Putin Recognizes Donbass Republics, Sends Russian Military to 'Denazify' Ukraine

On Zelensky wanting ‘air defence systems from the West’, the problem there is, there aren’t any. At least not the kind the he’s asking for, which are known as ‘integrated’, and are what the soviets and the Russians and by that token, Ukraine, are used to using.

The reason being, those types of air defence systems are actually ‘defensive’, but through the 20th century, the US instead focused on the ‘offensive’ option by putting their money into fighter jets for air defence.

This is a bit odd. For the record, I didn’t intentionally post this last night. I wrote it a few days ago and had it saved in a draft in response to a post in the thread. I got that info from a commentator on YouTube and decided that if I was going post about it, I would to try to find the video and include it and rewrite the post, rather than just parroting the information.

I didn’t get around to doing so, and then I’ve somehow accidentally posted the draft. It comes across as me trying to sound super knowledgeable about US and Russian defence systems, when I’m not at all.

Guess I’ll not make use of the draft function again :lol: Sorry for adding noise to the thread.
 

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There is more, but it comes in the next post:
More from Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives
published in 1997. It is somewhat disturbing to read how US strategists described the situation 25 years ago, considering how the US applauded the separation of a union of nations to make later cooperation more difficult for the sake of establishing US hegemony and financial control.

The numbers are page numbers, but the version was a pdf, and the book seems to have other numbers, but it gives and idea anyway of where in the book, the excerpts are from.
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In that context, even friendly western policy is seen by some influential members of the Russian policymaking community as designed to deny Russia its rightful claim to a global status. As two Russian geopoliticians put it:

[T]he United States and the NATO countries—while sparing Russia's self-esteem to the extent possible, but nevertheless firmly and consistently—are destroying the geopolitical foundations which could, at least in theory, allow Russia to hope to acquire the status as the number two power in world politics that belonged to the Soviet Union.

Moreover, America is seen as pursuing a policy in which

the new organization of the European space that is being engineered by the West is, in essence, built on the idea of supporting, in this part of the world, new, relatively small and weak national states through their more or less close rapprochement with NATO, the EC, and so forth.4

4. A. Bogaturov and V. Kremenyuk (both senior scholars in the Institute of the United States and Canada), in "Current Relations and Prospects for Inter-.•icliori Between Russia and the United States," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 28, 1966.

The above quotations define well—even though with some animus—the dilemma that the United Slates laces. To what extent should Russia be helped economically—which inevitably strengthens Russia politically and militarily—and to what extent should the newly independent states be simultaneously assisted in the defense and consolidation of their independence? Can Russia be both powerful and a democracy at the same time? If it becomes powerful again, will it not seek to regain its lost imperial domain, and can it then be both an empire and a democracy?

U.S. policy toward the vital geopolitical pivots of Ukraine and Azerbaijan cannot skirt that issue, and America thus faces a difficult dilemma regarding tactical balance and strategic purpose. Internal Russian recovery is essential to Russia's democratization and eventual Europeanization. But any recovery of its imperial potential would be inimical to both of these objectives. Moreover, it is over this issue that differences could develop between America and some European states, especially as the EU and NATO expand. Should Russia be considered a candidate for eventual membership in either structure? And what then about Ukraine? The costs of the exclusion of Russia could be high—creating a self-fulfilling prophecy in the Russian mindset—but the results of dilution of either the EU or NATO could also be quite destabilizing.
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By now, it seems the most dangerous scenario has happened.
Potentially, the most dangerous scenario would be a grand coalition of China, Russia, and perhaps Iran, an "antihegemonic" coalition united not by ideology but by complementary grievances. It would be reminiscent in scale and scope of the challenge once posed by the Sino-Soviet bloc, though this time China would likely be the leader and Russia the follower. Averting this contingency, however remote it may be, will require a display of U.S. geostrategic skill on the western, eastern, and southern perimeters of Eurasia simultaneously.
This one has not yet happened:
A geographically more limited but potentially even more consequential challenge could involve a SinoJapanese axis, in the wake of a collapse of the American position in the Far East and a revolutionary change in Japan's world outlook. It would combine the power of two extraordinarily productive peoples, and it could exploit some form of "Asianism" as a unifying anti-American doctrine. However, it does not appear likely that in the foreseeable future China and Japan will form an alliance, given their recent historical experience; and a farsighted American policy in the Far East should certainly be able to prevent this eventuality from occurring.
The following scenario almost developed, but with the French navy ship deal being prohibited by the US in 2014 and with Nord Stream being sabotaged, for now the Russian relations with France and Germany are on hold.
Also quite remote, but not to be entirely excluded, is the possibility of a grand European realignment, involving either a German-Russian collusion or a Franco-Russian entente. There are obvious historical precedents for both, and either could emerge if European unification were to grind to a halt and if relations between Europe and America were to deteriorate gravely. Indeed, in the latter eventuality, one could imagine a European-Uussian accommodation to exclude America from the continent. At this stage, all of these variants seem improbable. They would require not only a massive mishandling by America of its European policy but also a dramatic reorientation on the part of the key European states.

Whatever the future, it is reasonable to conclude that American primacy on the Eurasian continent will be buffeted by turbulence and perhaps at least by sporadic violence. America's primacy is potentially vulnerable to new challenges, either from regional contenders or novel constellations. The currently dominant American global system, within which "the threat of war is off the table," is likely to be stable only in those parts of the world in which American primacy, guided by a long-term geostrategy, rests on compatible and congenial sociopolitical systems, linked together by American-dominated multilateral frameworks.
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1. American engagement in the cause of European unification is needed to compensate for the internal crisis of morale and purpose that has been sapping European vitality, to overcome the widespread European suspicion that ultimately America does not favor genuine European unity, and to infuse into the European undertaking the needed dose of democratic fervor. That requires a clear-cut American commitment to the eventual acceptance of Europe as America's global partner.

2. In the short run, tactical opposition to French policy and support for German leadership is justified; in the longer run, European unity will have to involve a more distinctive European political and military identity if a genuine Europe is actually to become reality. That requires some progressive accommodation to the French view regarding the distribution of power within transatlantic institutions.

3. Neither France nor Germany is sufficiently strong to con struct Europe on its own or to resolve with Russia the ambiguities inherent in the definition of Europe's geographic scope. That re quires energetic, focused, and determined American involvement, particularly with the Germans, in defining Europe's scope and hence also in coping with such sensitive—especially to Russia—issues as the eventual status within the European system of the Baltic republics and Ukraine.

