LOSS OF A MISSILE CARRIER: RUSSIA MISSED A BLOW WORSE THAN THE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE CRIMEAN BRIDGE
Another sabotage raid by the Ukrainians resulted in the destruction of a supersonic aircraft. Ukrainian saboteurs managed to deal Russia a really heavy blow.
A small drone attacked the Soltsy military airfield in the Novgorod region. Why these aircraft are so important for Russia and what to do to prevent such situations from repeating, read in the material Tsargrad.
The victim of the attack was
a long-range supersonic missile carrier-bomber Tu-22M3. The Ministry of Defence of Russia confirmed this information.
The Kiev regime carried out a terrorist attack using a copter-type UAV on a military airfield in Novgorod Region. The UAV was detected by the aerodrome's external observation post and was hit with small arms fire. A fire broke out at the aerodrome's aircraft parking area, which was promptly extinguished. One aircraft was damaged, there were no casualties as a result of the terrorist act,
- the report, published by the official Telegram channel of the military department
on 19 August, said.
To what extent the wording of the military corresponded to the actual consequences of the strike can be judged on the basis of photos from the scene of the incident.
❗️Предположительно, горящий Ту-22М3 на аэродроме Сольцы в Новгородской области, который вчера был атакован украинским беспилотником. Минобороны заявляло о повреждении одного самолета в ходе атаки. Однако, судя по всему, Ту-22М3 полностью уничтожен. Никаких укрытий или навесов для ракетоносца...
t.me
[
TG transl: Presumably a burning Tu-22M3 at the Soltsy airfield in the Novgorod region, which was attacked by a Ukrainian drone yesterday.
The Defence Ministry claimed one aircraft was damaged in the attack. However, the Tu-22M3 appears to have been completely destroyed. There are no shelters or canopies for the missile carrier.]
Obviously, as a result of the attack, the
Tu-22M3 missile carrier was 99.9 per cent damaged - simply put, destroyed.
From the Ministry of Defence report, which claims that base guards tried to save the unique aircraft by firing at the drone with machine guns, we can assume that
there is no anti-drone defence at the facility. But the soldiers should have anti-drone rifles, which are now being supplied
en masse to the front by volunteers.
Just as there was no passive defence of the missile carrier, which stood in an open top caponier (shelter) formed by an earthen embankment.
Where are the shelters?
Observers, bloggers and war correspondents have been writing about concrete shelters for our combat aircraft - indeed, shouting in their voices - for years.
The urgent need for aircraft shelters first became apparent in Syria during the attacks on the Hmeimim airbase. It became even more urgent with the beginning of the SVO after attempts to hit strategic aviation airfields. How things are with the problem now - you can see in the photo: there is not even a canopy over the aircraft,
- commented on the demise of the missile carrier Telegram channel Rybar, whose author and host Mikhail Zvinchuk is a professional military man.
Oleg Tsarov, a former deputy of the Verkhovna Rada who did not accept the 2014 Maidan coup, sees the situation in a similar way.
I'm tired of writing about aircraft caponiers. Ukraine, by the way, has them. The whole world has them. On all military airfields of the world. And us? On the cost of one lost aircraft could be built hangars for all military aircraft on all military airfields in Russia. But we continue to lose unique aircraft,
- the politician wrote in his Telegram channel.
It is noteworthy that it is not necessary to develop technologies for creating such shelters. There is also no need to build bushcraft. In the USSR, all the necessary studies have already been carried out, all the necessary calculations have been made and a huge number of shelters have been built. The only problem is that after the collapse of the Soviet Union they remained in the Baltic States and Ukraine.
All you need to do is to take the drawings of the arch shelter of type 2A/13 and repeat it in a simplified form.
The Soviet design can be radically simplified by doing away with such complex and expensive elements as the hangar fuel system or the gas lines that allowed the engines to be started inside the shelter.
It just needs concrete slabs, earth and rubble, plus steel gates. Already this will be more than enough to prevent the means of defeat used by the Ukrainians from reaching our aircraft worth hundreds of millions of roubles.
