettlers also possessed a strong and vibrant culture which also has been much misunderstood. They were not ancient Celts, or wild Scotch-Irish savages, or innocent children of nature. Neither were they rootless pluralists, incipient entrepreneurs, agents of the Edinburgh enlightenment or heralds of the New South. The majority, no matter whether northern Irish, lowland Scots or North Country English, shared a culture of high integrity which had been tempered in fire of the British borderlands.
Indians also experienced the Atlantic world's diseases. Europeans carried germs and viruses that exploded into epidemics among Native American populations, who had not acquired immunity to diseases that were all too common in Europe, Asia, and Africa. Smallpox, measles, bubonic plague, influenza, cholera, whooping cough, and other killer illnesses spread like wildfire through Indian societies, which were simultaneously experiencing bouts of famine, escalating warfare, cultural disruptions, and other associated traumas of colonization. Mortality rates reached as high as ninety percent, and in some cases entire populations perished. Sometimes populations recovered or even increased as they incorporated refugees from other areas, but sooner or later imported diseases struck all of the Native populations. Recurrent epidemics and numerous chronic afflictions contributed to the continual attrition of Indian numbers from the fifteenth to the twentieth century.27
Smallpox was a particularly vicious killer. According to Governor William Bradford of Plymouth Plantation, a smallpox epidemic among the Indians on the Connecticut River in 1633 and 1634 killed ninety-five percent of the population.28 At the time of the American Revolution, a huge smallpox pandemic killed thousands of Indian peoples in the West. Breaking out in Mexico City in 1779, the scourge spread in all directions, traveling through the southwest, north across the Great Plains and Rocky Mountains, and deep into the forests of Canada by 1783. Perhaps half of the people on the plains died.29 In the nineteenth century smallpox struck repeatedly. The Mandans on the upper Missouri may once have numbered as many as fifteen thousand but declined steadily under recurrent outbreaks of disease. They probably had no more than two thousand people when smallpox broke out in 1837. When it was over, 138 remained. The sickness spread across the plains, killing thousands of people.30 In 1869 smallpox hit the northern plains again. Cholera, measles, and scarlet fever added to the death toll in Indian villages. The American conquest of the West took place in the wake of biological disasters that rocked Indian communities and reduced their capacity to resist.
Because Europeans had had longer exposure and thus developed some resistance, killer diseases struck Indian populations with greater virulence, but Europeans were not immune to epidemiological tragedy and demographic catastrophe. The Black Death of 1348-135o had killed a third to one half of Britain's population, and recurrent outbreaks-Scotland suffered eight plague years between 1349 and 142o-kept the population low well into the sixteenth century" Scotland's population rose steadily in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, while Indian populations collapsed, but the deadly diseases brought devastation, heartbreak, and despair to Highland as well as Indian communities.
I will argue against this near-consensus among historians and lawyers, but a few words of caution may first be necessary. The principle of Indian landownership was never recognized with unanimity. There were always some English colonists, and sometimes even some colonial governments, willing to take land from the Indians without paying for it. All laws are violated sometimes, and this one was probably violated more than most. As the English population of the colonies grew, so did the English demand for Indian land, and incidents of trespassing grew more frequent. But if one is interested in overall English colonial land policy, in how the English treated Indian land as a general matter, the answer is that they treated the Indians as owners of their land.
That the English normally recognized Indian property rights does not imply that the English were as concerned with the Indians' welfare as they were with their own, or that they considered the Indians their equals.' The English had several reasons to buy the Indians' land, none of which depended on liking the Indians or wishing them well. By recognizing the Indians as owners of their land, the English were helping themselves, not the Indians.
Finally, that the English normally purchased Indian land says nothing about whether, from the Indians' point of view, the transactions were voluntary in any meaningful sense, or whether the Indians interpreted the sales the same way the English did, or whether the Indians were sometimes defrauded by individual settlers or even by colonial governments, or whether the prices were fair, or whether large-scale land purchasing would turn out to have devastating effects on Indian life. Such issues will be taken up in Chapter 2. The purpose of the present chapter is to demonstrate a single point: that after some controversy in the early years, the English normally acknowledged that Indian land had to be obtained by contract, not by force.
Robert Kirkconnell said:Hey, Joe and Niall just snuck a new book in under our noses!! I just bought Manufactured Terror and I can't wait to read it!!