Just one glance at the map of the vast Eurasian landmass underlines the geopolitical significance to America of the European bridgehead—as well as its geographic modesty.
The preservation of that bridgehead and its expansion as the springboard for democracy are directly relevant to America's security. The existing gap between America's global concern for stability and for the related dissemination of democracy and Europe's seeming indifference to these issues (despite France's self-proclaimed status as a global power) needs to be closed, and it can only be narrowed if Europe increasingly assumes a more confederated character. Europe cannot become a single nation-state, because of the tenacity of its diverse national traditions, but it can become an entity that through common political institutions cumulatively reflects shared democratic values, identifies its own interests with their universal-ization, and exercises a magnetic attraction on its co-inhabitants of the Eurasian space.
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In the current circumstances, the expansion of NATO to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary— probably by 1999—appears to be likely. After this initial but significant step, it is likely that any subsequent expansion of the alliance will either be coincidental with or will follow the expansion of the EU. The latter involves a much more complicated process, both in the number of qualifying stages and in the meeting of membership requirements (see chart on page 83). Thus, even the first admissions into the EU from Central Europe are not likely before the year 2002 or perhaps somewhat later. Nonetheless, after, the first three new NATO members have also joined the EU, both the EU and NATO will have to address the question of extending membership to the Baltic republics, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia, and perhaps also, eventually, to Ukraine.
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4. Somewhere between 2005 and 2010, Ukraine, especially if in the meantime the country has made significant progress in its domestic reforms and has succeeded in becoming more evidently identified as a Central European country, should become ready for serious negotiations with both the EU and NATO.
In the meantime, it is likely that FrancoGerman-Polish collaboration within the EU and NATO will have deepened considerably, especially in the area of defense. That collaboration could become the Western core of any wider European security arrangements that might eventually embrace both Russia and Ukraine. Given the special geopolitical interest of Germany and Poland in Ukraine's independence, it is also quite possible that Ukraine will gradually be drawn into the special Franco-GermanPolish relationship. By the year 2010, Franco-German-Polish-Ukrainian political collaboration, engaging some 230 million people, could evolve into a partnership enhancing Europe's geostrategic depth (see map above).
As a comment to the above, what has happened by now seems to be a stronger US-Polish relation, with a weaker Polish-German. Why should Poland otherwise revive the 1.3 trillion claim against Germany.
Next the idea of manipulating Russia to believe in Europe and the US:
Whether the above scenario emerges in a benign fashion or in the context of intensifying tensions with Russia is of great importance. Russia should be continuously reassured that the doors to Europe are open, as are the doors to its eventual participation in ;ui expanded transatlantic system of security and, perhaps at some future point, in a new trans-Eurasian system of security. To give credence to these assurances, various cooperative links between Russia and Europe—in all fields—should be very deliberately promoted. (Russia's relationship to Europe, and the role of Ukraine in that regard, are discussed more fully in the next chapter.)

If Europe succeeds both in unifying and in expanding and if Russia in the meantime undertakes successful democratic consolidation and social modernization, at some point Russia can also become eligible for a more organic relationship with Europe. That, in turn, would make possible the eventual merger of the transatlantic security system with a transcontinental Eurasian one. However, as a practical reality, the question of Russia's formal membership will not arise for quite some time to come—and that, if anything, is yet another reason for not pointlessly shutting the doors to it.

To conclude: with the Europe of Yalta gone, it is essential that there be no reversion to the Europe of Versailles. The end of the division of Europe should not precipitate a step back to a Europe of quarrelsome nation-states but should be the point of departure for shaping a larger and increasingly integrated Europe, reinforced by a widened NATO and rendered even more secure by a constructive security relationship with Russia. Hence, America's central geostrategic goal in Europe can be summed up quite simply: it is to consolidate through a more genuine transatlantic partnership the U.S. bridgehead on the Eurasian continent so that an enlarging Europe can become a more viable springboard for projecting into Eurasia the international democratic and cooperative order.
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The America wanted under the umbrella of US democracy and economic terrorism to subdue Russia. He does not say that directly, but what can we conclude when:
THE DISINTEGRATION LATE IN 1991 of the world's territorially largest state created a "black hole" in the very center of Eurasia. It was as if the geopoliticians' "heartland" had been suddenly yanked from the global map.

For America, this new and perplexing geopolitical situation poses a crucial challenge. Understandably, the immediate task has to be to reduce the probability of political anarchy or a reversion to a hostile dictatorship in a crumbling state still possessing a powerful nuclear arsenal. But the long-range task remains: how to encourage Russia's democratic transformation and economic recovery while avoiding the reemergence of a Eurasian empire that could obstruct the American geostrategic goal of shaping a larger Euro-Atlantic system to which Russia can then be stably and safely related.
The historic shock suffered by the Russians was magnified by the fact that some 20 million Russian-speaking people were now inhabitants of foreign states dominated politically by increasingly nationalistic elites determined to assert their own identities after decades of more or less coercive Russification.
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Brezinsky has earlier described the importance of Ukraine for the control of Russia and Eurasia. In this light, the developments in Eastern Europe including Ukraine following 1991 are interesting. He puts it, as if Russia lost Ukraine. He does not say that Crimea was Russian until 1954 or that parts of Eastern Ukraine were parts of Russia until the Russian Revolution. Until the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine was the Heaven, they had sun, sea, fruits, fertile land, food, industry, comfort. Many Ukrainians living through the 1990ies were aware of what had been lost with the fracturing of the union, that the US helped to bring along even further by encouraging the separation, guided by US freedom and democracy and aligned NGOs like the George Soros foundations.
And beyond the frontiers of the former Soviet Union, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact meant that the former satellite states of Central Europe, foremost among them Poland, were rapidly gravitating toward NATO and the European Union. Most troubling of all was the loss of Ukraine.

The appearance of an independent Ukrainian state not only challenged all Russians to rethink the nature of their own political and ethnic identity, but it represented a vital geopolitical setback for the Russian state. The repudiation of more than three hundred years of Russian imperial history meant the loss of a potentially rich industrial and agricultural economy and of 52 million people ethnically and religiously sufficiently close to the Russians to make Russia into a truly large and confident imperial state. Ukraine's independence also deprived Russia of its dominant position on the Black Sea, where Odessa had served as Russia's vital gateway to trade with the Mediterranean and the world beyond.

The loss of Ukraine was geopolitically pivotal, for it drastically limited Russia's geostrategic options.
Even without the Baltic states and Poland, a Russia that retained control over Ukraine could still seek to be the leader of an assertive Eurasian empire, in which Moscow could dominate the non-Slavs in the South and Southeast of the former Soviet Union. But without Ukraine and its 52 million fellow Slavs, any attempt by Moscow to rebuild the Eurasian empire was likely to leave Russia entangled alone in protracted conflicts with the nationally and religiously aroused non-Slavs, the war with Chechnya perhaps simply being the first example. Moreover, given Russia's declining birthrate and the explosive birthrate among the Central Asians, any new Eurasian entity based purely on Russian power, without Ukraine, would inevitably become less European and more Asiatic with each passing year.

The loss of Ukraine was not only geopolitically pivotal but also geopolitically catalytic. It was Ukrainian actions—the Ukrainian declaration of independence in December 1991, its insistence in the critical negotiations in Bela Vezha that the Soviet Union should be replaced by a looser Commonwealth of Independent States, and especially the1 sudden coup-like imposition of Ukrainian command over the Soviet army units stationed on Ukrainian soil—that prevented the CIS from becoming merely a new name for a more con-federal USSR. Ukraine's political self-determination stunned Moscow and set an example that the other Soviet republics, though initially more timidly, then followed.

Russia's loss of its dominant position on the Baltic Sea was replicated on the Black Sea not only because of Ukraine's independence but also because the newly independent Caucasian states— Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan—enhanced the opportunities for Turkey to reestablish its once-lost influence in the region. Prior to 1991, the Black Sea was the point of departure for the projection of Russian naval power into the Mediterranean. By the mid-1990s, Russia was left with a small coastal strip on the Black Sea and with an unresolved debate with Ukraine over basing rights in Crimea for the remnants of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, while observing, with evident irritation, joint NATO-Ukrainian naval and shore-landing maneuvers and a growing Turkish role in the Black Sea region. Russia also suspected Turkey of having provided effective aid to the Chechen resistance.
Of course, the Russian leadership know not only their own history, but also what foreign analysts have written about it. In fact, it is possible that people like Brezinsky and Friedman today are more read in Asia than in Western Europe.
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The post-Soviet Russian elite had apparently also expected that the West would aid in, or at least not impede, the restoration of a central Russian role in the post-Soviet space. They thus resented the West's willingness to help the newly independent post-Soviet states consolidate their separate political existence. Even while warning that a "confrontation with the United States ... is an option that should be avoided," senior Russian analysts of American foreign policy argued (not altogether incorrectly) that the United States was seeking "the reorganization of interstate relations in the whole of Eurasia ... whereby there was not one sole leading power on the continent but many medium, relatively stable, and moderately strong ones ... but necessarily inferior to the United States in their individual or even collective capabilities."4

4. A. Bogaturov and V. Kremenyuk (both senior scholars in the Institute of the United States and Canada), in "The Americans Themselves Will Never Stop," Nezauisimaya Gazeta, June 28, 1996.

