Corto Maltese said:
What helped me overcome this shock (probably the same one as Erna's ) was reading carefully The Fellowship Declaration and also knowing how this idea came to materialization.
Unfortunately being in 3D means being proficient in legal definitions, this doesn't mean BEING OF this world, but as I said BEING IN it. OSIT
What is interesting to me is how totally and completely our minds have been taken over by pathology. At the same time, something inside us rebels against that pathology, and we become mavericks with no "home", no community, no network, all outsiders wandering around like pinballs, bouncing off the pathology in our environment; no structure, no foundation, because, of course, the ONLY structures and foundations and homes and communities we know are pathological and we reject them instinctively.
In his study of the Jews, Kevin MacDonald probably didn't realize that he was studying a system that was created by schizoidal psychopaths, taken over by characteropathic spell-binders, and further modified as time went on by essential psychopaths. In any event, he tries to describe what he is seeing in ethnic terms which, while they go some way toward describing the phenomenon of how pathology takes over, do not quite get at the heart of the problem. It is useful to review a few of his remarks from his book "Culture of Critique" here - it is well worth reading carefully:
Kevin MacDonald said:
I have several times been called an "anti-Semite" for the tone of some of my writings, both in CofC and my comments on various Internet discussion lists.
To be perfectly frank, I did not have a general animus for organized Jewry when I got into this project. I was a sort of ex-radical turned moderate Republican fan of George Will. Before even looking at Judaism I applied the same evolutionary perspective to the ancient Spartans and then to the imposition of monogamy by the Catholic Church during the middle ages (see MacDonald 1988a, 1995b).
There are quite a few statements in my books that attempt to soften the tone and deflect charges of anti-Jewish bias. The first page of my first book on Judaism, A People that Shall Dwell Alone (MacDonald 1994), clearly states that the traits I ascribe to Judaism (self-interest, ethnocentrism, and competition for resources and reproductive success) are by no means restricted to Jews.
I also write about the extraordinary Jewish IQ and about Jewish accomplishments (e.g., Nobel prizes) in that book.
In the second book, Separation and Its Discontents (MacDonald 1998a), I discuss the tendency for anti-Semites to exaggerate their complaints, to develop fantastic and unverifiable theories of Jewish behavior, to exaggerate the extent of Jewish cohesion and unanimity, to claim that all Jews share stereotypically Jewish traits or attitudes, especially in cases where in fact Jews are over-represented among people having certain attitudes (e.g., political radicalism during most of the 20th century).
And I describe the tendency of some anti-Semites to develop grand conspiracy theories in which all historical events of major or imagined importance, from the French Revolution to the Tri-lateral Commission are linked together in one grand plot and blamed on the Jews.
All of this is hardly surprising on the basis of what we know about the psychology of ethnic conflict. But that doesn't detract in the least from supposing that real conflicts of interest are at the heart of all of the important historical examples of anti-Semitism. ...
I think there is a noticeable shift in my tone from the first book to the third simply because (I'd like to think) I knew a lot more and had read a lot more.
People often say after reading the first book that they think I really admire Jews, but they are unlikely to say that about the last two and especially about CofC. That is because by the time I wrote CofC I had changed greatly from the person who wrote the first book.
The first book is really only a documentation of theoretically interesting aspects of group evolutionary strategies using Judaism as a case study (how Jews solved the free-rider problem, how they managed to erect and enforce barriers between themselves and other peoples, the genetic cohesion of Judaism, how some groups of Jews came to have such high IQ's, how Judaism developed in antiquity).
Resource competition and other conflicts of interest with other groups are more or less an afterthought, but these issues move to the foreground in Separation and Its Discontents, and in CofC I look exclusively at the 20th century in the West.
Jews have indeed made positive contributions to Western culture in the last 200 years. But whatever one might think are the unique and irreplaceable Jewish contributions to the post-Enlightenment world, it is naïve to suppose they were intended for the purpose of benefiting humanity solely or even primarily.
In any case I am hard pressed to think of any area of modern Western government and social organization (certainly) and business, science, and technology (very probably) that would not have developed without Jewish input, although in some cases perhaps not quite as quickly.
In general, positive impacts of Jews have been quantitative rather than qualitative. They have accelerated some developments, for example in finance and some areas of science, rather than made them possible.
On the other hand, I am persuaded that Jews have also had some important negative influences.
