I think that there may be a difference in "what seems like anger" and a "mechanical manifestation of anger" in the example of Fritz Peters provided above. Let's assume that Gurdjieff was just doing something that he knew would produce a certain result in his student Orage (or in any other person, for that matter, if that was the need of the moment), he was pushing Orage's "buttons." Expression of anger may be assumed from a certain tone of voice, certain mimics, gestures, verbal expressions. It could have as well been a sort of "theatrical" act on Gurdjieff's part.
So, to extrapolate this example, one could act in any way needed for a particular situation - except, perhaps, in the Cassiopaean code of ethics, when that interferes with another's free will, which is an interesting angle to approach Gurdjieff's actions from - and not "be angry."
I could as well assume that Gurdjieff would feel an intense Love for his pupil while his outward actions spoke for the opposite. It's hard if not impossible to judge in this case, and another matter is that "one should call no man master" and Gurdjieff may have well been yet another human being that makes mistakes.
So, to extrapolate this example, one could act in any way needed for a particular situation - except, perhaps, in the Cassiopaean code of ethics, when that interferes with another's free will, which is an interesting angle to approach Gurdjieff's actions from - and not "be angry."
I could as well assume that Gurdjieff would feel an intense Love for his pupil while his outward actions spoke for the opposite. It's hard if not impossible to judge in this case, and another matter is that "one should call no man master" and Gurdjieff may have well been yet another human being that makes mistakes.