In this regard, Ukraine was critical. The growing American inclination, especially by 1994, to assign a high priority to American-Ukrainian relations and to help Ukraine sustain its new national freedom was viewed by many in Moscow—even by its "westerniz-ers"—as a policy directed at the vital Russian interest in eventually bringing Ukraine back into the common fold. That Ukraine will eventually somehow be-, "reintegrated" remains an article of faith among many members of the Russian political elite.5 As a result, Russia's geopolitical and historical questioning of Ukraine's separate status collided head-on with the American view that an imperial Russia could not be a democratic Russia.
Brezinsky and the US did not think that the area of the USSR could be democratic? It was never allowed a chance to develop on its own without US and EU interference, that stirred division.
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5. For example, even Yeltsin's top adviser, Dmitryi Ryurikov, was quoted by Interfax (November 20, 1996) as considering Ukraine to be "a temporary phenomenon," while Moscow's Obshchaya Gazeta (December 10, 1996) reported that "in the foreseeable future events in eastern Ukraine may confront Russia with a very difficult problem. Mass manifestations of discontent... will be accompanied by appeals to Russia, or even demands, to take over the region. Quite a few people in Moscow would be ready to support such plans." Western concerns regarding Russian intentions were certainly not eased by Russian demands for Crimea and Sevastopol, nor by such provocative acts as the deliberate inclusion in late 1996 of Sevastopol in Russian public television's nightly weather forecasts lor Russian cities.
To the last paragraph, time has showed that a conflict did come in Eastern Ukraine, and not without reason.
The political weakness of the new democratic elite was compounded by the very scale of the Russian economic crisis. The need for massive reforms—for the withdrawal of the Russian state from the economy— generated excessive expectations of Western, especially American, aid. Although that aid, especially from Germany and America, gradually did assume large proportions, even under the best of circumstances it still could not prompt a quick economic recovery. The resulting social dissatisfaction provided additional underpinning for a mounting chorus of disappointed critics who alleged that the partnership with the United States was a sham, beneficial to America but damaging to Russia.

In brief, neither the objective nor the subjective preconditions for an effective global partnership existed in the immediate years following the Soviet Union's collapse. The democratic "westerniz-ers" simply wanted too much and could deliver too little.
There are videos about the early 90ies, how the CIA came in with a list of 200 strategic companies they wanted off the market. The US had an intention to destroy, and they succeeded to a large degree.
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Opposition to Moscow's notions of "integration" was particularly strong in Ukraine. Its leaders quickly recognized that such "integration," especially in light of Russian reservations regarding the legitimacy of Ukrainian independence, would eventually lead to the loss of national sovereignty. Moreover, the heavy-handed Russian treatment of the new Ukrainian state—its unwillingness to grant recognition of Ukraine's borders, its questioning of Ukraine's right to Crimea, its insistence on exclusive extraterritorial control over the port of Sevastopol—gave the aroused Ukrainian nationalism a distinctively anti-Russian edge. The self-definition of Ukrainian nationhood, during the critical formative stage in the history of the new state, was thus diverted from its traditional anti-Polish or anti-Romanian orientation and became focused instead on opposition to any Russian proposals for a more integrated CIS, for a special Slavic community (with Russia and Belarus), or for a Eurasian Union, deciphering them as Russian imperial tactics.

Ukraine's determination to preserve its independence was encouraged by external support. Although initially the West, especially the United States, had been tardy in recognizing the geopolitical importance of a separate Ukrainian state, by the mid-1990s both America and Germany had become strong backers of Kiev's separate identity. In July 1996, the U.S. secretary of defense declared, "I cannot overestimate the importance of Ukraine as an independent country to the security and stability of all of Europe," while in September, the German chancellor—notwithstanding his strong support for President Yeltsin—went even further in declaring that "Ukraine's firm place in Europe can no longer be challenged by anyone ... No one will be able any more to dispute Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity." American policy makers also came to describe the American-Ukrainian relationship as "a strategic partnership," deliberately invoking the same phrase used to describe the American-Russian relationship.

Without Ukraine, as already noted, an imperial restoration based either on the CIS or on Eurasianism was not a viable option. An empire without Ukraine would eventually mean a Russia that would become more "Asianized" and more remote from Europe. Moreover, Eurasianism was also not especially appealing to the newly independent Central Asians, few of whom were eager for a new union with Moscow. Uzbekistan became particularly assertive in supporting Ukraine's objections to any elevation of the CIS into a supranational entity and in opposing the Russian initiatives designed to enhance the CIS.
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Ukrainian insistence on only limited and largely economic integration had the further effect of depriving the notion of a "Slavic Union" of any practical meaning. Propagated by some Slavophiles and given prominence by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's support, this idea automatically became geopolitically meaningless once it was repudiated by Ukraine. It left Belarus alone with Russia; and it also implied a possible partition of Kazakstan, with its Russian-populated northern regions potentially part of such a union. Such an option was understandably not reassuring to the new rulers of Kazakstan and merely intensified the anti-Russian thrust of their nationalism. In Belarus, a Slavic Union without Ukraine meant nothing less than incorporation into Russia, thereby also igniting more volatile feelings of nationalist resentment.
To the above, I wonder if Belarus is closer to Russia than the EU countries to the EU or the EU with regard to NATO and the US. I suspect Belarus has more independence of Russian, than the EU countries of the EU.
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Most important, however, is Ukraine. As the EU and NATO expand, Ukraine will eventually be in the position to choose whether it wishes to be part of either organization. It is likely that, in order to reinforce its separate status, Ukraine will wish to join both, once they border upon it and once its own internal transformation begins to qualify it for membership. Although that will take time, it is not too early for the West—while further enhancing its economic and security ties with Kiev—to begin pointing to the decade 2005- 2015 as a reasonable time frame for the initiation of Ukraine's progressive inclusion, thereby reducing the risk that the Ukrainians may fear that Europe's expansion will halt on the Polish-Ukrainian border.
Russia, despite its protestations, is likely to acquiesce in the expansion of NATO in 1999 to include several Central European countries, because the cultural and social gap between Russia and Central Europe has widened so much since the fall of communism. By contrast, Russia will find it incomparably harder to acquiesce in Ukraine's accession to NATO, for to do so would be to acknowledge that Ukraine's destiny is no longer organically linked to Russia's.
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The states deserving America's strongest geopolitical support are Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and (outside this region) Ukraine, all three being geopolitically pivotal. Indeed, Kiev's role reinforces the argument that Ukraine is the critical state, insofar as Russia's own future evolution is concerned.
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It follows that political and economic support for the key newly independent states is an integral part of a broader strategy for Eurasia. The consolidation of a sovereign Ukraine, which in the meantime redefines itself as a Central European state and engages in closer integration with Central Europe, is a critically important component of such a policy, as is the fostering of a closer relationship with such strategically pivotal states as Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, in addition to the more generalized effort to open up Central Asia (in spite of Russian impediments) to the global economy.
Russia is mentioned more around 700 times, Ukraine more than 80, France about 100 and Germany 110, so although there is more than the above selection reveals, the impression is the US was up to no good seen from a Eurasian perspective. Actually, Brzezinski dedicated the book to his students, writing: "For my students—to help them shape tomorrow's world". However, the students might also have been Russian and Chinese analysts and diplomats, so who knows, what twists and turns are ahead.
 