I am morally certain that Jewish involvement in the radical left in the early to middle part of the last century was a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for many of the horrific events in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. (About this, of course, one can disagree. I am simply saying that I find the evidence compelling.)
But the main point is that I came to see Jewish groups as competitors with the European majority of the U.S., as powerful facilitators of the enormous changes that have been unleashed in this country [...]
I found that I was being transformed in this process from a semi-conservative academic who had little or no identification with his own people into an ethnically conscious person-exactly as predicted by the theory of social identity processes that forms the basis of my theory of anti-Semitism (see MacDonald 1998a).
In fact, if one wants to date when I dared cross the line into what some see as proof that I am an "anti-Semite," the best guess would probably be when I started reading on the involvement of all the powerful Jewish organizations in advocating massive non-European immigration. [...]
There need to be legitimate ways of talking about people who oppose policies recommended by the various Jewish establishments without simply being tarred as "anti-Semites".
Immigration is only one example where there are legitimate conflicts of interest.
As I write this (November, 2001), we are bogged down in a war with no realizable endgame largely because of influence of the Jewish community over one area of our foreign policy and because of how effectively any mention of the role of Israel in creating friction between the U.S. and the Arab world-indeed the entire Muslim world-is muzzled simply by the cry of anti-Semitism.
And at home we have entered into an incalculably dangerous experiment in creating a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural society in which the intellectual elite has developed the idea that the formerly dominant European majority has a moral obligation to allow itself to be eclipsed demographically and culturally [...]
I agree that there is bias in the social sciences and I certainly don't exempt myself from this tendency. [...] my attitudes about Jewish issues marked a cumulative, gradual change from a very different world view.
It is annoying that such disclaimers rarely appear in writing by strongly identified Jews even when they see their work as advancing Jewish interests.
A major theme of the CofC is that Jewish social scientists with a strong Jewish identity have seen their work as advancing Jewish interests.
It is always amazing to me that media figures like the Kristols and Podhoretzes and foreign policy experts like Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle do not feel an obligation to precede their remarks on issues affected by their solicitude for Israel by saying, "you should be wary of what I say because I have a vested ethnic interest in advancing the interests of Israel."
But the same thing goes for vast areas of anthropology (the Boasian school and racial differences research), history (e.g., obviously apologetic accounts of the history and causes of anti-Semitism or the role of Jews in the establishment of Bolshevism), psychology (the Frankfurt School, psychoanalysis), and contemporary issues (immigration, church-state relations).
The point of CofC that really galls people is the idea that we should simply acknowledge this bias in (some) Jewish researchers as we do in others.
There are a great many books on how Darwin and Galton were influenced by the general atmosphere of Victorian England, but writing of a Jewish bias immediately results in charges of "anti-Semitism."
But the deeper point is that, whatever my motivations and biases, I would like to suppose that my work on Judaism at least meets the criteria of good social science, even if I have come to the point of seeing my subjects in a less than flattering light. In the end, does it really matter if my motivation at this point is less than pristine? Isn't the only question whether I am right? [...]
It is instructive to look at the way Europeans in the U.S. saw themselves a century ago.
Americans of European descent thought of themselves as part of a cultural and ethnic heritage extending backward in time to the founding of the country. The Anglo-Saxon heritage of the British Isles was at the center of this self-conception, but Americans of German and Scandinavian descent also viewed themselves as part of this ethnic and cultural heritage.
They had a great deal of pride in their accomplishments. They had conquered a vast territory and had achieved a high degree of economic progress. They saw themselves as having created a civilization with a strong moral fabric-a country of farmers and small businessmen who had developed into a world economic power. [...] They saw themselves as exhibiting positive personality traits such as courage in the face of adversity, self-reliance, inventiveness, originality, and fair play-the very virtues that allowed them to conquer the wilderness and turn it into an advanced civilization. [...]
What MacDonald doesn't bring in here is the fact that even Western European culture was already infected with the schizoidal memes of Judaism via Christianity and saw themselves as the new "Children of Israel" moving to the promised land (see Burton Mack's "The Myth of Innocence").
When these people looked back on their own childhood, they saw "a simple, secure world of commonly accepted values and behavior" (Bendersky 2000, 6)-a world of cultural and ethnic homogeneity. They had a strong sense of family pride and regional identification: They had deep roots in the areas in which they grew up. They did not think of the U.S. as a Marxist hell of war between the social classes. Instead they thought of it as a world of harmony between the social classes in which people at the top of society earned their positions but felt a certain sense of social obligation to the lower social classes.