Last December, analysing the Ukrainian drone attack on the Dyagilevo long-range aviation base on the outskirts of Ryazan and the Engels-2 strategic aviation airfield in the Saratov region, retired Major General Vladimir Popov, an honoured pilot of Russia, told Tsargrad:
Such shelters make it possible to protect the aircraft even from the effects of a nearby nuclear explosion. To destroy a car in such a hangar, it would have to be hit with a concrete-piercing munition, and it is highly likely to be intercepted by the facility's air defence.
It turns out that we have also warned the military that shelters are urgently needed. But...
Iran knows how to do it
Yes, there is a problem of creating protective structures for such giants as the Tu-160 and partly the Tu-22M3. They require hangars so large that concrete slabs will not be able to provide a normal level of protection. Well, in these cases we should turn to the experience of Iran, which has long been protecting all strategically important buildings with grids and nets.
Yuri Lyamin, the expert on armed forces of Islamic Republic, in conversation with Tsargrad noted that such system of defence well proved itself:
Steel and rope nets can be stretched in 10-20 layers over any large aircraft. They will confidently stop any drone. And even if it explodes, the munition will be detonated at a great distance from the winged machine, which will increase its chances of survival by an order of magnitude.
Who's to blame and what to do with them?
Perhaps the most pressing question that is raised after every attack, when Ukrainian saboteurs destroy or damage unique combat vehicles with pennies, is why the situation does not change and who is responsible?
Perhaps the most pressing question that is raised after each attack, when Ukrainian saboteurs destroy or damage unique combat vehicles with a cheap means, is why the situation does not change and who is responsible for it?
There are a lot of culprits, but let's go from the simple. If the plane had been in a tunnel, could a saboteur have blown it up? No, he couldn't. So, direct responsibility, including criminal responsibility, lies with all military officials from top to bottom who, since the explosions in Novofyodorovka (it's been a year - Ed.), have not solved the issue of hiding combat aircraft. They should all be dismissed from the army and tried,
- writes the well-known volunteer and publicist Alexei Zhivov.
That is, a year ago it was clear to everyone how military aircraft should be stored. It's been a year. But no conclusions have been drawn.
In turn, another military volunteer Roman Alyokhin suggests applying the Japanese method of "five why's" to the analysis of the situation, which first establishes the immediate preconditions for an emergency, and then names the persons whose activities (or inactivity) led to their occurrence.
Why has no one thought about the importance of protecting strategic bombers? It is the
systematic ignoring of the problem that causes justifiable indignation in the people and the desire to hold officials to account, says Alekhin.
This is the reason why more and more people remember Stalin. Although, no matter how many monuments to Stalin are erected, all more embezzlers and corrupt officials will not stand against the wall,
- the volunteer is sure.
So what?
The fact of the Tu-22M3's demise is really worse for Russia than the damage to the Crimean Bridge. It may seem like an exaggeration, but the attacks on the bridge are terrorist attacks in their purest form, which in the current circumstances have no effect on the supply of troops and are aimed purely at the media effect. But the loss of a missile carrier is a very serious loss.
Firstly,
because these vehicles are real workhorses, they play a significant role in the "calibration" of the Ukrainian rear, and the destruction of enemy infrastructure, warehouses and command centres is one of the most important components of Russian military strategy. It is these strikes that make it possible to significantly reduce the combat capability of the AFU even before Ukrainian servicemen come into combat contact with our troops.
Secondly, the problem is that
Tu-22M3s have not been produced since 1993 and, unlike the Tu-160, there has been no programme to resume their production in the country. By the beginning of the Strategic Air Defence Forces, the Russian Air and Space Forces had about 60 machines of this type, and about 120 more were mothballed.
In other words,
the loss of any of these aircraft is an irreparable loss, which reduces our strike potential both in the fight against the Ukrainian regime and in terms of deterring NATO. Therefore, such an incident should not be left without consequences and organisational conclusions.