Accurate summation of the current situation from Alastair Crooke at Strategic Culture Foundation - use of the term 'Leviathan' is particularly apt.

I'll quote the whole piece as he pretty much hits on every important point in the current Western collapse in a very succinct way:

The Leviathan Super Cycle Ends; Western Leaders Pretend They Didn’t Notice

The Ukraine war ‘bubble’ is deflating as the U.S. and Europe reach the bottom of the arms ‘inventory barrel’.

Historic shifts in world politics happen very slowly. That was not the case however, when the U.S. first stepped onto the world stage. It happened quite suddenly in 1898 – with the invasion of Cuba: Old Europe watched with palpable anxiety …The Manchester Guardian, at the time, reported that nearly every American had come to embrace this new expansionist zeitgeist. The few critics were “simply laughed at for their pains”. The Frankfurter Zeitung warned against “the disastrous consequences of their exuberance” but realized that Americans would not listen.

In 1845, an unsigned article already had given birth to the slogan ‘Manifest Destiny’ – a claim that America had a destiny to expand, and to occupy others’ lands. Sheldon Richman, in America’s Counter-Revolution, wrote that this latter vision clearly had ‘Empire on its Mind’.

This ‘Destiny’ ethos marked the turning point away from the former decentralization dynamic, and the start of the American impulse towards an imperial totalising outreach which succeeded it. (Not all, of course, were on board – the early U.S. conservative ethos was Burkean: i.e., suspicious of foreign entanglements).

Today, the picture could not be more different. Doubts and misgivings are everywhere; the drive and confidence of ‘Empire’ has faded. The U.S. apes more the exhausted Austro-Hungarian Empire of the pre-WW1 era – dragging an array of allied nations into a conflict that – at that time – turned into WW1. Now, it is western Europe that has been dragged into another European war – by default – owing to their alliance/ allegiance with Washington.

Then, as today, all states disastrously underestimated the length and severity of the conflict – and misread the nature and significance of events.

Today’s war (against Russia) is framed in the West in a childish-moral trope (which nonetheless seems to work for an anaesthetised public) – that of WWII: Every rival is another Hitler, any reflective comment, another Neville Chamberlain example of appeasement. A tyrant lusts for European land and domination, and the only question is whether the good and just can muster the resolve to defeat this evil ambition.

This simplistic meme plainly is intended to obfuscate from their electorates the significance of the underlying dynamics at work: Not only is a major political cycle in transition, but this is occurring precisely at a moment when the western hyper-financialised ‘business-model’ is cracking. Put simply: the narrative obfuscation (“we are winning”) hides risks (both political and economic) whose gravity, western leaders seem unable (or unwilling) to grasp.

The U.S. – like pre-war Austria–Hungary – is slowly falling apart. That cannot any more be fudged. Washington is haemorrhaging control over events and making strategic mistakes. A certain class in the western ruling élite however, seems stuck in a reading of history. An interpretation that sees war as restoring the health of the state: that any conflict – any us vs them, whether real or abstract (such as war on poverty, drugs, the virus, etc.) – feeds centralisation and strengthens the totalising Leviathan. Indeed, even conceptualised as an internal ‘us versus the enemy within’ war, this too is seen as consolidating the Leviathan.

This is the lesson that the élite claims it has learned from the modern state. In one sense however, this politics has become its own bubble of abstract narratives: a centralising, totalising bubble. One however, that is beginning to burst.

The western Ruling Classes do not understand – that is to say, they do not want to understand – the ‘straws in the wind’, that are blowing in another direction – for example, the recent Samarkand SCO summit. Put simply: The Leviathan current has run its course; that’s it. History is moving in a different direction, and western leaders pretend not to notice.

This key shift was summarised succinctly by the Indian Foreign Minister recently, when accosted by a European demanding to know whether, or not, he supported Ukraine – that is, faced by the standard western binary: the ‘with us or against us’ meme – the Indian diplomat riposted simply that it was high time that Europeans stopped thinking that ‘their wars’ were the globe’s wars: ‘We don’t have a side: We are our own side’, he replied.

In other words, western ‘interests’ do not necessarily ‘translate’ into becoming the mandated interests of the non-western world. The non-western world is its ‘own side’. These states insist on living to a framework drawn from their own past historical experience; on creating political structures shaped towards their own civilisation and their own interests, and on economies adjusted to the grain of their own social framing.

This is the significance of Samarkand: Multipolarism. It refutes the western presumption of exceptional ‘entitlement’: Expecting others to put their interests behind those of the West. Above all, it is a current emphasising sovereignty and self-determination.

Plainly, such sentiments cannot be said to be anti-western. Yet the binary pre-disposition in the West is so deeply entrenched that few ‘get it’ (and those who do, don’t like it).

This is the primary way that the significance of today’s European crisis is misunderstood politically: The long historical cycle is reversing from centralisation, back toward de-centralisation (states being their ‘own side’). On the other side, there is the U.S. – internally divided; beset by crisis; intimating weakness; and consequently lashing out at all around in order to cling to its original expansionist roots.

Secondly, the war’s nature is misconceived in the West by being seen solely through the lens of the Ukraine conflict. The latter is but one small episode in the ‘long war’ waged by Europeans and Anglo-Saxons against Russia. This, in itself, has caused old revanchist ghosts of Europe to re-awaken – a fact that both aggravates tensions, and complicates any eventual resolution of the crisis.

One egregious misunderstanding and neglect, however, concerns the nature of politics and the role played by fossil fuels. Energy is in fact at the heart of this. How could the current Ruling Class in Washington ‘forget’ that the Western real economy is a physics-based network system, powered by energy? Modernity is contingent on fossil fuels. A smooth transition to green energy over time, therefore is too, largely dependent on the continued availability of plentiful, cheap fossil fuel. Without energy of the right kinds, jobs disappear, and the total quantity of goods and services produced falls steeply.

Yet, western leaders cast this basic understanding to the wind. Of what were they thinking when advocating that Europe should sanction cheap Russian energy, and rely on expensive American LNG instead? On reasserting a “rules-based” hegemony? On “European values”? Was this properly thought through?

And, in a further act of energy-linked folly, the Biden Administration now has alienated Saudi Arabia and the OPEC producers. OPEC is a cartel that attempts to manage production and demand through setting the price of oil. Did Team Biden forget that oil and gas – in a real way – are the very essence of geo-politics? The price, flow and routing of energy is at bottom, the principal ‘currency’ of global politics.

Yet, the G7 decided to strip Saudi Arabia of its rôle. It proposed instead a ‘buyers cartel of western states’ that would set the price of oil (and at Mario Draghi’s suggestion) extend a price cap to gas, too. Simply said: This was to take a hammer to Saudi Arabia’s ‘business model’ and collapse the main function of OPEC – now strengthened as OPEC+.

Not content with doing that, the Biden Administration took to selling one million barrels per day from the strategic reserves that further undermined the Saudi business model, whilst additionally seeking to drive crude prices lower through market manipulation.

Was Saudi Arabia expected to surrender OPEC’s hard won, price-setting role to the G7? Why should it? Is it justified on grounds that Biden’s party faces challenging midterm elections in November?