The early part of the 20th century was also the high water mark of Darwinism in the social sciences. It was common at that time to think that there were important differences between the races-that races differed in intelligence and in moral qualities. Not only did races differ, but they were in competition with each other for supremacy. As described in Separation and Its Discontents (MacDonald 1998a), such ideas were part of the furniture of intellectual life-commonplace among Jews as well as non-Jews.
That world has vanished. The rise of Jewish power and the disestablishment of the specifically European nature of the U.S. are the real topics of CofC. The war to disestablish the specifically European nature of the U.S. was fought on several fronts. The main thrusts of Jewish activism against European ethnic and cultural hegemony have focused on three critical power centers in the United States: The academic world of information in the social sciences and humanities, the political world where public policy on immigration and other ethnic issues is decided, and the mass media where "ways of seeing" are presented to the public. [...]
At the intellectual level, Jewish intellectuals led the battle against the idea that races even exist and against the idea that there are differences in intelligence or cultural level between the races that are rooted in biology. They also spearheaded defining America as a set of abstract principles rather than an ethnocultural civilization. At the level of politics, Jewish organizations spearheaded the drive to open up immigration to all of the peoples of the world. Jewish organizations also played a key role in furthering the interests of other racial and ethnic minorities, and they led the legal and legislative effort to remove Christianity from public places.
All of that sounds pretty good, yes? On the surface... But wait, it gets better.
The first bastion of the old American culture to fall was elite academic institutions and especially the Ivy League universities. The transformation of the faculty in the social sciences and humanities was well underway in the 1950s, and by the early 1960s it was largely complete. The new elite was very different from the old elite it displaced. The difference was that the old Protestant elite was not at war with the country it dominated. The old Protestant elite was wealthier and better educated than the public at large, but they approached life on basically the same terms. They saw themselves as Christians and as Europeans, and they didn't see the need for radically changing the society.
Here, MacDonald's republican views come to the fore. He just does not realize what he is seeing. But, read on, he IS SEEing something!
Things are very different now. Since the 1960s a hostile, adversary elite has emerged to dominate intellectual and political debate. It is an elite that almost instinctively loathes the traditional institutions of European-American culture: its religion, its customs, its manners, and its sexual attitudes. In the words of one commentator, "today's elite loathes the nation it rules" (Gerlernter 1997). [...]
This "hostile elite" is fundamentally a Jewish-dominated elite whose origins and main lines of influence are described in CofC. The emergence of this hostile elite is an aspect of ethnic competition between Jews and non-Jews and its effect will be a long-term decline in the hegemony of European peoples in the U.S. and elsewhere in the world. [...]
The fact that the Jewish intellectuals and political operatives described in CofC did not lose their national/ethnic loyalties shows that there was no general trend to de-ethnicization. The broad trends toward de-ethnicization somehow occurred among the Europeans but spared the Jews who by all accounts continue to strongly support their ethnic homeland, Israel, and continue to have a strong sense of peoplehood - propped up now by high-profile programs encouraging Jews to marry other Jews. [...]
How to account for the acceptance of Jews and Judaism by the WASP establishment after W.W.II? Cuddihy's (1978) book, No Offense: Civil Religion and Protestant Taste, focuses on the elevation of Judaism to the status of one of the "big three" U.S. religions, to the point that a rabbi officiates at the presidential inauguration even though Jews constitute approximately 2-3% of the population.
Cuddihy argues that this religious surface served as a protective coloring and led to a sort of crypto-Judaism in which Jewish ethnic identities were submerged in order to make them appear civilized to the goyim. As part of this contract, Niebuhr acknowledged "the stubborn will of the Jews to live as a peculiar people" - an acknowledgement by an important Protestant leader that the Jews could remain a people with a surface veneer of religion. [...]
The Jews' posturing as a religion left them open to large-scale defection via intermarriage to the extent that they took seriously the idea that Judaism was akin to Protestantism, and to some extent this did occur. But recently, Jews have been mending the fences. There is an upsurge in more traditional forms of Judaism and an open rejection of intermarriage even among the most liberal wings of Judaism. Recent guidelines for Reform Judaism emphasize traditional practices of conversion, such as circumcision, that are likely to minimize converts, and proselytism is explicitly rejected. [...]
