Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 Crashes in Ukraine

Palinurus

The Living Force
There seems to be developing some sort of a media war around Vladimir Tsemakh.

Source: Press release Netherlands Public Prosecution Service concerning Mr Vladimir Tsemakh

Press release Netherlands Public Prosecution Service concerning Mr Vladimir Tsemakh

2 December 2019 - National Prosecutor's Office


Today the Public Prosecution Service (PPS) has informed the Russian authorities of its findings regarding the Dutch request for the provisional arrest of a person who may have been involved in the downing of flight MH17.

As he himself has announced in the media, this concerns Mr Vladimir Tsemakh. The PPS regards him as a suspect, but a decision whether it will prosecute him has not yet been taken. For the decision to prosecute more evidence is required than for the decision to consider someone a suspect.

Tsemakh was arrested in Ukraine and detained for other criminal offences. The investigation into his role in the downing of flight MH17 is still ongoing. During Tsemakh’s detention in Kiev, the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) questioned him several times about his involvement but could not prevent Mr Tsemakh from being transferred to the Russian Federation on 7 September 2019 as part of a prisoner exchange.

To prevent that Tsemakh would evade the investigation, the PPS immediately requested his arrest for the purpose of extradition to the Netherlands. The Russian Federation does not extradite its own citizens but since Mr Tsemakh is a Ukranian citizen, there were no impediments for his extradition.

Before the plane with the exchanged prisoners landed in Moscow that day, the PPS got confirmation that Russia had received the request for Mr Tsemakh’s arrest. When his immediate arrest failed to occur, the PPS contacted the Russian authorities several times and advised them of the possible flight risk of Mr Tsemakh. Since there were indications that he wanted to return to Eastern Ukraine.

On 23 September 2019 the Russian authorities informed the PPS that they were considering the request, but required additional information. In later correspondence even more information was requested, which was repeatedly provided. According to the PPS this information had no relevance to the decision to arrest Mr Tsemakh.

The request for his arrest was frequently reiterated through Dutch diplomatic and political channels and Russia was called upon to give full and prompt cooperation. The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Blok, stressed the urgency of the request, both in writing and in a personal meeting with his Russian counterpart, Mr Lavrov. The urgent need for swift execution of the request was also emphasized at European level, both by Mr Blok and by the Dutch Prime-Minister, Mr Rutte.

On 19 November 2019 the Public Prosecution Service received notification from the Russian authorities that the request for the arrest of Mr Tsemakh could not be executed because no information regarding the whereabouts of Mr Tsemakh in the Russian Federation was available.

According to media reports Mr Tsemakh had already returned to his residence in Eastern Ukraine. From there he cannot be extradited.

The Public Prosecution Service has concluded that Russia willingly allowed Mr Tsemakh to leave the Russian Federation and refused to execute the Dutch request. While under the European Convention on Extradition, it was obliged to do so.

The PPS has shared this conclusion with the Russian authorities. The PPS has also informed the next of kin of the MH17 victims.

The events concerning Mr Tsemakh have no effect on the start of the MH17 criminal trial. This will commence on 9 March 2020 at 10:00 AM, in the court building Justitieel Complex Schiphol.

Four suspects, Igor Vsevolodovich GIRKIN, Sergey Nikolayevich DUBINSKIY, Oleg Yuldashevich PULATOV and Leonid Volodymyrovych KHARCHENKO have been summoned to appear on this day. In their case the judge will deliver a judgment on the accusations.

Other coverage:
Russia accused of obstructing MH17 suspect’s extradition to Netherlands
MH17: Russia accused of letting potential suspect flee across the border - DutchNews.nl

Coverage in Dutch:
Persverklaring OM inzake Vladimir Tsemach
OM: Rusland frustreerde uitlevering MH17-verdachte Tsemach aan Nederland
OM: Moskou frustreerde uitlevering MH17-verdachte
nd.nl/nieuws/nederland/moskou-frustreerde-uitlevering-mh17-verdachte.3709751.lynkx (registration required - for free)
 

Palinurus

The Living Force
Source (Dutch only): Omroepbaas Rusland: satellietfoto MH17 was nep

DeepL Translator said:
Broadcaster from Russia: Satellite photo MH17 was fake

ANP - 3 hours ago


© Copyright ANP 2019 - Broadcaster from Russia: satellite photo MH17 was fake


MOSKOU (ANP) - The Russian state broadcaster First Channel recognizes that the evidence that a Ukrainian jet fighter would have shot down MH17 is fake. Konstantin Ernst, the boss of the broadcaster that brought the theory into the world, says in an interview with the American magazine The New Yorker that "a mistake" was made at the time.

In November 2014, the Russian state broadcaster announced that the plane would have been hit by a Ukrainian fighter jet missile and not by a BUK rocket. To prove this, the channel came up with satellite images that would have been from British or American intelligence services.

However, the authenticity of the images was soon questioned. Several people claimed that the images were fake because, for example, the lettering on the plane did not match that of a Malaysian plane. Asked why the First Channel came out with this, Ernst says: "Yes, we are human, we made a mistake, but not on purpose."

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

Other coverage in Dutch:
Rusland erkent dat satellietfoto van neerhalen MH17 nep was
Rusland: Satellietfoto MH17 was nep

Link to the very long article in The New Yorker, with the relevant fragment quoted:

the-kremlins-creative-director said:
<snip>

In July, 2014, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, headed from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, was shot out of the sky as it passed over eastern Ukraine, and all two hundred and ninety-eight people on board were killed. The Dutch launched a years-long multinational investigation, which eventually identified Russia-backed separatists as having fired the missile and traced the anti-aircraft system used in the attack to a Russian military unit. As the inquiry proceeded, state media went into a fury, giving voice to every other possible theory: that the Malaysian airliner had been targeted by the Ukrainians in the mistaken belief that it was Putin’s plane; that it was hit accidentally as part of an air-defense training exercise gone wrong; that it was downed by the Ukrainian Air Force. In November, 2014, Channel One aired what it called “sensational” footage: a satellite image, supposedly taken by Western intelligence services and passed to Russia by an American scientist, that purported to show the plane being attacked by a Ukrainian fighter jet. “The image supports a version of events which has hardly been heard in the West,” a host said.

The picture was quickly outed as a fake. The time stamp didn’t match that of the incident, the plane had identifying markings that distinguished it from the Malaysian aircraft, and the terrain underneath was clipped from photos posted online two years before. When I asked Ernst why his channel gave voice to something so easily disproven, he said that it was a simple error: “Yes, we’re human, we made a mistake, but not on purpose.”

Baldly false stories, in the right doses, are not disastrous for Channel One; in fact, they are an integral part of the Putin system’s postmodern approach to propaganda. In the Soviet era, the state pushed a coherent, if occasionally clumsy, narrative to convince the public of the official version of events. But private media ownership and widespread Internet access have made this impossible. Today, state outlets tell viewers what they are already inclined to believe, rather than try to convince them of what they can plainly see is untrue. At the same time, they release a cacophony of theories with the aim of nudging viewers toward believing nothing at all, or of making them so overwhelmed that they simply throw up their hands. Trying to ascertain the truth becomes a matter of guessing who benefits from a given narrative.

In this case, the state’s approach seems to have worked: a year later, a poll showed that only about five per cent of Russians blamed their government or the separatists for the disaster. When I asked Ernst about the official Dutch report, he told me that our disagreement came down to a matter of belief: “You believe the Dutch report is true, and I believe the Dutch report is unprofessional.” It was as if we were arguing about religion or aesthetics rather than a set of facts.

<snip>
 
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