This is exactly what states were railing against at the Samarkand Summit – the western sense of entitlement. That, of course, Mohammad bin Salman must defer to Biden’s upcoming election prospects, and smile as his geo-political asset is stripped away.

Instead, it has evoked outright defiance. A former Indian Ambassador, MK Bhadrakumar, writes:​

“… the OPEC is proactively pushing back. Its decision to cut down oil production by 2 million barrels per day and keep the oil price above $90 per barrel makes a mockery of the G7 decision [to force a cap on prices]. The OPEC estimates that Washington’s options to counter OPEC+ are limited. Unlike in the past energy history, the U.S. does not have a single ally today, inside the OPEC+ group.
Due to rising domestic demands for oil and gas, it is entirely conceivable that the U.S. exports of both items may be curtailed. If that happens, Europe will be the worst sufferer. In an interview with FT last week, Belgium’s prime minister Alexander De Croo has warned that as winter approaches, if energy prices are not brought down, “we are risking a massive deindustrialisation of the European continent and the long-term consequences of that – might actually be very deep.”
He added these chilling words: “Our populations are getting invoices which are completely insane. At some point, it will snap. I understand that people are angry. . . people don’t have the means to pay.” De Croo was warning about the likelihood of social unrest and political turmoil in European countries”.
This is the old Imperial ‘sin’. Expecting, and insisting on deference, whilst transmitting inherent weakness. Washington and its allies are trying to compel servility on all fronts. Yet the bellicose rhetoric is backfiring – states progressively have lost their trepidation vis á vis Washington.

Thus, U.S. threats increasingly inspire not deference – but defiance. The problem is that the web of ‘us and them’ binary war narratives has become increasingly artificial and implausible – and consequently, near impossible for the West to keep stitched together.

This global trend toward defiance may ultimately prove to be the watershed – far surpassing any Ukraine war outcome – to a changed global order. Particularly, as Biden has picked a delicate moment to wage war on oil producers. So, we have three distinct bubbles that seem set to burst in tandem, creating a very ‘imperfect’ storm that may engulf what remains of western ‘strength’.

Here is the point: Not only is a political super-cycle transitioning, but bubbles are bursting on all fronts:

The Ukraine war ‘bubble’ is deflating as the U.S. and Europe reach the bottom of the arms ‘inventory barrel’; as Kiev’s finances tank and as its forces reel from heavy losses. Kiev and NATO face rather, the daunting prospect of a major Russian offensive maybe shortly – perhaps in early November.

The second bursting bubble is that of Europe’s ‘business model’. Much of EU industry simply is now uncompetitive, having ‘lost’ cheap Russian gas and oil. Simply put: the cost of energy is bankrupting Europe’s industry.

The third is the biggest of all: It is the ‘zero inflation–zero interest rate/QE’ bubble that has begun to burst. It is huge. And strategically, the Gulf represents the last pool of genuine ‘liquidity’ that historically has been a reliable purchaser and holder of U.S. Treasuries.

More significantly, this decades-long hyper financialisation has begun to unwind, as interest rates spike. What we are seeing in the UK is but a ‘canary in the mineshaft’: Many funds are highly leveraged again (as pre-2008) and exposed to derivatives using dazzling maths to pretend above-benchmark returns can be created risk-free from thin air again (as pre-2008). This always ends badly. All this high risk, unhedged leverage will need to be unwound at some point.

And just at this very moment, Biden elects to go to war with those Gulf energy producer states who almost uniquely hold the credibility of U.S. Treasury bonds in the palm of their hands. Washington exudes no apparent awareness of the gravity of combined events – nor of any need to tread carefully.​
 
Here Sahra Wagenknecht also reposted on Bürgerinitiative für Frieden in der Ukraine describes the war sentiments of the German left-wing liberals in terms that are still a rarity in European politics:

A turning point - left-liberalism and the farewell to liberal society
Excerpt from the new foreword to the paperback edition of the Self-Righteous, [Die Selbstgerechten] published in Die Welt, October 12, 2022
If there is a "turn of the times," it is in the Germans' opinion of war: conscientious objectors suddenly know all the tanks by name, and green-left milieus are promoting "sacrifice" and arms exports. Only one thing remains as always: dissenting opinions are radically marginalized.

Wars are not only fought with tanks and missiles, they also need emotionally catchy narratives to keep the public in line. Unforgettable was the tearful appearance of the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador before the U.S. Congress, who, as an alleged nurse, described how Iraqi soldiers had brutally torn Kuwaiti premature babies from their incubators in order to set the mood for the first Iraq war.

The PR agency Hill & Knowlton had professionally arranged the setting at the time and presumably rehearsed it with the girl beforehand. Somewhat less touching was U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell's speech to the UN Security Council, in which he told the assembled nations of the world the lie that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. "We lied, we cheated, and we stole. We had whole training courses in it," ex-CIA chief Mike Pompeo once summed up this practice good-humoredly.

Today, Putin tells the Russian people that his special operation is primarily about fighting Ukrainian Nazis and fascism there. Large Anglo-Saxon PR agencies, in turn, make us believe the same thing with regard to Russia. The message is that if Putin is not stopped, he will invade Poland tomorrow and march through the Brandenburg Gate the day after.

This interpretation turned a regional conflict into our war, which we now have to fight, whatever the cost. And it costs a lot, especially for Europe and especially for Germany. But only conspiracy theorists are asking the question "Who benefits from it?" today.

If there has been a kind of turning point anywhere, it has been in the public debate in Germany. Former conscientious objectors suddenly know the exact names of all the types of tanks produced in Germany,
and their choice of words gives the impression that they would like to roll right over to Russia themselves in a Leopard with a loaded barrel.

Even their well-protected children are no longer calling only for meat bans, e-cars and open borders, but also for the shipment of heavy military equipment, even though its deployment in the Ukraine war can hardly be made CO₂-neutral. The German population, in turn, is being asked to make sacrifices. If you don't fight for freedom, you should at least freeze for it.

Even the national is experiencing an unexpected rehabilitation. Urban cosmopolitans, for whom every little German flag during the soccer World Cup caused physical pain, are decorating their Twitter accounts with blue and yellow colors, and Ukrainian flags are flying on windows and balconies in hip, trendy neighborhoods. Whereas yesterday the nation-state was an outdated relic of ancient times, today every square kilometer of Ukrainian territory is worth thousands of lives.

Public rebuttals are rarely heard
Of course, the left-liberal milieu is not the only one in which an alarming drunkenness on war has broken out since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. What is new is that the contributions of green-savvy lifestyle leftists on war issues stand out for their particular aggressiveness, and public rebuttals from this political spectrum are heard even more rarely than from conservative circles or from the few remaining traditional social democrats.

There are reasons for this. The most important is probably that the narrative of the turning point in time, of the new world in which we have suddenly awakened and in which the free West, we the good guys, are fighting against the resurrected evil empire and must also make sacrifices for this righteous struggle, in its fairy-tale moralization of politics fits almost perfectly with a current of thought that has always defined itself primarily in terms of morals and attitudes and in which the question of benefits and harms has always been considered secondary.

Those who were used to asking above all for a morally impeccable attitude, who have become politicized through the struggle for politically correct speech bubbles, and who are driven above all by the desire to feel good by belonging to the good guys, are the ones for whom the new sound finds an almost ideal resonance.

But today, supposedly green left-liberalism is not only pushing armament and militarization and is partly responsible for the growing danger of nuclear escalation in Europe. It is also fighting with great verve and frightening success to keep dissenting opinions out of the public debate as much as possible.