Judaism became unconditionally accepted as a modern religion even while retaining a commitment to its ethnic core. It conformed outwardly to the religious norms of the U.S., but it also continued to energetically pursue its ethnic interests, especially with regard to issues where there is a substantial consensus among Jews: support for Israel and the welfare of other foreign Jewries, immigration and refugee policy, church-state separation, abortion rights, and civil liberties (Goldberg 1996, 5). What is remarkable is that a wealthy, powerful, and highly talented ethnic group was able to pursue its interests without those interests ever being the subject of open political discussion by mainstream political figures, for at least the last 60 years. [...]
The implicit downgrading of the ethnic character of Judaism provided an invaluable tool in furthering Jewish ethnic aims in the U.S. The downgrading of the ethnic aspect of Judaism essentially allowed Jews to win the ethnic war without anyone even being able to acknowledge that it was an ethnic war.
For example, during the immigration debates of the 1940s-1960s Jews were described by themselves and others as "people of the Jewish faith."
They were simply another religion in an officially pluralistic religious society, and part of Jewish posturing was a claim to a unique universalistic moral-religious vision that could only be achieved by enacting legislation that in fact furthered their particularist ethnic aims.
The universalistic moral-religious vision promoted by Jewish activists really amounted to taking the Protestants at their own word-by insisting that every last shred of ethnic identity among Protestants be given up while Jews were implicitly allowed to keep theirs if they only promised to behave civilly. [...]
What cultural or ethnic characteristics of Europeans made them susceptible to the intellectual and political movements described in CofC?
Now, here is where MacDonald really doesn't have a clue as to what happened to Europeans - that they were invaded by pathology and that pathology served to turn them against each other. Keep in mind that, in Europe, there was a social system that existed without wars or identifiable social conflicts for over 20,000 years... and that Europe resisted the "agricultural revolution" incepted by pathology as a way of dominating large groups of people, for longer than any other group.
Anyway, here is MacDonald's answer to that question.
[...] individualism, relative lack of ethnocentrism, and concomitant moral universalism - all features that are entirely foreign to Judaism. [...] Europeans are relatively less ethnocentric than other peoples and relatively more prone to individualism as opposed to the ethnocentric collectivist social structures historically far more characteristic of other human groups, including Jewish groups. [...]
European groups are highly vulnerable to invasion by strongly collectivist, ethnocentric groups because individualists have less powerful defenses against such groups. The competitive advantage of cohesive, cooperating groups is obvious. [...]
European peoples are more prone to individualism.
Individualist cultures show little emotional attachment to ingroups. Personal goals are paramount, and socialization emphasizes the importance of self-reliance, independence, individual responsibility, and "finding yourself" (Triandis 1991, 82).
Individualists have more positive attitudes toward strangers and outgroup members and are more likely to behave in a pro-social, altruistic manner to strangers.
People in individualist cultures are less aware of ingroup/outgroup boundaries and thus do not have highly negative attitudes toward outgroup members. They often disagree with ingroup policy, show little emotional commitment or loyalty to ingroups, and do not have a sense of common fate with other ingroup members.
Opposition to outgroups occurs in individualist societies, but the opposition is more "rational" in the sense that there is less of a tendency to suppose that all of the outgroup members are culpable.
Individualists form mild attachments to many groups, while collectivists have an intense attachment and identification to a few ingroups (Triandis 1990, 61).
Individualists are therefore relatively ill-prepared for between-group competition so characteristic of the history of Judaism. [...]
MacDonald doesn't realize that he is describing the difference between pathological groups that have been ponerized and groups that have a different form of cohesion. It seems that there was a natural resistance to dominance by pathology in the European peoples and this was used against them, to promote "individualism" and to turn them against their own cultural groups. And, of course, having pathology introduced into the lines by the spread of psychopathy helped ...
But, as I mentioned, MacDonald also failed to discuss the fact that, in the context he is discussing, the Judao-Christian memes were already dominant. Had he gone much further back, he might have seen the pattern, that it was long and slow and biological.
European groups are part of what Burton et al. (1996) term the North Eurasian and Circumpolar culture area. This culture area derives from hunter-gatherers adapted to cold, ecologically adverse climates. In such climates there is pressure for male provisioning of the family and a tendency toward monogamy because the ecology did not support either polygyny or large groups for an evolutionarily significant period.