It is true that in left-liberal debates there is constant talk of minorities, whose sensitivities and feelings are to be protected from all the impositions of life. But woe betide a minority that dares to have not only feelings but also an opinion that differs from that of the left-liberal mainstream. Then it's over with the much-invoked tolerance.

We were used to believing that the attack on freedom of expression, democracy and the foundations of our liberal society could only come from the far right. This danger has not been averted either. But it is not the only one. Moralizing left-wing liberalism has long since tipped over into a new authoritarianism that bears totalitarian traits and undermines liberal democracy through an extreme narrowing of the tolerated spectrum of opinion, missionary educational zeal, pressure to conform, stigmatization and exclusion.
The war has clearly spread to other places than Ukraine, as it appears to have engendered more steps in the direction of totalitarianism.

In a recent video, Wagenknecht, almost to her own surprise, gives Donald Trump kudos for having the idea to recommend negotiations and blames the US and the UK for not having been interested in peace when it was possible at an earlier stage in the conflict.
 
More signs that Ukraine is in trouble as the EU adds more training to the already depleted and able-bodied UA Army.
Plus more ca$h to follow as well.

Updated: 17/10/2022 17:54
European Union foreign ministers signed off on Monday on a military assistance mission to train 15,000 Ukrainian personnel in various member states.

"Today we step up our support to Ukraine to defend itself from Russia’s illegal aggression. The EU Military Assistance Mission will train the Ukrainian Armed Forces so they can continue their courageous fight," said the EU's top diplomat Josep Borrell in a statement.

The plans would mean both Ukrainian recruits and specialised personnel would receive training on EU soil over the coming two years.

The idea for the EU Military Assistance Mission was first floated by the bloc's High Representative Josep Borrell in a non-paper released in August following a request from Ukraine.

It is loosely based on a proposal pre-dating Russia's invasion of Ukraine to provide high-level training within the country's border which never came to fruition.

An EU diplomat described the plan as "radically new and very substantial".

Several EU countries are already providing training to Ukrainian forces on a bilateral basis although this tends to be limited to ensuring they can operate the military equipment these member states have provided the country to defend itself against Russian forces.

The EU military assistance is set to broaden the scope of the training with a clear command structure that coordinates supply and demand between Ukrainians and EU countries as well as with other partners and allies already providing Ukraine's troops with training including Canada, the UK and the US.

'Niche skill sets'

Borrell told reporters in Luxembourg on Monday morning that "it's clear (that if) the European Union armies pull together all their capacities, they can do much more than each one of their side."

"I'm strongly convinced that (by) putting together the capacities of the European armies we can offer a much better product," he added.

The operational headquarters of the mission will be within the European External Action Service (EEAS) in Brussels and the mission will be open to the participation of third states, the Council's statement also read.

It is still unclear which EU states will offer personnel, instructors and training modules as well as how and from where the Ukrainian troops enter and leave the EU.

France's Armies Minister, Sebastien Lecornu, meanwhile announced over the weekend that the country will train some 2,000 Ukrainian soldiers.

"Ireland has niche skill sets that I think can be useful in terms of that training, particularly around, you know, managing explosives, counter IED," Irish Foreign Minister Simon Coveney said on Monday morning.

"There are, unfortunately, many, many thousands of landmines placed across Ukraine, which I think Ireland, I hope Ireland can be part of helping to train Ukrainian military to deal with safely, he added.

The Hungarian government, which has been calling for sanctions against Russia to be scrapped and has struck a deal with Gazprom to receive more Russian gas, has confirmed that it will not offer any training to Ukrainian troops.

"Hungary was the only one not to vote on this proposal. It used the option of constructive abstention," Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó told reporters, adding: "We don't participate in this training mission, we don't send trainers, we don't contribute to the costs of the operation."

Austria, which has a policy of military neutrality, is also not expected to take part.

'Long-term planning and training'

A senior EU official said that the mission is needs-based and that the type of training offered will adapt as the conflict evolves. The number of Ukrainian troops receiving training could also increase.

The UK, for instance, has already trained 10,000 Ukrainian troops since the beginning of the Russian invasion on 24 February and is providing air bases for Canada to offer its own training to another 10,000 Ukrainian troops. US training is provided in Germany.

"We are probably, unfortunately, in the long haul when it comes to the war against Russia to stop Putin's aggression against Ukraine. Therefore, we need also long-term planning and training," Danish Foreign Minister Jeppe Kofod told reporters.

"It's historical for us," he added, citing the June 1 referendum in Denmark which abolished the country's defence opt-out.

The military assistance mission is expected to cost up around €106 million over two years.

Ministers also approved the disbursement of the sixth tranche of funds from the European Peace Facility (EPF). The additional €500 million will take the total amount given to Ukraine through the EPF — with which Kyiv procures weapons — to €3.1 billion.


Over 100 Russians – mostly civilians – were exchanged in return for Ukrainian female soldiers, the Russian Defense Ministry has said
A total of 110 Russians have returned home from Ukraine as part of a major prisoner exchange with Kiev, the Russian Defense Ministry said on Monday. The group included 72 civilian sailors who had been held in Ukraine since February 2022, it added.

In exchange, Moscow released 108 female soldiers to Ukraine. Two women slated for the exchange turned down the offer and said they would like to stay in Russia, the ministry said. All of the Russians who returned home would receive all the necessary medical and psychological assistance, it added.

Kiev also confirmed what it called “another large-scale” exchange. Earlier on Monday, the head of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), Denis Pushilin, announced the swap on social media. The exchange would have involved some 30 soldiers from various parts of Russia, including the DPR and the neighboring Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR), along with the civilian sailors, he said at that time.

Kiev detained dozens of Russian civilians who had been in boats that stopped at Ukrainian ports in late February, when Moscow launched its military operation. Some of them were freed after Russian troops captured the port city of Mariupol, but many others remained in Ukrainian custody.

According to the Russian Defense Ministry, Russian Commissioner for Human Rights Tatyana Moskalkova was directly involved in facilitating the exchange. Last week, she said that 65 sailors could be set free soon, and that talks over their release were in the final stage.

Last Thursday, the two sides exchanged 20 Russian soldiers for an equal number of Ukrainian troops, according to officials from both nations. Moscow and Kiev have repeatedly swapped prisoners since the start of the conflict between the two neighbors in late February.

The last major exchange took place in late September, when 55 Russian soldiers, including those from Donbass, were freed. Kiev also released Ukrainian opposition leader Viktor Medvedchuk as part of the swap. The Ukrainian authorities charged Medvedchuk with treason last year and banned his party, Opposition Platform – For Life, after Moscow launched its military operation in Ukraine.

According to Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky, 215 Ukrainian soldiers were returned to their home country in the swap. Those included more than 100 members of the Azov Battalion, within the ranks of which fighters openly embrace neo-Nazi views.

15 Oct 2022 -Plus Videos of how the Deep State translates the truth into propaganda.

The first convoy of Russian forces has arrived in Belarus, the country’s defence ministry said on Saturday, as part of a regional force “exclusively to strengthen the protection and defence of the border” with Ukraine.

It comes days after Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, a close ally of his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, said that Minsk and Moscow will deploy a joint military task force in response to what he called an aggravation of tension on the country’s western borders.

Images on social media showed soldiers welcomed by women wearing traditional costumes and handing out bread and salt.

Lukashenko also accused Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine of training Belarusian radicals “to carry out sabotage, terrorist attacks and to organise a military mutiny in the country”.

Lukashenko relies financially and politically on Russia. Moscow helped the Belarusian president quell pro-democracy protests that erupted following his victory in the disputed presidential election in 2020.

The Belarus leader allowed his country to be used by Moscow’s troops to launch the invasion of Ukraine. But Belarusian armed forces have until now not taken part in the offensive.

Now, the joint force’s deployment raises fears that Belarusian troops could join Russian forces in their offensive in Ukraine.

1666059939038.png

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused Russia of “trying to directly draw Belarus into this war” at a G7 meeting on Tuesday, calling for an international observers’ mission to be placed on the Ukraine-Belarus border.

The latest development comes as the Russian military offensive has witnessed a series of setbacks after losing ground in the northeast and south of Ukraine. In a further blow to Moscow last week, a huge explosion damaged the Kerch bridge linking annexed Crimea to mainland Russia. The damaged bridge – a key supply route for Russian soldiers – will not be repaired until July, a document published on the Russian government’s website said. Kyiv has not claimed responsibility for the attack.

Russia has carried out a barrage of missile and drone attacks across Ukraine after blaming Kyiv for the Kerch bridge blast. A hospital, a kindergarten and other buildings in the town of Nikopol, across the river from the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, were targeted.

On Friday, Putin said he has no plans “for now” to launch massive air raids such as those carried out on Monday. He added the call-up of reservists would be finished in two weeks, promising an end to the divisive mobilisation that has seen hundreds of thousands of men summoned to fight in Ukraine and huge numbers fleeing the country.

Speaking at a security summit in the Kazakh capital, Astana, Putin said he did not regret sending troops into Ukraine nearly eight months ago.

“What is happening today is unpleasant, to put it mildly,” he said. “But we would have had all this a little later, only under worse conditions for us, that’s all. So my actions are correct and timely.”

In response to Monday’s attacks, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said Washington would send munitions and military vehicles to Ukraine as part of a new $725m assistance package.

As Ukrainian “defenders push back Russia’s forces”, the US stands united with Ukraine, Blinken said on Friday in a tweet.

Washington’s newest military package includes more ammunition for HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems) and brings the total US military assistance to Ukraine to $18.3bn from Joe Biden’s administration, the Department of Defence said in a separate statement.

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Chinese Flee Ukraine​

It would appear the Special Military Operation in Ukraine is about to transform into actual war between Russia and NATO:
Some Chinese nationals still in Ukraine have signed up for evacuation from the country, with most registering for organized evacuations, while others are preparing to leave Ukraine on their own, the Global Times learned on Sunday, after the Chinese Foreign Ministry urged Chinese citizens to leave Ukraine, citing the grave security situation.
The move, following the large-scale evacuation in March that safely returned some 6,000 Chinese nationals in Ukraine back to their motherland, represents the Chinese government’s greatest efforts to protect its citizens, as the Russia-Ukraine conflict further escalated, experts noted.
In a notice issued on Saturday, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said that given the grave security situation in Ukraine, it calls upon Chinese nationals still in the country to strengthen security precautions and evacuate the country. The Chinese embassy will assist the organization of evacuation for those in need, the notice said, while urging them to register their personal information to the embassy as soon as possible.
Chinese nationals in Ukraine sign up for evacuation after call from FM, Global Times, 16 October 2022
One has to assume that the Russian leadership is keeping its Chinese allies well-informed. And Russia’s warning shots have been uniformly ignored. The only real question at this point is if the Russian forces will limit their attacks to Ukrainian territory or if they will be targeting the NATO forces with whom they are actually at war outside of Ukraine.

DISCUSS ON SG
 
@Lumiere_du_Code

I sympathize with your situation but I don't think you are making it easier on yourself to delve into everything negative and amplify it a thousand times. Others tried to tell you the same.

Russia has already been using these drones during the Syrian campaign.

As for the Iranian ones, it's also saves Russia from using expensive missiles. It is the cheaper solution for the same problem.

I'm sorry that you think so prejudicially, as if I do nothing but look for all the negative sides and make everything bad worse.
I'm just responding to things that are contradictory and have flip sides, that's all. You're only dragging pretty pictures and wording brushed to shine here, isn't that one-sided, selective thinking? Isn't that objective? Seeing only what you like and want to see. You make the mistake of assuming that I am focused on everything negative. And so you studiously ignore any facts about anything that contradicts your beliefs, carefully sifting through the information.
And thus your pattern of thinking looks something like: if I, a fan of negativity, wrote this, then you can just ignore it all and everything is okay, everything is fine, you can safely continue to live in a world of all the beautiful propaganda.
Sorry. I have no purpose or desire to spoil your world. I'm just letting you know that not everything is as beautiful as you think it is. There is no malice or negativity involved. I really don't understand this strange reaction to it. It's like I came in and destroyed your sandcastle on the beach.
If we are not here for knowledge and understanding, but for propaganda and a careful division of facts into "what we like" and "what we don't want to see and know" - then I really have the wrong room.
I apologize if I unintentionally wrote anything offensive. I am not trying to bring discord to this group. However, it is noticeable from the outside that some things are no different than the methods and goals of propaganda and wallowing in illusions instead of choosing the truth, especially if it displeases you and taste of bitterness.
 
Carving out about 500 years of history in the dark ages was an attempt to hide Ukraine's greatness 😁.
And here is Maria Zaharova again:


"They made a collection of official statements (with proofs) that Nezalezhnaya created everything - from the birth of Christ and Europe to WiFi and submarines. The "ukrainians dug up the Black Sea," by the way, is a fake.

Prince Vladimir, who baptized Kievan Rus in 988, wished it to join the European Union - Ukrainian Foreign Ministry.
Ukraine is the only legitimate heir of Kievan Rus - Vladimir Zelensky.
It was Ukraine that stood at the origins of Europe, and Kievan Rus has nothing to do with Russia - Ukrainian Ambassador to Austria Alexander Shcherba.
Modern Canada, as we are used to seeing it, was created by colonists from Ukraine - Boris Lozhkin, head of the Poroshenko administration.
It would be cooler (for us) to build a spaceport for intergalactic flights rather than a factory for the production of packaging - but we can't build an intergalactic spaceport in the near future because of the crisis - Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko.
Great Ukraine founded the European civilization - Speaker of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Andriy Parubiy.
The whole world owes the emergence of Wi-Fi to the Ukrainian talent - the deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Gleb Zagoria.
Jesus Christ is a Galilean (Galician), an ancient Ukrainian. All the apostles, except for Judas, were Galileans (Galician) ancient Ukrainians, only Judas was a Jew - the deputy head of the Ukrainian Republican Party Rostislav Novozhenets.
The mother of Zeus came from Zhytomyr, the Buddha was a Scythian prophet, there were Ukrainians among the Egyptian pharaohs, and Aeneas was a king in Ukraine - Valery Bebik, a laureate of the Taras Shevchenko National Prize.
Ukraine was one of the first in the world to create a Cossack-powered submarine - with which it attacked Turkish ships - Ukrainian TV as part of the national project "Krajina".
Donald Trump has Ukrainian roots, his ancestors lived in the Ternopil region - TV channel Ukraine, the program "Today".
The Ukrainian language is one of the oldest languages in the world... Already at the beginning of our calendar it was an intertribal language of the world... There is reason to believe that Ovid wrote poetry in ancient Ukrainian language" - the textbook "Ukrainian Language for Beginners" (Kiev, 1992) and research by E. Gnatkevich "From Herodotus to Photius
"At a time when the Roman Republic was just preparing to become the ruler of the world, Ukraine already was. And it was already great" - an extracurricular reading for Ukrainian schoolchildren.

Yours @batyachitaet"
 
Russia has already been using these drones during the Syrian campaign.

As for the Iranian ones, it's also saves Russia from using expensive missiles. It is the cheaper solution for the same problem.