These cultures are characterized by bilateral kinship relationships which recognize both the male and female lines, suggesting a more equal contribution for each sex as would be expected under conditions of monogamy.
There is also less emphasis on extended kinship relationships and marriage tends to be exogamous (i.e., outside the kinship group). [...] all of these characteristics are opposite those found among Jews.
[T]he unique Western European "simple household" type is based on a single married couple and their children. It contrasts with the joint family structure typical of the rest of Eurasia in which the household consists of two or more related couples, typically brothers and their wives and other members of the extended family (Hajnal 1983). (An example of the joint household would be the families of the patriarchs described in the Old Testament; see MacDonald 1994, Ch. 3)
Again note that MacDonald is speaking of a context wherein the Judao-Christian memes had already infiltrated and been adapted to the European system which was still in transition. Effectively, the European cohesion, tribal system, etc, was broken up and destroyed by pathology entering the picture genetically.
Uniquely in Eurasia, age of first marriage for women was quite high, fluctuating around a mean of about 25 years of age. Age of marriage was flexible, rising in times of scarcity and declining in times of abundance, with the result that there was capital accumulation rather than a constant pressure of population on resources. During economically difficult times, women married late or not at all, whereas in the polygynous societies of the rest of Eurasia, women married early, often as concubines or secondary wives of wealthy men (MacDonald 1995b,c).
Before the industrial revolution, the simple household system was characterized by methods of keeping unmarried young people occupied as servants. It was not just the children of the poor and landless who became servants, but even large, successful farmers sent their children to be servants elsewhere. In the 17th and 18th centuries individuals often took in servants early in their marriage, before their own children could help out, and then passed their children to others when the children were older and there was more than enough help (Stone 1977).
This suggests a deeply ingrained cultural practice which resulted in a high level of non-kinship based reciprocity. The practice also bespeaks a relative lack of ethnocentrism because people are taking in non-relatives as household members whereas in the rest of Eurasia people tend to surround themselves with biological relatives. Simply put, genetic relatedness was less important in Europe and especially in the Nordic areas of Europe. The unique feature of the simple household system was the high percentage of non-relatives. [...]
This simple household system is a fundamental feature of individualist culture. The individualist family was able to pursue its interests freed from the obligations and constraints of extended kinship relationships and free of the suffocating collectivism of the social structures typical of so much of the rest of the world. Monogamous marriage based on individual consent and conjugal affection quickly replaced marriage based on kinship and family strategizing. (See Chs. 4 and 8 for a discussion of the greater proneness of Western Europeans to monogamy and to marriage based on companionship and affection rather than polygyny and collectivist mechanisms of social control and family strategizing.) [...]
The establishment of the simple household freed from enmeshment in the wider kinship community was then followed in short order by all the other markers of Western modernization: limited governments in which individuals have rights against the state, capitalist economic enterprise based on individual economic rights, moral universalism, and science as individualist truth seeking. Individualist societies develop republican political institutions and institutions of scientific inquiry that assume that groups are maximally permeable and highly subject to defection when individual needs are not met.
Recent research by evolutionary economists provides fascinating insight on the differences between individualistic cultures versus collectivist cultures. An important aspect of this research is to model the evolution of cooperation among individualistic peoples. Fehr and Gächter (2002) found that people will altruistically punish defectors in a "one-shot" game - a game in which participants only interact once and are thus not influenced by the reputations of the people with whom they are interacting. This situation therefore models an individualistic culture because participants are strangers with no kinship ties. The surprising finding was that subjects who made high levels of public goods donations tended to punish people who did not even though they did not receive any benefit from doing so. Moreover, the punished individuals changed their ways and donated more in future games even though they knew that the participants in later rounds were not the same as in previous rounds. Fehr and Gächter suggest that people from individualistic cultures have an evolved negative emotional reaction to free riding that results in their punishing such people even at a cost to themselves-hence the term "altruistic punishment."
Essentially Fehr and Gächter provide a model of the evolution of cooperation among individualistic peoples. Their results are most applicable to individualistic groups because such groups are not based on extended kinship relationships and are therefore much more prone to defection. In general, high levels of altruistic punishment are more likely to be found among individualistic, hunter-gather societies than in kinship based societies based on the extended family. Their results are least applicable to groups such as Jewish groups [...]
Europeans are thus [...] groups with high levels of cooperation with strangers rather than with extended family members, and they are prone to market relations and individualism.