There’s some other factors involved here. It’s possible that due to the Western sanctions, Russia and Iran struck up a trade deal for drones, which would obviously be massive helpful for both Iran and Russia.

The other fact is that Iran has denied that the drones Russia has been using are theirs. And it stands to reason that if the Iranian design is good, then if the Russians made their own version, they would use a similar, if not identical design. No use reinventing the wheel.
 
I apologize if I unintentionally wrote anything offensive. I am not trying to bring discord to this group. However, it is noticeable from the outside that some things are no different than the methods and goals of propaganda and wallowing in illusions instead of choosing the truth, especially if it displeases you and taste of bitterness.

It's important to mention that people are reacting to your tone and not the content. This forum is dedicated to research and additional information (if valid) is definitely welcomed.

What has been happening is that your posts carry an additional emotional flavor that is rather unnecessary and bothersome. You are not the only one who has the same flavor. Some Russian speaking people on Telegram have the same. It's also understandable, specifically due to your undoubtedly difficult personal situation. :hug2: And that's why you can see how people again and again politely point it out to you.

But this flavor interferes and spoils your entire message, unfortunately. I can guarantee you that many people don't read your posts or even avoid the thread all together, because they don't want to deal with that. It is very draining. And it's not because people don't want to get objective information. Far from it. It is because the way you deliver the information is so emotionally charged, or even somewhat hysterical. As if you try to hammer it on the rest of us.

I'll give you an example. When I started reading the post you wrote here, I thought that it was a very important testimony. It's an important example of how the society can be brainwashed and changed. But then the tone of the narrative changed from simply recounting the facts to more emotionally loaded and accusatory. This part in particular.

But none of that matters at all, does it? It's so boring, and I "can't see the forest for the trees," of course. I don't need to think that I think in such a limited way. I discuss a lot of things with friends every day, global things, I can analyze and try to see more, "read between the lines." And I'm not a troll or a toxic critic who's only doing nothing but being unhappy and resentful of everything for no reason. I'm not. It's just that not everyone likes to see something that has little appeal when you can ignore it or explain it away so as not to spoil your impression and your views.

The way you made a subtle dig toward what Laura said, by ridiculing her mentioning that you are "missing the forest for the trees". Please realize that such behaviour is unacceptable. And it has nothing to do with the information you think we don't want to see, but everything with the way you communicate. Please make an effort to see the difference.

For some weird reason you think that you are the only person who is in the best position to share information about Ukraine. And for some weird reason you also think that presenting your information with such emotional and dramatic overtones may make us more receptive to it. And if we don't react well or at all to what you write, it means that we simply don't want to know. It doesn't occur to you that the reason may be different.

It also reeks of victim mentality. Please understand that I am very familiar with a victim mentality, because I lived in Israel for 20 years.

Obviously things are not the same, because I wasn't in a clear and direct physical danger if I would dare to express my opinion. But I also felt constantly psychologically oppressed for not being able to share with others my real views regarding Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Sharing such views also carried a possibility of losing one's job or simply being harassed. Perhaps now less than before, don't know.

In any case, back then in many situations the way I was communicating or behaving also had an additional "victimhood" overtone. Some people remarked about that, but I wasn't able to fully see it or understand what was going on until I left the country.

You see, since we are social creatures, if we are part of any specific society, we "soak up" various characteristics of this society. Even if we disagree with it. We "fall in confluence" in a way, and sometimes it's unavoidable. It's like swimming in a poisoned pool. Unless you are fully isolated, you can't help but drink the same water. The whole region, both Ukraine and Russia to a degree, right in the middle of very challenging energies. And it would do good to remember that and not to become one of the ants, doesn't matter what "side" you are on.

My reply is an attempt to get you see how you come across. Regardless of the information you share. Hopefully you will take this as an opportunity to learn more about yourself and become more self-aware. Perhaps it may even make things a bit easier for you and allow you to preserve some energy. The forum could also become a great source of hope and support for you, if you would stop identifying with the victim mentality. No matter how hard your life is at the moment. It could also act as an inspiration for others.

And if you have any feedback or comments, please don't reply here, but open a separate thread in the relevant section of the forum.
 
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Review of Ukrainian politician Sergei Pashinsky on Turkish UAVs supplied to Zelensky's regime.
“Bayraktar has more PR and corruption than combat use. He has no combat effectiveness. All of them shot down the Russians almost immediately. They are very vulnerable.”

 
There's a video in Swedish media of the damage to Nord Stream 1, shared by BBC, Guardian etc.


At least 50 metres (164ft) of an underwater pipeline bringing Russian gas to Germany is thought to have been destroyed by a blast last month.
Video shot by a Norwegian robotics company, published by Swedish newspaper Expressen, appears to show the massive tear in the Nord Stream 1 pipe.
Danish police believe "powerful explosions" blew four holes in the pipe and its newer twin, Nord Stream 2.
It is still unknown who or what caused the blasts amid suspicions of sabotage.

Powerful, mysterious explosions. Such a mysterious mystery. We'll probably never know what happened, time to move on.
 
Carving out about 500 years of history in the dark ages was an attempt to hide Ukraine's greatness 😁.
And here is Maria Zaharova again:


"They made a collection of official statements (with proofs) that Nezalezhnaya created everything - from the birth of Christ and Europe to WiFi and submarines. The "ukrainians dug up the Black Sea," by the way, is a fake.

Prince Vladimir, who baptized Kievan Rus in 988, wished it to join the European Union - Ukrainian Foreign Ministry.
Ukraine is the only legitimate heir of Kievan Rus - Vladimir Zelensky.
It was Ukraine that stood at the origins of Europe, and Kievan Rus has nothing to do with Russia - Ukrainian Ambassador to Austria Alexander Shcherba.
Modern Canada, as we are used to seeing it, was created by colonists from Ukraine - Boris Lozhkin, head of the Poroshenko administration.
It would be cooler (for us) to build a spaceport for intergalactic flights rather than a factory for the production of packaging - but we can't build an intergalactic spaceport in the near future because of the crisis - Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko.
Great Ukraine founded the European civilization - Speaker of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Andriy Parubiy.
The whole world owes the emergence of Wi-Fi to the Ukrainian talent - the deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Gleb Zagoria.
Jesus Christ is a Galilean (Galician), an ancient Ukrainian. All the apostles, except for Judas, were Galileans (Galician) ancient Ukrainians, only Judas was a Jew - the deputy head of the Ukrainian Republican Party Rostislav Novozhenets.
The mother of Zeus came from Zhytomyr, the Buddha was a Scythian prophet, there were Ukrainians among the Egyptian pharaohs, and Aeneas was a king in Ukraine - Valery Bebik, a laureate of the Taras Shevchenko National Prize.
Ukraine was one of the first in the world to create a Cossack-powered submarine - with which it attacked Turkish ships - Ukrainian TV as part of the national project "Krajina".
Donald Trump has Ukrainian roots, his ancestors lived in the Ternopil region - TV channel Ukraine, the program "Today".
The Ukrainian language is one of the oldest languages in the world... Already at the beginning of our calendar it was an intertribal language of the world... There is reason to believe that Ovid wrote poetry in ancient Ukrainian language" - the textbook "Ukrainian Language for Beginners" (Kiev, 1992) and research by E. Gnatkevich "From Herodotus to Photius
"At a time when the Roman Republic was just preparing to become the ruler of the world, Ukraine already was. And it was already great" - an extracurricular reading for Ukrainian schoolchildren.

Yours @batyachitaet"
Ukrainians are Jews!? :scared:

:-D
 
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