On the other hand, Jewish culture derives from the Middle Old World culture area characterized by extended kinship networks and the extended family. [...]
This suggests the fascinating possibility that the key for a group intending to turn Europeans against themselves is to trigger their strong tendency toward altruistic punishment by convincing them of the evil of their own people.
He got that part right! He just doesn't understand that it is deeper than ethnicity vs ethnicity.
Because Europeans are individualists at heart, they readily rise up in moral anger against their own people once they are seen as free riders and therefore morally blameworthy-a manifestation of their much stronger tendency toward altruistic punishment deriving from their evolutionary past as hunter gatherers.
In making judgments of altruistic punishment, relative genetic distance is irrelevant. Free-riders are seen as strangers in a market situation; i.e., they have no familial or tribal connection with the altruistic punisher. [...]
Once Europeans were convinced that their own people were morally bankrupt, any and all means of punishment should be used against their own people. Rather than see other Europeans as part of an encompassing ethnic and tribal community, fellow Europeans were seen as morally blameworthy and the appropriate target of altruistic punishment. For Westerners, morality is individualistic-violations of communal norms by free-riders are punished by altruistic aggression.
Historically Judaism has been far more ethnocentric and collectivist than typical Western societies. [...]
On the other hand, group strategies deriving from collectivist cultures, such as the Jews, are immune to such a maneuver because kinship and group ties come first. Morality is particularistic-whatever is good for the group. [...]
And right here is where we need to take a lesson and understand that it is not about ethnicity, it is about humanity vs pathological beings who seek to destroy normal humanity. Here is where we need to really grok it that we need to feel some responsibility towards other, normal humans who have simply been damaged by pathology and are unaware because they were born into a system that had already been in the process of ponerization for hundreds if not thousands of years.
Individualist societies are therefore an ideal environment for Judaism as a highly collectivist, group-oriented strategy.
Human society where the members are empathic and emotion driven is a perfect environment for psychopathy to flourish and increase... so as to ultimately destroy it.
[T]he Frankfurt School of Social Research advocated radical individualism among non-Jews while at the same time retaining their own powerful group allegiance to Judaism.
Jews benefit from open, individualistic societies in which barriers to upward mobility are removed, in which people are viewed as individuals rather than as members of groups, in which intellectual discourse is not prescribed by institutions [...] and in which mechanisms of altruistic punishment may be exploited to divide the European majority.
This is also why, apart from periods in which Jews served as middlemen between alien elites and native populations, Middle Eastern societies were much more efficient than Western individualistic societies at keeping Jews in a powerless position where they did not pose a competitive threat (see MacDonald 1998a, Ch. 2). [...]
Jews originate in the Middle Old World cultural area and retain several of the key cultural features of their ancestral population.
The Middle Old World culture group is characterized by extended kinship groups based on relatedness through the male line (patrilineal) rather than the bilateral relationships characteristic of Europeans.
These male-dominated groups functioned as military units to protect herds, and between-group conflict is a much more important component of their evolutionary history. There is a great deal of pressure to form larger groups in order to increase military strength, and this is done partly by acquiring extra women through bridewealth. [...]
As a result, polygyny rather than the monogamy characteristic of European culture is the norm. Another contrast is that traditional Jewish groups were basically extended families with high levels of endogamy (i.e., marriage within the kinship group) and consanguineous marriage (i.e., marriage to blood relatives), including the uncle-niece marriage sanctioned in the Old Testament. This is exactly the opposite of Western European tendencies toward exogamy. [...]
Jews are at the extreme of this Middle Eastern tendency toward hyper-collectivism and hyper-ethnocentrism-a phenomenon that goes a long way toward explaining the chronic hostilities in the area. [...]
If he only knew that he was describing the means to create a society of pathologicals and intensify the strains...
It was noted above that individualist European cultures tend to be more open to strangers than collectivist cultures such as Judaism. In this regard, it is interesting that developmental psychologists have found unusually intense fear reactions among Israeli infants in response to strangers, while the opposite pattern is found for infants from North Germany. The Israeli infants were much more likely to become "inconsolably upset" in reaction to strangers, whereas the North German infants had relatively minor reactions to strangers. The Israeli babies therefore tended to have an unusual degree of stranger anxiety, while the North German babies were the opposite-findings that fit with the hypothesis that Europeans and Jews are on opposite ends of scales of xenophobia and ethnocentrism. [...]
Here he fails to mention the important factor of circumcision on the 8th day as possibly being a factor in this infant study.
[In] Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel (Shahak & Mezvinsky 1999), Shahak and Mezvinsky argue that present-day fundamentalists attempt to recreate the life of Jewish communities before the Enlightenment (i.e., prior to about 1750). During this period the great majority of Jews believed in Cabbala-Jewish mysticism. Influential Jewish scholars like Gershom Scholem ignored the obvious racialist, exclusivist material in the Cabbala by using words like "men", "human beings", and "cosmic" to suggest the Cabbala has a universalist message.
The actual text says salvation is only for Jews, while non-Jews have "Satanic souls" (p. 58).
How typical it is for the pathological to accuse the non-pathological of that which they, themselves, are guilty.
The ethnocentrism apparent in such statements was not only the norm in traditional Jewish society. It remains a powerful current of contemporary Jewish fundamentalism, with important implications for Israeli politics. For example, the Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, describing the difference between Jews and non-Jews:
We do not have a case of profound change in which a person is merely on a superior level. Rather we have a case of ...a totally different species.... The body of a Jewish person is of a totally different quality from the body of [members] of all nations of the world [...]
The difference of the inner quality [of the body] [...] is so great that the bodies would be considered as completely different species.
This is the reason why the Talmud states that there is an halachic difference in attitude about the bodies of non-Jews [as opposed to the bodies of Jews] 'their bodies are in vain'.[...]
An even greater difference exists in regard to the soul. Two contrary types of soul exist, a non-Jewish soul comes from three satanic spheres, while the Jewish soul stems from holiness. (In Shahak & Mezvinsky 1999, 59-60)
Talk about your MAJOR pathological projection! But it is true that psychopaths really DO know - and there is truth to that knowledge - that they are a "different species."
This claim of Jewish uniqueness echoes Holocaust activist Elie Wiesel's (1985, 153) claim that "everything about us is different." Jews are "ontologically" exceptional.
The Gush Emunim and other Jewish fundamentalist sects described by Shahak and Mezvinsky are thus part of a long mainstream Jewish tradition that considers Jews and non-Jews as completely different species, with Jews absolutely superior to non-Jews and subject to a radically different moral code. Moral universalism is thus antithetical to the Jewish tradition. [...]
Within Israel, these Jewish fundamentalist groups are not tiny fringe groups, mere relics of traditional Jewish culture. They are widely respected by the Israeli public and by many Jews in the Diaspora. They have a great deal of influence on the government, especially the Likud governments and the recent government of national unity headed by Ariel Sharon. The members of Gush Emunim constitute a significant percentage of the elite units of the Israeli army, and, as expected on the hypothesis that they are extremely ethnocentric, they are much more willing to treat the Palestinians in a savage and brutal manner than are other Israeli soldiers. [...]
The point here is not so much about the fundamentalists in contemporary Israel but that traditional Jewish communities were intensely ethnocentric and collectivist - a major theme of all three of my books on Judaism. A thread throughout CofC is that Jewish intellectuals and political activists strongly identified as Jews and saw their work as furthering specific Jewish agendas. Their advocacy of intellectual and political causes, although often expressed in the language of moral universalism, was actually moral particularism in disguise.
There is much more, but I think this post is already pretty long. I just hope that all of you will read it carefully and understand that what we are seeing here is how a very tiny group of pathologicals infiltrated a small tribe in the Middle East and took it over to use it as a weapon against humanity. And that is not to say that there weren't other pathological types already present there. It's not exactly simple and cut and dried. It's not just the Jews, though they have been particularly susceptible to the action of ponerization and it's been working on and in North Africa and the Middle East a lot longer than in Europe. (See: "Saharasia" for more details on that.
So, we see how they survived against all odds. Well, now they (pathologicals in general, not just Jewish pathologicals) are in power and even if they are still a relative minority, normal people have been put in the position where they have to figure out how to survive and they must take pathology into account to do so. That means, as the Cs once said, we have to study how they did it and back engineer it to find our own way out of the trap.
Read more of Kevin MacDonald's excellent work (even if he isn't really aware of Ponerology):
http://www.kevinmacdonald.net/books.htm
And the longer piece from which the above was extracted:
http://www.csulb.edu/~kmacd/books-Preface.html